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DR. SHEDD’S WORKS 


Dogmatic Theology. 
Two vols, Svo. Third Edition, . = 


Supplement to Dogmatic Theology. 
One vol., Sve, é. . . . . 


A History of Christian Doctrine. 


Two vols., crown 8vo, Eleventh Edition, 


Homiletics and Pastoral Theology. 


Crown 8vo. Tenth Edition, ‘ e ° 


Literary Essays (with Portrait). 


Crown Svo. Revised Edition, . e 


Theological Essays. 
Crown 8vo, Revised Edition, . . 


Commentary on Romans. 
Crown Svc. Second Edition, with Appendix, 


Sermons to the Natural Man. 
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Sermons to the Spiritual Man. 


Crown 8vo, : . = . 


The Doctrine of Endless Punishment. 


Crown 8vo. Second Edition, . . . 
Calvinism: Pure and Mixed, . . 


Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy. 
Crown 8yo,. . « ote! Sea ae 


2.50 


2.50 


2.50 


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2.00 


A HISTORY 


OF 


CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 


BY 


WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, D.D. 


IN TWO VOLUMES 


VOL. Wie 


FOURTEENTH EDITION 


NEW YORK 
CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONE& 
1902 


Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1863, by 
CHARLES SCRIBNER, 


In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District 
of New York. 





CoPYRIGHT, 1891, BY 
W. G. T. SHEDD 


TROW'S 
PRINTING AND BCOKBINDING COMPANY, 
NEW YORK. 


§1. 
§ 2, 
§ 3. 
§ 4, 


§1. 
§2. 


e 


§3. 
§ 4. 


$1. 
§ 2. 


CONTENTS 


OF THE SECOND VOLUME. 


BOOK FOURTH. 


HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


CHAPTER I. 
Theories of the Origin of the Soul. 


Pre-existence, “ - A : : 
Creationism, 5 : : ° 
Traducianism, c = > 
Mediaeval and Modern Theories, - ° 
CHAPTER II. 
The Greek Anthropology. 
Preliminary statements, : 5 : 
The Alexandrine Anthropology, : 5 
Later-Alexandrine and Antiochian Anthropology, . 
Recapitulatory Survey, . , : “ ; 
CHAPTER III. 
The Latin Anthropology. 
Tertullian’s Traducianism, . 3 
Anthropology of Cyprian, ‘Ano: and Hilary, 


349220 


26 
31 
36 
41 


43 
47 


ii 


§3. 
§ 4, 


§1. 
§2. 


§1. 
§2. 


§1. 
§ 2. 


61. 
89, 
83, 
§ 4, 


$1. 
§ 2. 
$3. 


CONTENTS, 
Anthropology of Augustine, . Pe . . 
Recapitulation, . - A e ° 
CHAPTER IV. 
Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism. 
Pelagianism, . - : ° ‘ ’ 
Semi-Pelagianism, 


CHAPTER V. 
The Anselmic Anthropology. 


Anselm’s theory of Original Sin, z 
Anselm’s idea of the Will and Freedom, . 


CHAPTER VI. 
The Papal Anthropology. 

Tridentine theory of Original Sin, . FE ° 
Tridentine theory of Regeneration, - 2 

CHAPTER VII. 

Anthropology of the Reformers. 

Lutheran-Calvinistic theory of Original Sin, . 
Lutheran-Calvinistic theory of Regeneration, . 
Melanchthon’s Synergism, . ‘ - : 
Zuingle’s doctrine of Original Sin, * R 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Arminian Anthropology. 

Arminian theory of Original Sin, . F 
Arminian theory of Regeneration, - . 
Recapitulation, 


PAGE 


93 
102 


111 
127 


140 
149 


152 
164 
173 
174 


178 
186 
194 


Sif, 


§ 2. 


$3. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER IX. 
Total survey of the history of Anthropology, : 


BOOK FIFTH. 
HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


CHAPTER I. 
Soteriology of the Ancient Church: A. D. 70-780. 


. Preliminary statements, 

. Gnostic and Ebionite theories of ine Rion tinent. 

. Soteriology of the Apostolic Fathers, 

. Early Patristic Soteriology, 

. Alexandrine Soteriology, 

. Soteriology of Athanasius, and the Greeks Tatler: 
. Soteriology of Augustine, and Gregory the Great, . 
. Recapitulatory survey, 


CHAPTER II. 
Soteriology of the Mediaeval Church: A. D. 730-1517. 


. Anselm’s theory of satisfaction, A 

. Soteriology of Abelard, and Lombard, . ‘ 

. Soteriology of Bernard, and Hugh St. Victor, - 

. Soteriology of Bonaventura, : 

. Soteriology of Aquinas, 5 - . 

. Soteriology of Duns Scotus, 

. Recapitulatory survey, : : - - F 


CHAPTER III. 
The Papal Soteriology. 


Preliminary statements, ‘ : : : 
Soteriology of the Council of Trent 
Soteriology of Bellarmin, . : 5 


349220 


iil 


PAGE 


197 


203 
205 
207 
212 
226 
237 
253 
265 


278 
286 
289 
292 
804 
315 
317 


iv CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER IV. 
Soteriology of the Reformers. 


§1. Forerunners of the Reformation, . " 
§2. Protestant and Anselmic Soteriologies compared, 
§3. Recapitulatory survey, 


CHAPTER VY. 
The Grotian Soteriology. 


§1. Preliminary statements, P a 3 
§2. Grotian idea of law and penalty, : . 
§ 3. Grotian theory of relaxation and substitution, 
§4. Critical estimate of the Grotian Soteriology, 


CHAPTER VI. 
The Arminian Soteriology. 


$1. Positive statements, . 
§2. Arminian objections to the theory of satisfaction, 


CHAPTER VII. 
The Socinian Soteriology. 


§1. Socinian idea of justice, 
§2. Socinian objections to the theory of adkistattions 





BOOK SIXTH. 


HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


CHAPTER I. 
Second Advent of Christ. 


§1. Millenarianism, 2 ° 
§2. Catholic theory of the Beco Advent! : 


347 
850 
356 
366 


370 
874 


876 
879 


889 


§1. 
§2. 


§1. 
§2. 
§3. 


§1. 


. Preliminary statements, : 5 
. Apostles’ Creed, 

. Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbicl: 
. Chalcedon Symbol, 

. Athanasian Creed, 

. Recapitulatory survey, 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER II. 
The Resurrection. 


The Intermediate State, 2 . - . 
The Resurrection-Body, . 4 = 


CHAPTER III. 
‘The Final State. 


Day of Judgment, . 5 . 5 ° 
Purgatory, : ° = 
Endless Rewards and Penisnmait : : e 


BOOK SEVENTH. 


HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


CHAPTER I. 


Ancient and Mediaeval Symbols. 


CHAPTER Ii. 
Modern Symbols. 


Lutheran Confessions, 4 : 
1) Augsburg Confession, S : 
2) Apologia Oonfessionis, : 5 = 


3) Confessio Saxonica, : . 


PAGE 


400 
403 


408 
409 
411 


423 
428 
435 
438 
439 
440 


Ses 


456 


Vi CONTENTS. 


4) Confessio Wurtemburgica, 
5) Articles of Smalcald, - 
6) Luther’s Catechisms, . 

7) Formula Concordiae, 


§2. Reformed (Calvinistic) Confessions, 


1) Confessio Tetrapolitana . 
2) Zuingle’s Fidei Ratio, . 
3) First Helvetic Confession, . 
4) Consensus Tigurinus, . 
5) Consensus Genevensis, 


6) Second Helvetic Confession, 
7) Formula Consensus Helvetici, 


8) Heidelberg Catechism, 


9) Confessio Belgica, . - 
10) Confessio Gallicana, . 
11) Confessio Scoticana, - 


12) Canons of Dort, 
13) Thirty-Nine Articles, : 
14) Westminster Confession, 


15) Savoy Confession, . - 
16) Cambridge Platform, . 
17) Boston Confession, 4 


18) Saybrook Platform, . 
§ 3. Papal Confessions, 
§ 4. Confessions of the Greek Chatedls, 
§5. Arminian Confessions, . - 
§6. Socinian Confessions, 


PAGE 


456 
456 
457 
457 
458 
458 
459 
465 
467 
468 
469 
472 
473 
476 
476 
476 
476 
479 
479 
480 
482 
485 
490 
491 
494 
495 
498 


BOOK FOURTH. 





HUST ORY 


meno el RO: PO LO & Xe 


VOL. 11.—] 


LITERATURE. 


Aveustrxvus: Operum Tom. X. 

Vossius: Historia de controversiis quas Pelagius ejusque reliquiae 
moverunt. 

GaneauF: Metaphysische Psychologie des Augustinus. 

Wiaccers: Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus. 
II. Theile (first part translated by Emerson). 

NEANDER: Church History, Il. 557-627. 

GUERICKE: Church History, § 91-93. 

Cavin: Institutes, Book I. 

UsHER: Works, Vol. III. 

WHITAKER: On Original Sin. 

TAYLOR (JEREMY): On Original Sin. 

Wairsy: On Original Sin. 

Mi.uER: Christliche Lehre von der Siinde (translated by Puls- 
ford). 

Hasse: Anselm von Canterbury, Buch II. Cap. ix—xi. 

REDEPENNING : Origenes, in locis. 

Baur: Der Gegensatz des Catholicismus und Protestantismus. 

MoénueR: Symbolik. 


CHAPTER i 


THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL. 


$1. Pre-existence. 


THE inquiry and the theory respecting the ori- 
gin of the human soul exerted a decisive influence 
upon the formation of the Doctrine of Sin, and 
hence we commence with this topic. 

The views of the Ancient Church concerning the 
origin of the soul ran in three directions; though 
not with equal strength, or to an equal extent. 
The three theories that appear in the Patristic pe- 


riod are: Pre-existence, 
cianism? 


*“La premiére difficulté est, 
comment l’ime a put étre infectée 
du péché originel, qui est la ra- 
cine des péchés actuels, sans qu’il 
y ait eu de Vinjustice en Dieu 4 
ly exposer. Cette difficulté a 
fait naitre trois opinions sur l’or- 
igine de l’4me méme: celle de la 
prééxistence des dmes humaines 


Creationism, and Tradu- 


dans un autre monde, ou dans une 
autre vie, ol elles avoient péché, 
et avoient été condamnées pour 
cela 4 cette prison du corps hu- 
main; opinion des Platonicens 
qui est attribuée 4 Origéne, et 
qui trouve encore aujourd’hui des 
sectateurs. Henri Morus docteur 
Anglois a soutenu quelque chose 


+ HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The theory of Pre-eristence teaches that all hu- 
man souls were created at the beginning of creation, 
—not that of this world simply, but of all worlds. 
All finite spirits were made simultaneously, and prior 
to the creation of matter. The intellectual universe 
precedes the sensible universe. The souls of men, 
consequently, existed before the creation of Adam. 
The pre-existent life was Pre-Adamite. Men were 
angelic spirits at first. Because of their apostasy in 
the angelic sphere, they were transferred, as a pun- 
ishment for their sin, into material bodies in this 
mundane sphere, and are now passing through a 
disciplinary process, in order to be restored, all of 
them without exception, to their pre-existent and 
angelic condition. These bodies, to which they are 
joined, come into existence by the ordinary course 
of physical propagation; so that the sensuous and 
material part of human nature has no existence pre- 
vious to Adam. It is only the rational and spirit- 


de ce dogme dans un livre expres. 
Quelques-uns de ceux qui soutien- 
nent cette prééxistence, sont allés 
jusqu’d la metempsycose ... La 
seconde opinion est celle de la 
traduction, comme si lime des 
enfans étoit engendrée (per tra- 
ducem) de l’me ou des ames de 
ceux dont le corps est engendré. 
8. Augustin y étoit porté, pour 
mieux sauver le péché originel. 
Cette doctrine est enseignée aussi 
par Ja plus grand partie des the- 
ologiens de la Oonfession d’Aus- 


bourg. Oependant elle n’est pas 
établie entitrement parmi eux, 
puisque les universités de Jena, 
de Helmstat, et autres y ont été 
contraires depuis long-tems. La 
troisiéme opinion et la plus recue 
aujourd’hui est celle de la erea- 
tion: elle est enseignée dans la 
plus grande partie des ecoles 
Chrétiennes, mais elle recoit le 
plus de difficulté par rapport au 
péché originel.” Lxrreyrrz: Thé- 
odicée, Partie I. 86. 


- 


FP RE-EXISTENCE. 5 


ual principle of which a Pre-Adamite life is as- 
serted. 

The principal defender of this theory was Ori- 
gen. Some things akin to it are to be found in the 
Pythagorean and Platonic speculations,—particu- 
larly in the doctrine of metempsychosis, or trans- 
migration of souls from one body into another; 
and in the theory that man’s innate ideas are remi- 
niscences of an antecedent life in a higher world 
than that of sense of time.’ But Origen endeavored 


*GaneatF: Psychologie des Au- 
gustinus, p. 235 sq.; BrEavsoBRE: 
Manicheisme, VI. iv.; Srupren 
unpD KritiKen, Vol. [X.—In the 
Pheedo, Plato maintains the dcoc- 
trine of the pre-existence of the 
soul. He lays down the position 
that 7 paSnots ovx G@AXo Ti 7 ava- 
punots. This position he supports 
by the following argument. When 
the soul awakes to consciousness, 
and begins to have intellectual 
perceptions, it observes that such 
a thing is good, and that such a 
thing is beautiful, and that such a 
thing is true, etc. But at the 
same time it perceives that these 
objects, thus denominated, are 
not goodness, beauty, and truth 
themselves, but only participate 
in these qualities. The soul, 
therefore, possesses ideas of good- 
ness, beauty, and truth, distinct 
from any particular things in 
which such properties inhere. 
But these ideas, the soul brings 
with it. They are not derived 
from the things of time and sense, 


because the soul carefully distin- 
guishes between them and the 
concrete sensible object. It says: 
“This beautiful object which I see 
is not beauty itself, but only aman- 
ifestation of it.” But these ideas 
of absolute beauty, goodness, and 
truth are not figments of the 
brain, to which there is no ob- 
jective correspondent. There ac- 
tually are such objects as eternal 
truth, eternal beauty, and eternal 
goodness. Now, argues Plato, 
the fact that the soul upon awak- 
ing to intellectual perception is 
already in possession of such ideas 
proves that it has had a vision of 
the corresponding objects in a 
previous mode of existence. The 
knowledge of these abstract ideas 
is only the recollection of a pre- 
existent vision enjoyed by the 
soul, before its union with the 
body. 


’ 7 
m™pOTEpov, Tmply etvat ev av3pa7ov 


*Hoav apa ai Wuxai kat 


del, Xwpis TapudTar, Kat Ppovnow 
eixov. 
“Tt was a beautiful system 


6 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


to defend the theory of Pre-existence upon Serip- 
ture grounds, though he was undoubtedly much 
influenced by the speculations of pagan philosophy 
in adopting it. The Mosaic narrative of the tempt- 
ation and apostasy, in Genesis iii, according to him, 
is an allegorical representation of the fall of the 
finite spirit from the higher into the lower sphere. 
Adam in the Hebrew is a generic term, and denotes 
not an actual historical individual, but the image 
and representative of the race. The serpent em- 
blematizes the devil; the death threatened is not 
temporal but eternal death, of which the death of 
the body is the shadow and symbol; the expulsion 
from paradise is the loss of the pre-existent blessed- 
ness, and the “coats of skins” signify the clothing 
of the fallen spirit in a material body. That the 


which represented that the forms 
of all that is good and fair in the 
visible world, having an inde- 
pendent previous existence in the 
Supreme Mind, had indeed be- 
come obscured and tarnished in 
their union with the matter of 
the visible world; but that the 
souls of men, having before their 
entrance into the body once in a 
higher sphere gazed upon the 
original patterns or ideas of beau- 
ty, and justice, and holiness, are 
now from a faint reminiscence 
kindled by such imperfect shad- 
ows of those lovely realities as 
the dark and gross things of the 
earth still exhibit; and that if 
they cherished by the exercise 


of pure mutual affections their 
love of these heavenly images, 
and improved their acquaint- 
ance with them by serene con- 
templation, they should after 
death wing back their flight again 
to those realms of beatific vision 
which had once before been their 
happy home.” Lonpon Quar- 
TERLY Review. 1838. 

This theory reappears also in 
some portions of English litera- 
ture,—as, for example, in Worps- 
wortuH’s Ode on Immortality. 


“Our birth is but a sleep, and a forgetting: 
The soul that rises with us, our life's 


star, 
Hath had elsewhere its setting, 
And cometh from afar.” 


PRE-EXISTENCE. a 


narrative is to be explained in this manner, and not 
to be understood literally, is plain, says Origen, to 
every one who penetrates into the real meaning of 
Scripture, and takes worthy views of the Divine 
Being. Such allegorical costume for the higher 
truths is not strange; it is found in the Greek sym- 
bolism. Plato’s myths of Poros and Penia, in the 
Symposium, have much similarity with this Mosaic 
account of the fall.!. Origen also interprets the lan- 
guage of the apostle Paul respecting the creation 
“oroaning and travailing in pain together” (Rom. 
viii. 19), as referring to the low and degraded con- 
dition of spirits who once occupied a higher sphere. 
Alluding to the fall of some of the angelic spirits, 
he says: “Hence God the creator made them bodies 
suited to a most degraded condition (congrua hu- 
milibus locis), and fabricated the visible world for 
them, and sent into this world ministering angels, 
for the care and discipline of those who had fallen.” ? 
Origen also cites Rom. ix. 11 sq., in proof of the 
pre-existence of the human soul, remarking that 
“there was no injustice in Jacob’s supplanting 
Esau in the womb, in case we suppose him to have 
been chosen of God on the ground of merit acquired 
in a preceding life (ex praecedentis vitae meritis), so 
that he deserved to be preferred to his brother.” § 


*OricENEs: De Princip. IV. i. ? Ortcenzs: De Principiis, III. y. 
16; Contra Celsum, IV. xxxix. *Origenes: De Principiis, IL. 
See Tuomastus: Origenes, 191, ix. (Ed. Bas. p. 705). 

192; Sonusert: Geschichte der 
Seele, p. 657. 


8 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY, 


Another proof for the soul’s pre-existence is derived 
by Origen, from the parable of the vineyard and 
the laborers, in Matthew xx. 1 seq. They who are 
hired first are Adam and those of that time. They 
who are hired at the third hour are Noah and his 
generation. Abraham and his generation are hired 
at the sixth hour; Moses and his generation at the 
ninth. All mankind at, and since, the time of Christ, 
are represented by the laborers employed at the 
eleventh hour." But these are described as having 
been standing idle all the day long,—that is during 
the entire saeculum represented by the “day” 
spoken of in the parable. “If therefore,” says Ori- 
gen, “the soul has no existence anterior to the 
body, but is generated with it (ovvecraey), how 
could those who were born since the birth of 
Christ have been in existence, to stand idle pre- 
vious to that event ?”? 

The theory of Pre-existence may be said to rise 
and set with Origen. Only here and there was a 
voice heard in its favor after his death ; and during 
his life-time it was confined chiefly to the Alex- 
andrine school. Cyril of Alexandria® and Nemesius 
of Emesa,* defend the doctrine of the simple pre- 
existence of the soul, but not of its fall in a pre- 


This allegorical interpretation ’ CYRILLUS ALEXANDRINUS : 
is to be found in the middle ages. Com. in Johan. Op. IV. p. 78 sq. 
See Orpericus Virauis: I. 40, ‘Nemesius: De natura homi- 
Bohn’s Ed. nis, cap. il. 


2 OrtaenEs: In Matt. Tract. X. 
(Ed. Basil 1571, p. 81.) 


PRE-EXISTENCE. 9 


existent state. The theory, however, was generally 
refuted and combatted, so that by the latter part 
of the 4th century it had become obsolete. Jerome’ 
denominates it a stulta persuasio to believe “ that 
souls were created of old by God, and kept in a 
treasury ;” and Philastrius? enumerates it among 
the heresies. Augustine*® opposes the doctrine of 
a fall in a pre-existent state, as contradicting the 
Scripture statement that “God saw everything that 
he had made, and behold it was very good.” He 
also remarks that if earthly bodies were given to 
fallen spirits on account of the sins they have com- 
mitted, the bodies should be proportioned to the 
degree of the sins; and that the devils, therefore, 
should have worse bodies than men,—which Augus- 
tine thinks is not the fact. 

The theory of Pre-existence, it is obvious, is the 
most extreme form of individualism as applied to 
the origin of man. It rejects the idea of race-con- 
nection, and race-unity, in every form. Each human 
individual is created by a distinct fiat at the very 
beginning of creation, and antecedent to all mate- 
rial worlds. As such, it has no physical or generic 
connection with other souls; but is a pure unit alone 
and by itself. And this individualism, pure and 
simple, pervades its entire history. It apostatizes 
alone and by itself; it is associated with a material 


? Hieronymus: Ep. LXXVIII, * Aveustints : De civitate Dei, 
Ad Marcellinum. XI. xxiii. 
* Puitasrrivs: Haereses, XCIX. 


10 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


body, as a disciplinary infliction, alone and by it 
self; and it is redeemed alone and by itself, only 
to be still liable to another and yet another apos- 
tasy, alone and by itself. The notion of a created 
species, a common human nature, is wholly and 
energetically excluded by the theory of Pre-exist- 
ence. The material body, into which the rational 
spirit descends from its antecedent sphere of exist- 
ence, is, indeed, propagated ; but this is only a tem- 
porary prison, and not a permanent constituent of 
humanity. The sensuous and earthly part of man, 
according to the Origenistic theory, is not a part 
of his real and proper humanity. 


$2. Creationism. 


2. The theory of Creationism maintains that 
God immediately creates de nihilo a new soul, in 
every instance that a new individual of the human 
family is born. But the human body is not created 
de nihilo, in this successive manner. This part of 
man is created in and with Adam, and is propa- 
gated from him. 

Creationism met with far more favor in the 
Ancient Church, than the doctrine of Pre-existence. 
Its advocates cited in favor of it, the declaration of 
Christ, in John v.17: “My Father worketh Aith- 
erto, and I work,”’—interpreting the “work” here 
spoken of as that of creation, and not providence 


CREATIONISM. 11 


merely. They also quoted Ps. xxxii. 15: “He 
fashioneth their hearts alike;” and Zech. xii. 1: 
“The Lord .. . formeth the spirit of man within 
him.” 

Speaking generally, the theory of Creationism 
was the dominant one in the Eastern Church, and 
found advocates in the Western. Jerome asserts 
that God “ quotidie fabricatur animas,” and cites in 
proof the above-mentioned texts of Scripture.’ He 
remarks that Creationism is the true church doc- 
trine (ecclesiasticum est), though not much received 
as yet by the Western bishops. In another place, 
however, he refers the inquirer upon the subject of 
the soul’s origin to Augustine, whose work De 
origine animae, although it does not explicitly de- 
cide the question, he praises, and shows an inclina- 
tion to Augustine’s views? Hilary of Pictavium is 
the most explicit advocate of Creationism in the 
West. In his tractate upon Psalm xci (§ 3), he 
lays down the position that the souls of men are 
daily (quotidie) originated by the secret and un- 
known operation of divine power. 

Creationism, it is obvious, is a mixed theory. 
As respects the human soul, it teaches that there 
are as many repeated and successive fiats of crea- 
tion, as there are individuals in the series of human 
beings; while so far as the human body is concern. 
ed, there is but a single creative fiat. In the in- 


‘Hieronymus: Ad Pammachi- ° Hieronymus: Epist. LXXVIII, 
um, a 397. LXXIX. 


12 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


stance of each and every individual soul after Adam, 
there is creation, but not procreation or propaga- 
tion. In the instance of each and every individual 
body after Adam, there is procreation or propaga- 
tion, but not creation. The physical part of every 
man, considered as a creation de nihilo, dates back 
of birth and individual existence, to the creative 
act mentioned in Genesis i. 27; but his spiritual 
part, as a creation de nihilo, dates back only to 
birth, or to the commencement of individual ex- 
istence, in whatever generation, or year of the 
world, that may happen to be. Reckoning from 
the strict and absolute creation of each, the body 
of a man of this generation, upon the theory of 
Creationism, would be six thousand years older than 
his soul; for there is this interval of time between 
the creative fiat that originated the former, and the 
creative fiat that originated the latter. The theory, 
therefore, is a composite one. It has affinities with 
Traducianism, in adopting the idea of race-connec- 
tion, and generic unity, so far as respects man’s sen- 
suous nature. And it has affinities with Origen’s 
theory of Pre-existence, in excluding the idea of 
species when applied to the human soul, and in 
adopting the idea of pure individuality alone. The 
tenet of pre-existence in the angelic world, it rejects. 


TRADUCIANISM. ey 


$ 2. Traducianism. 


The theory of Zraducianism maintains that 
both the soul and body of the individual man are 
propagated. It refers the creative act mentioned in 
Gen.i. 27 tothe human nature, or race, and not toa 
single individual merely. It considers the work of 
creating mankind de nihilo, as entirely completed 
upon the sixth day; and that since that sixth day 
the Creator has, in this world, exerted no strictly 
creative energy. He rested from the work of cre- 
ation upon the seventh day, and still rests. By this 
single act, all mankind were created, as to both 
their spiritual and their sensuous substance, in and 
with the first human pair, and from them have 
been individually procreated and born, each in his 
day and generation. According to Traducianism, 
creation is totally distinct and different from birth. 
Creation relates to the origination de nihilo of the 
total substance or nature of mankind, considered as 
a new and hitherto non-existent species of being. 
Birth is subsequent to creation, and refers only to 
the modifications which this substance undergoes,— 
its individualization in the series of generations. 
Hence man can be created holy, and be born sinful. 
By creation he may be endowed with the moral 
image and righteousness of his Maker; while by 
birth, or rather at birth, he may be possessed of a 
moral guilt and corruption that was originated after 
creation, and before birth. 


14 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


This view of the origin of the soul was first 
stated with distinctness by Tertullian, and from his 
time onward gained ground and authority in the 
Western Church ; while the Eastern Church, as has 
been remarked, preferred the theory of Creation- 
ism. The Biblical support for Traducianism was 
derived from Paul’s statement of the Adamic con- 
nection and the origin of sin, in Romans y. 12-19, 
corroborated by 1 Cor. xv. 22: “ In Adam all die,” 
Eph. ui. 3: “And were by nature children of 
wrath, Heb. vii. 10: “ For Levi was yet in the loins 
of his father when Melchizedec met him,” Ps. li. 5: 
“Behold I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did 
my mother conceive me,” and Gen. v. 3: “ And 
Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his 
image.” 

Tertullian was the first to state this theory in 
express terms, and defend it upon speculative 
grounds. He does it in a somewhat crude and 
materializing manner, because he attempts to ex- 
plain and illustrate the manner in which the indi- 
vidual life is deduced from the generic. In this 
respect, he falls into the same error into which 
Justin Martyr, and the first theoretic Trinitarians, 
generally, fell, in the speculative construction of 
the doctrine of the Trinity. In his tract De Anima 
(c. 19), Tertullian remarks that “the soul of man, 
like the shoot of a tree, is drawn out (deducta) 
into a physical progeny from Adam the parent 
stock.” In another place (c. 27), in this same tract, 


TRADUCIANISM. he 


he asserts that “both substances (body and soul) 
are conceived, finished, and perfected together ;” 
and holds to both a corporeal and a psychical gen- 
eration, each proceeding from its own appropriate 
base, though each is inseparable from the other, and 
both are simultaneous." 

The Traducian theory continued to gain ground 
in the North-African, and in the Western European 
Church, by reason of its affinity with that particu- 
lar mode of stating the doctrine of sin which pre- 
vailed in these churches. Jerome remarks that in 
his day it was adopted by “ maxima pars occidenta- 
lium.” Leo the Great (+461) asserts that the 
“catholic faith teaches that every man, with refer- 
ence to the substance of his soul as well as of his 
body, is formed in the womb.”* Among the Orien- 
tals, this theory obtained little currency. Gregory 
Nyssa,* and Anastasius Sinaita,* alone, were inclined 
to adopt it. 

But the theologian who contributed most to the 
currency and establishment of Traducianism was 
Augustine. And yet this thinker, usually so ex- 
plicit and decided, even upon speculative points, 
nowhere in his works formally adopts the theory - 
itself. In his Opus imperfectum (IV. 104) he re- 


* Nam etsi duas species confite- ? Leo Maenus: Epist. XV, Ad 
bimur seminis, corporalem et ani- Turribim. 


malem, indiscretas tamen vindi- ’ Grecorius Nyss: De hominis 
camus, et hoc modo contempora-_ opificio, c. 29. 
Jes ejusdemque momenti.” De * Anastasius Sin: Homilia in 


Anima, ¢. 27. Banvint Monumenta, II. 54. 


16 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


plies to Julian: “ You may blame, if you will, my 
hesitation because I do not venture to affirm or 
deny that of which I am ignorant; you may say 
what you please concerning the profound obscurity 
of this subject ; nevertheless let this doctrine be 
fixed and unshaken that the guilt of that one man 
is the death of all, and that in him all died.” Yet 
Augustine’s entire speculation upon the origin and 
nature of sin is indirectly, and by implication, an 
earnest defence of the Traducian theory. His an- 
thropology, as we shall see when it comes up for 
examination, is both illogical and inconceivable 
without it. The transmission of sim, to which 
Augustine held, logically involves, as Tertullian 
had perceived before him, the transmission of the 
sinning soul; and this implies the Adamic existence 
and unity. 

The attitude and tendency of Augustine’s mind, 
in respect to the two systems of Creationism and 
Traducianism (for the theory of Pre-existence he 
expressly rejects and argues against),? may be seen 
from an analysis of the first book of his treatise De 
Anima. Renatus had sent Augustine the work of 
Vincentius Victor, in which the doctrine of Cre- 
ationism was defended. Augustine in his critical 
reply takes the ground that Victor cannot demon- 


‘Similar statements are made De peccatorum meritis et remiss. 
in Ep. XO, Ad Optatum; De _ II. 36, III. 10. 
Genesi ad literam X. 21; Ep. ? Aveustinus: De civitate Dei, 
_CXLITI, Ad Marcellinum; and XI. 23. 


TRADUCIANISM. 17 


strate from Scripture, the position that souls are 
created and in-breathed in every instance of birth, 
and asserts that we are in ignorance upon the 
whole matter. He examines one by one those 
texts which Victor has quoted, and contends that 
they are insufficient to prove Creationism. In sum- 
ming up, he remarks, that if any one prefers to 
hold that souls are created in each individual in- 
stance, he must take care not to hold the four fol- 
lowing errors: 1. That the souls thus immediately 
created are made sinful at the instant of creation, 
by the Creator, through an original sin, or sinful 
disposition, that is infused into them, and-which is 
not truly their own sin; 2. That those who die in 
infancy are destitute of original sin, and do not 
need that baptism which puts them in possession of 
the merits of Christ; 3. That souls sinned in some 
other sphere before their connection with flesh, and 
that for this reason they were brought down into 
sinful flesh; 4. That the newly-created souls of those 
who die in infancy are not punishable for existing 
sin, but only for sins which it is foreknown they 
would have committed had they been permitted to 
arrive at a suitable age.’ 

The difficulties that beset the subject of the 
origin of the individual soul, whether the theory of 
creation or of traduction be adopted, are very clear- 
ly stated by Augustine in his epistle Ad Optatum, 


* Aueustinus: De Anima, Liber I. (Opera X. 481.482, Ed. Migne). 
2 


18 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


his treatise De peccatorum meritis et remissione, his 
tract De anima, and his.exegetical work De Genesi 
ad (.teram. We will briefly give the line of re 
mark in these treatises, which we take from the 
learned and discriminating work of Gangauf* upon 
the Metaphysical Psychology of Augustine. 

So far as the question of the divine agency in 
creation is concerned, says Augustine, we may ac- 
cept either Creationism or Traducianism. By either 
theory, God is recognized as the creator; for even 
in case the theory of traduction or generation be 
adopted, God is still the absolute origin and author, 
inasmuch as in the primal act of creating the human 
soul he so created it that it possesses the power of 
reproducing and perpetuating itself in individual. 
souls, just as in the sphere of nature and matter the 
first seed is indued with the power to reproduce 
individuals after its own kind. This endowment of 
reproductive power, says Augustine, as much re- 
quires creative energy to account for its existence, 
as does the existence of the first seed, or the first 
soul; “for who can make a seed to produce indi- 
viduals invariably after its kind, except that Being 
who made the seed itself from nothing?” Never- 
theless, continues Augustine, both theories have 
their difficulties. In reference to Traducianism, the 
question arises, how it is possible to hold to such a 
propagation of the soul without falling into ma- 


1GancauF: Metaphysische Psy- stick III. $3. p. 248. sq. 
chologie des Augustinus, Haupt- 


TRADUCIANISM. 19 


terialism, and regarding the soul as a corporeal 
entity, after Tertullian’s example, whose fancies in 
this respect need not awaken our wonder, since he 
represents God the creator himself as corporeal.! 
On the other hand, he who adopts Traducianism 
finds little difficulty with the doctrine of original 
sin, while the advocate of Creationism finds a great 
difficulty here. For the soul as newly created (and 
it is newly-created in every individual instance 
according to the Creationist) cannot be anything 
but a pure and perfect soul. It cannot be tainted 
with evil of any kind; but on the contrary, as com- 
ing immediately from the creator’s hand, must pos- 
sess his holy image and likeness. If, now, it be 
thus pure and perfect, the question arises: Why 
does it deserve to be associated at very birth with 
a diseased and dying body, and to be stained and 
polluted with a corrupted sensuous nature??_ The 


any diversity of parts in himself; 
he is altogether uniform.” This, 


+ Augustine, however, takes 
Tertullian too literally. In com- 


batting the Gnostic idea of the 
deity, which was hyperspiritual- 
izing, Tertullian, it is true, em- 
ploys phraseology that is ma- 
terializing, and has furnished 
ground for the charge of mate- 
rialism. But if he is interpreted 
by his context, it will be found, 
we think, that he meant merely 
to assert that God, though a spirit, 
is a substance or essence. ‘‘Cor- 
pus” in his vocabulary is equiva- 
lent to “substantia.” He express- 
ly declares that ‘God has not 


of course, could not be, if he were 
corporeal or material. Augustine 
himself (De Genesi ad literam, X. 
xxv. 41) remarks that Tertullian, 
“quoniam acutus est, interdum 
contra opinionem suam visa veri- 
tate superatur. Quid enim verius 
dicere potuit, quam id quod ait 
quodam loco, ‘Omne corporale 
passibile est’ (De anima. c. 7)? 
Debuit ergo mutare sententiam, 
qua paulo superius dixerat etiam 
Deum corpus esse.” 

? This was an objection strongly 


20 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


fact that its connection with such a body does not 
depend at all upon the soul, but rests entirely upon 
the will of the creator, would seem to imply that 
God himself is the cause of the soul’s deteriorated 
state and condition. But if so, its restoration would 
be no act of grace. It would, rather, be a matter 
of obligation, since the creator would be merely 
healing a wound which he himself had made. Fur- 
thermore, in the case of infants who die without 
baptism,—a thing that occurs in thousands of in- 
stances, and with the Divine foreknowledge,—how is 
the justice of God to be vindicated, if such infantile 
souls, without any agency and fault of their own, are 
visited with disease, sickness, pain, and death tem- 
poral and eternal? Can we believe that the cre- 
ator makes these newly-created spirits guilty at the 
time of creating them, and then inflicts these evils 
upon them as a punishment? How, upon the theory 
of Creationism, shall we find an interval of time 
between the act that creates the soul and the act 
that unites it with a diseased and mortal body, of 
sufficient length for Satan to present his temptation, 
and the newly-created spirit to yield and fall? 
Neither is it any relief to say that God punishes 
the souls of unbaptized infants upon the ground of 
those sins which they would have committed had 
urged by the Pelagians, as Augus- et ipsa sola poenam meretur; in- 
tine remarks in De peccatorum justum esse... ut hodie nata 
meritis IIT. iii. 5,—“‘Sianimanon anima non ex massa Adae, tam 


est ex traduce, sed sola caro, ipsa antiquum peccatum portet alie- 
tantum habet traducem peccati, num.” 


TRADUCIANISM. mA | 


they lived, and which he foreknew they would com- 
mit. For this would conflict with the nature of 
retribution and the idea of justice. Punishment 
supposes some actual offence in the past. It is 
always retrospective. Hence penalty cannot be 
anticipated. No being can be justly punished in 
advance. If he can be, then there is nothing to 
prevent a child who dies at the age of three years, 
from being punished for all the sins which he 
would have committed had he lived upon earth to 
the age of forty, or sixty, or sixty thousand years. 
With respect to such questions as the following, 
which were urged against the theory of Creation- 
ism: Why does God create souls for children who 
die at birth, or immediately after? and why does 
he create souls in the instance of adulterine off- 
spring? Augustine remarks, that he thinks he could 
give an answer from the position of Creationism. 
But to the question: Why does God punish an 
infant soul? he can give no answer from this posi- 
tion. 

Augustine finally remarks, that if one goes to 
the Scriptures for a decisive settlement of the 
question at issue between Creationism and Tra- 
ducianism, he does not obtain it. In respect to the 
doctrine of original sin, the preponderance of 
Scripture proof is upon the side of Traducianism. 
But passages may be quoted in favor of the soul’s 
new creation in each individual instance; still, no 
one of them is so decisive that it might not be in- 


y) 


22 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


terpreted in favor of its traduction. All such 
passages prove, indeed, that God is the giver, the 
creator, the former of the human soul. But how he 
is, whether by in-breathing them newly-created, or 
by the traduction (trahendo) of them from the 
parent, the Scriptures nowhere say." “As yet,” 
says Augustine (Ep. cxc, Ad Optatum), “I have 
found nothing certain and decisive in the canonical 
Scriptures, respecting the origin of the soul.”? 

It is evident from these trains of remark, which 
are drawn from a very wide surface in Augustine’s 
writings, that his mind felt the full force of the 


mysteries that overhang 


? Proinde quia non dixit ex ani- 
ma viri factam animam mulieris, 
convenientius creditur eo ipso nos 
admonere voluisse, nihil hic aliud 
putare, quam de viri anima nove- 
ramus, id est similiter datam esse 
mulieri; cum praesertim esset 
evidentissima occasionis locus, ut 
si non tune quando formata est, 
postea certe diceretur, ubi ait 
Adam, ‘Hoe nunc os ex ossibus 
meis, et caro de carne mea.’ 
Quanto enim carius et amantius- 
que diceret, Et anima de anima 
mea? Non tamen hine tam mag- 
na quaestio jam soluta est, ut 
unum horum manifestum certum- 
gue teneamus.” Aueustinus: De 
Genesi ad lit. X. i. 2. 

*In his final revision of his 
works he says: “Quod attinet 
ad ejus (sc. animi) originem, qua 
fit ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo 


the origin of the indi- 


uno sit qui primum creatus est, 
quando factus est homo in ani- 
mam vivam, an semper ita fiant 
singulis singulae, nec tune scie- 
bam nec adhuce scio.” Retractati- 
ones I. i. 3.—At the time when 
Augustine wrote the 2d and 3d 
books of his treatise De libero ar- 
bitrio, viz. : about 895, he attrib- 
uted more value to the theory of 
pre-existence than he afterwards 
did, as the following extract 
proves. ‘ Harum autem quatuor 
de anima sententiarum, utrum de 
propagine veniant, an in singulis 
quibusque nascentibus novae fi- 
ant, an in corpora nascentium jam 
alicubi existentes vel mittantur di- 
vinitus, vel sua sponte labantur, 
nullam temere affirmare oporte- 
bit.” De libero arbitrio, IIT. xxi, 
58. 


MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN THEORIES 23 


vidual soul, and its inborn sinfulness. That his 
mind inclined to Traducianism, the course of reason- 
ing which has been delineated plainly shows. That 
he was not averse to Creationism, provided the 
problem of sin could be solved in a way to accord 
with what he believed to be the teaching of Scrip- 
ture and the Christian experience, is evident from 
the following remark which he makes respecting 
this theory in his letter to Jerome: “ Ecce volo ut 
illa sententia mea sit, sed nondum esse confirmo.” 
Again in this same letter he says to Jerome: “Teach 
me now, I beg of you, what I shall teach ; teach me 
what I shall hold; and tell me if souls are every 
day, one by one, called into. being from nonentity, 


in those who are daily being born.”* 


§$ 4. Mediaeval and Modern Theories. 


In the Middle Ages, the theory of Creationism 
prevailed over the rival theory. Traducianism fell 
into disrepute with the Schoolmen,’ for two rea- 
sons: 1. Because they regarded it as conflicting with 


1 Aveustinus: De origine ani- 
mae, seu epistola OLXVI, Ad 
Hieronymum. Compare FLevrr: 
Eccl. Hist. Book XXIII. xvii. 

2“ Ticet igitur aaima non sit ex 
traduce, tamen originalis culpa ab 
anima Adae transit ad animas pos- 
terum mediante carne per concu- 
piscentiam generata; ita quod si- 
cut ab anima peccanti infecta fuit 


caro Adae, et prona effecta ad li- 
bidinem ; ita seminata caro secum 
trahens infectionem vitiat ani: 
mam. In carne est materialiter 
et originaliter, et in anima for- 
maliter tanquam in subjecto.” 
BoNAVENTURA : Compendium 
Theologicae Veritatis (De cor- 
ruptela peccati Lib. III. cap. 
viii.). 


24 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the doctrine of the soul’s immortality, and as ma- 
terializing in its influence. 2. Because, rejecting 
as most of them did, the anthropology of Augus- 
tine, and adopting the Greek anthropology, they 
had less motive than Augustine had, for favoring 
the theory of the soul’s traduction. 

The revival of the Augustinian anthropology at 
the Reformation naturally led to the re-appearance 
of the Traducian theory. The symbols of both the 
Lutheran and the Calvinistic divisions, so far as 
they make any speculative statement at all upon 
the subject, generally enunciate, or at least logic- 
ally involve, the doctrine of the Adamie unity in 
respect to both soul and body. But as we have 
seen Augustine himself hesitating to take a decided 
position respecting the origin of the individual soul, 
it is not strange that minds in the Protestant Church 
that were agreed upon the doctrine of original sin, 
should differ upon this metaphysical question. Ad- 
vocates of both Traducianism and Creationism are 
to be found among the early Protestant divines.’ 


CaLovi- 


* LuTHeEr taught Traducianism, 
and the Lutheran theologians, 
generally, followed him, with the 
exception of Carixtus, who 
adopts Creationism in his treatise, 
De animae creatione. GERHARD 
(Loci IX. viii. 116, 118.) leaves 
the determination of the manner 
to the philosophers; but holds 
that “‘animas eorum qui ex Ad- 
amo et Eva progeniti fuissent, non 
creatas, neque enim generatas, 


sed propagatas fuisse.” 
vs, III. p. 1084, and Hottaz, take 
the same view. 

Catyty, and the Reformed par- 
ty generally, declare for Oreation- 
ism, though retaining the Augus- 
tinian doctrine of original sin. 
Calvin (Inst. II. i. 7) takes the 
ground that the decision of the 
question, as between the two the- 
ories, is unimportant. “Who 
will be solicitous about a trans- 


MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN THEORIES. 


25 


The subject itself, like other purely speculative 
ones, has attracted less attention for two centuries 
past, than it did in the previous history of the 
Chureh. One of the most decided of modern advo- 
cates of Traducianism is the American theologian 
Edwards, in his treatise On Original Sin.* 


mission of the soul, when he 
hears that Adam received the or- 
naments that he lost, no less for 
us than for himself? that they 
* were given, not to one man only, 
but to the whole human nature?” 
Beza (Qu 47.) rejects Traducian- 
ism decidedly: ‘“ Doctrina de ani- 
mae traduce mihi perabsurda.vi- 
detur, quoniam aut totam ani- 
mam aut partem ejus_ traduci 
oporteret.” Peter Martyr 
(Thes. 705.) declares that: ‘ Ani- 
mae non sunt omnes simul crea- 
tae ab initio, sed creantur quoti- 
die a deo corporibus inserandae.” 


Potants (p. 2183) asserts: ‘‘ Ko- 
dem momento Deus creat animam 
simul et unit corpori infecto.” 
See HaeensaoH: Dogmenge- 
schichte, § 248; Hasz: Hutterus 
Redivivus, § 85. 

*SamuEL Hopkins, also, 
(Works, I. 289) seems to have 
been a Traducianist. ‘“‘ The moth- 
er, therefore, according to a law 
of nature, conceives both the soul 
and body of her son; she does as 
much towards the one as towards 
the other, and is equally the in- 
strumental cause of both.” Ep- 
warps: Against Watts’s Notion, 
§ 7. 


CHAPTER. 483 


THE GREEK ANTHROPOLOGY.? 


$1. Preliminary Statements. 


Tue universality of human sinfulness, and the 
need of divine grace in Christ in order to deliver- 
ance from it, were acknowledged in the doctrinal 
system of the Christian Church from the beginning. 
There was no denial, except among the confessedly 
heretical sects, of the doctrines of Sin and Redemp- 
tion stated in this general form. In constructing 
the more specific statements there was, however, a 
difference of opinion in the Ancient Church, which 
showed itself in two great tendencies. The one re- 
sulted in what we shall denominate the Greek An- 


?Compare GuERiokE: Church 
History, $$ 91, 92, 98. Wairsy on 
Original Sin (Chapters VI-VIII) 
cites from those Fathers who 
deny the imputation of Adam’s 
sin to his posterity as a ground 
of condemnation; he is somewhat 
biased by his polemic aims, and 


in many instances gives a deeper 
color to the quotation as extract- 
ed, than it wears in its original 
connections. WiecErs’ Augus- 
tinism, Chap. XXII, presents the 
views of the earlier Fathers, in 
respect to the contested points 
between Augustine and Pelagius. 


PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS. 27 
thropology ; the other in the Latin Anthropology. 
These types of doctrine were not rigorously con- 
fined, the one to the Eastern and the other to the 
Western Church. But each was the predominating 
scheme within its own borders, while yet each found 
some advocates, and exerted some influence within 
the limits of the other. 

The two questions upon which the controversy 
turned were the following: 1. Is man’s power to 
good diminished by sin, and if so to what extent ? 
2. What is the precise relation which the agency 
of the human will sustains to the workings of the 


Holy Spirit, in regeneration ? 


*“ While in the Western 
Church the Augustinian scheme 
of doctrine had become dominant, 
in the Greek Church the older, 
and more indefinite mode of ap- 
prehending the doctrines of grace, 
of free-will, and of providence, a 
theory bordering upou Pelagian- 
ism, had been preserved.” NE- 
ANDER: II]. 554. The reformers 
of the English Church recognized 
the difference between the an- 
thropology of the East and the 
West, a fact noticed by Hattam: 
Constitutional History, VII. i. 
See, also, MacxintosH: Ethical 
Philosophy, Section IIT. (p. 106. 
Pa. Ed.). “He lent Burnet’s 
commentary on the Thirty Nine 
Articles to me, and I have now a 
distinct recollection of the great 
impression which it made. I read 
with peculiar eagerness and pleas- 
ure, the commentary on the 17th 


article,—that which regards Pre- 
destination ; and I remember Mr. 
Mackenzie’s pointing out to me, 
that though the bishop abstained 
from giving his own opinion on 
that subject, in the commentary, 
he had intimated that opinion not 
obscurely in the preface, when he 
says that ‘he was of the opinion 
of the Greek Church, from which 
St. Austin departed.’ I was so 
profoundly ignorant of what the 
opinion of the Greek Church was, 
and what St. Austin’s deviations 
were, that the mysterious magnifi- 
cence of this phrase had an extra- 
ordinary effect on my imagination. 
My boarding mistress, the school- 
master, and the parson, were or- 
thodox Calvinists. I became a 
warm advocate for free will, and 
before I was fourteen I was prob- 
ably the boldest heretic in the 
country.” Maoxrytosn’s Life, I.5. 


28 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The views of the entire Church, both the West 
ern and Eastern, upon these points, during the 2d 
and 3d centuries were shaped very much by the 
controversy with Gnosticism. The dualistic theory 
of the universe, held by the Gnostic, involved the 
eternity of evil as well as of good, and the further 
tenet that man is sinful by creation, because all 
creation is the work of the Demiurge. In opposi- 
tion to this view, the Christian Fathers contended 
for the biblical doctrine that man was created holy, 
and a free moral agent, and that by the misuse of 
his moral freedom he is himself the author of his 
own sin.’ Again, the Gnostic, dividing mankind 
into three classes,—oé tvevuarixol, of wuytxol, ot 
vAcxol,—asserted that only the first class were capa- 
ble of being redeemed, and that the other two 
classes, who constituted the great mass of mankind. 


1 Justin Martyr (Apol. I. 48) 
thus argues against the Pagan 
doctrine of fate. ‘But lest any 
should infer from what has been 
said, that we are assertors of fa- 
tal necessity, and conclude that 
prophecy must needs infer pre- 
destination, we shall clear our- 
selves as to this point also; for 
we learn from these very proph- 
ets that rewards and punishments 
are to be distributed in propor- 
tion to the merits of mankind. 
And it is a truth which we our- 
selves profess; for if it be not so, 
but all things are determined by 
fate, then farewell freedom of 
will; and if this man is destined 


to be good, and that one to be evil- 
then neither the one nor the oth- 
er can be justly approved or con- 
demned; so that unless we sup- 
pose that man has it in his power 
to choose the good, and refuse 
the evil, no one can be accounta- 
ble for any action whatever. But 
to prove that men are good or 
evil by choice, I argue in this 
manner: We see in the same per- 
son a transition to quite contrary 
actions; but now were he neces~ 
sitated either to be good or bad, 
he would not be capable of this 
contrariety.”’ Compare, also, 
Apologia I. 10; and 80. 


PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS. 29 


were hopelessly given over to evil lusts and satanic 
powers. In opposition to this theory, the Christian 
Fathers maintained the essential moral equality and 
similarity of all men, and contended that the varie- 
ties of character seen in human society are varie- 
ties in the manifestation only, and not of the inward 
disposition, and that even these are owing to cir- 
cumstances, and to the different use which indi- 
viduals make of their faculties and powers. 

It was a natural consequence of this polemic 
attitude towards Gnosticism, that the anthropology 
of the 2d and 3d centuries of both the Western and 
the Eastern Church was marked by a very strong 
emphasis of the doctrine of human freedom. Ata 
time when the truth that man is a responsible agent 
was being denied by the most subtle opponents 
which the Christian theologian of the first centuries 
was called to meet, it was not to be expected that 
very much reflection would be expended upon that 
side of the subject of sin which relates to the weak- 
ness and bondage of the apostate will. The Gnostic 
asserted that man was created sinful, and that he 
had no free will. The Ancient Father contented 
himself with rebutting these statements, without 
much reference to the consequences of human apos- 
tacy in the moral agent, and the human will itself. 
When, therefore, the question respecting these con- 
sequences was raised, it is not surprising that there 
was some variety in the answers that were given 


v 


30 


HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY, 


by the different theological ‘schools, and parties, of 


Primitive Christendom.! 


These varieties of opinion 
have been observed and con- 
ceded. Says Carvin (Inst. Il. i. 
4): “On the subject of original sin 
the Fathers had much contention, 
nothing being more remote from 
natural reason, than that all 
should be criminated on account 
of the guilt of one, and thus his 
sin become common; which 
seems to have been the reason 
why the most ancient doctors of 
the Church did but obscurely 
glance at this point, or at least 
explained it with less perspicuity 
than it required.” Hooxer (On 
Justification, Works, II. 530), 
making a distinction between 
error of ignorance, and distinct 
and persistent heresy, remarks: 
“Was not their opinion danger- 
ous, who thought the kingdom 
of Christ should be earthly? was 
not theirs, who thought the gos- 
pel should be preached only to 
the Jews? What more opposite 
to prophetical doctrine concern- 
ing the coming of Christ, than 
the one? concerning the catholic 
church than the other? Yet they 
which had these fancies, even 
when they had them, were not 
the worst men in the world. The 
heresy of free-will was a mill- 
stone about the Pelagian’s neck ; 
shall we therefore give sentence 
of death inevitable against all 
those Fathers in the Greek church, 
who being mispersuaded, died in 


the error of free-will?” Wuuirsy 
(On Original Sin, Ch. viii.) makes 
the following statements. “We 
have, first, the great Petavius (De 
incar. lib. xiv. cap. 2. § 1), ingen- 
uously confessing: ‘That the 
Greeks in their writings seldom 
make any mention, and never an 
express mention, of original sin.’ 
Whitaker (Original Sin, lib. ii. e. 
2), after he had produced many 
passages in which the Fathers 
have spoken of original sin and 
free will incautiously, and with 
too little exactness, has these 
words: ‘Why should I recite 
many other passages of the same 
kind? From these it abundantly 
appears that the Fathers before 
the rise of Pelagius did very often 
think and write more inaccurate- 
ly of original sin and free will, in 
which two articles his heresy did 
mainly consist, than it became 
great doctors of the church; and 
God suffered Pelagius to go on 
for a while, that the catholic Fa- 
thers might learn to judge and 
speak more soundly concerning 
matters of so great consequence. 
And therefore, what the Magde- 
burg Centuriators have written,— 
that the Fathers ascribed too much 
to man’s power, have something 
darkened the subject of human 
corruption, and explained it in a 
manner too slight and mean,—is 
so true that nothing can be more 
certain. Du Moulin, also, holds 


ALEXANDRINE ANTHROPOLOGY. oe 


§ 2. The Alexandrine Anthropology. 


The most unqualified position, in reference to 
the power of free will in apostate man, was taken 
by the Alexandrine School. This was partly the 
result of the excessive speculative tendency by 
which this school was characterized, and partly of 
its collision with Gnosticism. The Alexandrines 
represent the will of man as possessed, notwith- 
standing its apostasy in a pre-existent state, of a 
plenary power to good, and able to turn from sin 
by the exercise of its own inherent energy (avre- 
Clement of Alexandria asserts that “ to 
believe or to disbelieve is as much at the command 


Eouvouorv). 


with Petavius and Whitaker; but 
Vossius endeavors to prove that 
the Greek and Latin Fathers 
taught the same doctrine of origi- 
nal sin essentially.” NiesuHR 
(Life and Letters, p. 530. N. Y. 
Ed.), remarks that, ‘‘ all who are 
acquainted with church history 
know, that no system of doctrine 
respecting redemption, hereditary 
sin, grace, &c., existed for at least 
the first two centuries after 
Christ ; that on these points, 
opinions and teaching were un- 
fettered, and that those were ney- 
er considered as heretics who 
simply accepted the creed (the so- 
called Symbolum Apostolicum), 
kept in communion with the 
church, and were subject to her 


discipline.”—In investigating the 
anthropology of the Fathers, gen- 
erally, it is of great importance 
to notice whether the writer is 
speaking of man as fallen, or as 
unfallen. Assertions made re- 
specting the primitive freedom 
of man as he is by creation should 
not be transferred to his apostate 
condition; and, on the other 
hand, statements that relate to 
the bondage and helplessness of 
the apostate will are not to be 
applied to the unfallen human 
will. Unless this distinction is 
taken into view, one and the 
same writer will, oftentimes, be 
found to teach contradictions ; 
sometimes asserting freedom, and 
sometimes bondage. 


32 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


of our will as to philosophize or not to philoso. 
phize.” “Man, like every other spiritual being, 
can never lose the power of arbitrary choice. By 
means of this power, noble minds, at all times, here 
and hereafter, aided by that Divine Power which is 
indispensable to success, are lifting themselves up 
from ignorance and deep moral corruption, and are 
drawing nearer to God and the truth.” ? 

Yet these statements undergo some modifica- 
tion. Clement also insists upon the necessity of 
divine influences in order to deliverance from sin, 
because, although man is able to commence moral 
improvement by the resolute decision of his will, he 
cannot bring it to completion without the aid of 
divine grace. “God,” he remarks, “co-operates 
with those souls that are willing.” “ As the phy- 
sician furnishes health to that body which syner- 
gizes towards health [by a recuperative energy of 
its own], so God furnishes eternal salvation to those 
who synergize towards the knowledge and obe- 
dience of the truth.”* In these extracts, which 
might be multiplied, Clement teaches that the 
initiative, in the renewal and change of the sinful 
heart, is taken by the sinner himself. The first 
motion towards holiness is the work of man, 
but it needs to be succeeded and strengthened 
by the influences of the Holy Spirit. Whenever, 


1 REDEPENNING: Origenes, I. dives salvus, Cap. XI.; Stromata 
133-135. VII. 
? CLEMENS ALEXANDRINTS: Quis 


ALEXANDRINE ANTHROPOLOGY. 33 


by virtue of its own inherent energy, the soul 
is itself willing, then God co-operates, and concurs 
with this willingness. 

These views of Clement, respecting the power 
to good in apostate man, were shared by Origen.? 
In the third book of the De Principiis, he argues 
that the assertion of the apostle that man’s salva- 
tion “is not of him that willeth,” but “of God that 
showeth mercy,” means merely that the existence 
of the will as a faculty depends upon Divine 
power, and not that the wse of the faculty is thus 
dependent. ‘As we derive it from God that we 
are men, that we breathe, that we move, so also we 
derive it from God that we will. But no one would 
infer from the fact that our capacity to move, the 
hand, e. g.,is from God, that therefore the motion 
of our hand in the act of murder, or of theft, is 
from God.”* Throughout this first chapter of the 
third book of the De Principiis, in which Origen 
enunciates his view of human freedom, and examines 
the Scripture texts that relate to this subject, he 
holds that the relation which the human will sus- 
tains to moral good is precisely the same as that 


* Justin Martyr (Apologia I. 
10) remarks that, “though we had 
no choice in our creation, yet in 
our regeneration we have; for 
God persuades only, and draws 
us gently, in our regeneration, by 
co-operating freely with those ra- 
tional powers he has bestowed 
upon us.” 

VOL, IL.—3 


2? For Origen’s anthropology, 
compare REDEPENNING : Origenes. 
TI. 318, 360. sq.; THomasivs: 
Origenes, p. 195. sq. 

SOrtcenes: Tom. I. 720. Ed. 
Bas. 1771. 


34 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


which it sustains to moral evil. The will znitiates 
both holiness and sin; so that, in Origen’s view, it 
is as incorrect to deny to the human will, be it 
fallen or unfallen, the power to holiness, as it would 
be to deny it the power to sin. Origen’s position 
is, that the will of man is the ultimate efficient in 
either direction, or else it is the ultimate efficient in 
neither direction. 

Origen’s view of the relation which the agency 
of the human will sustains to Divine power in re- 
generation, coincides with that of Clement. The 
finite faculty begins the process of right action, and 
divine grace perfects and completes it. The faculty 
by which to will the right, man has from God; but 
the decision itself is his own act. God’s part is 
therefore greater than man’s; as the creation of a 
faculty is greater than the use of it. Moreover, 
every right beginning of action on the side of man, 
requires a special succor and assistance from God. 
Through the Holy Spirit this succor is granted, 
according to the worthiness of the individual ; and 
thus every right act of man is a mixture of self- 
choice and divine aid. 

The views of Clement and Origen respecting 
original sin harmonized with these views of free 
will and regeneration. To understand their theory 


1 REDEPENNING: Origenes, IT. 522; De Prine. III. 279; Sel. in 
318. His citations are: Fragm. Ps. p. 571,672; Tom. in Matt. 
de Prine. III. p.35; Hom.in Jer. XII. 561. 

VIII. 170; Com. in Rom. iv. 


ALEXANDRINE ANTHROPOLOGY. 35 


of original sin, it will be necessary first to exhibit 
their psychology. They subdivided the constitu- 
tion of man into caue, wuyn, and azvetua. The 
first, was the material part; the second included 
the principle of animal life, together with the sen- 
suous appetites and passions that relate to the phys- 
ical world; while the third was the rational and 
spiritual principle, including the will and the moral 
affections of human nature. Original sin, according 
to the Alexandrine theologians, was confined to the 
two first subdivisions in the trichotomy. It was an 
inherited corruption which has its seat in the body 
and the sensuous nature, but does not inhere in the 
mvevjece, because this is not propagated, and there- 
fore cannot inherit anything. Adopting then, as 
the Alexandrine anthropologist did, the theory of 
pre-existence, it was easy to see that the rational 
part, the zvevuc, coming down from the angelic 
sphere, would be kept, more or less, in isolation 
from the body and its sensuous corruption, and 
might thus be regarded as able by its intrinsic 
energy to rule and overcome this “original sin,” 
this corrupted sensuousness, that was all around it, 
but was not zn it." 

Original sin, being only physical corruption, and 
pertaining only to the bodily and physical nature, 
was not regarded as truly and properly culpable by 


VP Averidextov Tov yxeipover to Prine. III. 1. THomasrus: Orige- 
mvetua. ORIGEN in Joh. xxxii. nes, p. 196. 
Disa 9s) im Matt. x. dil: de 


36 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the Alexandrine school. There is no guilt except 
in the wrong action of the zvevua. Sin, in the strict 
sense, therefore, has no origin in Adam, but is the 
act of the individual will, either in a previous world, 
or in this one. That the individual will, in every 
instance, yields to the solicitation of the corrupt 
sensuousness, Origen accounts for by the force of 
example and education, and not by any connection 
or union between the posterity and the progenitor. 
“Parents,” says Origen, “not only generate their 
children, but also imbue them; and they who are 
born are not merely the children, but the pupils, 
of their parents; and they are urged to the death 
of sin, not so much by natural connection (natura), 
as by training. For illustration, if a man aposta- 
tizing from Christianity should take up the worship 
of idols, would he not teach the children that should 
be begotten, to worship demons and offer sacrifice 
to them? This is what Adam did when he apos- 
tatized from God.” ? 


§ 3. Later-Alexandrine and Antiochian Anthro 
pology. 

The Anthropology indicated in these state- 

ments of Clement and Origen, in a modified form, 


became the type of doctrine in the Oriental Church 
generally. It received a modification in three par- 


+ OrigENES : Com. in Rom. y. 18, Opera II. p. 584. Ed. Basil, 1571. 


LATER-ALEXANDRINE ANTHROPOLOGY. 37 


ticulars: 1. The theory of pre-existence was re 
jected, and that of creationism was substituted. 
2. There was more recognition of the indirect 
effects of the Adamic transgression upon the soul 
itself, including the will (aveiuc). 3. There was 
a more qualified assertion of power to holiness in 
the fallen man. 

These modifications are apparent in the writings 
of the Zater- Alexandrine School, composed of those 
Greek theologians who had felt the influence of 
Origen, viz.: Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, 
Gregory Nyssa, Cyril of Jerusalem, and Cyril of 
Alexandria. These Fathers endeavored to exhibit 
the doctrine of the universality of sin in its relation 
to the sin of Adam, yet did not adopt that doc- 
trine of a propagated sinfulness of the will (avetuce) 
which we shall meet with in the Latin Anthro- 
pology. Original Sin, with them also, is not cul- 
pable. It is only an inherited disorder of the sen- 
suous nature, from which temptation issues, and to 
which the will yields; and not until this act of the 
will is there any sin, properly so called, in man. 
Athanasius was engaged with the discussion of the 
doctrine of the Trinity all his life, and exhibits his 
anthropological opinions only rarely, and in passing. 
But his view of original sin would probably be sum- 
med up in the above-mentioned statement. Hagen- 
bach (Dogmengeschichte, $ 108) quotes a remark of 
Athanasius, to the effect that “many men have be. 


38 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


come pure from all sin,”? in proof of his own state- 


went that Athanasius did not hold to the universal- 
ity ofsin. But the remark of Athanasius when read 
in its original connection shows that he was speak- 
ing not of the unregenerate, but of those who were 
the subjects of renewing divine influence. “ Many,” 
he says, “ have deen made holy and clean from all sin ; 
nay Jeremiah was hallowed from the womb ; never- 
theless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even 
over those that had not sinned after the similitude of 
Adam’s transgression,” and thus “man remained 
mortal and corruptible as before, liable to the affec- 
tions proper to his nature.” 

Cyril of Jerusalem makes the following state- 
ments respecting original sin: “ When we come into 
the world we are sinless (¢vauagrnroc), but now we 
sin from choice.” “Where God first sees a good 
conscience there he bestows the saving seal.” “ We 
did not sin before our souls came into the world ; 
but coming into it free from evil, we transgress by 
the choice of our mind. There is no kind of souls 
that are either sinful or righteous by nature, but 
that we are either the one or the other proceeds 
only from free choice.” “The sentence of death 
threatened against Adam extended to him and all 
his posterity, even unto those who had not sinned 
as Adam did when he disobeyed God by eating the 


1 TIudol yap obv Gytoe yeydvact KaSapoi maons duaprias. Contra Ari- 
anos, III. 33. 


LATER-ALEXANDRINE ANTHROPOLOGY. 39 


forbidden fruit.”* Cyril here implies, that as infants 
have not sinned by a conscious and deliberate act 
of choice they have not sinned at all, and that death 
passes upon them not as penalty, but for other rea- 
sons. Gregory Nazianzen denominates unbaptized 
children aogeayiorous; utv, anovigous 0s. Gregory 
Nyssa asserts a universal tendency to sin in man- 
kind, but denies sin in the sense of guilt, in in- 
fants.’ | 

The Antiochian School, represented by Theo- 
dore of Mopsuestia, Chrysostom, and Theodoret, 
adopted substantially the same anthropology with 
the Later-Alexandrines. They held the doctrine 
of the Adamic connection only so far as the physi- 
cal nature is concerned, and taught that there is an 
inherited evil, or corruption, but not an inherited 
sin. The best representative of this school, and per- 
haps of the Greek anthropology generally, is Chry- 
sostom. He concedes that the mortal Adam could 
beget mortal descendants, but not that the sinful 
Adam could beget sinful descendants. The doctrine 
of propagation, according to him, applies to the 
physical nature of man, but not to his spiritual and 
voluntary. The first progenitors of the human race 
brought corruption, i. e. a vitiated sensuousness, 
but not a sinful w2// into the series of human beings, 


1 Orrittus Hieros.: Cateche- 2? Grecorius Naz.: Orationes, 
ses, IV. xix.; I. iii Compare XL. p. 563, B. 
Wuirsy: On Original Sin, Ch. > Grecorius Nys.: De oratione 


WA Dom.; De Infantibus. 


40 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


and these latter universally adopt it, and strengthen 
it, by the strictly individual choice of their will. In 
his Commentary upon Romans v., Chrysostom thus 
expresses his views. “It is not unbefitting (ovdé» 
azecxoc) that from that man who sinned, and there- 
by became mortal, there should be generated those 
who should also sin, and thereby become mortal; 
but that by that single act of disobedience another 
being is made a stnner, what reason is there in 
this? No one owes any thing to justice, until he 
first becomes asinner for himself (oixodev). What, 
then, is the meaning of the word ¢ueerodol, in the 
phrase ‘were made sinners?’ It seems to me, to 
denote liability to suffering and death.” Here, 
plainly, Chrysostom limits the connection of Adam 
with his posterity to that part of man which is 
other than the strictly voluntary part. The union 
of Adam and his posterity accounts for the origin 
of strong animal passions, of inordinate sensual ap- 
petites, but not for the origin of voluntary wicked- 
ness. This, as it is the act of will, and not the 
mere working of sensuous appetite, has a purely 
individual origin. 

Chrysostom’s theory of regeneration was firmly 
synergistic. If man upon his side works towards 
holiness, God’s grace will come in to succor and 

‘Synergism (ctv €pyov) teaches in the renewing act. But strict 
that there are two efficientsin re- codperation implies concert and 
generation ; that the human will agreement between the two co- 


co-operates, in the strict sense of operating agents; hence syner- 
the term, with the Holy Spirit, gism asserts a certain degree of 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. 41 


strengthen him. In his 16th Homily on Romans, 
his exegesis is as follows: “The phrase ‘it is not of 
him that willeth, nor of him that runneth’ does not 
denude man of power altogether, but indicates that 
the whole power is not of man. Assisting grace is 
needed from above. For, it is necessary that the 
man himself should both will and run; but he is to 
be courageous (cAc¢@getv) and constant [in well do- 
ing], not by his own efforts, but through God’s 
loving kindness.” Again, Chrysostom remarks, that 
“it is necessary for us first to choose goodness, and 
when we have chosen it, then God introduces (eéou- 
yet) goodness from himself. . . . It is our function 
to choose beforehand, and to will, but it is God’s 
function to finish and bring to completion.” ? 


§ 4. Recapitulatory Survey. 


The Greek Anthropology, commencing with the 
extreme positions of Clement and Origen, and pass- 
ing from these into the more guarded statements of 
the Later-Alexandrine and Antiochian Schools, be- 
came the general type of doctrine for the Kastern 
Church ; and under new forms and names has per- 
petuated itself down to the present time. Christen- 


right inclination remaining inthe a maximum or a minimum, and 
human will after apostasy, by hence the varieties of synergism. 
means of which it can concur 1 Onrysostomus: Homilia XII 
with the Divine in regeneration. Ad Hebraes. 

This degree may be more or less, 


42 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


dom from the very beginning became divided inte 
two great dogmatic divisions; in one of which the 
Greek, and in the other, the Latin Anthropology has 
prevailed. A recapitulatory survey of the cardinal 
points of the former presents the following particu- 
lars: 1. Original Sin is not voluntary, and, therefore, 
is not properly sin in the sense of guilt. 2. The 
Adamic connection relates only to the corporeal 
and sensuous nature, and not to the voluntary and 
rational. 38. The voluntary and rational avevwe is 
not propagated, but is created in each individual 
instance, and its action is individual altogether. 
4. The Adamic connection exerts no immediate 
effect upon the will; it affects it only mediately, 
through the fleshly corruption. 5. Infants are guilt- 
less, because they possess only a propagated phys- 
ical corruption. 6. The will takes the initiative in 
regeneration ; but though the first to commence, it 
is unable to complete the work; and hence the 
need of the Divine efficiency, with which the human 
will co-operates as itself an efficient power. 

2 All, or at least the greater any real original sin.” Wuieerrs: 


part of the Fathers of the Greek Augustinism and Pelagianism, p. 
Church, before Augustine, denied 43 (Emerson’s translation). 


CHAPTER III. 


THE LATIN ANTHROPOLOGY. 


§ 1. Zertullian’s Traducianism. 


As has been observed, the Greek anthropology 
was the dominant theory in the Eastern Church, 
and prevailed extensively in the Western. In the 
2d and 3d centuries, many of the Occidental Fathers, 
judging from their writings, would not have quar- 
relled with a statement of the doctrines of sin and 
regeneration substantially like that of Chrysostom. 
But in the writings of the leading minds at the 
West, in the 3d and 4th centuries, we can discover 
the swelling germs of that other theory which 
afterwards became dominant in the Latin Church. 
The fathers in whom this tendency is most apparent 
are Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrose.’ 

Tertullian’s Traducianism, which gradually be- 

* Hippotytvs, the pupil of Ire- ner, and particularly the doctrine 


naeus, states the doctrine of free ofthe origin ofsin. “Man was born 
will in a somewhat guarded man- a creature endued with free will, 


44 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


came the received psychology of the Latin Church, 
paved the way for the doctrine of mnate sin, in 
distinction from innate evi/, and also for the theory 
This Father, start- 
ing from the fact that from birth man is constantly 
inclined to sin, deduced from it his famous maxim: 
Tradux animae, tradux peccatiithe propagation 
of the soul implies the propagation of sin. 

His argument, drawn out in full, was as follows. 
If there can be a traduction of the soul, there can 
be a traduction of sin. Ifa free-agent can be prop- 
agated, then free-agency can be; for the agency 
follows the agent, and shares in all its character- 
istics. If, therefore, there be nothing in a con- 
tinuous process of transmission from a generic unity 
that is incompatible with the nature of a rational 
and voluntary essence like the soul, then there is 


of monergism* in regeneration. 


but not dominant (ovk dpxov) ; hay- 
ing reason, but not able to govern 
everything with reason, authority, 
and power, but aslave (SovAov), and 
having all contraries (ra évavtia) 
in himself. He, in having free 
will, generates evil; but nothing 
evil comes to pass accidentally, 
but only unless thou doest it [by 
design and intentionally]. For, 
in the volition or cogitation of 
evil, evil receives its name, and 
does not exist from the begin- 
ning, but came into existence sub- 
sequently.” WorpswortH: Hip- 
polytus, p. 289 (Philosophumena, 
Ed. Miller, p. 336).—In another 
place (p. 388, Ed. Miller, Words- 


worth, p. 295), he remarks that 
“God made nothing evil, and 
man is endued with free will, 
having the power of willing or 
not willing in himself, and being 
able to do both [good and evil].” 

? Monergism (y6vov épyov) teach- 
es that there is but one efficient 
agent in the regeneration of the 
soul, viz. the Holy Spirit. The 
apostate will, according to this 
theory, possesses not the least de- 
gree of efficiency, or inclination, 
to act holily, until it has been 
acted upon by Divine grace, and 
therefore cannot co-operate in 
the renovating act. 


TERTULLIAN’S TRADUOIANISM. 45 


nothing in such transmission that is incompatible 
with the activity of such an essence, or, in other 
words, with the wolwntariness of sin. If God can 
originate the entire human nature by the method of 
creation, and then can individualize this nature by 
the method of procreation, it follows that he can pre- 
serve all the qualities of the nature,—its rationality, 
its immateriality, its freedom, &c.,—in each of its in- 
dividualizations, and from one end of the process to 
the other; for preservation is comparatively less 
difficult than creation from nothing. In other words, 
if mind, considered as an immaterial substance, does 
not lose its distinctive qualities by being procreated, 
but continues to be intelligent, rational, and volun- 
tary at every point in the process, and in every one 
of its individualizations, then it follows that the 
activities and products of such a mental essence do 
not cease to be rational and responsible activi- 
ties and products, though exhibiting themselves 
in that unbroken continuity which marks a prop- 
agation. It is evident that everything depends 
upon the correctness of the hypothesis that there is 
a traduz animae,—that man is of one generic nature 
as to his spiritual part as well as his physical, and 
that his entire humanity is procreated. Hence the 
importance attached to the Traducian theory of 
the origin of the soul, by Tertullian, and the earnest- 
ness with which he maintained it. 

It is only the beginnings, however, of the Latin 
or Augustinian anthropology, that we can trace in 


46 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Tertullian’s writings. In some instances, he still 
speaks of original sin in the same terms with the 
Greek theologians. His well-known plea for the 
delay of paedo-baptism rests upon the comparative 
innocency of infancy. “Why should the age of 
innocency be in haste to obtain remission of sin?”? 
Yet it would not be correct to infer from this 
phraseology, that Tertullian held to an absolute in- 
nocency upon the part of infants. The innocency 
is relative only ; the infant has not committed “ ac- 
tual” sins, though possessed of a sinful bias, which 
Tertullian held to be condemning, certainly to the 
extent of needing the remission of baptism. 
Tertullian at times, also, employs phraseology 
that looks towards the synergistic theory of re- 
generation. “Some things are by virtue of the 
divine compassion, and some things are by virtue 
of our agency.”? Yet, in his writings, generally, 
the human efficiency is a minimum, and almost dis- 
appears, so that the rudiments of the monergistic 
theory of regeneration are distinctly visible in the 
anthropology of the North-African Church, which 
was mainly shaped by them. In his tract De Andma, 
Tertullian, with allusion to Scripture phraseology, . 
remarks: “ And thus stones shall become the chil- 
dren of Abraham, if they be formed by the faith 
of Abraham, and the progeny of vipers shall bring 


1“ Quid festinat innocens aetas 2 TerTULLIANUS: Ad uxorem, 
ad remissionem peccatorum?” ce. 21. 
De Bapt. 18. 


CYPRIAN, AMBROSE, HILARY. 47 


forth the fruits of repentance, if they spit away 
the poison of their malignity. But this involves 
the energy of divine grace, more powerful than 
that of nature, and which holds in subjection to 
itself that free power of will within us which is 
denominated avretovecov.” } 


§ 2. Anthropology of Cyprian, Ambrose, and Hilary. 


The writings of Cyprian (+ 258) exhibit an in- 
creasing tendency in the Western Church towards 
the doctrine of an original sinfulness, and a moner- 
gistic renovation of the human soul. The pressure 
from Gnosticism was now less heavy, and the atten- 
tion of theologians was being turned more to the 
effects of sin upon the will itself. As a consequence, 
less emphasis was placed upon the doctrine of human 
power, and more upon that of Divine grace. “ All 
our ability,” says Cyprian,’ “is of God. In him we 
live, in him we have strength. Our heart merely 
lies open and thirsts. In proportion as we bring a 
recipient faith, do we drink in the inflowing grace.” 
Respecting the gut of original sin, Cyprian is fluc- 
tuating, and not entirely consistent with himself. 
He seems to hold that original sin is not so culpable 
as actual sin, and yet teaches that it needs remis- 
sion. “The infant,” he remarks,® “has committed 

1 TERTULLIANtS: De anima, c. 21. 3 Cyprianus: Ad Fidum, e. 5. 


? Cypriants: De gratia, ad Do- 
natum, c. 4 5. 


48 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


no sin. He has only contracted the contagion of 
death from his progenitor, and hence remission of 
sin is more easy in his case, because it is not his 
own but another’s sin that is remitted to him.” 

In the writings of Ambrose (+ 3897) and Hilary 
(+ 368), the two most distinguished Latin theolo- 
gians of the 4th century, we find the doctrine of a 
sinful, as distinguished from a corrupt, nature still 
more distinctly enunciated than in Tertullian and 
Cyprian, and more use made of the ideas and 
phraseology of the fifth chapter of Romans. The 
from Ambrose’? will indi- 
cate his general view of original sin, and of the 
Adamic connection. Quoting Romans y. 12, which 
in the version of his day was rendered “in whom 
all have sinned,” he remarks: “ Adam existed (fuit), 
and we all existed in im; Adam perished, and all 
perished in him.” “ We all sinned in the first man, 
and by the succession -of nature, the succession of 
guilt (culpae) was transfused from one to all.” 
“Before we are born, we are stained with conta- 
gion, and before we see the light we receive the 
injury of the original transgression.” “ ‘In whom all 


following passages 


‘AveustineE (Opus imp. lib. 
TV. Ed. Migne X. 1400) quotes 
Ambrose to Julian as follows: 
‘“‘Audi ergo Juliane: ‘Omnes’ 
inquit, ‘in Adam moriuntur ;’ 
quia ‘per unum hominem pecca- 
tum intravit in mundum, et per 
peccatum mors; et ita in omnes 


homines pertransiit, in quo om- 
nes peccaverunt;’ illius ergo eul- 
pa mors omnium est (Lib. IV. in 
Lucam iv. 38). Audi adhuc ali- 
ud: ‘Fuit,’ inquit, ‘Adam, et in 
illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, 
et omnes in illo perierunt’ ” (Lib, 
VII. in Lue. xv. 24). 


CYPRIAN, AMBROSE, HILARY. 49 


sinned,’ —thus it is evident that all sinned in Adam, 
as if in a mass; for having corrupted by sin those 
whom he begat, all are born under sin. Wherefore 
we all are sinners from him (ex eo), because we all 
are [men] from him.”* Statements similar to these 
are made by [Hilary 

We find, then, the germinal substance of the Au- 
gustinian theory of sin, so far as concerns the 
Adamie connection, in the century previous to that 
in which Augustine’s principal dogmatic influence 
falls. Indeed, it is evident that this latter Father 
was the recipient as well as the propagator of that 
particular system which goes by his name. He only 
developed an anthropology that had been gradually 
forming in preceding centuries, out of that remark- 
able dogmatic material which is contained in the 
fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. 

Respecting the other anthropological question : 
viz. To what degree is the power of the human 
will weakened by sin? both Ambrose and Hilary 
teach the synergistic theory; although with less 
firmness, and more self-contradiction, than we have 
found in the earlier Latin Fathers.. The follow- 
ing passages from Ambrose illustrate his vacil- 
lation. “The apostle says, ‘Whom he foreknew, 
them he also predestinated:’ for he did not pre- 

1 Amprosius: Apol. David pos- mentatio in Matthaeum X. § 23;. 

terior; Ad Psalmum LIT. 7; In In Psalmum 118; Cont. duas 
ep. ad Rom. c. 5. Expositio sec. Epist. Pelag. lib. 1V., Ed. Migne, 
Lucam 7. X. 614. 


?Compare AtGusTINE: Com- 
VOL. 11.—4 


50 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


destinate before he foreknew, but to those whose 
merit he foreknew, he predestinated the rewards of 
merit.” “The will of man is brought into a state 
of recipiency (praeparatio) by God. For that God 
may be honored by a holy will is through God’s 
grace.”* A comparison of the latter passage with 
the former evinces a mental wavering between 
synergism and monergism. Hilary is more 
explicit and firm in favor of the theory of co- 
operation; although asserting the weakness of 
the apostate will. The following passages indi- 
cate his views. “In preserving our righteousness, 
unless we are guided by God, we shall be in- 
ferior through our own nature. Wherefore, we 
need to be assisted and directed by his grace in 
order to attain the righteousness of obedience.” 
“The persevering in faith is of God, but the origin 
and commencement of faith is from ourselves.” “ It 
is the part of divine mercy to assist the willing, to 
confirm those who are making a beginning, to re- 
ceive those who are approaching. But the com- 
mencement is from ourselves, that God may finish 
and perfect.” ? 


§ 3. Anthropology of Augustine. 


The anthropology indicated in these extracts 


1 Awprosius: De fide, lib. V. tera i. 12; In Psal. CXIX, litera 
n. 83; Expositio in Lucam, lib. I. xiv. 10; In Psal. CXIX, litera 
? Hinarivus: In Psal. CXIX, li- xvi. 10. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 51 


from Tertullian, Cyprian, Hilary, and Ambrose, 
grew more and more definite in the Latin Church, 
and became theoretically the established faith with- 
It was wrought out into its most distinct 
form, and received its fullest statement, in the 
Patristic period, in the Augustinian anthropology, 
of which we shall now make a detailed examina- 
tion.? 

In the first part of his Christian life, Augustine 
was influenced by the views of his teacher Ambrose, 
and occasionally attributed a certain amount of co- 
operating efficiency to the human will in the work 
In his earlier writings, some ten- 
dency to synergism is apparent.? For example, in 
his Exposition of certain points in the Epistle to 


in it. 


of regeneration. 


*Compare Gurricke : Church 
History § 91-93, for a compre- 
hensive and compressed state- 
ment. 

? The treatises cf Augustine in 
which synergism appears are: De 
libero arbitrio lib. III; Ad Sim- 
plicianum lib. II; De catechizan- 
dis rudibus ; Expositio propositio- 
num ex epistola ad Romanos.— 
“ Augustine, in the earlier part 
of his Christian life, had the Semi- 
Pelagian view of the nature of 
faith. In De Praedestinatione 
Sanctorum III,and De Dono Per- 
severantiae XX, Augustine grants, 
that at a former period, he was 
himself in error, and held faith 
in God, or the assent which we 
give to the gospel, not as a gift 
from Him, but as something 


which we ourselves produce, by 
which we obtain God’s gract to 
live devoutly and righteously; 
but that he had been taught 
something better, especially by 
the words of Paul, 1 Cor. iv. 7: 
‘What hast thou, that thou hast 
not received?’” WiceErs: Au- 
gustinism, translated by Emerson, 
p. 199. ‘* But it will be said, Am- 
brose, Origen, and Jerome, be- 
lieved that God dispenses his 


‘grace among men, according to 


his foreknowledge of the good 
use which each individual will 
make of it. Augustine also was of 
the same sentiment; but when he 
had made a greater proficiency in 
scriptural knowledge, he not only 
retracted it, but powerfully con- 
futed it.” Catyry: Inst. II. viii. 


52 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the Romans he remarks: “ It is nowhere said that 
God believes all things in us. Our faith, therefore, 
is our own; but the good works that we perform 
are of him who gives the Spirit to those who be- 
lieve . . . It is ours to believe and to will; but it 
is his to give, through his Spirit, to those who be- 
lieve and will, the power of performing good works. 
... God gives his holy Spirit to one whom he 
foreknows will believe, so that by performing good 
works he may attain eternal life.”* The two last 
statements, Augustine formally retracts in his final 
revision of his works.’ 

The external cause of this synergism in Augus- 
tine’s earlier writings, besides the influence of the 
undecided views of Ambrose and Hilary, was the 
Manichaeism from which he had just escaped, and 
against which he felt a strong repugnance.* This 
scheme, like the Gnosticism of the 2d and 3d cen- 
turies, made sin a thing of creation and natural ne- 
cessity, so that the same motive for emphasizing 
the doctrines of free-will and human _ responsi- 
bility existed in the case of Augustine, that ex- 
isted in the instances of Origen and Tertullian. 
On the other hand, his growing experience of 
the depth of moral evil within his own soul, and 
the whole course of his Christian life so vividly 

*Expositio quorondarum pro- ? Retractationes I. 23 ; II. 3. 
positionum ex Epistola ad Ro- ° Confessions VII. iii. 4, 5, sq. 
manos, ¢. 60, 61, 6. Compare 


BaumGarrten-Orvsius : Dogmen- 
geschichte II. 246, Note b. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 53 


portrayed in his Confessions, were forcing upon his 
notice the fact, that the w7ll, the higher spiritual 
faculty, as well as the lower sensuous nature, has 
felt the effects of the apostasy in Adam. The Greek 
anthropology, we have seen, excepted the volun- 
tary part of man when speaking of the consequences 
of Adam’s transgression, and limited them to the 
bodily and sensuous part. But the severe conflict 
which Augustine was called to wage with his bodily 
appetites, and his old heathen habits, revealed to him 
the fact that the governing power of the soul, the will 
itself, has been affected by the same apostasy that 
has affected the other parts of human nature. “I 
was bound,” he says, “not with another’s irons, but 
by my owniron will. My weld the enemy held, and 
thence had made a chain for me, and bound me. 
For of a perverse will came lust; and a lust yielded 
to becomes custom; and custom not resisted be- 
comes necessity (necessitas). By which links, as it 
were, joined together as in a chain, a hard bondage 
held me enthralled.”* In this way, Augustine’s 
attention was directed to the reflex influence of sin 
itself upon the voluntary faculty, whereby its energy 
to holiness is destroyed, and it becomes by its own 
act an enslaved will. His experience of the truth 
that even after regeneration, “to will is present,” 
but “how to perform,” the will “finds not,” led 
Augustine to his fundamental position, that original 


‘ Aueustinus: Confessiones imperfectum, Ed. Migne X. 1467. 
VIII. v. 10, 11. Compare Opus 


54 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


sin is in the z/7/] as well as in the sensuous nature, 
and has vitiated the voluntary power along with all 
the other powers of man. This practical experience, 
and the important speculative conflict with Pela- 
gianism and Semi-Pelagianism, were the causes of 
Augustine's transition from the Greek anthropology 
of his earlier days, to that other view to which his 
own name has been affixed. * 

The following are the essential points in the 
Augustinian anthropology.” Man was created in the 
image of God,—that is with a will inclined and de- 
The 
primitive holiness of man was not his own product, 
in the sense that he is the ultimate author of it, be- 
cause he would then be entitled to the glory of it. 
All finite holiness, be it in man or angel, is only 
relatively meritorious, because it is the result of 
God’s working in man or angel to will and to do. 
As possessed of this con-created holiness, man was 
immortal, both in regard to body and soul. He 
was not liable to death in any form. With 
this condition of holiness, was coupled the pos- 
sibility of originating sin de néhilo® This, in re- 


termined to holiness, and positively holy. 


? Respecting the alleged contra- II. 20 (Ed. Migne I. 1270). “ Mo- 


dictions in Augustine’s views, 
compare Ganeaur: Psychologie 
des Augustinus, 325 sq. 

? The Biblical data for Augus- 
tine’s theory are presented in 
Wiceers’ Augustinism (Emer- 
son’s translation), Chap. XX. 

* Aueustinus: De lib. arbitrio 


tus ergo ille aversionis, quod fate- 
mur esse peccatum, quoniam de- 
fectivus motus est, omnis autem 
defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo 
pertineat, et ad Deum non perti- 
nere ne dubites. Qui tamen de- 
fectus quoniam est voluntarius, in 
nostra est positus potestate.” 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 55 


lation to the existing determination to goodness, was 
the power of contrary choice. This power was not 
added for the purpose of making man a free agent, 
but a probationary agent. Adam was already free, 
in his inclination to good. When God works in the 
finite will, to will and to do, there is no compulsion. 
But man could not be put upon probation, unless a 
power to the contrary, or a power to create sin out 
of nothing, were superadded to his freedom. The 
power to the contrary, therefore, was not the sub- 
stance of moral freedom, but only an accident ex- 
isting for a temporary purpose merely. Man, though 
endowed with this power of contrary choice, was 
commanded not to use it,—which is another proof 
that it is not needed in order to moral freedom. 
Man would not have been forbidden to use a power 
that belongs necessarily, and intrinsically, to free 
will. But if the power were used, Adam would 
become both sinful and mortal. His original right- 
eousness would be totally lost; original sin would 
take the place of it in his soul; his body would be 
subject to temporal death, and his soul to eternal. 
Augustine distinguished between absolute per- 
fection, and relative perfection. The former is the 
perfection of God, who is destitute of the power of 
sinning. Those angels who have passed through pro- 


1The Divine will is free, and 


—6 yap Seds dreipactds €ort. But 


yet it does not possess the power 
of originating sin. The apostle 
James affirms that “‘ God cannot 
be tempted with evil.” The 
Deity is absolutely untemptable, 


a being who cannot even be tempt- 
ed cannot sin, because this would 
imply voluntary action without 
any motive. 


56 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


bation successfully are also absolutely perfect ; not, 
however, because of aself-subsistent energy like that 
of God, but because they are “kept from falling.” But 
the primitive state of man was that of relative per- 
fection only. Though holy, his holiness was neither 
self-derived nor self-subsistent; and neither was it 
so established by divine power that he could not 
apostatize." Whether he should become absolutely 
perfect, like God and the elect angels, depended 
upon the use which he should make of his proba- 
tionary power to the contrary, during the period of 
probation. If Adam had continued to will holi- 
ness, his power to will sin would have dimin- 
ished, by the operation of a natural law, until it 
reached the minimum point, and would then have 
vanished forever. When his probation was thus 
over, his will would have become so profoundly 
harmonized with that of God, that the hazards of 
apostasy would no more pertain to him, than to the 
Deity. The relative perfection with which he had 
been endowed by creation, would have resulted in 
absolute perfection ; that is, the incapability of sin- 
ning, which belongs to God and the holy angels. 
But this was not the actual result. Adam was 


“~ 


*“Man in his state of inno- Avucustinus: De Genesi ad lit. 
cency had freedom and power to XI. vii. (Ed. Migne III. 433); 
will and to do that which is good Howe: I. 133, II. 1196; Samuen 
and well-pleasing to God; but MHopxtys: Works, I. 148, 172, 
yet mutably, so that he might 173, 176. 
fall from it.” WerstMiNsTER Con- ? Aucustinus: Opera X. 1518; 
FEssion: Ch. IX. Compare also, VII. 802 (Ed. Migne), 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 57 
tempted, and induced by Satan to use the power 
of contrary choice. He thereby originated sin de 
nihilo, and by ultimate efficiency. He is now sinful 
in the inclination and determination of his will. 
His body has become mortal,’ and his soul is con- 
demned to everlasting death. His condition is now 
directly contrary to what it would have been, had 
he continued in holiness. Had he passed through 
probation safely, he would have become unable to 
sin; but having failed to do so, he is now unable to 
originate holiness and recover himself from apos- 
tasy.” According to the Augustinian anthropology, 
there are two reasons for this. In the first place, 
the power to the contrary, in either direction, is 
only an accident of voluntariness, and not its sub- 


1«TF Adam had not sinned, 
he would not have been de- 
spoiled of his body, but would 
have been clothed with immor- 
tality and incorruptibility, that 
what is mortal should be swal- 
lowed up of life, i. e. pass from 
the animal to the spiritual state.” 
Aueustinus: De pec. mer. I. ii. 
4. “The death of the body is a 
penalty, since the spirit, because 
it voluntarily left God, leaves the 
body against its will; so that, 
as the spirit left God because it 
chose to, it leaves the body al- 
though it chooses not to.” Av- 
eustinus: De Trin. IV. xiii.; De 
Gen. ad lit. IX. x. Augustine 
distinguished between a “‘ minor” 
and a “major” immortality. 
Adam by creation possessed the 


first,—namely, the possibility of 
dying, in case of sinning. Had 
he not fallen, he would have at- 
tained the latter, which is pos- 
sessed also by the resurrection 
body, and the angels,—namely, 
the impossibility of dying, found- 
ed upon the impossibility of sin- 
ning. Aucustinus: Op. Imp. VI. 
XXX. 

2“ Man was so created with 
free-will, as not to sin if he 
willed not to, but not so, that if 
he willed, he could sin with im- 
punity. What wonder, then, if, 
by transgressing, i. e. by chang- 
ing the rectitude in which he 
was made, he is followed with 
the punishment of not being able 
to do right.” Avucustinus: Op. 
Imp. VI. xii. (Ed. Mizne X. 1522.) 


58 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


stance. Voluntariness, whether it be holy or sin- 
ful, consists in sé/f-motion with absence of compul- 
sion. Adam’s righteousness was spontaneous self- 
motion, and the power to originate sin did not ren- 
der it any more so, by being bestowed, nor would it 
have rendered it any less so, by being withheld. 
Adam’s sinfulness was pure and simple self-will, 
self-decision, and did not require the additional 
power to originate holiness, in order to be self-will. 
Voluntariness consists in positively willing the one 
thing that is willed, and not in the bare possibility 
of willing a contrary thing. If a person walk by 
his own self-decision, this self-decision would be 
neither strengthened nor weakened by endowing 
him with another power to fly. His voluntariness 
depends upon the single fact that he is walking 
without external compulsion, and of his own accord. 
There are many other things which might be de- 
nied to his option, yet the denial would not inyali- 
date the fact that he is moving of, and from, his 
own determination. In the second place, the power 
to the contrary, in reference to a sinful will, would 
be a power to originate holiness by an ultimate 
efficiency. But this power, according to Augus- 
tine, belongs solely to the Deity, and is as incom- 
municable to any created will human or angelic, as 
omnipotence or omniscience itself. For any being 
who originates holiness by his own ultimate effi- 
ciency is worthy of the veneration and worship due 
to holiness. The finite will can be the ultimate 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 


59 


efficient of sin; and hence unfallen Adam could be 
endowed with a power to originate sin,—or, with 
the power to the contrary, downward. But holi- 
ness in the creature must always be the result 


of God working in him to will 


Hence fallen 


Adam could not be endowed with the power to 
originate holiness by ultimate efficiency,—or, with 
the power to the contrary, upward. The power 
of contrary choice, therefore, according to the Au- 


1“ Free will was sufficient for 
sin; but not adequate to good, 
unless aided by the Omnipotent 
Good.” Aveustinus: De cor. et 
gratia, XI. xxxi. (Ed. Migne, X. 
935). To the objection which 
the Pelagians continually urged 
against the doctrine of an enslay- 
ed and impotent will, that ‘‘ God 
would not command man to do 
what cannot be done by man,” 
Augustine makes the reply, that, 
“God commands man to do what 
he was able to do by creation, but 
is now wnable to do by reason of 
apostasy, in order that he may 
come to know what he must seek 
from Him and His grace,”—*“‘ ideo 
jubet aliqua quae non possumus, 
ut noverimus quod ab illo petere 
debeamus.” Aveutstrnus: De 
gratia, et lib. arbitrio, I. xvi. 32. 
After quoting the words of 
Christ: ‘‘No man can come unto 
me, except the Father, which hath 
sent me, draw him” (John vi. 44), 
Augustine remarks: ‘“ He does 
not say lead him, for this would 
imply that the sinful will antici- 


pates and goes before the Holy 
Spirit. For who is drawn, if he 
is already inclined to go? And 
yet no one comes to Christ unless 
he is inclined. The sinful man 
therefore is drawn, not led, in a 
wonderful manner, by Him who 
knows how to work within the 
hearts of men, so that they are 
changed from opposition to wil- 
lingness.” Again, quoting the 
declaration of St. Paul (2 Cor. iii. 
5): “‘ Not that we are sufficient of 
ourselves to think anything as of 
ourselves; but our sufficiency is 
of God,” he adds: “ To think any- 
thing, especially any good thing. 
But to think is less difficult than 
to desire; for we can think of 
anything that we desire, but we 
cannot desire anything that we 
think of. If then our sufficiency 
is of God in order to think any 
good thing, much more is it to de- 
sire and to do any good thing.” 
Aveustinus: Contra duas episto- 
las Pelagianorum, I, xix. 37; IL 
viii. 18. 


60 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


gustinian anthropology, can be given in only one 
direction. It is a transient and accidental char- 
acteristic of the human will, which is intended 
to belong to it only during the middle or proba- 
tionary stage in its history, and which disappears 
either in a state of immutable holiness, or immuta- 
ble sin. The assertions of Augustine are frequent — 
upon this point, and very explicit. “God,” he 
remarks, “ was able to make man so that he should 
not be able to sin; but he chose rather to make 
him so that it should lie in his power to sin, if he 
would, and not tosin, if he would not; forbidding 
the one, enjoining the other; that it might be to 
him, first, a merit not to sin, and afterwards a just 
reward to be unable to sin. For in the end, he 
will make all his saints to be without power to 
pun. 2 

It is here that we notice the marked difference 
between the Latin and the Greek anthropology, in 
respect to the idea, and definition, of the will. The 
Latin anthropology regards the will as always in a 
state of decision, by its very nature. Voluntariness 
belongs as intrinsically to the faculty of will, as in- 
telligence does to the faculty of understanding. A 
will that is characterless would be an involuntary 
will; which is as great asolecism as an unintelligent 
understanding. The Greek anthropology, on the 
contrary, conceives of the voluntary faculty as in- 


1 Aveustinus: De continertia, Church History, p. 879, Note 
ce. xvi. Compare GuUERICKE: 2, 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 61 


trinsically undecided. At and by creation, it is 
without character, because it is in a state of indif- 
ference. Taken and held at the instant of crea- 
tion, the human will is an inactive and involuntary 
essence, because it is undetermined either to good 
or evil. From this unelective and inactive state, 
it starts out an election, a voluntariness, either of 
good or evil. Hence, God cannot create a holy 
will, any more than he can create an evil will; be- 
cause this would imply a determined will. In brief, 
the Greek idea of the will is, that it is a vacuum 
which is to make itself a plenum by a vacuum’s 
activity.” 

Again, the Latin definition of freedom is wholly 
diverse from the Greek. In the Latin anthropology, 
freedom is se/f-determination ; in the Greek anthro- 
pology, it is ¢z-determination, or indifference. Ac- 
cording to Augustine, a faculty is free when it acts 
purely from within itself, and is not forced to act 
from without.? If, therefore, the human will moves 


? Peracius adopts this idea, and 
applies it to original sin. He de- 


Contra duas epist. xviii. I. (Ed. 
Migne, X. 567). Augustine ar- 


nies that man, as born, possesses 
any inherited vitiosity,—‘ capa- 
ces enim utriusque rei, non pleni 
nascimur; sine virtute et vitio 
procreamur.” Pertacrcs: De li- 
bero arbitrio, quoted in AveustI- 
nus: De peccato orig. c. xiii. 

? “ No man is compelled by the 
power of God to evil or good; 
but that he wills the good is a 
work of grace.” AUGUSTINUS: 


gues that the will is free (in the 
sense of uncompelled) in sin, be- 
cause it delights in sin. “Sed 
haec voluntas guae libera est in 
malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo 
libera in bonis non est quia libe- 
rata non est.” Contra duas epist. 
Pelag. lib. lL. (Ed. Migne, X. 554). 
‘“Voluntariness has not perished 
in the sinner, because he sins 
with delight, and delight is vol- 


62 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


towards a proposed end, by its own se/f-motion, this 
self-motion alone constitutes its voluntariness.’ It is 
not necessary to endow it with an additional power 
to move in a contrary direction. Such a super- 
addition of power would add nothing to the already 
existing fact of an unforced se/f-motion. Even when 
the power to the contrary, or the possibilitas peccan- 
di, is given for purposes of probation, the real free- 
dom of the will, according to Augustine, is seen in 
not using it, rather than in using it,—in continuing 
to will the right, and refusing to will the wrong. 
Persistency in the existing determination, and not a 
capricious departure into another determination, is 
the token of true rational liberty. “ Velle et nolle, 
propriae voluntatis est,”*—by which Augustine 
means that, to will holiness and to nill sin, not, to 
will ether holiness or sin, is the characteristic of the 


untariness.” Contra duas episto- 
las Pelag. I. ii. 

*Compulsion may be by physic- 
al law ; as when, for example, the 
particles of water fall down a pre- 
cipice. In this instance, the mole- 
cule of water is as really pushed 
down by the power of gravitation, 
as if there were a hand behind it 
urging it on. The real motive 
power is the force of gravity, and 
not aforce in the particle of water. 
There is, consequently, no seé/- 
motion in a water fall. The same 
reasoning also applies to the 
spontaneity of physical growth. 
There is no self, and no self/-mo- 


tion, in the plant, but only the 
movement caused by the law of 
life. Augustine’s idea of will 
makes it a power of origination, 
or causation, in distinction from 
a power of alternative choice. In 
this respect, his view resembles 
that of Kanr (Practische Ver- 
nunft, 78 sq.), with the important 
difference, however, that Augus- 
tine would not attribute a power 
of origination to the finite will, 
upon the side of holiness, except 
as the Infinite Will works in and 
upon it. 

? Aveustinus: De gratia et li- 
bero arbitrio, ¢. iil. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 63 


will. In the Greek anthropology, on the contrary, 
the substance of moral freedom consists in what the 
Latin anthropologist regards as the accident,—viz., 
in the power to do another thing, or to do different- 
ly. It is not sufficient that the will be uncompelled, 
and self-moved. It must possess, over and above. 
this, a power of alternative choice,—the possibilitas 
utriusque partis. Hence the human will, by crea- 
tion and structure, is indifferent and undetermined. 
Having no choice by and at creation, it can choose 
with equal facility either of the two contraries, holi- 
ness orsin. And in this fact, and not in its positive 
self-motion, consists its freedom. 

To recapitulate, then, the principal points in the 
Augustinian anthropology are the following. Adam 
as created and unfallen was positively holy, in the 
sense of possessing a holy inclination or determina- 
tion of his will. This holy inclination or determina- 
tion was accompanied, for merely probationary pur- 
poses, with an accidental and negative power to the 
contrary, or a possibility of originating sin de néhilo. 
His freedom consisted solely in this holy inclination, 
—in this unforced se/f-motion of his will to good. 
Neither the presence nor the absence of a power to 
do something other than the right, could affect the 
fact that he was doing the right, and without com- 
pulsion. Hence, according to Augustine, Adam’s 
power to the contrary, which was the power to ruin 
himself and his posterity, was not necessary to con- 
stitute him a voluntary agent. He would still have 


64 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 

been willingly holy, even if God had not placed 
him upon probation, and super-added the power of 
willingly sinning. The possibilitas peccandi, there- 
fore, was an accident, and not the essence, of moral 
agency. God is a moral agent, and yet can neither 
apostatize, nor be put upon probation.* Hence 
Adam was commanded no# to use this accident of 
moral agency. It was intended to disappear in and 
with the process of probation ; and when it had so 
disappeared, Adam would have still been, as before, 
willingly holy, without the possibility of sin and 


self-ruin. The relative 


' AUGUSTINE notices that there 
is a point, even in reference to 
the human will, where freedom 
and necessity coincide. ‘Some 
voluntary things are also neces- 
sary things. It is necessary, for 
example, that we will to be hap- 
py; for we cannot will to be 
miserable. And it is necessary 
that we will something or other; 
for we cannot stop willing. It is 
necessary, therefore, that we will, 
and that we will happiness. Sunt 
et voluntaria necessaria, sicut be- 
ati esse volumus, et necesse est ut 
velimus.” Opus imp. V. Ixy. (Ed. 
Migne, X. 273, 1489). Jeremy 
Taytor (Efficient Causes of Hu- 
man Actions, Rule J. 5) remarks 
that “in moral and spiritual 
things, liberty and indetermina- 
tion are weakness, and suppose a 
great infirmity of our reason, and 
a great want of love. For if we 
understood all the degrees of 


perfection of a creature 


amability in the service of God, 
and if we could love God as he 
deserves, we could not deliberate 
concerning his service, and we 
could not possibly choose or be 
in love with obedience, we should 
have no liberty left, nothing con- 
cerning which we could deliber- 
ate; for there is no deliberation 
but when something is to be re- 
fused, and something is to be 
preferred, which could not be, 
but that we understand good but 
little, and love it less. For the 
saints and angels in heaven, and 
God himself, love good and can- 
not choose evil, because to do so 
were imperfection and infelicity ; 
and the devils and aceursed souls 
hate all good without liberty and 
indifferency: but between these 
is the state of man in the days of 
his pilgrimage, until he comes to 
a confirmation in one of the op- 
posite terms.” 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 65 


placed upon temporary trial, to see if he would re- 
tain his virtue, would have become the absolute 
perfection of a creature who has safely passed 
through probation. On the other hand, Adam 
the fallen is positively sinful; in the sense of 
possessing a sinful inclination or determination 
of will, ‘This inclination is the activity of the 
will, and not its substance. It is the creature’s 
unforced, selfmoved energy. It is not, as holi- 
ness is, the activity of the will when under the in- 
fluence of God “ working in it to will.” On the 
contrary it is the creature’s merest self-will, unin- 
fluenced by the Holy Ghost. It is, consequently, 
the most extreme kind of séf-motion. It is self 
will, or wilfulness, in its most intense form. It is 
voluntariness in the strongest manner conceivable. 
This wrong inclination of the will is not accom- 
panied with a power to the contrary, as the primi- 
tive right inclination was. And this for two rea- 
sons. First, the power to the contrary is not neces- 
sary in order to voluntary action. It is needed only 
for purposes of probation ; and after probation has 
been ended by an act of apostasy there is no further 
need of it, because it has answered the purpose for 
which it was bestowed. Secondly, a power to the 
contrary possessed by a will with a sinful inclina- 
tion, would be a power to originate holiness dé nz- 
hilo. The creature, in this case, would be the ulti- 
mate efficient of holiness as he is of sin, and be 


capable of an absolute merit as he is of an absolute 
Vor. 1.—5 


66 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


demerit. But such a power is incommunicable to 
the finite will, because it would place the creature 
upon a level with the Creator, in respect to moral 
excellence, and desert of worship. The guilt of sin 
consists in its unforced wilfulness ; and this guilt is 
not in the least diminished by the fact that the 
will cannot overcome its own wilfulness. For this 
wicked wilfulness was not created in the will, but 
is the product of the will’s act of apostasy. The 
present impotence to holiness is not an original and 
primitive impotence. By creation Adam had plen- 
ary power, not indeed to originate holiness, for no 
creature has this, but to preserve and perpetuate it. 
The present destitution of holiness, and impossi- 
bility of originating it, is due therefore to the crea- 
ture’s apostatizing agency, and is a part of his con- 
demnation.' 

Augustine’s theory of regeneration is, conse- 
quently, entirely monergistic.? The work of the 


“Tf any one wish to dispute 
with God, and to escape his judg- 
ment by the pretext of having 
been incapable of acting other- 
wise, he is prepared with an an- 
swer, which we have elsewhere 
advanced, that it arises not from 
creation, but from the corruption 
of nature, that men, being en- 
sfaved by sin, can will nothing 
but what is evil. For whence 
proceeded that impotence, of 
which the ungodly would gladly 
avail themselves, but from Adam’s 


voluntarily devoting himself to 
the tyranny of the devil?” Cat- 
vin: Institutes, IT. v. 1. 

2 « Without grace we can do no- 
thing, achieve nothing, commence 
nothing.” ‘There are certain 
characteristics of the soul which 
perish through an evil will, and 
this so that they cannot be recoy- 
ered by a good will, unless God 
does that which men cannot 
do.” Aveustinus: Ad Bonifa- 
cium, IT. ix.; Opus imperfectum, 
VI. xviii. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE, 


67 


Holy Spirit is necessary not merely to supplement 
a deficiency in the power of fallen man, but to take 
the very initiative, and renovate the will itself. 
Divine agency is the sole originating cause of holi- 
ness in fallen man.’ The only righteousness which 
the unrenewed will is able to work out is that ex- 
ternal righteousness which Augustine denominates 
justitia civilis, and which the modern denominates 
“morality.” That internal righteousness, which 
consists in a spiritual and total conformity to law, 
Augustine contended is beyond the competence of 
the apostate will to produce. Grace is imparted to 
sinful man, not because he believes, but in order 
that he may believe; for faith itself is the gift of 
God.? The method of regeneration, in Augustine’s 


1See Aveustinus: Cont. duas 
epist. lib. IV. (Kd. Migne, X. 
618) for the Scripture citations : 
1 Oor. iv. 7. ‘‘For who maketh 
thee to differ from another? and 
what hast thou that thou didst 
not receive?” John xv.5. ‘‘ With- 
out me ye can do nothing.” John 
vi. 44. ‘“*No man can (dvvarat) 
come to me, except the Father 
which hath sent me draw him.” 
1 John iv. 7. ‘‘ Love is of [from] 
God.” Rom. xii. 38. “God hath 
dealt to every man the measure 
of faith.” John iii. 8. ‘The wind 
bloweth where it listeth.” Rom. 
viii. 14.“ As many as are led by 
the spirit of God, they are the 
sons of God.” John vi. 65. “No 
man can come unto me, except it 


were given him of my Father.” 
Jer. xxxii. 40, 41. “I will put 
my fear in their hearts, that they 
shall not depart from me, and I 
will visit them that I may make 
them good” (Sept. Ver.). Ezekiel 
XXXVI. 22-38. 

2“The Pelagians say in praise 
of free will, that ‘grace assists 
the good intention of every man.’ 
This might be accepted as a true 
and catholic doctrine, provided 
such a merit were not supposed 
to be in the good intention as de- 
serves the assistance of grace, 
and provided it were acknowl- 
edged, and added in explanation, 
that the good intention which has 
grace for ‘its consequent could 
not have been in man unless it 


68 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


scheme, is as follows. The Holy Spirit is the effi. 
cient ; the human spirit is the recipient. The former 
acts independently ; the latter acts only as it is acted 
npon. The consequence of the divine efficiency is 
regeneration ; the consequence of the human reci- 
piency is conversion. God regenerates, and as a 
sequence therefrom man converts. 

The following are the several degrees of grace, 
which mark the several stages in the transition of 
the human soul from total depravity to perfect holi- 
ness. The first is that of prevenient grace (gratia 
praeveniens). In this stage of the process, the Holy 
Spirit employs first the moral law, as an instru- 
mental agent, and produces the sense of sin and 
guilt; and then, by employing as a second instru- 
mentality the gospel promise of mercy, it conducts 
the soul to Christ, in and by the act of faith. This 
second stage in the transition is the result of what 
Augustine denominates operative grace (gratia 
operans). By means of faith, thus originated by 
operative grace, the Divine Spirit now produces 
the consciousness of peace and justification through 
Christ’s blood of atonement, and imparts a new 
divine life to the soul united to Christ. In this 
manner, a will freely and firmly determined to 
holiness is restored again in man, and the fruits of 
this weravoca, or change of heart and will, begin te 


had had grace for its anteced- epist. IV. vi. 18 (Ed. Migne, X. 
ent.” Aveustinus: Contra duas_ 618). 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 69 


appear. But the remainders of the apostate nature 
still exist in the regenerate soul,’ though in con- 
tinual conflict with the new man. In the life-long 
struggle that now commences, the now renovated 
and holy will is efficiently operative for the first 
time, and co-works with the Holy Spirit. Hence 
this third degree of grace is denominated co-operat- 
ing grace (gratia co-operans).’ The final and crown- 
ing act of grace results in the entire cleansing of 
indwelling sin from the soul, and its glorified trans- 
formation into complete resemblance to its Re- 
deemer,—a state of absolute perfection, as distin- 
guished from the relative perfection with which 
man was created, and characterized by the incapa- 
bility of sinning and dying (non posse peccare et 
mort). This grade of grace is never witnessed this 
side of the grave. 

Experience and observation show that all men 


Augustine did not hold that his renovation commences with 
baptism possesses an efficiency in the remission of sins. .. . For al- 
and of itself to remuve sin. No- though in baptism there is a total 
thing but spiritual influence can and plenary remission of sins, yet, 
do this. Hence there is indwell- if aperfect renewal were wrought 
ing sin even inthe regenerate and in the mind itself, the apostle 
baptized. “For neither in adults would not say, ‘the inward man 
is this effected in baptism (unless is renewed day by day.’ For he 
by an ineffable miracle of the Al- who is daily renewed, is not yet 
mighty Creator) that the law of totally renewed; and by as much 
sin which is in our members, as he is not yet renewed, by so 
striving against the law of the much is he still in the old state.” 
mind, is wholly extinguished and Aveustinus: De peccatorum me- 
ceases to be.” ‘All his old in- ritis, J. xxxix.; II. vii. 
firmity is not removed from the ?Oompare Howe: Works, L 
moment a pereon is baptized, but 555-6. (New York Ed.) 


70 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


are not regenerated. Now, since, according to the 
above theory, the sinner can contribute nothing in 
the way of efficiency towards his own regeneration, 
because he acts holily only as he is acted upon, it 
follows that the difference between man and man, in 
respect to regeneration, must be referred to God. 
Hence Augustine accounts for the fact that some men 
are renewed, and some are not, by the uncondition- 
al decree (decretum absolutum), according to which 
God determines to select from the fallen mass of 
mankind (massa perditionis), the whole of whom 
are alike guilty and under condemnation, a portion 
upon whom he bestows renewing grace, and to 
leave the remainder to their own self-will and the 
This is a method of 
pure sovereignty upon his part, wherein are mani- 
fested both the “ goodness and severity of God,”— 
upon them who were not interfered with, and were 
left to their own self-will, severe and exact justice; 
upon them whose obstinate and hostile self-will was 
overcome by the Holy Spirit, unmerited pity and 


operation of law and justice.’ 


1 The opponents of Augustine 
objected that ‘it is unjust in the 
case of those who are alike guilty 
to pardon one and punish the 
other.” To this Augustine re- 
plies: “It is certainly just to 
punish both ; we ought then to 
render thanks to our Saviour that 
he has not treated us like our fel- 
lows. For if all men were saved, 
the justice due to sin would not 
be discerned ; if none were saved, 


the benefit of grace would not be 
known. We must not then seek 
for a cause, either in the distinc- 
tion of merit, or in the necessity 
of fate, or in the caprice of for- 
tune, but in the depth of the 
treasures of God’s wisdom, which 
the Apostle admires without un- 
folding.” Avcustinus: Epist. ad 
Sixtum, Cap. ii. (Ed. Migne, IL 
875). 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 71 


compassion.’ The ground and reason of this se- 
lection of only a portion of mankind, according 
to Augustine, is God’s wise good-pleasure, and not 
a foreseen faith upon the part of the individual 
man. For faith itself is a gift of God. It is the 
product of grace, and grace results from the uncon- 
ditional decree.” As the mere consequent of elect- 
ing mercy, faith can no more determine the divine 
decree of election, than the effect can determine its 
cause. “ Predestination,” says Augustine,*® “is the 
preparation for grace, but grace is the gift itself.” 


**“Many hear the word of 
truth; but some believe, others 
contradict. Therefore the first 
have a will to believe, the last 
have not. Who is ignorant of 
this? who would deny it? But 
since the will is prepared to some 
by the Lord, to others not, we 
must discriminate what proceeds 
from his mercy, and what from 
his justice. That which Israel 
sought, says the apostle, he ob- 
tained not: but the election ob- 
tained it, and the rest were blind- 
ed. Behold mercy and justice; 
mercy upon the elect who have 
obtained the righteousness of 
God, but justice upon the rest 
who were blinded. And yet the 
former believed because they had 
a will [were inclined] to believe; 
and the latter did not believe be- 
cause they had a will [were in- 
clined] to disbelieve. Mercy and 
justice, therefore, were manifest- 
ed in the wills themselves (in ip- 


sis voluntatibus facta sunt).” “To 
know, wiy, of two persons who 
hear the same doctrine or see the 
same miracle, one believes, and 
the other believes not; it is the 
depth of the wisdom of God, 
whose judgments are unsearcha- 
ble, and are not the less just for 
being hidden. ‘He hath mercy 
on whom he will have mercy, 
and whom he will he hardeneth :’ 
but he does not harden in hatred, 
but only in not showing mercy.” 
Aveustintus: De predestinatione, 
Cap. vi. (Ed. Migne, X. 968); 
Ep. ad Sixtum (Ed. Migne, IL. 
879). 

?Howe (Works, I 123) re- 
marks that “God uses a certain 
arbitrariness, especially in the 
more exuberant dispensation of 
his grace,” in order that men 
“may be cautioned not to neglect 
lower assistances.” 

* Aueustinus: De predestina- 
tione, c. x. (Ed. Migne, X. 971). 


72 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


“God elected us in Christ before the foundation of 
the world, predestinating us to the adoption of sons 
not because he saw that we should become holy 
and spotless through ourselves, but he elected and 
predestinated us that we might become so. But he 
did this according to the good pleasure of his will; 
that man might not glory in his own will, but in the 
will of God towards him.”! “How can it be,” he 
writes to Vitalis,’ “that God waits for the wills of 
men to move first, that he may then impart grace to 
them; since we properly give him thanks in ref- 
erence to those whom while unbelieving and per- 
secuting his truth with an ungodly will he antici- 
pates with his mercy, and with an almighty facility 
converts unto himself, and out of unwilling makes 
them willing? Why do we give him thanks for 
this, if he really does not do this ?”® 
The unconditional decree, in reference to the 

non-elect, according to Augustine, is one of preteri- 
tion, or omission merely.* The reprobating decree 
is not accompanied, as the electing decree is, with 
any direct divine efficiency to secure the result. 
And there is no need of any; for according to the 
Augustinian anthropology there is no possibility of 

? Aveustinus : De predestina- ? Aveustinus : Ep. OCXVII. 
tione, c. xviii. (Ed. Migne, X.9S7). ad Vitalem (Ed. Migne, II. 987). 
In another place (Tom. X. 582, Ed. * Augustine’s proof texts for 
Migne) Augustine defines election election are given in Wi@GERs: 
in the following terms: ‘“‘Electio Augustinism, p. 295. (Emerson’s 
dicitur, ubi deus non ab alio fac- Trans.) 


tum quod eligat invenit, sed quod * Aveustints: De libero arbi- 
inveniat ipse facit.” trio, II. (Ed. Migne, I. 1272, sq.) 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 73 
self-recovery from a voluntary apostasy, and, conse- 
quently, the simple passing by and leaving of the 
sinful soul to itself renders its perdition as certain, 
as if it were brought about by a direct divine effi- 
ciency. 

Not all grace, but the grace which actually re- 
generates, Augustine denominates zrresistible (gratia 
trresistibilis). By this he meant, not that the hu- 
man will is converted unwillingly or by compul- 
sion, but that divine grace is able to overcome the 
utmost obstinacy of the human spirit.’ “ When God 
wills to save any one, no will of man resists him.” 
“No man is saved but he whom God wills to be 
saved; it is necessary, therefore, to pray that he 
may will it, because if he wills it, it must come to 
pass.” “It is not to be doubted that the human 
will cannot resist [so as toovercome and defeat] 
the will of God.”® Divine grace is irresistible, not 
in the sense that no form of grace is resisted by the 
sinner ; but when grace reaches that special degree 
which constitutes it regenerating, it then overcomes 
the sinner’s opposition, and makes him willing in 
the day of God’s power. The only sure sign that 
an individual is one of the elect is his perseverance 


1“God so moves the creature, 
that he may suffer him in the 
mean while to exercise his own 
motion.” Aveustinus: De Civi- 
tate, VII. iii. Prosper, a follow- 
er of Augustine, remarks (De lib. 
arbitrio, sub fine) that ‘‘the in- 


flux and efficacy of Divine grace 
does not take away, but regulates 
the voluntary faculty ; does not 
destroy, but converts the will.” 

? Aveustinus: De correptione 
et gratis, xiv.; Enchiridion, cii.; 
De libero arbitrio. 


74 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY, 


in the Christian life ; for he is elected to holiness, as __ 
well as to happiness. Perseverance, like faith, is the 
gift of God, and Augustine denominates it donwm 
perseverantiae. In answer to the objection urged 
against the doctrine of unconditional election, accord- 
ing to which it is impossible for any but the elect to 
be saved, drawn from the text, “God our Saviour 
will have a// men to be saved, and to come unto the 
knowledge of the truth” (1 Tim. ii. 4), Augustine 
explains this passage to mean: “all who are predes- 
tinated.” “It is said that he wills all men to be 
saved, that it may be understood that predestina- 
tion is no respecter of persons, but that all classes, 
ages, and conditions of mankiad are among the 
eles. * 

Augustine denies that the heathen are saved, al- 
though he is particular to remark that there are 
degrees in the scale of their condemnation. He 
takes this position, in opposition to Pelagianism, 
which contended that natural virtue may be a 
ground of salvation, and asserted that some of the 
more virtuous pagans were saved by their personal 
excellence, and irrespective of redemption. Argu- 


? Aveustinus: De correptione 
et gratia, xliv. GREGORY THE 
Great interprets the passage 
thus: “God wills that all men 
should be saved, that is, none are 
saved except as the effect of the 
Divine will; or, some are saved 
from every class of mankind.” 
ANSELM (Opera I. 584 Ed. Migne) 


adds to this explanation the fur- 
ther one: “Or he wills that all 
should be saved in the sense that 
he does not compel any one to be 
lost.” Hower’s explanation is: 
‘Where he will he hardeneth, or 
doth not prevent but that men be 
hardened.” (Works, I. 123, New 
York Ed.) 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 75 


ing against Julian, who was a much more able de- 
fender of Pelagianism than Pelagius himself, he re- 
marks: “In the day of judgment, the consciences 
of the heathen will ‘excuse’ them (Rom. ii. 15) 
only to the degree that they will be punished more 
mildly, in case they have been a law unto them- 
selves, and have obeyed it in some measure. Fabri- 
cius will be less severely punished than Catiline ; 
not because Fabricius is good, but because he was 
less wicked than Catiline. Fabricius was less sinful 
than Catiline, not because he possessed true holiness, 
but because he did not depart so far from true holi- 
ness.”* In the fifth book of the De Civitate Dei, Au- 
gustine shows that God rewarded the natural vir- 
tues of the early Romans with temporal prosperity ; 
yet that their frugality, contempt of riches, -mod- 
eration, and courage, were merely the effect of the 
love of glory that curbed those particular vices 
which are antagonistic to national renown, without 
ceasing to be a vice itself. He concedes the praise 
of external rectitude (justitia civilis) to many ac- 
tions of the heathen, yet he maintains that when 
these are viewed in the motive or principle from 
which they sprung they are sins; for whatsoever is 
not of faith is sin (Rom. xiv. 23). “It is sin, then,” 
objects Julian, “when a heathen clothes the naked, 
binds up the wounds of the infirm, or endures tor- 
ture rather than give false testimony?” Augustine 


1 Aveustines: Contra Julianum, IV. xxiii. 


76 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY, 


replies that the act in itself, or the matter of the 
act, is not sin; but as it does not proceed from faith, 
and a purpose to honor God, the form of the act, 
which contains the morality of it, is sm.7 Augus- 
tine supposed that unbaptized infants are lost,’ al- 
though he believed that the punishment allotted to 
them is the mildest possible of all (omnium mitissi- 
ma). Yet he is explicit in asserting that “there is 
no middle place ; so that he who is not with Christ, 
must be with the devil.” This he affirms in opposi- 
tion to that middle sort of state which the Pelagi- 
ans denominated “eternal life,” in distinction from 
the world of perfect blessedness, which they held to 
be denoted by the “ kingdom of heaven.” ® 
We have seen that Augustine refused to declare 

for either Creationism or Traducianism, when the 
question came up before him as a purely speculative 
and philosophical one. When, however, he is de- 
fending his view of the doctrine of Original Sin, he 
makes statements that are irreconcilable with any 
theory of the origin of the human soul, but that of 
creation by species, and the propagation of both 
soul and body. When endeavoring to justify his _ 
position that all men are guilty of the Adamic 
transgression, or “ Adam’s sin,” he distinctly teaches 
that all mankind were created in Adam. “God the 

* Aueustinus: De civitate Dei, * Aveustinus: De peccatorum 
V. xii, xili.; Contra Julianum, wmeritis, I. xxviii. 
IV. iii, (Ed. Migne, X. 750). 


2 Aveustinus: De peccatorum 
meritis, I. xxi. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. aT 


author of nature, but not of sin (vitium), created 
‘man upright, but he having through his own will 
become depraved and condemned, propagated de- 
praved and condemned offspring. For we were all 
in that one man, since we were all that one man 
who lapsed into sin through that woman who was 
made from him, previous to transgression. The 
particular form in which we were to live as individ. 
uals had not been created and assigned to us man 
by man, but that seminal natwre was in existence 
from which we were to be propagated.” “ All men 
at that time sinned in Adam, since in his nature all 
men were as yet that one man.” “Adam was the 
one in whom all sinned.” “The infant who is lost 
is punished because he belongs to the mass of per- 
dition, and as a child of Adam is justly condemned 
on the ground of the ancient obligation.” ? 

These passages, which might be multiplied in- 
definitely, are sufficient to indicate Augustine’s the- 
ory of generic existence, generic transgression, and 
generic condemnation. The substance of this theory 
was afterwards expressed in the scholastic dictum, 
“natura corrumpit personam,”—human nature apos- 
tatizes, and the consequences appear in the human 
individual. In the order of nature, mankind exists 
before the generations of mankind; the nature is 


1 Aveustinus: De civitate Dei, nali, c. xxxvi. Compare also: 
XIII. xiv.; De peccatorum meri- Contra duas epistolas Pelagiano- 
tis, III. vii. 14; De peccatorum rum, IV. iii. 7; De nuptiis et 
meritis, I. xv.; De peccato origi- concupiscentia, II. v. 15. 


78 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


prior to the individuals produced out of it. But 
this human nature, it must be carefully noticed, pos- 
sesses all the attributes of the human individual ; 
for the individual is only a portion and specimen of 
the nature. Considered as an essence, human nature 
is an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence ; 
and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the 
corresponding qualities. Hence, according to Au- 
gustine, generic or original sin is truly and properly 
sin, because it is moral agency. The Latin anthro- 
pology extended the doctrine of the Adamie con- 
nection to the whole man, instead of confining it, as 
the Greek did, to a part only. Chrysostom, for ex- 
ample, conceded a union between the physical part 
of the individual, and the first progenitor. But this 
logically involved an existence, as to the body, in 
Adam; because it is impossible to unite two things, 
one of which is an absolute non-entity. Even ac- 
cording to the Greek anthropology, the physical 
nature of the individual must have existed generi- 
cally in the physical nature of Adam, in order to 
such a union and propagation. But what the Greek 
anthropologist affirmed of a part, the Latin affirmed 
of the entire man. The rational and voluntary 
principle, equally with the physical and animal, ex- 
isted in Adam. A mystery overhangs the existence 
of the posterity in the progenitor, even when the 
existence is limited to the body, and not extended 
to the soul; yet the mere fact of mystery did not 
prevent the Greek anthropology from adopting the 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 79 


doctrine of the Adamic unity up to the line that 
separates the sensuous from the rational part. And, 
in like manner, the mere fact of mystery did not 
deter the Latin anthropology from extending the 
oneness and connection to the whole man, both body 
and soul. 

The principal source of this theory was the fifth 
chapter of Romans." Augustine’s Platonic studies 
may have exerted some influence upon his develop- 
ment of the Scripture data, but those writers mis- 
take greatly who suppose that he would have fa- 
voured one of the most difficult of all theories to un- 
derstand and defend, if he had had no higher authori- 
ty to embolden him, than that of Plato. And as it 
was, we have seen that he shrank from adopting it, 
as a philosopher, however he might as a theologian. 
But the fifth chapter of Romans, it was universally 
conceded, teaches an Adamic union of some kind; 
and Augustine contended that it was of the most 
comprehensive species, and included both the soul 
and the body. He was led to this exegesis, by a 
theological, and not by a philosophical interest. In 
no other way could he account for sin at birth, and 
for the sufferings and death of infants. 

It was one consequence of this theory of the 
Adamic unity, that Augustine held that all sin, 
both original and actual, is voluntary,—meaning 
thereby, in accordance with the Latin idea of free- 


1The proof texts are given in (Emerson’s Trans.). 
' Wiecers: Augustinism, Ch. XX. 


80 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


dom, that it is unforced self-will, without power to 
the contrary, or the power of originating holiness de 
nihilo, There is no author in the whole theological 
catalogue, who is more careful and earnest than 
Augustine, to assert that sin is se/f-activity, and that 
its source is in the voluntary nature of man Sin, 
according to him, is not a substance, but an agency ; 
it is not the essence of any faculty in man, but only 
the action of a faculty. The Manichaean theory 
that sin is a substance created, and infused into man 
by creative power, Augustine refuted and combat- 
ted with all the more energy because he had at one 
time been entangled in it. Hence, he was careful 
to teach that original sin itself, as well as the actual 
transgressions that proceed from it, is moral agency. 
But in order to agency there must be an agent; 
and since original sin is not the product of the indi- 
vidual agent, because it appears at birth, it must be 
referred to the generic agent,—i. e. to the human 
nature in distinction from the human person, or in- 
dividual. Hence the stress which he laid upon the 


1Tn his Retractationes (Lib. I.), 
Augustine complains that the Pe- 
lagians quoted his statements to 
this effect, in his treatise De libe- 
ro arbitrio, in proof that he con- 
tradicted himself, and sometimes 
taught their views. In answer, 
he remarks first, that in this 
treatise he was speaking only of 
the origin of sin, in opposition to 
the fatalist, and not of its effects 


upon the soul; and secondly, 
that in teaching that sin is ulti- 
mately in the will, and not in the 
physical nature, he implies that 
the voluntary faculty cannot re- 
new itself, and therefore needs 
renovation by Divine grace. If 
sin were in the sensuous part 
only, and not in the will, the will 
might overcome sin. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 8] 


act of transgression in Adam. At this point in 
the history of man, he could find a common agent, 
and a common agency; and only at this point. 
Ever after, there are only portions or individualiza- 
tions of the nature, in the series of generations. This 
one common agent yields him the one common 
agency which he is seeking. In this manner, origi- 
nal sin is voluntary agency, as really as actual sin 
is,—the difference between the two being only for- 
mal. Both are equally the product of human will; 
but original sin is the product of human will as yet 
unindividualized in Adam, while actual sin is the 
product of human will as individualized in his pos- 


terity." 


In proof that Augustine held to the voluntari- 
ness of sin in both its forms, original and actual, we 
mention the following of his positions. 


‘It is important to notice that 
the term “actual,” applied to sin 
in this connection, is employed 
in its etymological signification, 
to denote the sin of single choices 
and distinct acts, in distinction 
from the sin of heart, or natural 
disposition. The ordinary use 
of the word, in common parlance, 
makes ‘‘actual” the opposite of 
“imaginary,” or “‘unreal;” and 
hence it is sometimes supposed 
that ‘“ original” sin, as the oppo- 
site of “actual”? sin, must be a 
fictitious or imaginary sin,—that 
is, no sin at all. But in the Au- 
gustino-Calvinistic nomenclature, 

VOL. 11.—6 


both forms of sin are alike real ; 
both are alike the product of the 
human will. A similar error is 
also committed in reference to 
the phrase ‘‘ Adam’s sin.” To be 
guilty of Adam’s sin, in the Latin 
anthropology, meant to be guilty 
of the Adamic sin. It implied 
the oneness of Adam and his pos- 
terity, and a guilt that belonged 
to the sum total, only because 
the sin was the act of the sum 
total. 

Samvet Hopxrns (Works I. 224. 
Note) objects to the distinction 
between “ original” and “actual” 
sin, “because,” he says, “‘ the sin- 


82 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY- 


1. In the first place, he carefully distinguishes 
between the work of the Creator and that of the 
creature, and designates the former by the term 
“natura.” In this sense and use of the word, he 
denies that sin is by “nature,” or belongs to “na- , 
ture.” “ All fault or sin (vitium),” he says, “is an 
injury to nature, and consequently is contrary to 
nature.”? “In one and the same man, the intention 
[i. e. the inclination] may be blamed, but the nature 
praised; for they are two different things. Even 
in a little child, that nature which was created by 
the good and holy God is not the only thing that 
exists; but he has also that fault (vitium se. inten- 
tio), i.e. intention or disposition, which through one 
man passed over to all.”? For this reason, Augus- 
tine prefers the phrase “ peccatum originale,” to the 
phrase “ peccatum naturale” or “ peccatum naturae,” 
as the designation of the Adamic sin; and employs 
it, particularly when the Pelagians charge him with 
holding to a “natural,” in the sense of a “created” 
sin. “The good,” he remarks, “ which is in nature as 


ful disposition of the heart is as 
actually sin as the expression or 
acting out of the disposition.” 
This is a criticism that would 
have been precluded by an ac- 
quaintance with the history of 
these theological terms. 

* Aueustinus: De civitate Dei, 
XII. i. Compare De lib. arbit. 
III. xvii.; De Gen. ad lit. Cap. 
XXVi. 


?“Tn uno homine jure vitupe- 
ratur intentio, et natura laudatur, 
quia duo sunt quae contrariis ap- 
plicentur. Etiam in paryulo, non 
unum est tantum, id est, natura, 
in qua creatus homo a Deo bono: 
habet enim et vitium (se. inten- 
tio) quod per unum in omnes ho- 
mines pertransit.” AueusTINus : 
De nuptiis et concupiscentia, IL 
XXix. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 83 


such, cannot be destroyed, unless nature itself is de- 
stroyed. But if nature is destroyed [1. e. as to its 
substance] by corruption, then corruption itself will 
no longer remain; for there is then no nature in 
which corruption can exist.” “If man had lost the 
whole divine image [as to substance, i. e.], there 
would be nothing remaining, of which it could be 
said, ‘Though man walketh in an image he is vainly 
disquieted (Ps. xxxix. 6).’” “That is good which 
deplores the lost good; for if there were nothing 
of good remaining in nature, there would be no 
pain for the lost good, as punishment.” “ Every- 
thing good is from God; there is therefore no na- 
ture that is not from God (omne autem bonum ex 
Deo; nulla ergo natura est quae non sit ex Deo).”? 
In these passages, which might be multiplied, in 
which “nature” is synonymous with “ creation,” sin 
is denied to be natural, or to belong to the course 
and constitution of nature ; while yet, in the second- 
ary signification of a natural disposition or inclina- 
tion (intentio), Augustine, it is needless to say, con- 
stantly affirms that sin is both “ natural” and a “na- 
ture.” In harmony with these statements, Augus- 
tine also distinguishes- between “substance” and 
“quality,” and asserts that sin is not substance but 
quality. Arguing with Julian of Eclanum, he 
says: “ Julian speaks as if we had said that some 


* Aueustinus: Enchiridion iv; ad literam, VIII. xiv; De lib. ar- 
Retractationes, I. xxvi; DeGenesi bit. IT. xx. 


84 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


substance was created in men by the devil. The 
devil persuades to evil as sin, but does not create it 
as nature. But evidently he has persuadedfature, 
as man is nature ; and by persuading has corrupted 
it. For he who inflicts wounds does not create 
limbs, but injures limbs. But wounds inflicted on 
bodies make the limbs falter or move feebly, but do 
not affect that voluntary faculty (virtutem) by 
which the man is or does right; but the wound 
which is called sin, wounds that voluntary faculty 
(vitam) by which man leads a holy life. ... And 
yet that weakness (languor) by which the power 
of living holily perished, is not nature, but a cor- 
ruption ; just as bodily infirmity is not a substance 
or nature, but a vitiation.” ‘Evil is not a sub- 
stance; for if it were a substance, it would be good.”? 

2. Secondly, Augustine denies that God can him- 
self sin, or efficiently cause sin in his creatures. He 
maintains that moral evil must, from the nature of 
the case, originate within the sphere of the finite 
solely. Only a finite will can sin, or be the author 
of sin. The only relation which the Infinite Will 
can sustain to moral evil is permissive and regula- 
tive. “Evil does not arise except in a good being ; 
and this, too, not in the Supremely and Immutably 
Good, but in a being made from nothing, by the wis- 


1 Avcustinus: De nuptiis et objects to the Manichaeans that 
concupiscentia, II]. xxxiv; Con- they regard “evil, not as the ac- 
fessiones, VIII. xii. In his Opus cident of a substance, but as the 
imperfectum (III. 189), Augustine very substance itself.” 


_ ee OF AUGUSTINE. 85 


dom of God.” Every finite rational being, in other 
words, must be created holy. From this position he 
lapses into evil. Holiness is thus always from the 
creator ; and sin always from the creature. Hence, 
says Augustine, the efficient cause of sin cannot be 
found back of the will of the creature, and must not 
be sought for at any point more ultimate than this. 
The caption of the seventh chapter of the twelfth 
book of the De Civitate Dei runs as follows: “The 
efficient cause of an evil will is not to be sought for.” 
By this Augustine means, as his argument goes on 
to show, that it contradicts the idea of sin to ask 
for an originating cause of sin other than the sinner 
himself. To seek an efficient cause of an evil will, 
is to ask for the efficient cause of an efficient cause. 
The whole argument in the sixth chapter of the 
twelfth book of the De Civitate Dé aims to prove 
that moral evil is the purest possible se/f-motion, 
and consequently cannot be referred to anything, or 
any being, but the se/f. “Let no one,” Augustine 
says, “seek an efficient cause for the evil w7// ; there 


*“Non ortum est malum nisi 
in bono; nec tamen summo et 
immutabili, quod est natura Dei, 
sed facto de nihilo per sapientiam 
Dei.” Aveustinus: De nuptiis et 
concupiscentia, III. 1. Compare 
De libero arbitrio I. xi. Augus- 
tine teaches that God ordains sin, 
but does not produce it. ‘‘Some 
things God both produces and 
ordains ; others he only produces. 


The holy he both produces and 
ordains; but sinners, so far forth 
as they are sinners, he does not 
produce, but only ordains.” De 
Genesi ad literam. ‘Since na 
one by the act of memory com- 
pels the performance of past acts, 
so God does not, by his fore- 
knowledge, compel the perform- 
ance of future acts.” De libero 
arbitrio, III. iv. 


- 


86 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


is no efficient cause, only a deficient one.”* In oth 
er words, the sinful inclination of the human will 
is not a product originated by a positive external 
cause, but it is a deficiency, or falling away, within 
the will itself. Augustine then goes on to show 
how God’s agency, the agency of an Infinite Being, 
can never be a deficiency, but must always be an 
efficiency ; and thereby evinces the impossibility of 
sin in the Divine will. . It is in such speculations as 
these, that the Latin Father laid the foundation of 
the scholastic doctrine that sin is a negation. By 
this it was not meant that sin is a non-entity; but 
only a negative, or privative, entity. It has exist- 
ence, and is to have it endlessly, now that it has 
come into existence. But evil has not that intrinsic 
and positive excellence of being, that eternal rzght to 
be, which good possesses. Hence evil, unlike good, 
is eternal only a parte post. Holiness is from eter- 
nity to eternity, like God. But sin is from time, 
and of time, to eternity. 

3. Thirdly, Augustine expressly asserts that all 
sin, both original and actual, is voluntary. “If sin, 
says Julian, is from will, then it is an evil will that 
produces sin; if from nature, then an evil nature. 
I quickly reply: Sin is from will. Then he asks 
whether original sin also [is from will]? I an- 


1 Aveustinus: De civitate Dei trio, I. xx. (Ed. Migne, I. 1270). 
XI. vii. Compare Howe: Works, I. 134 
? Aveustinus: De libero arbi- (New York Ed.). 


87 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 


swer, certainly, original sin also; because this too 
was transmitted (seminatum est) from the will of 
the first man, that it might both be in him, and pass 
over to all.”’ Here, it is plain that Augustine pro- 
ceeds upon the ethical maxim, that that which 
springs from a voluntary cause is itself to be reck- 
oned voluntary, and places voluntariness beneath all 
the sin of man,—voluntariness either generic or in- 
dividual. Hence he remarks, in another place, that 
“ moral evil would not be in infants except by the 
voluntary action of the first man, and the traduction 
of original sin.”* Speaking, in his Confessions, of 
his erroneous views of evil when involved in Mani- 
chaeism, he says: “ I maintained that Thy unchange- 
able substance did err compulsorily, father than con- 
fess that my changeable substance had gone astray 
voluntarily, and now for punishment, lay in error.” ® 
Arguing with Julian, he remarks: “ We, too, say 
that there cannot be sin without free will. Nor 
does our doctrine of original sin contradict this po- 
sition; because we arrive at this kind of sin through 
free will,—not, indeed, through the will of the indi- 
vidual at birth, but through the will of him in whom 
all were originally, at the time when he vitiated 


- Aveustints: De nuptiis et 
concupiscentia, II. xxviii. 2. Com- 
pare Wuirsy On Original Sin, 
Chapter VIL., for citations to this 
same effect. This writer, how- 
ever, mistakenly supposes that 
Augustine’s assertion of the vol- 


untariness of sin infers the power 
to the contrary; and that there- 
fore Augustine’s definition of sin 
contradicts his theory of grace. 
?De nuptiis et concupiscentia, 
1HDE Ye 
’ Confessiones, IV. xv. 


88 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the common human nature, by an evil act of will, 
Hence, infants do not, at their birth, originate the 
sinful will which they have; but Adam in that time 
of his apostasy committed that great common sin 
(magnum illum peccatum) with a free will.”* Again, 
in this treatise Contra Julianwm, he says: “In vain, 
therefore, do you imagine that there is no guilt (de- 
lictum) in infants, for the reason that guilt cannot 
be without voluntariness, and there is no voluntari- 
ness in infants. This is true, so far as individual 
transgression (proprium cujusque peccatum) is con- 
cerned ; but not so far as concerns the original con- 
tagion of the first [Adamic] sin. But if this Adamic 
sin is a nullity, infants would not be involved in any 
evil, and certainly would not be exposed to any 
species of evil, either of body or soul, under the 
government of a perfectly just God. The guilt that 
is in original sin, therefore, takes its origin from the 
sinful will of the first pair (priorum hominum). 
Thus, neither original nor individual sin can origi- 
nate but from a wrong will.”* In his treatise De 
Vera Religione, Augustine remarks that “sin is an 
evil so voluntary, that there can be no sin but 
what is voluntary ; and this is so very manifest, that 
none of the learned few or the unlearned many ever 
dissent. In fine, if we do not perform evil with our 
will, then ought no person to be reproved or ad- 


1 Opus imperfectum, Cont. Jul. ? Contra Julianum, III. v. 
TV. xc.; compare Opus imperf. 
II. xxi, IV. xci. xev, V. xl. 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE. 89 


monished; but if you deny this fact, the Christian 
law and the discipline of every religion must be set 
aside.”! In his Epistle Ad Sixtum, Augustine rep- 
resents the Pelagian as objecting that “men will 
excuse themselves by saying, ‘Why should we be 
blamed if we live ill, since we have not received 
grace to live well?’” To this he answers: “Those 
who live ill cannot truly say that they are not to 
blame; for ifthey do noill, they live well. Butifthey 
live ill, it proceeds from themselves, either from their 
original evil, or from that which they have them- 
selves added to it. If they are vessels of wrath, let 
them impute it to themselves as being formed out 
of that mass (massa) which God has justly condemn- 
ed for the sin of that one man, in whom ai] men 
have sinned. ... Every sinner is inexcusable, either 
by his original sin, or because he has added to it of 
his own will, whether knowingly or ignorantly ; for 
even ignorance itself is without doubt a sin in those 
who have chosen not to know; and in those who 
have not been able [to know], it is the punishment 
of sin. The just judgment of God does not spare 
even those who have not heard [the law]: ‘For as 
many as have sinned without law, shall also perish 
without law’ (Rom. xii.). And although they may 
seem to have an excuse for their disobedience, yet 
God does not admit this excuse, because he knows 
that he made man upright and gave him the rule of 


? De vera religione, xiv. 


90 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


obedience, and that it is only by the abuse of free 
will that sin originated and passed over to the pos- 
terity.”* Julian cites the passage in Deut. xxiv. 16: 
“The fathers shall not be put to death for the chil- 
dren, neither shall the children be put to death for 
the fathers: every man shall be put to death for his 
own sin,” in proof that the sin of Adam cannot be 
imputed and punished. To this Augustine replies, 
that this refers to the fathers and the children in 
their ¢ndividual capacity, and not as existent in a 
common unity, or nature. It refers to a condition 
of things subsequent to the existence in Adam. The 
individual sins of a father cannot be imputed to the 
son, and vice versa; because in this capacity, the 
father and son are not one. The doctrine of one- 
ness does not apply in this instance. But, previous 
to birth, and as existing in the first man, parents 
and children, says Augustine, are one numerical hu- 
man nature, and the imputation of the sin of this 
nature is not, therefore, the imputation of another's 
sin. Original sin is a common act of transgression ; 
and in charging it upon the posterity, the very 
principle enunciated by Moses is carried out, viz. : 
that no agent shall be punished for another's agen- 
cy. Augustine concedes that if Adam and his pos- 
terity did not, at the time of the apostasy, constitute 
one human nature and one indivisible agent, it 
would not be just to impute the primitive act 


‘Opera IT. 882, 883 (Ed. Migne). 


RECAPITULATION. 91 


of apostasy to the posterity. In other words, he 
charges the posterity with the Adamic transgression, 
upon the principle of swwm cuzque.* 


§$ 4. Recapitulation 


The Latin anthropology, in a recapitulation, 
presents the following points. 1. Man was created 
holy, and from this position originated sin de nihilo 
by a purely creative act. Original sin is voluntary 
in the sense of being self-will, and is therefore prop- 
erly punishable as guilt. 2. Man was created as a 
species, in respect to both soul and body ; and hence 
the Adamie connection relates to the entire man,— 
to the voluntary and rational nature, equally with 
the corporeal and sensuous. 3. By the Adamic 
connection, the will, the zvsdua, is corrupted, as 
well as the wuy7 and cauc. 4. Infants are guilty, 
because they possess a sinful bias of will, and not 
merely a corrupt sensuous nature. 5. The corrup- 
tion of the sensuous nature is the consequent, and 
not the antecedent, of apostasy in the rational and 
voluntary ; so long as the voluntary and rational 
powers are in their created holy condition, there is 
nothing disordered or corrupt in the lower nature. 
The corruption of the flesh (auc) is not the cause, 
but the effect, of the corruption of the reason and 
will (zvedua). 6. The Holy Spirit takes the initia 


? Compare Opus imperfectum, III. xii. (Ed. Migne, X. 1251). 


92 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


tive in the change from sin to holiness, and there is 
no co-operation of the human with the Divine agen- 
cy in the regenerating act. The efficiency or activ- 
ity of the human will up to the point of regenera 
tion is hostile to God, and therefore does not co 
work with Him 


CHAPTER “BV. 


PELAGIANISM AND SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 


§ 1. Pelagianism. 


Pexactus, a British monk, directly by his own 
teachings, and indirectly by the controversy to 
which he gave occasion, and the adherents who de- 
veloped his views, constructed an anthropology to- 


tally antagonistic to the Augustinian. eo. 
The fundamental points in his theory are the¢ “it 
following. The soul of man by creation is neitherw") J% 


holy nor sinful.’ His body by creation is mortal... 
The fall of Adam introduced no change of any kind \ 
into either the souls or the bodies of his posterity. jt 


*“Omne bonum ac malum, quo Pertacius: De lib. arbitrio, quoted 
vel laudibiles vel vituperabiles in Aueustmyus: De peccato ori- 
sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed ginis, c. xiii. “‘ Nemo naturaliter 
agitur a nobis; capaces enim malus est; sed quicunque reus est, 
utriusque rei, non pleninascimur, moribus, non exordiis accusatur.” 
et ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio Jutianus, in Aveustinus: Op. 
procreamur, atque ante actionem imp. I. cv. Oonp. Op. imp. V. 
propriae voluntatis id solum in lvi. See MiinscHer-Von CoLty: 
homine est, quod Deus condidit.” Dogmengeschichte, I. 375 sq. 


cs 
(Seinen 


yw 


”~ 


ice bas Adam was when created.) 


94 ae HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


vit 


Every man, therefore, when born into the world is 


At birth, each 


oe physical nature is liable to disease and death, 
as was Adam’s at creation; and, at birth, each 
“ante S voluntary faculty, like ‘Aan s at creation, is 


ither to sin or holiness. 
’~ character ‘less, with a will undecided either for good 


Being thus 


or evil, and not in the least affected by Adam’s 
apostasy, each individual man, after birth, com- 
mences his own voluntariness, originates his own 


character, 


choice of either right or wrong.’ 


1Tt was charged upon Ooeles- 
tius, at the synod of Diospolis, 
and condemned, that he held that 
* Adam did not injure his poster- 
ity,” and that ‘‘ new-born infants 
are in the same condition as 
Adam was before the fall.” Pe- 
lagius, according to Augustine 
(De pec. orig. xi.), professed to 
disagree with Coelestius, and 
made out the following points of 
difference between Adam and his 
posterity: 1. Adam injured his 
posterity by setting a bad exam- 
ple; 2. Adam was created an 
adult, but his posterity are born 
infants; 8. Adam could con- 
sciously use his free will, but in- 
fants cannot. 

? AuaustINnE (Contra duas epist. 
IV. iv. Ed. Migne, X. 614) repre- 
sents the Pelagians as saying that 
“‘ death only, and not sin (crimen), 
passed to us from Adam.” To 


and decides his own destiny, by the 


Temporal death 


this he objects that: “Adam 
died, because he sinned ; but in 
our case, according to Pelagius, 
death is transmitted without sin ; 
and innocent infants are punished 
unjustly, by contracting death 
without the desert of death.” 

*“ All good and evil, by which 
we are praiseworthy or blame- 
worthy, does not originate with 
us, but is acted by us. We are 
born capable of either; we are 
not born full [of character]; we 
are procreated without holiness, 
and also without sin; before the 
action of his own individual will, 
there is nothing in man but what 
God has created.” Quoted by 
Augustine from Preraerus, in Av- 
custinus: De peccato originis, ¢. 
xiii. ‘Children (filii), so long as 
they are children, that is before 
they do anything by their own 
will, cannot be punishable (rei).” 


PELAGIANISM. 95 


wad 
yar H 
is a of the punishment of sin, because it be- 
falls man by creation. His body is mortal per se, 
and irrespective of sin.’ Eternal death is therefore 
the whole ishment of man’s sin. 

The general, but not strictly universal preva- vv 
lence of sin in the world is accounted for, by theQ~—~ 
power of tgmptation, and the influence of example 


and of habit. It is possible for any man to been 


Quoted by Aveustrnus: Op. im- 
perf. IJ. xlii. ‘Free will is as 
yet in its original uncorrupted 
state, and nature is to be regard- 
ed as innocent. in every one, be- 
fore his own will can show itself.” 
Quoted from Jutian, by Aueus- 
TINuUS: Op. imp. II. xx. 

1“The words ‘till thou return 
to the earth from which thou 
wast taken, for dust thou art and 
unto dust shalt thou return’ be- 
long not to the curse, but are 
rather words of consolation to 
man. ‘Thy sufferings, toils, and 
griefs shall not endure forever, 
but shall one day end.’ If the 
dissolution of the body were a 
part of the punishment of sin, it 
would not have been said, ‘thou 
shalt return to dust, for dust thou 
art ;’ but, ‘thou shalt return to 
dust, because thou hast sinned, 
and broken my command.’” 
Quoted by Aveustinus: Op. imp. 
VI. xxvii. ‘Adam himself, say 
the Pelagians, would have died 
as to the body, though he had 
not sinned; and hence he did 
not die in consequence of his 


guilt, but by the necessity of na- 
ture.” Aveustinus: De haer. c. 
lxxxviii. 

2 The ep o, in Rom. v. 12, Pe- 
lagius translated, as did Augus- 
tine and all at that day, by in 
quo; but he explained it in this 
phraseology: ‘“‘It is said we sin- 
ned in Adam, not because sin is 
innate, but because it comes from 
imitation.” Quoted by AveustI- 
nus: De natura et gratia, c. x. 
JULIAN explains it thus: ‘Jn quo 
omnes peccaverunt nihil aliud in- 
dicat, quam : guia omnes pecca- 
verunt.” PrLacius in his letter 
to the nun Demetrias, remarks: 
“While nature was yet new, and 
a long-continued habit of sinning 
had not spread as it were a mist 
over human reason, nature was 
left without a [written] law; to 
which the Lord, when it was op- 
pressed by too many vices, and 
stained with the mist of ignorance, 
applied the file of the [written] 
law, in order that, by its frequent 
admonitions, nature might be 
cleansed again, and return to its 
lustre. And there is no other 


Panis to man.! 


96 


HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


tirely sinless, and there have been some such, even 


among the heathen. 


The grace of the Holy Spirit 


is not absolutely, but only relatively necessary, in 
order to holiness ; it renders its attainment easier 


Regeneration does not consist in the re- 


newal of the will by an internal operation of Divine 


j efficiency, but in the iJumination of the intellect by 


the truth, the stimulation of the will by the threat- 
enings of the law and the promise of future rewards, 


dulgence. God’s 











difficulty of doing well, but the 
long-contipued habit of 
which has contaminated us from 
youth up, and corrupted us 
many years, and holds us after- 
wards so bound and subjugate 
to herself, that she seems in 
measure to have the force of na- 
ture.” Augustine (Ed. Migne, X. 
115) objects to Pelagius’s expla- 
nation of “in quo peccaverunt 
omnes,” that men are not said to 
sin “in the devil,” because they 
imitate him. 

1“ Pelagius enim facilius dicit 
impleri quod bonum est, si adju- 
vet gratia. Quo additamento, id 
est, addendo facilius, utique sig- 
nificat hoc se sapere, quod etiam 
si gratiae defuerit adjutorium, po- 
test, quamyvis difficilius, impleri 
bonum per liberum arbitrium.” 
Aveustints: Contra duas episto- 
las Pelag. II. viii. 17; Comp. De 
gratia Christi, c. xl.—‘‘ Confidunt 
in virtute sua, et creatori n stro 


4, and by the remission of gn through the Divine in- 
ace * is designed for all, but man 


quodammodo dicunt, Tu nos fe- 
cisti homines, justos autem ipsi 
nos fecimus.” Aveustinus: Ep. 
elxxvii. Ad Innoc. Ooelestius 
was condemned by the council of 
Carthage as holding that “lex sic 
mittit ad regnum coelorum, quo- 
modo et evangelium.”  Augus- 
tine (De haer. 88) represents Pe- 
lagianism as allowing of no im- 
ediate divine influence, but only 
hat of the truth: “[deo] adju- 
ante per suam legem et doctri- 
ngm, ut discamus quae facere et 
quae sperare debeamus.” 

y “grace” Pelagius meant: 
1. The natural freedom of will 
which every man receives by ere- 
ation; 2. The truth, both natural 
and revealed ; 3. A species of in- 
ward illumination ; 4. The remis- 
sion of sins. Augustine’s repre- 
sentation is as follows, in De ges- 
tis contra Pelagium, ¢. XXxV-: 
“The Pelagians say, that man’s 
nature, which was made with 


‘| 


ey 


» 


PELAGIANISM. 


ot 


must make himself worthy of it by an honest striv- 


ing after virtue. 


The Son of God became man, in 


order, by his perfect teaching and example, to afford 


the strongest motives for self-improvement, and 


thereby redeems us. 


As we are imitators of Adam 


in sin, so we are to become imitators of Christ in 


virtue. 


Pelagius held that infant baptism is necessary 


free will, is sufficient to keep us 
from all .sjn, > and to fulfil all 
righteousness ; and that this is 
the grace of God, that we were 
so made that we could do this by 
our own will; that he has given 
us the aid of his law and com- 
-mandments; and that he pardons 
sins that are past to those who 
are converted to him. In these 
things alone, is the grace of God 
to be acknowledged, and not in 
assistance given in our single 
acts.” In his work, ‘On free 
will,’ written against Jerome, and 
after the council of Diospolis, Pe- 
lagius explained his view of will 
and grace, by distinguishing the 
faculty, the volition or decision, 
and the external act (posse, velle, 
esse), and maintaining that the 
first alone is from God, while the 
other two are from man alone. 
Aveustinus: De gratia christi- 
ana, IV. v. Hence, Augustine 
directed the attention of Innocent 
of Rome, and John of Jerusalem, 
to Pelagius’s idea of “ grace,” and 
referred them to passages in 
which Pelagius represented grace 
VOL 1.—7 


to be the natural endowments 
of man, which, inasmuch as 
they are the gift of God, are 
“orace.”” AuGuSTINUS: Ep. ¢lxxix. 
ad Paul. § 2. In his letter 
to Sixtus, with allusion to the 
Pelagian position that the en- 
dowments with which man is 
created are ‘“‘grace,” since he 
does not merit them, Augustine 
says: “The grace which the 
Apostle recommends, is not that 
by which we have been created 
men; but that by which we have 
been justified, when we were al- 
ready bad men. Christ did not 
die for the creation of those who 
were not in existence, but for 
the justification of those who 
were in existence, and were sin- 
ful.” Aveustixus: Ep. Sixto. 
(Ed. Migne, II. 877). Julian, ac- 
cording to Augustine (Op. imp. 
I. xciv.), includes under the name 
of “grace” all the gifts of God,— 
“‘innumerae species adjutorii di- 
vini.” Compare Atvctustinus: De 
pec. mer, II. xviii. (id. Migne, X, 
168). 


Si ix 


98 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


in order to the remission of future sins;' but chil- 
dren who died without baptism he thought would 
be saved, although they would experience a less de- 
gree of felicity than the redeemed enjoy.? Respect- 
ing the doctrines of the trinity and the deity of 
Christ, of revelation, of prophecy, and of miracles, 
Pelagius adopted the supernaturalism of the Church, 
although his anthropology logically developed would 
have brought him to the rationalistic view upon 


these subjects. 


Pelagius advanced his views first at Rome, from 
409 to 411, principally through a commentary upon 


the Pauline Epistles. 


* AueustTINE (De pecc. meritis, 
Ill. vi.) remarks: “A short time 
ago, when I was at Carthage, I 
heard the passing remark from 
some, that infants are not bap- 
tized for the forgiveness of sins, 
but as an act of consecration to 
Christianity (ut sanctificentur in 
Christo).” Itis probable that he 
refers to some of the Pelagians, 
whether Pelagius and Coelestius 
themselves is uncertain.—There 
were some, whom Augustine (De 
pec. mer. I. xvii. xxxiv.) plainly 
distinguishes from Pelagians, who 
founded infant baptism upon ac- 
tual sins committed by infants. 

? According to Augustine (De 
pec. mer. I. xxxiy. xxxvi.), the Pe- 
lagians made a distinction between 
“salvation,” or ‘‘ eternal life,” and 
the “kingdom of heaven.” The 
former could be gained by the un- 


His system was brought to 


baptized: the latter was the sal- 
vation of Christians, or the bap- 
tized.— Augustine (De Haeresi- 
bus, Ixxxviii. Ed. Migne, VIII. 47) 
states the Pelagian theory of bap- 
tism as follows: “The Pelagians 
maintain, that infants are so born 
without any shackles whatever of 
original sin, that there is nothing 
at all to be forgiven them through 
the second birth, but that they 
are baptized in order to admission 
into the kingdom of God, through 
regeneration to the filial state; 
and therefore they are changed 
from good to better, but are not 
by that renovation freed from 
any evil at all of the old imputa- 
tion. For they promise them, 
even if unbaptized, an eternal and 
blessed life, though out of the 
kingdom of God.” 


PELAGIANISM. 99 


- 


the notice of the North-African Church, in 411, by 
his pupil Coelestius, who was judged heretical by a 
council at Carthage in 412, and was excommuni- 
cated upon his refusal to retract his opinions. Pela- 
gius In 411 went to Palestine. The Eastern Church 
were suspicious of his views, and he was accused of 
heresy before the synods of Jerusalem and Diospo- 
lis. But he succeeded in satisfying his judges, by 
qualifying his assertions respecting the possibility 
and the actual fact of human sinlessness.. The 
North-African Church, however, under the leader- 
ship of Augustine, were not satisfied with Pelagius’s 
explanations, and followed up the discussion. Pela- 
gianism was condemned as a heresy by the synods 
of Mileve and Carthage, in 416, and this decision 
was ultimately endorsed by the vacillating Roman 
bishop Zosimus,” in 418, and thus by the Latin 
Church. The Eastern Church, as represented at 


'Before the synod of Jerusa- 
lem, he explained, “that in assert- 
ing that man could live without 
sin if he only would, he spoke of 
man after conversion, and did not 
deny the influence of grace upon 
the converted man, or intend to 
teach that any man had actually 
lived free from sin.” GuUERICKE: 
Church History, §92. By “grace” 
Pelagius meant outward aids, as 
distinct from inward operation. 
The natural endowments of wil 
and understanding, the communi- 
cation of truth, the knowledge of 
the commandments, the influence 


of favorable circumstances would 
be “grace,” according to Pela- 
gius’s use of the term. 

? Jn his statement of belief to 
Zosimus, Pelagius said: ‘We 
have a free will, either to sin, or 
to forbear sinning; and in all 
good works it is aided by the Di- 
vine assistance. We maintain 
that free will exists generally in 
all mankind, in Christians, Jews, 
and Gentiles; they have all equal- 
ly received it by nature, but in 
Christians only it is assisted with 
grace. In others, this good of 
their original creation is naked 


100 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the Council of Hphesus, in 431, also condemned 
Pelagianism. 

But though the Eastern Church came into this 
decision, its opposition to Pelagianism was not so 
earnest and intelligent as that of the Western, and 
particularly as that of the North-African Church. 
There were two reasons for this. In the first place, 
the Greek anthropology was adopted by the Orien- 
tal bishops. This, we have seen, maintained the 
position that original sin is not voluntariness but 
physical corruption, together with the synergistic 
view of regeneration.. The Greek anthropology 
would therefore come in conflict with the theory of 
Augustine upon these points. In the second place, 
the doctrine of unconditional election and predesti- 
nation, which flowed so naturally from the Augus- 
tinian view of the entire helplessness of human 
nature, was extremely offensive to the Eastern 


and unarmed. They shall be not where they do go.” Avets- 


judged and condemned, because, 
though possessed of free will, by 
which they might come to the 
faith, and merit the grace of God, 
they make an ill use of their free- 
dom; while Christians shall be 
rewarded, because by using their 
free will aright, they merit the 
grace of the Lord, and keep his 
commandments.” In answer to 
the question : ‘‘ Where do unbap- 
tized children go?” Pelagius said: 
‘‘T know where children who die 
unbaptized do not go; but I know 


tTrnus: De gratia Christi. Cap. 
xxxi. (Ed. Migne, X. 376). 

*“During Pelagius’s residence 
at Rome, he fell into the heresy 
against grace, being instructed by 
aSyrian called Rufinus. For that 
error had already gained a footing 
in the East. It was taught by 
Theodore of Mopsuestia ; and it 
was thought to take its rise from 
the principles of Origen.” Frev- 
RY: Eccl. Hist. B. xxiii. § 1. 
Compare Orsnausen: Com. tiber 
Rom. vii. 7-24, p. 259. 


PELAGIANISM. 101 


mind. Hence we find that when the controversy 
between Augustinianism and Pelagianism was trans- 
ferred from the West to the East, and the examin- 
ation was conducted in the Eastern synods, there 
were bishops who either asserted that the matters 
in dispute were unessential, or else sided with Pela- 
gius, if the choice must be made between Pelagius 
and Augustine.’ The Antiochian School, as repre- 
sented by Theodore of Mopsuestia and Isidore of * 
Pelusium, stood midway between the parties, and 
the condemnation of Pelagianism which was finally 
passed by the Council of Ephesus seems to have 
been owing more to a supposed connection of the 
views of Pelagius with those of Nestorius, than to a 
clear and conscientious conviction that his system 
was contrary to Scripture, and the Christian ex- 
perience. 

Such a settlement, consequently, of the strife 
could not be permanent. Moreover, the views of 
Augustine respecting predestination were misstated 
by some of his followers, and misrepresented by 
some of his opponents, in such a manner as to i 
ply the tenet of necessitated sin,—evil being repre- 
sented as the product of an efficient decree, instead, 2. 
as Augustine taught, of a permissive one. Th 


* During the controversy, the 
Pelagians quoted as upon their 
side, Lactantius, Hilary, Ambrose, 
Jerome, Basil, Chrysostom, The- 
odore of Mopsuestia, and Dio- 
dorus of Tarsus; on the other 


hand, Irenaeus, Cyprian, Inno- 
cent, Gregory, Hilary, Ambrose, 
Jerome, Basil, and Chrysostom 
were claimed as agreeing with 
Augustine. Wairsy: On Sin, 
Chap. VIII. p. 251. 


102 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


doctrine of election was construed into a motive for 

indifference, instead of fear and supplication for 

mercy. ‘The same abuse was made of the doctrine 

rare sovereign grace in the salvation of the human 

yer soul that was anticipated and warned against by 

the Apostle Paul. These causes, and this condition 

of things, led to the revival, by a party in the West, 

$ of the synergistic theory of regeneration, as the only 

thing which, it was supposed, could relieve the hon- 

est-minded of their difficulties respecting predestina- 

tion and election, and make conversion an intelligible 

and practical matter. This party were the so-called 
Semi-Pelagians.* 


§ 2. Semi-Pelagianism. 


The Semi-Pelagian controversy arose in the fol- 
lowing manner. The monks of the cloister of Ad- 
rumetum, in North-Africa, were most of them 
advocates of the Augustinian theory, but had fallen 
into dispute respecting its meaning. Sgme of them, 

| by the doctrine of absolute predestination, had been 
thrown into great mental doubt and despair. Others 
were making this doctrine the occasion of entire in- 
difference, and even of licentiousness. A third class 

, were supposing that some virtuous efficiency, even 


1 This name was not giventhem  sians, from their principal seat at 
until the Middle Ages; they were Marseilles, in Southern Gaul. 
called, previously, the Massilien- 


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 103 


though it be very slight, must be ascribed to the 
human will, in regeneration. The abbot of the 
cloister referred the case to Augustine, in 427, who 
endeavored in his two treatises, De gratia et libero 
arbitrio, and De correptione et gratia, to relieve the 
difficulties of the monks, and appears to have been 
successful. 

But, contemporaneously with this occurrence, a 
far more extensive opposition to Augustine’s theory 
arose in Southern Gaul. A theological school was 
formed among these enterprising and active French 
churches which, in fact, reproduced with modifica- 


tions the Greek anthropology of the preceding con” 


turies. A Scythian monk, John Cassian, a pupil 
and friend of Chrysostom, and the founder and pres- 
ident of the cloister at Marseilles, stood at the head 


gs? 


ee 


of it. It became a vigorous party, of which ee 
most distinguished members and leaders were Vin- bn 


cent of Lerins, Faustus of Rhegium, Gennadius, 
and Arnobius the Younger. — 

Augustine, also, had his disciples and adherents 
in these same churches of Southern Gaul. Among 
them were two influential theologians, viz.: Hilary 
and Prosper. These informed Augustine of the 
controversy that was going on in the French 
churches, and he endeavored, as in the instance of 
the monks of Adrumetum, to settle the dispute by 
explanatory treatises. He addressed to the Massi- 
liensians the two tracts: De pracdestinatione sanc 
torum, and De dono perseverantiae. He meets the 


( 


oe 


hh 


104 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


objection that the doctrine of predestination minis 
ters to moral indifference and licentiousness, by 
teaching that the decree of election is not a decree 
to bestow eternal happiness upon men full of sin, 
but that only he can be sure of his election who 
~ runs the Christian race, and endures to the end, 
The divine decree includes the means as well as the 
vend, and therefore produces holiness in order to 
y” secure happiness. Handled in this manner, the 
y™\\) doctrine, Augustine claims, is not a dangerous one 
for the common mind; but on the contrary affords 
the only strong ground of confidence to a helpless 
and despairing spirit. Augustine, however, did not 
succeed in convincing his opponents, and the con- 
troversy was afterwards carried on with some bit- 

terness between Prosper and Vincent of Lerins. 
The ablest advocate of the Semi-Pelagian theory 
ie was Faustus of Rhegium. His treatise De gratia 
et libero arbitrio greatly influenced the decisions of 
the council of Aviles, in 475, and of Zyons, in the 
same year,—both of which councils sanctioned Semi- 
Pelagianism. The fortunes of this system, however, 
declined in Southern Gaul, from two causes. In the 
3 |< first place, the later defenders of Augustinianism, 
particularly Pulgentius, while holding the doctrine 
ww” of predestination with entire strictness in its relation 
to holiness, were more reserved respecting its rela- 
tions to ) sin, (thus affording less opportunity for the 
charge of necessitated evil.) Secondly, the personal 
influence of some highly respected and excellent 


”” 


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 105 


bishops, such as Avitus of Vienne, and Caesarius 
of Arles, was thrown in favor of the views of the 
North-African Father. By these means, a change 
was effected in the churches of Southern Gaul, to 
such an extent, that in the year 529, a little more 
than fifty years after the councils of Arles and 
Lyons, they declared for the Augustinian anthropol- 
ogy, in the two councils of Orange and Valence. 
The following are some of the decisions of the coun- 
cil of Orange, and indicate in their condemnatory 
clauses the Semi-Pelagian positions, particularly re- 
specting grace and free-will. “If any one assert 
that by reason of man’s prayer the grace of God_is.. 4 
conferred, but that it is not grace itself which causes 
that God is prayed to, he contradicts the prophet 
Isaiah (1xi. 1), and the apostle Paul (Rom. x. 20) 
saying the same thing: ‘I was found of them that 
sought me not, and have been made manifest to 
them that asked not after me.” If any one main- 
tains that God waits for a willingness in us to be — 
purged from sin, and does not allow that the very ; 
willingness to be cleansed from sin is wrought in us 
by the infusion and operation of the Holy Spirit, he 
resists the Holy Ghost saying by Solomon (Prov. 
vill. 85, Septuagint ver.), ‘The will is prepared by 
the Lord;’ and by the apostle (Philip. 1. 13), 
‘It is God which worketh in you, both to will 
and to do, of his good pleasure.” If any man say, 
that we believe, will, desire, endeavor, labor, watch, 


study, ask, seek, and knock, without _and_previougs D 


106 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


to grace, and that grace is conferred by God upon 
this ground, and does not confess that it is wrought 
in us by the infusion and operation of the Holy 
Ghost, that we believe, will, desire, endeavor, and 
do all the above-mentioned things as we ought, and 
thus makes the aid of grace to follow after man’s 
humility or obedience, and does not allow that it is 
the gift of grace itself, that we are obedient and 
humble: he resists the apostle (1 Cor. iv. 7; xv. 
10) saying: ‘What hast thou, that thou hast not 
received, and: ‘By the grace of God I am what I 
am.’ It is God’s gift both when we think aright, 
and when we hold our feet from falsehood and un- 
righteousness. For as often as we do good things, 
God worketh in us, and with us, that we may work. 
There are many good things done zz man which are 
not done dy man (multa in homine bona fiwnt, quae 
non facit homo). But man doth no good things 
which God does not cause man to do (quae non 
Deus praestet, ut faciat homo). In every good 
work, we do not begin, and are helped afterwards 
by the grace of God, but he first of all, no good 
merits of ours going before, inspires into us both 
faith and love of himself, that we may both beliey- 
ingly seek the sacrament of baptism, and after bap- 
tism, by his help, may fulfil the things that are 
pleasing to him.”? 

Respecting the Semi-Pelagian theory itself: It 


1UsHer’s Works, III. p. 540 sq. 


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 107 


was intended by its advocates to be a middle-posi-  ¢ 
tion between Augustinianism and Pelagianism. The 

essence of the theory consists in a mixture of grace py. 
and free-wiJl. There are two. efficient agencies con- Mae 


cerned in the renovation of the human will: Vizag 
the wll itself and the Holy Spirit* Hence, they 
product can not be referred either to one or the 
other, as the sole originating cause. Upon this co-- 
existence of two co-efficients and their co-operation, 


*The degree of power to good 
which the Semi-Pelagians assert- 
ed was certainly less than that 
asserted by the Alexandrine an- 
thropology. Hilary’s account of 
their synergism is as follows: 
“They agree that all men per- 
ished in Adam, and that no man 
can be saved merely by his own 
will. But this they say is agree- 
able to truth, that when the op- 
portunity of obtaining salvation 
is announced to such as are pros- 
trate and would never rise again 
by their own strength (prostratis 
et nunquam suis viribus surrectu- 
ris, annunciatur obtinendae salutis 
oceasio), they, by that merit 
whereby they will to be healed 
of their disease and believe that 
they can be, obtain both an in- 
crease of this [slender] faith it- 
self, and entire restoration in the 
end (eo merito, quo voluerint et 
crediderint a suo morbo se posse 
sanari, et ipsius fidei augmentum, 
et totius sanitatis suae consequan- 
tur effectum).” Hirarn Epist. 
ad Aug. Aveustinus: Opera II. 


p. 825. In this same letter, Hi- 
lary represents the Semi-Pela- 
gians as affirming that, “‘ grace is 
not denied, when such a species 
of voluntariness is said to go be- 
fore grace, as only seeks and de- 
sires a physician, but is not able 
to do anything more than this; ” 
and as “explaining the passage, 
‘according as God hath dealt to 
every man the measure of faith,’ 
and similar ones (e. g. Rom. i. 17), 
to mean, that that man shall be 
assisted who has commenced to 
will; but not that this very com- 
mencement of willingness is also 
the effect of grace (ut adjuvetur qui 
coeperit velle; non ut etiam do- 
netur, ut velit).” Prosper charges 
the Massiliensians with taking po- 
sitions that logically, and in their 
tendency, favor Pelagianism. 
These positions are the following: 
1. The beginning of salvation is 
placed in man; 2. The human 
will is honored more than the 
Divine; since the sinner is help- 
ed because he commences to will, 
and does not commence to will 


108 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Cassian lays great stress, as the distinguishing and 
essential position which would retain the element 
of truth that, in his judgment, was in Augustinian- 
ism and in Pelagianism, and would exclude the 
errors into which, he believed, both fell. Hence, 
in answer to the test question: Which agency be- 
gins the work of regeneration ? Cassian affirms that 
sometimes it is the divine, and sometimes it is the 
human. Sometimes he ascribes the commencement 
of good in man, to man, and its completion to God ; 
and sometimes he derives the first desire after grace 
itself from God. Sometimes he even ascribes to the 
human spirit a compulsion to good. “Sometimes,” 
e remarks, “ we are drawn to salvation against our 
ill (inviti).”* In another place,’ he asks: “ What 
was that which stood in the way of Paul, because 
he seems to have been attracted to the way of life, 
as it were unwillingly ; though afterwards consum- 
mating and perfecting this initial compulsion (ne- 
cessitas), by a voluntary devotedness.” 
Semi-Pelagianism he_ revival in the West- 
ern Church of the Greekanthropology, though 
made somewhat more guarded by the discussions 
and statements of the Pelagian controversy. The 
following recapitulation, taken from Wiggers’ rep- 


because he is helped; 8. Thesin- which God himself has not be- 
ner’s recipiency towards holiness stowed or produced. 

is represented as originating from ? Cassranvs: De institutionibus 
himself, and not from God; 4. coenobitorum, XII. xviii. 

It is thought that God is pleased 2 Casstanus: Ooll. IID. v. 
with something in the sinner, 


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 109 


resentation, embraces the principal points in the Li 
system.’ In his primitive state, man was possessed 4 [sem 
of certain physical, intellectual, and moral advan- 

tages which he does not now possess. His body x 
was immortal; he lay under no earthly ills or bur- 

dens, such as the curse of labor, and in the instance 

of woman the pains of child-bearing; he possessed 
remarkable knowledge of nature and the moral law; Q 

and was entirely sinless. The sin of the first pair, S> > 
to which they were tempted by the devil, resulted, 

not only for them but also for their posterity, in 

both physical and_mgral disadvantages. The body) 4 
became mortal, and a moral corruption entered| 2 
which was propagated to the posterity, and grad- 

ually becomes greater and greater. Freedom of 3 
will, in the sense of power to good,is not wholly 

lost, but it is very much weaken. Man in his 
present condition is morally diseased. The imputa- 
tion of original sin is removed in baptism, and oe ee 
out baptism no one attains salvation. Owing to 

his morally diseased and weakened condition, man 

needs the assistance of divine grace, in order to the! 
practice of holiness, and the attainment of salvation. 

The moral freedom of man, or his power to good, 4 
works in cdnnection with divine grace. The two 

things are not to be separated from each other. 

There is ng_unconditional decree of God, but pre- 3 
destination to salvation or to perdition depends 


. 


1 Wiecers: Augustinismus: Th. IJ. 357 sq. 


110 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


upon the use which man makes of the remainder 
of his freedom to good. The,decree of election is 
therefore a conditional one; God determines to 
bestow forgiveness and ‘assisting ‘influences upon 
those who he foresees will make a beginning. 
And yet the merit of his salvation man must not 
ascribe to himself, but to the grace of God, because 
without this grace man’s endeavors would be un- 
successful. 
Wiggers compares the three systems with each 
other as follows: Augustinianism asserts that man 
{is morally dead ; Semi-Pelagianism maintains that 
| he is morally sick; Pelagianism holds that he is 
morally well. 


CHAPTER V. 


THE ANSELMIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 


“Many things have carried the appearance of contradiction, and inconsist: 
ency, to the first view of our straitened minds, which afterwards we have, upon 
repeated consideration and endeavor, found room for, and been able to make 
fairly accord, and lodge together.”—Joun Howe. 


§ 1. Anselm’s theory of Original Sin. 


Tue Augustinian theory of sin and grace, we 
have seen, was adopted as the anthropology of the 
Western Church, at the councils of Orange and 
Valence. But it would be an error to suppose that 
the Western Church as a body continued to adhere 
strictly to the views of the North-African father. 
The more devout and evangelical minds in the 5th 
and 6th centuries, like Leo and Gregory, and even 
in the 8th and 9th centuries, like Bede and Alcudn, 
propagated the teachings of Augustine respecting 
the corruption of human nature, and the agency of 
the Holy Spirit in its regeneration; but were less 


112 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


distinct and bold, in their statements respecting the 
preterition and reprobation of the lost. They 
were content with affirming, in the most unqualified 
manner, the doctrine of an enslaved will, and the 
need of divine efficiency in order to its renewal and 
liberation, and left the darker and more difficult side 
of the doctrine of predestination, without explana- 
tion. So far, therefore, as the practical part of the 
Augustinian anthropology,—its relations, namely, 
to the renewal and salvation of men,—is concern- 
ed, the more distinguished Fathers of the Western 
Church, during the two or three centuries succeed- 
ing that of Augustine, were steady adherents to his 
opinions. But the general decline that was advanc- 
ing in all the great interests of the church brought 
with it a departure from the high vantage-ground 
which had been gained in the contest with Pelagian- 
ism. The middle theory of Semi-Pelagianism, even 
in Augustine’s own century, we have seen, found 
some able defenders, and was oftentimes associated 
with genuine devotion and piety. — Its less rigorous 
and scientific character, together with its compara- 
tive silence upon the more difficult parts of the doe- 
trines of original sin, predestination, and free-will, 
recommended it to a large class of minds; while 
the element of human efficiency which it introduced 
into the doctrine of regeneration was thought to 
render it a more intelligible and practical doctrine, 
It was not strange, consequently, that in course of 
time, the Latin Church, though holding the name 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 113 


of Augustine in high respect, should have lapsed 
down very generally upon the Greek anthropology.’ 

That brief chapter in the doctrinal history of 
the Middle Ages which records the attempt of 
Gottschalk (+868) to revive the Augustinian an- 
thropology evinces how alien this system had at 
length become to the thinking and feeling of the 
Papal Church. This serious and earnest-minded 
monk contended for a two-fold predestination, in ac- 
cordance with the teachings of the revered bishop 
of Hippo. He simply applied the doctrine of pre- 


1«The debates in the first as- 
sembly of the Council of Trent 
(A. D. 1546) between the Domin- 
icans who adhered to Aquinas, 
and the Franciscans who follow- 
ed Scotus, on original sin, justifi- 
cation, and grace... show how 
strongly the whole Western 
Church, through all the divisions 
into which it has been separated, 
has manifested the same unzwill- 
ingness to avow the Augustinian 
system, and the same fear of con- 
tradicting it.” MAacKINTOSH : 
Progress of Ethical Philosophy. 
Note I. Prravius cites from the 
earlier writings of Augustine, to 
prove that the Augustinian and 
Tridentine anthropologies are 
identical, and gives the following 
definition of a Pelagian: ‘‘ Tile 
vero Pelagianus est, qui libero 
isti arbitrio tantum arrogat ut 
sine adjutorio Dei niti posse viri- 
bus suis ad Deum colendum exis- 
timet, hoc est ad recte agendum, 

VOL. 11.—8 


vel ad Christianam inchoandam, 
promovendam, perficiendamque 
justitiam.” De Pelag. et Semi- 
Pelag. haeresi, Lib. I. Cap. 2. § 
12. Petavius maintains that the 
theory of codperation in regener- 
ation is the truth, and that the 
Papal Church agrees with Augus- 
tine in holding it. Hass (Hutte- 
rus Redivivus, § 85) remarks that 
Semi-Pelagianism maintained that 
“durch den Siindenfall entstand 
nur allgemeinen Neigung zur 
Siinde, der Mensch ist krank, 
aber er kann und soll neben der 
gottlichen Gnade wirken, obwohl 
er nur durch diese zur vollen 
Heiligung und Seligkeit gelangt. 
Diese fur Augustinismus ausgege- 
bene Meinung, in der durch die 
Scholastiker gegebenen Fortbil- 
dung, wurde zu Trient Kirchen- 
lehre; und auch die morgenliin- 
dische Kirche hat nie mit vollem 
Ernste in den Abgrund der Siinde 
geblickt.” 


114 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


destination to the lost as well as to the saved, being 
careful at the same time to limit the divine efficiency, 
to the production of holiness. His statement of the 
doctrine of predestination was that of a permissive 
decree, only, in respect to sin,’ and yet it was con- 
demned as heretical by a church which had rejected 
Semi-Pelagianism. 

Upon passing, however, into the period of Scho- 
lasticism, we find one thinker who both reproduces 
the Augustinian anthropology, and makes a positive 
contribution towards the metaphysical solution of 
the difficult problems involved in it. This thinker 
is Anselm, a man who, in reference to the doctrine 
of original sin, as in reference to that of the atone- 
ment, belongs not to the Papal but to the Protest- 
tant Church. 

The anthropology of Anselm is stated in his two 
tracts, De conceptu virginali et originali peccato, 
and De libero arbitrio. A rapid analysis of a por- 
tion of each of them, which we derive from the ex- 


1“ Credo atque confiteor, prae- 
scire te ante secula quaecunque 
erunt futura sive bona sive mala, 
praedestinasse vero tantummodo 
bona.” Quoted by NEanpDER: 
Ill. 475. The employment of 
praescire in the one instance, and 
of praedestinare in the other, was 
undoubtedly designed by Gott- 
schalk to indicate the different re- 
lation which God sustains to evil 
from what he does to good ; while, 
yet, both are equally compre:.end- 


ed in the divine plan. For had 
Gottschalk not been endeavoring 
to establish this latter position, 
he would not have incurred the 
opposition of the Church. For 
other extracts see HAaGENBACH : 
Dogmengeschiclite, § 103. Gott- 
schalk’s Augustinianism was de- 
fended by Ratramnus and Remi- 
gius, and opposed by Hinemar 
and Erigena. See GuUERIOKE: 
History of the Mediaeval Church, 
§ 1238. 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 115 


cellent monograph upon Anselm, by Hasse, will be 
sufficient to indicate the position of this profound 
and devout Schoolman, respecting the doctrine of 
original sin, and the kindred doctrine of regen- 
eration. 

The phrase “original sin,” says Anselm,’ may 
direct attention, by the use of the word “ original,” 
either to the origin of human nature, or to the 
origin of the individual man. But so far as the 
origin of human nature itself is concerned, this is 
pure and holy. The phrase “original sin,” there- 
fore, has no reference to man as he was originated 
or created by his Maker. It must refer, conse- 
quently, only to the origin of the individual man, 
—either to his nearer, or his more remote origin ; 
either to his birth from immediate ancestors, or his 
descent from the first human pair.” For every man 
possesses that universal quality which is common to 
all men, viz.: human nature; and also that peculiar 
quality, which distinguishes him from all other men, 
viz.: his individuality. Hence, there is a two-fold 
sin to be distinguished in man ; that sin, viz.: which 
he receives in the reception of human nature at the 
very first moment of his individual existence, and 
that which he afterwards commits as this or that 


* Ansetmus: De originali pec- creation and birth must be care- 


cato, c. 1. 

? Man, according to Anselm as 
well as Augustine, was not cre- 
ated sinful, but he is born sin- 
ful. The distinction between 


fully distinguished in order to a 
correct apprehension of this an- 
thropology. Man was created 
on the sixth day; but men are 
born every day. 


116 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


particular individual. The first may be also de- 
nominated the sin of nature, peccatuwm naturale; yet 
it does not belong to the original essence of human 
nature, but is only a condition or state into which 
that human nature has come since the creating act. 
In the same manner, there is an original righteous- 
ness, and an individual righteousness. For human 
nature would have been propagated in its original 
con-created state or condition of holiness, had the 
first human pair kept their first estate. But as they 
did not, original sin, instead of original righteous- 
ness, has passed upon all men. In this way, each 
individual man is now characterized by both cor- 
ruption and guilt. By corruption, because the 
act of apostasy has vitiated his nature, both 
upon the physical and the spiritual side. By 
guilt, because inasmuch as he was created in a 
righteous state, the obligation still lies upon him, 
even in his apostasy, to have all that he was origin- 
ally endowed with by his Maker, and he is a debtor 
to this obligation." Hence, the requirement rests 
upon human nature as individualized in every child, 
and in every adult, to fulfil that original and per- 
fect righteousness which belonged to it at creation, 
and which it was under no necessity of losing; and 


1 Aquinas (De Peccato Origi- Hence the “blindness of the 


nali, Art. 2) affirms that ‘‘there 
is sin, not only when a man has 
not what he ought to possess, but 
also when he has that of which 
he ought not to be possessed.” 


heart,” and the “ignorance ” spo- 
ken of as belonging to the unre- 
generate, in Eph. i. 18, is sin in 
the sense of guilt. 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. big 


also to make satisfaction to justice for that sin which 
it was commanded not to commit. The inability 
of apostate human nature, in the child, or the adult, 
to fulfil this perfect righteousness, and atone for this 
sin, does not excuse it, because this inability is its 
own product, and because it ought not to have lost 
the power with which it was previously endowed. 
Thus, all sin, original as well as actual, is un- 
righteousness and guilt. But sin supposes the ex- 
istence of will. How then can original sin be im- 
puted to the infant, and why is the infant baptized 
for its remission? Anselm recurs to the Augus- 
tinian doctrine of the Adamic unity for his answer. 
Three facts, he remarks, must be taken into account, 
in endeavoring to solve this difficult problem. First, 
the fact that there is a common human nature.’ Sec- 


2“The realism of Anselm,” 
says Baur (Dreieinigkeitslehre, 
TI. 412), “‘ consists in his main- 
taining the actual existence of a 
universal that is distinguished 
from the individual. He objects 
to Roscellin that he does not con- 
ceive of man except as an indi- 
vidual. ‘ Nondum intelligit quo- 
modo plures homines in specie 
sint unus homo,—non potest in- 
telligere, aliquid esse hominem, 
nisi individuum.’” In Anselm’s 
theory, the species is an entity as 
truly as theindividual. For him, 
the universal has objective exist- 
ence, and is not a mere name for 
the collective aggregate of par- 
ticulars. The human “nature” 


is prior to the individuals that 
are produced from it, and is as 
substantially existent as they are. 
For the individuals are only the 
nature distributed ; they are the 
“species” metamorphosed into 
persons. The “nature,” there- 
fore, is not the collective aggre- 
gation of individuals; for in this 
case the nature is not an entity,— 
it is only the name given to the 
aggregation of particular individ- 
uals, and the only entity is the 
individual. On the contrary (ac- 
cording to the theory of Realism), 
the nature is a primary entity, 
having real existence, which is 
metamorphosed by distribution 
into a multitude of individual 


118 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


ondly, there is a particular individuality. And, 
thirdly, the individual is a production from the 
nature. As merely possessing the common human 
nature, the infant participates in no sin, guilt, or 
condemnation. For abstract human nature is the 
pure creation of God. If the mere fact of being 
human were sufficient to constitute an individual 
man a sinner, then Adam himself would have been 
a sinner before his act of apostasy. Neither is the 
second characteristic, viz.: that the infant possesses 
individuality, sufficient to account for his birth-sin ; 
for this equally with the generic nature is a crea- 
tion of God. The third fact, consequently, alone 
remains by which to explain the sin and guilt that 
belong to every man at birth: the fact, viz.: that 
the individual is produced out of the nature, and 
the nature has apostatized subsequent to its creation. 
Adam differed from all other human individuals by 
containing within his person the entire human na- 
ture out of which the millions of generations were 
to be propagated, and of which they are individual- 
ized portions. He was to transmit this human na- 
ture which was all in himself, exactly as it had been 
created in him; for propagation makes no radical 
changes, but simply transmits what is given in the 
nature, be it good or bad. If therefore he had not 
apostatized, human nature would not have aposta- 


persons. Compare Baur’s re- a substance or reality, in his 
marks upon Anselm’s universal Dreieinigkeitslehre, II. 411 sq. 
not being a mere conception, but 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 119 


tized, and would have been procreated, or individu- 
alized from generation to generation in the same 
holy and perfect condition in which it came from 
the hand of God. If, on the contrary, the first 
father, by an act of apostasy, should introduce a 
total moral change into the human nature that was 
included in him, then the same law of propagation 
must operate, and the individuals produced out of it 
must be characterized by a sinful state and condi- 
tion. Hence Anselm speaks of a necessity of being 
sinful which now, since the apostasy, overhangs 
the individual, though it did not overhang the na- 
ture. The nature in Adam was under no compul- 
sion to apostatize. ‘There is no original and created 
necessity for sin. But if human nature in Adam 
does by a free act lose its original righteousness, 
then the individual, inasmuch as he is produced out 
of the nature, cannot possibly escape depravity. 
The greater inevitably includes the less; and no 
individual can be sinless in case the nature out of 
which he is produced, and of which he is a portion, 
has lapsed into sin. Since apostasy, it is impossible 
that any child of Adam should be born sinless; and 
in this sense, and with this explanation, Anselm 
asserts a necessity of sin in reference to the individ- 
ual——not a necessity founded in creation, but in 
the unavoidable relation which an individual sus- 
tains to his race. Descent, then, or the propagation 
of an apostate nature, is the fact by which Anselm 
would account for the existence of sin in every indi 


120 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 

vidual man at birth. And he holds that the mirac- 
ulous and anomalous birth of Christ, by which he 
was kept out of the line of ordinary human genera- 
tion, indicates that sin now unavoidably flows down 
within that line. 

In endeavoring to impart a notion of the precise 
relation of that which is individual to that which is 
generic, Anselm theorizes in the vein of Augustine. 
That the posterity have sinned in and with the 
progenitor, supposes an original existence in him. 
Nonentity cannot sin. The first forefather semi- 
nally contained his posterity... Their essence, both 
on the spiritual and the physical side, was part and 
particle with his; their nature was consubstantial 
But this one common na- 


The pos- 


(6moovetoc) with his. 
ture or essence is not yet individualized. 


1 Adam differed from every one in Eve. Eve, seduced by Satan, 


of his posterity, in that his per- 
son included the whole human 
“nature” or species. Of no oth- 
er human person is this true. 
The moment that he was created 
a solitary individual, the nature 
was all in him, undistributed, and 
unindividualized. When Eve, the 
second individual, was formed, 
she was not created de nihilo, 
but made out of his substance,— 
“bone of his bone, and flesh of 
his flesh.” The human “ nature ” 
then became included in two in- 
dividuals, the first human pair,— 
the masculine side of the nature be- 
ing in Adam, and the feminine side 


tempted Adam to disobedience, 
and in their joint act of transgres- 
sion the entire human “nature” 
or species transgressed and aposta- 
tized. In the birth of Cain there 
was an individualization of a por- 
tion, only, of this (now) corrupt- 
ed nature. Cain, it is evident, 
did not, like Adam at the instant 
of creation, include the whole 
humanity in himself. He did not 
include Adam and Eve, neither 
did he include the other children 
of Adam and Eve, and the mil- 
lions of individuals who sprang 
from them. 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL sin. = 121 
terity do not exist in the progenitor as so niany 
distinct persons. Hence a distinction must be 
made between the sin which the nature in Adam 
originates, and the sin which the zndividual after 
Adam commits; or, in the technical phrase, be- 
tween “original” and “actual” sin. In the case of 
Adam, an individual transgression resulted in a sin 
of nature; while in the case of his posterity, a sin 
of nature results in individual transgressions. Adam 
by a single distinct transgression introduced a cor- 
ruption into that entire human nature which was 
in, and one with, himself. Here, the individual 
vitiates the generic, because the generic is included 
in the individual. Adam’s posterity, as so many 
distinct individualizations of this vitiated human 
nature, act out this corruption, each in his day and 
generation. Here the generic vitiates the individual. 


1 Aquinas (Summa, Pt. II. Q. 
81, Art. 1) states the relation of 
the individual to the generic 
transgression as follows: ‘ All 
men, who are born from Adam, 
can be regarded as one man; just 
as all who are members of the 
same civil community, may be 
regarded as one body, and the 
whole community as one man. 
Thus all men who spring from 
Adam are like members of one 
material body. But the act of 
any particular member of the hu- 
man body, say the hand, is not a 
voluntary act by reason of a vol- 
untariness that is in the hand it- 
self, but by reason of the volun- 


tariness of the soul which moves 
the hand. In like manner, the 
actual, that is the individual, 
transgression which is committed 
by some particular member of 
the body, is not the sin of that 
member, except so far as that 
member is a part of the total 
man himself, and for this reason 
is called a human sin; and in like 
manner original sin is the sin of 
the individual only so far as the 
individual receives a sinful nature 
or disposition from the first par- 
ent, and hence it is denominated 
the sin of nature (peccatum na- 
turae).” 


22 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


In the instance of the progenitor, the “actual” sin, 
or the sin of a single act, originates the “ original ” 
sin, or the sin of nature and disposition. In the in- 
stance of the posterity, the “original” sin, or the 
sin of the nature, originates the sin of single acts, or 
“actual” transgressions. In the first instance, the 
individual corrupts the nature ; in the last instance, 
the nature corrupts the individual. 

Anselm next raises the question, whether the sins 
of the immediate ancestors are imputed to the pos- 
terity, as well as the sin of the first father. This 
question he answers in the negative; because the 
individual sins, be they of immediate or of remote 
ancestors, are not committed by the common nature 
in Adam. The entire nature, at the moment of the 
temptation and apostasy, was in two persons. All 
mankind fell in the first human pair, who are con- 
jointly denominated Adam,—‘ God created man in 
his own image, in the image of God created he him ; 
male and female created he them” (Gen. i. 27). 
The first act of transgression was unique. There 
was never a second like it. The sins of Cain, or 
Abel, or of any other individual, were not the 
transgressions of an individual who included within 
himself the entire humanity. Even the individual 
transgressions of Adam, subsequent to the first act 
of apostasy, were only manifestations in his particu- 
lar person of the generic sin, and sustained the same 
relation to it that the transgressions of any other 
individual do. There is, therefore, no imputation 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 123 


of the strictly éndividual sins of Adam to his pos- 
terity. That only is imputed to all men which all 
men have committed; and the only sin which all 
men have committed is that one sin which they 
committed when they were all, “¢le wnus homo,” 
one human nature, in the first human pair. 

Thus, in Anselm’s anthropology, as in Augus- 
tine’s, everything starts from the original unity of 
the human race. If this idea is not conceded, the 
whole doctrine of original and transmitted sin, as 
Anselm constructs it, falls to the ground. Original 
sin is original agency ; but original agency supposes 
an original agent; and this original agent is the 
whole human nature undistributed an. unindividu- 
alized, in distinction from this or that individualized 
part of it. Original sin, coming into existence by 
the single primitive act of apostasy, is then trans- 
mitted along with the nature, from generation to 
generation,—the generation being so many indi- 
vidualizations of the common humanity. The first 
pair of individuals are created, and contain the sub- 
stance of the entire race, both upon the spiritual 
and the physical side. All the posterity, as indi- 
vidualizations, are propagated, not created. Herein 
consists the possibility of a transmission of sin from 
the first human pair, to the whole posterity, and 
also of a transmission of holiness. For had: there 
been no apostasy, or change in the moral character 
of human nature, as it existed in Adam, the propa- 
gation of human nature would have simply trans- 


124 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


mitted holiness,—that original righteousness with 
which man was endowed by the creative act. For 
Anselm did not hold the doctrine of the later 
Schoolmen, that the primitive man was only nega- 
tively holy,—that is, created in puris naturalibus, 
without either holiness or sin. Hence, if human 
nature in the person of Adam had remained as it 
was created, it would of course have been propa- 
gated as it had remained. Original righteousness 
instead of original sin would have been the inherit- 
ed and native character of the posterity. For prop- 
agation makes no changes in the type or kind. 
Propagation does not originate either sin or holi- 
ness, but simply transmits it. Had holiness, conse- 
quently, continued to be the intrinsic quality of 
human nature as generically in Adam, it would 
have continued to be that of all the individualiza- 
tions of that nature. But the original righteousness 
with which mankind in the person of Adam was 
endowed, was only a relative perfection. It was 
positive holiness, and not the mere negative destitu- 
tion of any character either good or evil; yet it was 
not that immutable and absolute perfection which 
belongs to God and the angels who have kept their 
first estate. The power of a contrary choice, or the 
possibility of apostasy, was attached to it, for pur- 
poses of probation merely, and not to complete 
moral freedom. Thus, along with the possibility of 
the transmission of original holiness to all the pos- 
terity, there was also established the possibility of 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 125 


the transmission of original sin; and which of these 
it should be, was left by the Creator to depend upon 
the decision of the human race itself in the person 
of its progenitor. Hence the uncommon and strange 
influence which the first parents exert upon the 
whole future of the posterity. A sinful character 
having been determined by a voluntary act for the 
entire race in the persons of the first human pair, 
nothing but the instantaneous intervention of God, 
by a renewing act, could have prevented the trans- 
mission of the sin thus originated. For propagation 
inevitably conveys human nature precisely as it finds 
it, and hence if human nature has, within itself and 
by its own act, substituted original sin for original 
righteousness, the fact must appear in every individ- 
ual instance. Thus the individual is Jorn’ in sin, 
because he is born an individual; but he was not 
created in sin, because he was created in Adam who 
was created holy. 

Another fact urged by Anselm is, that im the 
progenitors the guilt of the nature, or of original 
sin, rests upon the guilt of the individual, but in 
the posterity the guilt of the individual rests upon 
the guilt of the nature. The guilt, in both in- 
stances, results from the loss of that primitive holi- 
ness with which mankind was endowed by the 
Creator. But in the instance of the first pair, this 
loss and lack of original righteousness is the conse- 
quence of an individual act, while in the posterity 
it is the consequence of a generic act. Adam was 


126 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


an individual that included the species. By an act 
of his will, as an individual thus inclusive of hu- 
manity he vitiated human nature. But the pos- 
terity of Adam are none of them individuals inclu- 
sive of the species. They are purely and simply 
individuals. As such they cannot perform a gener- 
ic act. Hence, in the individual determinations of 
their will, they merely manifest, but do not origin- 
ate the generic sin. In the instance of the progen- 
itor, the individual corrupts the nature, because the 
individual includes the nature; but in the instance 
of the posterity, the nature corrupts the individual, 
because the individual does not include the nature 
but receives it. The first act of the individual, in 
the instance of the posterity, must consequently be 
a sinful act, from the nature of the case; because 
original sin, or the sin of nature, has already been 
brought into existence, and now lies as the poten- 
tial basis of the individual life; and from such a 
source as this, nothing but sin can issue. The origin 
of this original sin must not be sought for within 
the sphere of the ¢ndividual life and experience, but 
in the primary unity of the race in the person of 
Adam. At this point, mankind were free to stand 
or fall, and were endowed with plenary power to 
do either. But when the election has been made, 
and the apostasy of the entire race is a foregone 
conclusion, an accomplished fact, nothing but sin 
can appear in the individual life, except there be 
an act of divine interference immediately succeeding 


ANSELM’S IDEA OF THE WILL. 127 


the act of apostasy, to prevent. The Creator puts 
forth no such act, and hence the transmission of 
original sin proceeds parallel with the individualiza- 
tion of that common humanity that was created in 
Adam. 


§ 2. Anselm’s idea of the will, and freedom. 


The anthropology of Anselm would be incom- 
pletely represented, if we failed to exhibit his views 
respecting the nature of freedom and the human 
will. These are contained in his Dialogue De libero 
arbitrio, from which we derive the following partic- 
ulars.’ 

The pupil, with whom the dialogue is held, 
brings forward the popular definition of freedom, 
as the power of sinning and of not sinning,—potes- 
tas peccandi et non peccandi, or the possibilitas uirt- 
usque partis. This definition Anselm asserts to be 
altogether inadequate. For it does not hold good 
when applied to God and the holy angels. These 
possess moral freedom, and yet are destitute of the 
power to sin. If, therefore, there is a species of 
freedom from which the power to sin is absolutely 
excluded, then this power is not a necessary or 
essential element in the idea of moral freedom. 
That this is so, says Anselm, is evident from the 
nature of the case. For he who possesses that 


‘Hasse: Anselm von Canterbury, IT. 364 sq. 


128 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


which is right and excellent, in such a manner that 
he cannot lose it, is freer than he is who can lose it, 
and exchange it for that which is shameful and evil. 
Therefore that will which, of itself, and without ex- 
ternal compulsion, is so strongly determined to the 
right as to be unable to desert the path of recti- 
tude, is freer than that will which is so feebly deter- 
mined to the right as to be able to do this, Hence 
the power to sin, if attached to a will, diminishes 
its liberty, but if subtracted from it increases it. 
Hence it is neither liberty itself, nor a part of 
liberty. But, objects the pupil, if the possibility 
of sinning does not belong to the essence of free- 
dom, can we call that act by which the evil angels 
and our first parents apostatized a free act? Was 
it not, rather, an act of necessity? For there is no 
medium between a free and a necessary act. And 
if, according to our Lord’s saying, “‘ Whosoever com- 
mitteth sin is the servant of sin,” can we properly 
call such an one free? In other words, is not sin a 
compulsion, if the power to sin is no part of free- 
dom? To this Anselm replies, that the evil angels 
and the first human pair certainly sinned without 
being forced to do so; and in this sense they were 
free in the act of apostasy. It was unquestionably 
an act of spontaneity, and of pure untrammeled self- 
will;' though not an act of genuine freedom. For 


1 Sin is an act so free, that if we shall 
Say ’tis not free, ’tis no sin at all.” 
Herrick: Noble Numbers. 


ANSELM’S IDEA OF THE WILL. 129 


they sinned not because of their freedom,—for their 
freedom consisted in their holiness, and their power 
not to sin,—but in spite of their freedom. They 
apostatized not by virtue of their power to be holy, 
which constitutes the positive substance of moral 
freedom, but by virtue of the possibilitas peccandi, 
which was merely a negative accident attached to 
the positive substance of moral freedom, for pur- 
poses of probation. This negation, this power to 
do otherwise than they were already doing, did not 
add anything to their freedom, because they were 
voluntarily holy without it. Neither did it bring 
them under necessity, or force them to the act of 
sin. Nay, they were commanded not to use it. 
“Hence,” says Anselm to his pupil, “ you draw a 
wrong inference, when you infer that because the 
power to sin is not an essential part of moral free- 
dom, therefore the apostate angels and man were 
necessitated in the act of sin. For to sin was merely 
a possibility, but not a necessity. A rich man can- 
not be denominated poor, merely because he has the 
power to give away all his property; neither can 
the apostate angels and man be regarded as neces- 
sitated, merely because they were endowed with 
the power of losing their true freedom,—that 1s, 
their holy disposition and determination.” “ Very 
well,” replies the pupil, “defore the fall man was 
voluntary, but is he after it?” “ Yes after it also,” 
answers Anselm. “For although he has made 
himself the servant of sin, yet he has not thereby 


VOL. I1.—9 


130 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


destroyed the voluntary faculty itself.” His will 
still exists, and his sin is the unforced action of his 
will; but sinful activity excludes holy activity from 
the nature of the case. Self-motion in the direction 
of sin is incompatible with self-motion in the direc- 
tion of holiness. At this point, Anselm enters upon 
an elaborate investigation of the nature and true 
destination of the will, in order to show yet more 
clearly how the apostate will may be both guilty 
in reference to sin, and impotent in reference to 
holiness. 

The true end and destination of the will is not 
to choose either good or evil, but to choose good." 
The voluntary faculty was intended by its Creator 
to will the right, and nothing else. Its true free- 
dom, consequently, consists in its self-determination 
to holiness ; in its acceptance of the one single right- 
eous end which the Creator has prescribed to it. 
The notion that freedom is caprice, that the will is 
created with the liberty of indifference, and that the 
choice of either right or wrong is granted to it by 
the Creator, Anselm rejects. By creation, the will 
has no option of choosing either of two contrary 
objects, but is shut up to the choice of but one, 
namely, holiness. But its acceptance of this one 
object must be uncompelled. It must be a se/f- 
determination, and not a compulsion from without, 
If it chooses holiness proprio motu, by its own in. 


1“T have set before you life and death . . . therefore choose life.” 
Deut. xxx. 19. 


ANSELM’S IDEA OF THE WILL. 131 


ward self-activity, then it exercises true and rational 
freedom, and the power to choose an entirely con- 
trary object like sin would not add anything to this 
freedom, because, by the terms of the statement, 
there is already a self-election of the one true and 
proper object... On the contrary, the power to 
choose the wrong, when given for purposes of pro- 
bation, subtracts from the perfection of voluntary 
freedom, because it exposes it to the hazards of an 
illegitimate choice. The human will, according to 
Anselm, was created in possession of true and 
It was made with a determina- 
tion to the one sole proper object, with an inclina- 


rational freedom. 


tion to holiness, with a choice of the right. 


1 An objection presents itself, 
here, that if the freedom of the 
will consists merely in the fact 
that it is se/f-moved, and not at 
all in the existence of a power to 
move contrarily to what it does, 
then must we not ascribe freedom 
to the animal and the plant? For 
the animal follows its impulses 
with perfect spontaneousness, and 
reaches its true end and destina- 
tion in every instance. But, the 
animal does not reach the end of 
its creation by a real se/f-decision. 
It reaches it by the operation 
within it of a daw of nature, un- 
der which it is created. The in- 
stincts and appetences which it 
obeys are merely the workings 
of an impersonal principle of ani- 
mal life. There is no true se/f. 
The agency of a brute, like the 


It was 


process of growth in a plant, is 
merely one mode in which the 
great law of life operates. The 
water falls over a dam by virtue 
of the law of gravitation; which 
law is not the water, or any ru- 
dimental part of it. Hence there 
is no se/f-motion in a water-fall, 
because the moving force is gray- 
ity, and not water. In like man- 
ner, an animal performs all its 
various functions and acts by vir- 
tue of the law of vitality and in- 
stinct; so that it is the Jaw and 
not the animal that is the real de- 
terminant in the case. But in 
the instance of man, the rational 
ego, it is the wd itself, and not a 
force or a law other than the 
will, and using the will as its 
mere instrument, which is the de- 
terminer. 


132 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


not created characterless, and left to form a charac. 
ter subsequently. Man was “ made upright,” in the 
possession of positive rectitude, of which he was not 
himself the ultimate and therefore adorable author, 
but only the receptive and willing subject.’ Hence, 
with respect to holiness, though there was freedom, 
self-decision, and the entire absence of compulsion, 
on the part of the will of the unfallen Adam, there 
was yet no absolute merit. The Creator was the 
primal author of man’s concreated holiness, and con- 
sequently man’s desert could only be of a secondary 
and relative species. Accordingly, the chief duty 
of the unfallen Adam was to keep what had been 
given to him by the creative act,—not to originate 
holiness, but to retain holiness. He was simply to 
maintain that set and bias of his will towards God 
and goodness with which he had been endowed by 
his Maker. He was not, from an undetermined, in- 
different, and characterless state of his voluntary 


1 Anselm has left a treatise en- 
titled De casu diaboli, in which 
he discusses the origin of evil in 
its most absolute and metaphys- 
ical aspects with a subtlety and 
depth that are wonderful. In 
this tract, he argues (c. 12) that 
no rational creature can put forth 
its first act of will of and by it- 
self alone. Before the first voli- 
tion, the creature, if we can so 
conceive of him, is involuntary. 
But no being that is in an invol- 
untary condition can by its own 
isolated power start out a volition 


or originate voluntariness (nihil 
potest per se velle, qui nihil vult). 
The first volition in a creature 
must therefore be referred to the 
Creator, and must therefore be a 
holy volition. From this, Anselm 
deduces the further position, that 
the will which has deserted right- 
eousness can never of itself alone 
recover it. If the will cannot 
originate holiness at the begin- 
ning of its existence, still less can 
it originate it, when after its 
apostasy it is pre-occupied with 
sin. (De casu diaboli, c. 19.) 


ANSELM’S IDEA OF THE WILL. 133 


faculty, to originate holiness de nihilo; but was 
merely to stay where he was put, to continue just 
as he was made. His true freedom consisted in the 
unforced determination of his will to holiness, and 
of course the perpetuity of his freedom depended 
simply and solely upon his perseverance in this. 
And neither temptation, nor external compulsion, 
can force the human will out of its holy state and 
determination. If it leaves rectitude, it does so of 
its own motion. Man cannot sin against his will. 
So long as his will perseveres in its right decision 
and determination, there is no power that can force 
it in any other direction, and there is nothing that 
ean force it to continue in its holiness; for the effi- 
ciency of the Holy Spirit is not a compulsory force. 
If it is holy, it is so by self-decision. [If it is sinful, 
it is so by self-decision. And it is this se/f-activity, 
in each instance, which constitutes the substance of 
voluntariness. When, therefore, a holy will is ex- 
posed to temptation, as Adam’s was in the garden, 
it is at perfect liberty, and possesses plenary power, 
to persist In its existing holiness, in which case it 
resists the temptation, or to desert its existing holi- 
ness and take a contrary choice. In both courses 
alike, it is voluntary, though not truly free in both, 
according to Anselm. If it persists in holiness, it is 
both voluntary and free. If it deserts its holiness, 
it is voluntary but not free, because freedom is the 
choice of the right object, and not of the wrong one. 

The pupil, at this point, alludes to the very 


134 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


great power which temptation has over man’s will, 
and the great difficulty which it finds in resisting 
temptation, and suggests whether the will is not, 
after all, under a necessity of sinning. Anselm in 
answer replies, that it certainly cannot be a created 
and excusable necessity ; because a holy will, such 
as Adam’s was by creation, certainly had plenary 
power to continue in holiness, and therefore if it 
yields to temptation, and becomes sinful, it must be 
by its own pure and mere self-decision. But that 
by the exercise of this pure and mere self-will it 
does bring itself under a species of necessity, under 
a moral and guilty necessity of sinning, Anselm does 
not deny. And to make this plain, he distinguishes 
between the faculty of the will and the act of the 
will—the two things being frequently confounded. 
As the term “ vision” is sometimes employed to de- 
note the organ of vision and sometimes the act of 
vision, sometimes the eye and sometimes the eye- 
sight, so also the term “ will” sometimes means a 
particular faculty of the human soul,—as when the 
soul is divided into understanding and will,—and 
sometimes it means the exercise of this faculty. 
The former is the instrument itself; the latter is 
the use which is made of the instrument. We re- 
main, says Anselm, in possession of the faculty of 
will, even though we perform no act of will,—as, 
for example, when we are asleep. The voluntary 
faculty is always one and the same; but the acts 
are as various as the objects and motives by which 


ANSELM’S IDEA OF THE WILL. 13s 


the voluntary faculty is influenced. When, there- 
fore, we are speaking generally of the strength of 
the will, we mean by it the natural force of the 
faculty itself, and not any particular act of the fac- 
ulty. “Suppose,” says Anselm to the pupil, “that 
you knew a man who was strong enough to hold a 
wild lion so still that he could not stir, would you 
call this man a weak man because upon a certain 
time a little lamb which he was leading slipped 
away from him?” “No,” replies the pupil, “ be- 
cause in this instance he did not make a right use 
of his strength.” “Just so is it,” says Anselm, 
“with the will, Asa faculty, it is irresistible in 
the sense that no temptation can force it to yield in 
opposition to its own determination. It cannot be 
made to sin against its own choice. But the use 
which is made of the faculty, the activity of the 
faculty itself, is oftentimes weakening and enslaving 
in the highest degree; and having reference to a 
particular act of willing, such as the act of conver- 
sion to God, we certainly find the will powerless in 
the extreme. But in this case, the ground and 
cause of the impotence is always in the misuse, or 
abuse, of the original energy of the will” Anselm 
concludes his reply to the query of the pupil whe- 
ther the will is not under a necessity of yielding to 
temptation and of sinning, with the strong assertion 
that even God himself cannot turn the will of man 
frem the willing of right to the willing of wrong. 
God can reduce to nothing the entire universe which 


136 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


he has created from nothing; but he cannot turn a 
holy will away from the right. For what is the 
right? Is it not that which the will ought to 
choose? And is not that which the will ought to 
choose that which G’od wills that it should choose ? 
To will the right, therefore, is to will what God 
wills that we should will. To say, then, that God 
could by the exercise of his efficiency lead us, or 
force us, away from willing the right, would be the 
same as saying that God wills that we should not 
will what he himself wills that we should will,—in 
other words, that he does not will his own will. 
There can be nothing freer therefore, says Anselm, 
than the holy free will of the unfallen Adam. For 
there is absolutely no power out of itself, either 
finite or infinite, that can alter its self-determination 
to the right. Nothing but itself can bring this 
thing about. And the only connection that the 
Divine causality has with the origin of sin in the 
human will is the merely negative fact that God 
does not hinder. His agency in reference to human 
apostasy is merely permissive. He could prevent 
the apostasy of the holy will of Adam, because he 
could concur with Adam’s choice of holiness in such 
a degree as to render Adam’s relative perfection an 
absolute one, like his own. But he does not exert 
this degree of concurrence, and thus establishes for 
purposes of probation a possibility of apostasy, but 
no necessity. Whether this possibility shall be- 
come reality, God does not decide by any efficiency 


ANSELM’S IDEA OF THE WILL. 137 
of his own, but leaves wholly to the self-decision of 
the creature. 

The will of man, thus having been created posi- 
tively holy, and endowed with a plenary power of 
repelling all temptation, and remaining holy, it is 
fitting and just, continues Anselm, that if it does 
surrender its original holiness, it should then fall 
into the bondage of sin,—such a state of the will as 
disables it from the re-origination of perfect holi- 
ness, ‘But how,” interrupts the pupil, “can this 
bondage into which the will falls, in case it aposta- 
tizes, be reconciled with its continued and perpetual 
freedom? Can the will be both enslaved and free 
at one and thesame time?” “Certainly,” answers 
the teacher ; “ it is always in the power of the finite 
will to preserve its righteousness, in case it possesses 
righteousness ; though never in its power to origin- 
ate righteousness, in case it is destitute of it. If 
therefore it loses its righteousness by a voluntary 
act, it still remains as true as ever, that it would 
have the power to maintain itself in righteousness, 
if it had righteousness, and it had righteousness by 
creation. Its enslavement arises not from creation, 
but solely from the fact that it has dispossessed 
itself of its original dowry of holiness. Having 
thus become destitute of inward holiness, it cannot, 
of course, do anything but sin. But this does not 
alter the fact, that there was no necessity of its los- 
ing its righteousness, and that if it had not lost it, 
it could do right as easily as it now does wrong. 


138 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


An evil tree, to employ the figure of Christ, can- 
not bring forth good fruit; but then there was no 
original created necessity that the tree should be an 
evil one.” 

It will be seen from this analysis of the An- 
selmic anthropology, that everything is made to 
depend upon the primitive act of apostasy described 
in Genesis. The sin of man, considered as an evil 
principle or nature, was originated at the beginning 
of human history; and all the acts of individual 
transgression, since the act of eating the forbidden 
fruit, have been the developement of that principle. 
A total change in the moral character of human 
nature was made by an unforced act of self-will 
upon the part of Adam, whose person included the 
nature, and hence every individual at his very birth 
is characterized by original sin, or innate depravity ; 
and as his powers unfold, he acts out this inherent 
sinfulness in daily life and conduct. But the whole 
process from first to last, according to Anselm, is 
voluntary ; provided that the term be made to in- 
clude the activity of the common nature, as well as 
the activity of the particular individual. Original 
sin is the self-will of human nature while in Adam, 
and not yet individualized. Actual sin is the self- 
will of this same human nature individualized in the 
series. of its generations. 

The harmony of Anselm’s doctrine of Original 
Sin with that of Augustine is apparent. Had the 
anthropology of the Mediaeval Church been shaped 


ANSELM’S IDEA OF THE WILL. > 139 


by the profound contemplations of Anselm, instead 
of the superficial speculations of Lombard,—had the 
archbishop of the then unknown and insignificant see 
of Canterbury been accepted by the Latin Church 
as its leader and thinker, instead of the Master of 
Sentences,—the history of the Western Church 
would have been that of a gradual purification and 
progress, instead of a gradual corruption and de- 


cline.! 


? The anthropology of Bernard 
and Aquinas, though not so 
strongly pronounced as that of 
Anselm, is yet in the same gen- 
eral direction with that of the 


Augustino-Anselmic. Fora good 
sketch of Bernard’s anthropology, 
see HELFFERIOH : Christliche Mys- 
tik, I. 293 sq. 


CHAPTER VI. 


THE PAPAL ANTHROPOLOGY. 


§ 1. Zridentine Theory of Original Sin. 


As there had been two tendencies within the 
Roman Catholic Church,—a stricter one inclining 
to the Augustinian anthropology, and a laxer one 
inclining to the Semi-Pelagian,—the Council of 
Trent adopted an ambiguous method of treating 
the vexed subject of original sin. The phraseology 
of their canons favors the Augustinian theory, but 
the exposition of the canons in the negative anathe- 
matizing clauses, and by their leading theologians, 
supports the Semi-Pelagian doctrine. Chemnitz,’ 
after a brief specification of the Pelagianizing senti- 
ments of many of the schoolmen, remarks, “I, for 
my part, should judge that these profane opinions 
were condemned in the language of the decrees [of 
Trent]. But Andradius, the expositor of the coun- 


1 Examen Concilii Tridentini, Pars I. locus iii. sectio 1. cap 1. 


TRIDENTINE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 141 


cil, says that ‘the decrees were composed with such 
ingenuity, that neither these nor similar opinions of 
Papal theologians respecting original sin were con- 
demned, but were left free to be received or reject- 
ed”” A glance at the Canones, and then an exam- 
ination of the explanations of them, particularly by 
Bellarmin, will corroborate the remark of the 
Jearned Lutheran divine. 

The Tridentine theologians give their general 
statement of the doctrine of Original Sin in the 
following terms. “If any one shall not confess that 
the first man Adam, when he had transgressed the 
command of God in paradise, lost immediately the 
holiness and righteousness in which he had been 
created, and incurred through the offence of this 
disobedience the wrath and indignation of God, and 
thus the death which God had previously threat- 
ened, and with death captivity to the power of him 
who has the kingdom of death, that is the devil, 
and that the entire Adam, both soul and body, 
through this transgression was changed for the 
worse (in deterius): let him be accursed. If any 
one assert that the transgression of Adam injured 
himself alone, and not his posterity, and that he lost 
the holiness and righteousness which he had re- 
ceived from God, for himself alone and not for us, 
or, that having been polluted by the sin of disobe- 
dience he transmitted death and the punishment of 
the body only to the whole human race, but not sin 
itself, which is the death of the soul, let him be ae 


142 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


cursed, because he contradicts the apostle whe 
says : ‘By one man sin entered into the world, and 
death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, ip 
whom all sinned’ (in quo omnes peccayerunt). If 
any one assert that this sin of Adam, which is one 
in origin, and, being transmitted by propagation not 
imitation, is inherent in all and belongs to each, is 
removable by the power of man’s nature, or by any 
other remedy than the merits of the only Mediator 
our Lord Jesus Christ . . . . let him be accursed.” * 
This assertion of apostasy and need of redemp- 
tion taken by itself, and with the construction 
which the phraseology naturally suggests, could 
have been accepted by the Reformers themselves.? 
But the doctrine of Original Sin as actually formed 
by the leading Roman Catholic divines evinces 
plainly, that this construction was not intended to 
be put upon it. 

1. The first peculiarity in the Papal anthropolo- 
gy consists in the tenet, that original righteousness 
as not a natural, but a supernatural endowment. 
The germ of this view appears in one of the state- 
ments of the Roman Catechism,—a work which fol- 
lowed the Tridentine Canons, and is of equal au- 
thority with them in the Papal Church. ‘“ Lastly,” 
says the Catechism, “God formed man out of the 
clay of the earth, so made and constituted as to his 


1CanoneEs Conor TRIDENTINI, us” does not necessarily teach 
Sessio V. §§ 1, 2, 3. total depravity, however. 
2 The phraseology “‘in deteri- 


TRIDENTINE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 143 


material body, that he was immortal and impassible, 
not indeed by the force of nature itself, but by a 
Divine favor. But as to his soul, he formed him 
after his own image and likeness, endowed him with 
free-will, and so tempered within him all the emo- 
tions of his mind and his appetites, that they would 
never disobey the rule of reason. Then he added 
the admirable gift of original righteousness, and de- 
creed that he should have the pre-eminency over 
other animals.”’ Bellarmin ’ explains very clearly 
what he understands by original righteousness as a 
supernatural endowment; and his explanation is as 
authoritative as any individual opinion can be with- 
in the Papal Church. “In the first place it is to be 
dbserved that man naturally consists of flesh and 
spirit. ... But from these diverse or contrary 
propensities, there arises in one and the same man a 
certain conflict, and from this conflict great difficul- 
ty of acting rightly. . .. In the second place, it is 
to be observed that Divine Providence, in the be- 
ginning of creation (initio creationis), in order to 
provide a remedy for this disease or languor of hu- 
man nature, which arises from the nature of a mate- 
rial organization (ex conditione materiae), added to 
man a certain remarkable gift, to wit, original right- 
eousness, by which as by a sort of golden rein the 
inferior part might be easily kept in subjection to 
the superior, and the superior to God ; but the flesh 


1 Catrecnismus Romanvs, P. I. ? BELLARMINUS: Gratia primi 
Cap. ii. Q. 18. hominis, ¢. v. 


144 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


was thus subjected to the spirit, so that it could not 
be moved so long as the spirit was unwilling, nor 
could it become a rebel to the spirit unless the spir- 
it itself should become a rebel to God, while yet it 
was wholly in the power of the spirit to become or 
not to become a rebel to God. ... We think that 
this rectitude of the inferior part was a supernatural 
gift, and that, too, intrinsically, and not accidental- 
ly, so that it neither flowed nor could flow from the 
principles of nature (ex naturae principiis).” * 
Upon examining this statement, it will be found 
to conflict with the Latin anthropology. Man as 
created is a synthesis of body and soul; but the two 
are in antagonism at creation. Creation is thus im- 
perfect. The addition of the original righteousness, 
which is not a part of the creative act, is requisite in 
order that the higher shall obtain the victory over 
the lower nature, and the creature be made perfect. 
It is true that this supernatural endowment is be- 
stowed “<¢nitio creationis,’—still the work of cre- 
ation proper does not include it, but this is super- 
added, in the phrase of Bellarmin, “to provide a 
remedy for the disease or languor of human nature.” 
The Papal idea of creation, therefore, differs from 
the Augustinian, in that it involves imperfection. 
We have seen that the Latin anthropology regards 
man as created with a will that is holy, and which 
thereby possesses entire domination over the lower 


1 By this Bellarmin means, that over the flesh could not issue 
such a domination of the spirit from anything in the “ flesh.” 


TRIDENTINE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 145 


physical and bodily nature. It also teaches that 
the physical nature by creation has in it nothing 
corrupt or imperfect. Original righteousness, ac- 
cording to Augustine’s theory, enters into the very 
idea of man as coming from the hands of the Cre- 
ator. Itis a part of his created endowment, and 
does not require to be superadded. The work of 
the Creator is perfect, and needs no improvement. 
There is no “disease” or “languor” in it. But in 
the Papal anthropology, man as he comes from 
God, is imperfect. He is not created sinful indeed, 
but neither is he created holy. To use the Pa- 
pal phrase, he is created in puris naturalibus ; 
_ without positive righteousness, and without posi- 
tive unrighteousness. The body is full of natural 
carnal propensities, and tends downward. ‘The 
soul as rational and immortal tends upward. But 
there is no harmony between the two by crea- 
tion. An act subsequent to that of creation, and 
additional to it, is necessary to bring this harmony 
about; and this is that act by which the gift of 
original righteousness is swperadded to the gifts of 
creation. In and by this act, the higher part is 
strengthened to acquire and maintain dominion over 
the lower, and a positive perfection is imparted to 
human nature that was previously lacking in it. 
Original righteousness is thus, in reference to the 
created and natural characteristics of man, a super- 
natural gift. 

2. The second peculiarity in the Papal anthro- 


VOL. 11.—16 


146 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


pology consists in the tenet, that apostasy involves 
the loss of a supernatural, but not of a natural gift. 
By the act of transgression, human nature lapses 
back into that condition of conflict between the 
flesh and the spirit in which it was created. In 
losing its original righteousness, therefore, it loses 
nothing with which it was endowed by the creative 
act, but only that superadded gift which was be- 
stowed subsequently to this. The supremacy of 
the higher over the lower part is lost by the Adam- 
ic transgression, and the two parts of man, the flesh 
and the spirit, fall into their primitive and natural 
antagonism again. Original righteousness being a 
supernatural gift, original sin is the loss of it, and in 
reality the restoration of man to the state in which 
he was created. Original sin brings man back 
again to a negative condition, in which he is neither 
sinful nor holy. It is a state of conflict, indeed, be- 
tween the flesh and the spirit; but the flesh has no- 
thing in it which was not created in it, and nothing 
that does not naturally and necessarily belong to 
the flesh as such. And the spirit, in like manner, 
contains only its own intrinsic characteristics. So 
that the conflict is one that arises from the nature — 
of things, or by creation itself, and not from any act 
of apostasy on the part of man. Here appears an- 
other marked point of difference between the Papal 
and the Latin anthropology. The latter does not 
concede that by creation and the nature of things 


TRIDENTINE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 147 


the flesh must be in conflict with the spirit.’ It re- 
gards this as a relic of the Gnostic idea of matter 
and of a fleshly organism. On the contrary, the 
Augustinian anthropology maintains that the “flesh” 
as it comes from the creative hand contains nothing 
corrupt or disordered in it. It is a just tempering 
and mixture, which is in perfect harmony with the 
higher laws of mind and of God. If, therefore, 
there is ever found to be a conflict between the flesh 
and the spirit, this is proof positive that some change, 
some disorder, has been introduced into the flesh by 
the action of the spirit itself. Corruption begins in 
the spirit or will itself, and descends into the sensu- 
ous and bodily parts. The Augustinian anthropol- 
ogy regards the conflict between the fesh and the 
spirit, as a consequence and evidence of an apostasy. 
The Papal anthropology, on the contrary, considers 
it as the primitive and natural condition in which 
man was created, and which required to be reme- 
died by the addition of a supernatural gift. 

3. A third characteristic, consequently, of the 
Papal anthropology is that it does not regard origi- 
nal sin as truly and properly sin. This follows 
necessarily from the position that human nature is 
not created with holiness, but that holiness is a su- 


‘Sed in corpore vitae illius, concupisceret ; ut ei necesse esset 
ubi homo, nisi peccasset, non erat aut subjugari, aut reluctari.” Av- 
moriturus, alius procul dubio sta- @ustrnus: Op. imperf. cont. Juli- 
tus fuit: unde aut nulla ibi, aut anum, lib. V. (Vol. X. p. 1449, 
talis, qualis nune est, libido non Kd. Migne.) 
fuit, qua caro contra spiritum 


148 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


pernatural endowment specially bestowed after the 
act of creation proper is complete. For the loss of 
this endowment simply puts man back to the nega- 
tive and characterless position upon which he stands 
by creation. But this cannot be a position of guilt - 
and sin properly so called. If so, then God creates 
man in a sinful state. Original sin, according to the 
Tridentine theologians, is, indeed, a conflict between 
the flesh and the spirit, between the body and the 
mind. It is a state of corruption, and of inordinate 
physical desires. But this is not a state of sin and 
guilt. This conflict is necessary from the nature of 
the case. For by creation, the flesh is inordinate, 
and the spirit is weak. It is not until something 
subsequent to creation is bestowed,—viz. : the super- 
natural gift that subdues the lower to the higher 
part,—that righteousness or positive moral charac- 
ter exists. That act, therefore, whereby this right- 
eousness is lost, the act of original transgression, is 
not one that plunges man into guilt proper, but 
only into corruption or an inordinate and ungovern- 
ed condition of the lower nature,—which inordinate 
condition belongs to the flesh by creation, just as 
the properties of matter belong to matter by crea- 
tion. Hence, Bellarmin remarks that “the state of 
man after the fall of Adam differs no more from the 
state of man as created in puris naturalibus [i. e. 
previous to the bestowment of the supernatural gift 
of original righteousness], than a man originally 
naked differs from one who was once clothed, but 


TRIDENTINE THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 149 


has been stripped of his clothing; neither is human 
nature any worse if we except the guilt of the act 
of transgression in eating the forbidden fruit, than 
it was made by God, nor does it labor under any 
more ignorance or infirmity than it labored unde 
as created in puris naturalibus. Hence, the cor- 
ruption of nature results, not from the subtraction 
of any gift belonging to nature by creation, nor 
from the addition to it of any evil quality, but sole- 
ly from the loss of a supernatural gift which was 
over and above the gifts of nature.”* In conformi- 
ty with this, the Council of Trent decide that in- 
dwelling sin in the regenerate is not properly sin. 
After stating that concupiscence (concupiscentia vel 
fomes) remains in the baptized, they add that “ this 
concupiscence, which the apostle sometimes denom 
inates sin (Rom. vi. 12, vii. 8), the holy synod de- 
clares the catholic church never understood to be 
called sin because it is really and truly sin in the 
regenerate, but because it is from sin, and inclines 


to sin.”? 


§ 2. The Tridentine Theory of Regeneration. 


Holding such views of the nature of original sin, 
it was logical that the Tridentine theologians should 
combat the doctrine of human impotence, and the 


* BELLARMINtS: De gratia pri- * CanonEs TRIDENTINI: Sessio 
mi hreninis, c. v. Vv. 


150 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


helpless dependence of the apostate will upon the 
Divine efficiency in order to its renewal. They 
adopt the theory of synergism in regeneration, and 
defend it with great earnestness. “If any one,” say 
the Tridentine Canons, “shall affirm that the free 
will of man was lost, and became extinct, after the 
sin of Adam. ... let him be accursed. If any 
one shall affirm that the free will of man, moved and 
excited by God, co-operates nothing by assenting to 
God thus exciting and calling, so that it disposes 
and prepares itself for obtaining the grace of justi- 
fication, but like some inanimate object does nothing 
at all, but is merely passive, let him be accursed. 
If any one shall affirm that all works that are per- 
formed before justification, from whatever reason 
they are done, are really and truly sins, and merit 
the displeasure of God, or that the more a man en- 
deavors to dispose himself for grace, the more does 
he sin, let him be accursed. If any one shall affirm 
that the sinner is justified by faith alone, in the 
sense that nothing else is requisite which may co- 
operate to the attainment of the grace of justifica- 
tion, and that the sinner does not need to be pre- 
pared and disposed by the motion of his own will, 
let him be accursed.” ? 
There was no part of the anthropology of the 
Reformers which the divines of Trent opposed with 
more vehemence, than the monergistic theory of re- 


1 Canones TRIDENTINI: Sessio VI. Canones iv. v. Vii. ix. 


TRIDENTINE THEORY OF REGENERATION. 151 


generation. The theory that man cannot co-operate’ 
efficiently in the regenerating act was, and is to this 
day, represented by the Papal theologians as fatal- 
ism. ‘This is the charge made by Bellarmin, and ae 
Mohler. 


CHAPTER: Viw@ 


ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE REFORMERS. 


§ 1. Lutheran-Calvinistic Theory of Original Sin. 


Tue Reformers constructed the doctrines of Sin 
and Regeneration after the same general manner 
with Augustine and Anselm; so that the somewhat 
minute account which we have given of the Augus- 
tinian and Anselmic anthropologies renders a detail- 
ed representation of the Protestant anthropology 
unnecessary. The principal Lutheran and Calvin- 
istic symbols agree in their definitions of sin and 
grace, and from them we shall derive our account. 

The leaders of the Protestant Reformation reaf- 
firmed, in opposition to the Papal anthropology, the 
Augustinian doctrine that original sin is truly and 
properly sin, and also that it was committed in 
Adam. The Augsburg Confession is explicit re- 
specting the guilt of original sin, in the following 
terms. “The churches teach that after the fall of 
Adam, all men propagated according to ordinary 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 153 


generation, are born with sin, that is without the 
fear of God, without trust in God, and with concu- 
piscence (exetuuic), and that this disease (morbus) 
or original depravity (vitium originis) is truly sin, 
damning, and bringing eternal death upon those 
who are not regenerated by baptism and the Holy 
Spirit. They also condemn the Pelagians and oth- 
ers, who deny this original depravity to be sin.”? 
The explanatory defence of the Augsburg Confes. 
sion, which goes under the name of the Apologia, 
explains what the authors of this Confession meant 
by their assertion that original sin is “ concupi- 
scence.” “Some persons assert that original sin is 
not a depravity (vitium) or corruption in the na- 
ture of man, but only a condition of servitude or 
mortality which the descendants of Adam come into 
without any proper and personal guilt. Further. 
more, they assert that no one is under condemna- 
tion to eternal death on account of original sin. It 
is as when slaves are born of a slave woman, and 
come into this servile condition without any fault of 
their nature, but through the misfortune of their 
mother. In opposition to this view, we have made  - 
mention of concupiscence, and have called it desire, 
to indicate that the nature of man is born corrupt 
and vitiated.” ® | 


1Hase: Libri Symbolici, pp. *HaseE: Libri Symbolici, p. 50 
9, 10. sq. 

? This was ZuINGLE’s view ; see 
History of Symbols. 


154 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The Papal opponents of the Reformers had con- 
verted the doctrine of original sin into the doctrine 
of original evil, and had defined original sin as fo- 
meés,—not sin itself, but the fuel of sin; not the de- 
prayation of the will, but the corruption of the 
sensuous nature only. ‘Taking this merely physical 
theory of the Adamic sin, they had gone so far as 
to raise the questions: “ What is the particular 
quality of the body in which this fomes consists; 
was it contracted from eating the apple (contagio 
pomi), or from the breath of the serpent; and can 
it be cured by medicines?” Alluding to these no- 
tions, Melanchthon, the author of the Apology, re- 
marks that the “scholastic doctors” bury up the 
real matter in discussion. “ When they speak of 
original sin, they do not specify the greater and gra- 
ver faults of human nature,—namely, ignorance of 
God, contempt of God, destitution of the fear of 
God and of trust in Him, hatred of the government 
of God, terror at the justice of God, anger against 
God, despair of God’s favor, reliance upon things 
visible.”* It is this class of sins which the Symbol 
has in view, when it speaks of original sin, and 
which it sums up under that term and name. 

The same view of original sin is taught with yet 
greater decision and particularity, in the Formula 
Concordiae. This symbol carries out the doctrines 
of the Augsburg Confession to their logical results, 


‘Hass: Libri Symbolici, p. 52. 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 155 


and is the best expression of scientific Lutheranism. 
After distinctly rejecting the view of Flacius, which 
made original sin to be the substance of the human 
soul, and after asserting that sin in all its forms is 
the soul’s agency and not the goul’s essence, the For- 
mula Concordiae affirms, that “ Christians ought not 
only to acknowledge and define actual faults and 
transgressions of the commands of God to be sins, 
but they ought also to regard that hereditary dis- 
ease (morbus) by which the whole nature of man 
is corrupted, as a specially dreadful sin, and, indeed, 
as the first principle and source of all other sins, 
from which all other transgressions spring as from 
their root.” The first position in the statement of 
the doctrine of original sin, according to the For- 
mula Concordiae, is that “this hereditary evil is 
guilt (culpa) or crime (reatus); whence it results 
that all men, on account of the disobedience of 
Adam and Eve, are odious in the sight of God, and 
are by nature the children of wrath, as the apostle 
testifies.” 1 

The same view of original sin was adopted by 
the Calvinistic division of the Protestants. Calvin 
defines original sin to be “an hereditary pravity and 
corruption of our nature, diffused through all the 
parts of the soul, rendering us obnoxious to the 
Divine wrath, and producing in us those works 
which the Scripture calls ‘works of the flesh’ 


*Hase: Libri Symbolici, pp. 689, 640. 


I 
p 


a 


156 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


And this is, indeed, what Paul frequently denomi 
nates ‘ sin ;’ while the works which proceed thence, 
such as adulteries, fornications, thefts, hatreds, mur- 
ders, revellings, he calls the ‘ fruits of sin,—though 
they are also called ‘sins’ in many passages of 
Scripture, and even by himself. This thing, there- 
fore, should be distinctly observed: namely, that 
our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, 
we are, on account of this very corruption, consid- 
ered as convicted, and justly condemned in the sight 
of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but right- 
eousness, innocence, and purity. And this liability 
to punishment arises not from the delinquency of 
another; for when it is said that the sin of Adam 
renders us obnoxious to the Divine judgment, é¢ zs 
not to be understood as if we, being innocent, were 
undeservedly loaded with the guilt of his sin; but, 
because we are all subject to a curse, in consequence 
of his transgression, he is therefore said to have in- 
volved us in guilt. Nevertheless, we derive from 
him, not the punishment only, but also the pollution 
to which the punishment is justly duc. Wherefore 
Augustine, though he frequently calls it the sin of 
another, the more clearly to indicate its transmission 
to us by propagation, yet at the same time also as- 
serts it properly to belong to every individual. And 
the apostle himself expressly declares, that ‘death 


ps _ «has therefore passed upon all men, for that all have 


4 


sinned, —that is, have been involved in oxiginal sin. 
And therefore infants themselves, as they bring 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 157 


their condemnation into the world with them, are 
rendered obnoxious to punishment by ther_own 
sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another. For 
though they have not yet produced the fruits of 
their iniquity, yet they have the seed of it within 
them. .. . Whence it follows that this native de- 
pravity is properly accounted sin in the sight of 
God, because there could be no guilt without crime.” + 

Calvin does not examine the metaphysical 
grounds for the imputation of the Adamic sin, so 
fully as do Augustine and Anselm. But the extract 
cited above involves the doctrine of the unity of the 
race in the primitive apostasy. It teaches that origi- 
nal sin is not a mere individual sin, but is common 
or generic; otherwise, the individual “ being inno- 
cent” would be “ undeservedly loaded with the 
guilt of a sin not his own,” and foreign to him. 
We derive from Adam, “not the punishment only, 
but also the pollution to which the punishment is 
justly due.” 

The clearest and most explicit statement of the 
doctrine of original sin in its relations to the Adamic 
connection, that was made in any of the Calvinistic 
symbols of the 16th and 17th centuries, is found in 
the Formula Consensus Helvetici. This creed sus- 
tains the same relation to the Calvinistic system 
that the Formula Concordiae does to the Lutheran. 
It is confined to the doctrines of original sin and 


2 Carvin : Institutes, IT. i. 





158 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


grace, and upon these subjects makes statements 
that are more exhaustive and scientific than are 
found in any of the other creeds drawn up by the 
3 Reformed or Calvinistic theologians. It was com- 
+ | posed by the distinguished Swiss divines Heidegger, 
Turretine, and Geneler, primarily to oppose a par- 
ticular theory of original sin and election which was 
obtaining some currency, and which these theolo- 
gians regarded as a deviation from genuine Calvin- 
ism. In order to a proper understanding of the 
positions of the Formula, it is necessary to give a 

brief account of this theory. 
In the year 1640, Joshua Placaeus, a distin- 
Qo exished theologian of Saumur, in the west of 
France, published the theory,’ that God cannot 
justly, and therefore does not actually, impute 
Adam’s sin itself to his posterity, but only the con.) 
“sequences of that_sin. And inasmuch as punish- 
a ment follows imputation, God cannot justly and 
° does not actually punish Adam’s sin itself in the 
q posterity, but only the consequences of that sin,— 
\/| viz.: the corruption of nature resulting from it, and 
| transmitted by propagation. The apostatizing act 
itself was the act of the individual Adam simply 
and solely. The posterity, therefore, did not par- 
ticipate in it, and therefore it could not be zmme- 
diately imputed to them as guilt. But the conse- 


?PraoaEus: Theses theologici de imputatione primi peccati Ad 
de statu hominis lapsi ante gra- ami. 
tiam; followed by Disputationes 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 159 


quences of that individual apostatizing act of Adam, 
—wz.: the corruption of the whole nature, issuing 
it and transmitted to the posterity,—are im, 






Adam’s act of apostasy, Placaeus denominated “ me 
diate ;” while the imputation of the apostatizing 
act itself, or of the cause of these effects, he called 
“immediate.” “If,” says Placaeus, “by the first 
sin of Adam, his first actual sin be meant, and not 
his habitual sin which followed it, then imputation 
must be distinguished into émmediate or antecedent, 
and mediate or consequent. The first imputation 
occurs immediately, that is without 
any corruption. The last "imputatj n occurs medi- 
ately, that is throu the medium/f her editary and 
inward corruption. The formet precedes inward 
and hereditary corruption, in /the order of nature ; 
follows it. The former is the cause of 
inward and habitual corruption; the latter is the 
effect.) Placaeus rejects the former, and admits 
the latter." 

In opposition to this theory of “mediate” impu- 


e medium of 









tation, the Formula Consensus makes the following 
statements. ‘“ As God entered into a covenant of 
works with Adam, not only for himself but also with 
the whole human race in him as the head and root, 
so that the posterity who were to be born of him 
would inherit the same integrity with which he was 


?Minsoner- Von Coéit~tn-NeEvupEcKeR: Dogmengeschichte, IIL 
438. TurrReTTIN: Institutes, IX. ix, 5, 6. 


This imputation of the effects of 


\e 
\ 


ao 
Frgda'ak rep fuatlan ~ Sage Saige hie te 


160 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


rr 


a created, provided he should continue in it; so Adam 
Ca by his sad fall sinned not for himself only, but for 
, the whole human race who were to be born ‘of 
» - blood and the will of the flesh, and lost the bless 
ings promised in the covenant. We are of opinion, 
therefore, that the sin of Adam is imputed to all - 

his posterity by the secret and just judgment of 

God. For the apostle testifies that ‘In Adam all 

7 have sinned. By the disobedience of one man many 
Qe were made sinners;’ and, ‘In Adam all die’ 
56 (Rom. v. 12, 19; 1 Cor. xv. 21,22). But 2 does 

not appear how hereditary corruption, as spiritual 

death, could fall upon the entire human race by the 

just gudgment of God, unless some fault (delictum) 

of this same human race (ejusdem generis humani), 

bringing in the penalty of that death, had preceded. 

Hor the most just God, the judge of all the earth, 
punishes none but the guilty. Wherefore man, pre- 

vious to the commission of any single or ‘ actual’ 
transgression, is exposed to the divine wrath and 

curse from his very birth (ab ortu suo), and this in 

a twofold manner; first, on account of the transgres- 

sion (xagatraua) and disobedience which he com- 

mitted in the loins of Adam; and secondly, on 

account of the hereditary corruption inherent in his 
conception, which is the consequence of this primi- 

tive transgression, and by which his whole nature 

is depraved and spiritually dead. Thus it appears 

that original sin, by a strict discrimination, is two- 

fold, and consists of the imputed guilt of Adam’s 


ae Pa ye par 
we Be ae 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 161 


transgression and the inherent hereditary corruption 
consequent upon this. For this reason, we are un- 
able to assent to the view of those who deny that 
Adam represented his posterity by the ordinance 
of God, and, consequently, deny that his sin is 2m- 
mediately imputed to them, and who, under the 
notion of a ‘mediate’ and consequent imputation, 
not only do away with the imputation of the first 
sin, but also expose the doctrine of innate and here- 
ditary corruption itself to grave peril.”? 

According to this statement of Turretine and 
Heidegger, mediate imputation must _rest_upon im- 
mediate; and doth imputations must be asserted. 
They did not consider it conformable to justice, to 
impute an effect without imputing the cause. The 
posterity could not properly be regarded as guilty 
for their inward corruption of heart and will, unless 
they were guilty for that primal Adamic act of 
apostasy which produced this corruption. It does 
not appear reasonable, they say, that a corrupt 
nature should be transmitted and imputed to the 
universal race of mankind, “ unless some fault” 
(delictum), some voluntary and culpable act, “ of 
this same human race had preceded.” The attempt, 
therefore, of Placaeus, to sever the inherited de- 


1FormuLta Consensus HELveE- viz.: the natural union between 
Ticl, X.—XII. (Niemeyer’s Col- Adam and his posterity, and the 
lectio, p. 738).—Turretine also political or forensic union where- 
asserts both imputations in his by he is “the representative of 
Institutes, upon two grounds, the whole human race.” 
vou 1.—l1 


| e 
id - 
162 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


pravity from the Adamic act of apostasy, to impute 

the effect but not the cause of the effect, appeared 

to them in the highest degree illogical. More than 

this, it brought the doctrine of innate depravity 

itself into “grave peril.” For, according to the 

theory of “mediate imputation,” moral corruption 
together with temporal and eternal death come 

upon the posterity, while yet the posterity have no 

part in that primitive act of apostasy which is the 
originating cause, and sole justifying reason of this 

very corruption and death. The justice of the 

Divine procedure, according to Turretine and Hei- 

degger, is imperilled by a method that permits the 

misery and corruption that issue from an act of sin 

to fall upon a posterity who do not participate in 

that act, and are innocent of it. The Adamic sin 

peony i itself must, therefore, be imputable to the posterity, 
a n order to legitimate the imputation of its conse- 
quences. And, furthermore, this act, they imply, 
ait: must be imputed upon real and not nominal 
grounds. The eneesaer of Adam’s sin must not 

be a “ gratuitous” imputation, for this would yield 

uly a “ gratuitous” condemnation. Righteousness 
may be imputed when there is no righteousness ; 
but sin cannot be imputed when there is no sin. 
\ “ David describeth the blessedness of the man unto 
whom God imputeth righteousness without works: 
saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are for- 
given, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the 

man to whom the Lord wll not impute sin” (Rom. 






LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 163 


iv. 6-8). The imputation of righteousness when 
there is no inherent and real righteousness, accord- 
ing to this explanation of St. Paul, is simply the for. 
giveness of iniquity, or the non-imputation of sin. 
It is a gratuitous imputation, and a gratuitous jus- 
tification. But when Placaeus proposed to carry 
the doctrine of a gratuitous imputation, such as 
holds true of Christ’s righteousness, over to Adam’s 
sin, and proposed to impute the Adamiec guilt with- 
out any real and inherent demerit upon the part of 
the posterity, in the same manner that the right- 
eousness of Christ is imputed without any real and 
inherent merit upon the part of the elect, Turretine 
and Heidegger opposed him. The doctrine of a 
gratuitous justification is intelligible and rational ; 
but the doctrine of a gratuitous damnation is unin- 
telligible and absurd. Hence the Formula Consen- 
sus taught that “man previous to the commission 
of any single or ‘actual’ transgression, is exposed 
to the divine wrath and curse from his very birth, 
.. . first, on account of the transgression and dis- 
obedience which he committed in the loins of Adam.”y 
The posterity must be really, and not fictitiously, in 
the person of the progenitor, in order that they may 
be “ “mmediately ” and justly charged with a com- 
mon guilt. 

‘The Swiss theologian Sraprer the corruption of the nature, but 
and the elder Epwarps havebeen denying the imputation of the 
represented as adopting the Sau- first act of apostasy. The late 


tour theory of imputation, that Principal Cunnrnenam so repre- 
is, as affirming the imputation of sents Stapfer in his ‘‘ Reformers 


AS 


5 


164 


HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY, 


§ 2. Lutheran-Calvinistic Theory of Regeneration. 


The leading Protestant symbols adopt the Au 
gustinian view of regeneration, and particularly of 
the impotence to good of the apostate will. One 


and the Reformation” (p. 384). 
But this seems to be an error. 
The following extract from Stap- 
fer, which Edwards quotes with 
approbation (Original Sin, Works 
TI. 484. New York Ed.), is suffi- 
cient to prove that he held to the 
imputation of both the Adamic 
sin and its consequences. ‘“ Our 
opponents contend with us chief- 
ly on this account: that accord- 
ing to our doctrine of original sin 
such an imputation of the first 
sin is maintained, that God with- 
out any regard to universal native 
corruption esteems all Adam’s 
posterity as guilty, and holds 
them liable to condemnation 
purely on account of that sinful 
act of their first parent; so that 
they, without any respect to their 
own sin, and so as innocent in 
themselves, are destined to eter- 
nal punishment. I have, there- 
fore, ever been careful to show 
that our opponents do injuriously 
suppose those things to be separa- 
ted, in our doctrine, which are by 
no means to be separated. The 
whole of the controversy which 
they have with us about this 
matter evidently arises from this: 
that they suppose the mediate 
and the immediate imputation are 


distinguished one from the other, 
not only in the manner of concep- 
tion, but in reality. And hence 
they conceive of imputation as 
immediate only, and abstractly 
from the mediate ; while our di- 
vines suppose that neither one 
ought to be conceived of separately 
Jrom the other. Therefore, I 
choose not to use any such dis- 
tinction, or to suppose any such 
thing [as a separation of the two], 
in what I have said on the sub- 
ject; but have only endeavored 
to explain the thing itself, and to 
reconcile it with the divine attri- 
butes. And therefore I have 
every where conjoined both of these 
conceptions concerning the impu- 
tation of Adam’s first sin as insep- 
arable, and judged that one ought 
never to be considered separately 
from the other. [And although 
IT have abstained from using the 
distinction, I have nevertheless 
implied both kinds of imputation - 
in my statements, nor have I in 
fact departed from the opinion 
of our divines, or from that of 
the apostle Paul.”] This last 
clause in brackets is omitted in 
Edwards’s quotation from Stap- 
fer. See Sraprerus: Institu- 
tiones, Cap. xvii. § 78. Op. IV. p. 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 


165 


of the most striking characteristics of the anthro- 
pology of the first Protestant theologians is the 
marked difference which they find between the un- 


562. Ed. Tiguri, 1745. Epwarps 
is equally explicit in affirming the 
imputation of both the Adamic 
transgression and its conse- 
quences. In the opening of his 
treatise “‘On Original Sin,” he 
remarks as follows: ‘By original 
sin, as the phrase has been most 
commonly used by divines, is 
meant the innate sinful depravity 
of the heart. But yet when the 
doctrine of original sin is spoken 
of, it is vulgarly understood in 
that latitude as to include not only 
the depravity of nature, but the 
imputation of Adam’s first sin ; 
or in other words, the liableness 
or exposedness of Adam’s posteri- 
ty, in the divine judgment, to par- 
take of the punishment of that 
sin. So far as I know, most of 
those who have held one of these 
have maintained the other ; and 
most of those who have opposed one 
have opposed the other ; both are 
opposed by the author (Taylor) 
chiefly attended to in the follow- 
ing discourse, in his book on 
Original Sin; and it may, per- 
haps, appear in our future con- 
sideration of the subject, that 
they are closely connected, and 
that the arguments which prove the 
one establish the other, and that 
there are no more difficulties at- 
tending the allowing of one than 
the other.”—The views of Strap- 


FER respecting the voluntariness 
of original sin are expressed in 
the following objections and re- 
plies. ‘‘Objection: In order that 
any action may be called sin, it 
must be free and voluntary, for 
whatever occurs compulsorily, or 
in unconsciousness and without 
our consent and will, cannot be 
regarded and imputed to us as 
sin. But if we are corrupt by 
birth, the consent of our will is 
excluded. Hence, corruption by 
birth cannot be held to be sin, or 
imputed to us as such. Reply: 
In the first place, there is ample 
room for such a voluntary con- 
sent, in the instance of birth-sin. 
For the human race is to be re- 
garded as one moral person, 
which person in Adam its head, 
not its natural merely but also its 
federal head, made a covenant 
with God, and in so doing gave 
consent to all those things which 
Adam as a public person stipulat- 
ed and performed for himself and 
all his posterity. But where 
there is consent there is a place 
for will and liberty; and where 
these are, there can be transgres- 
sion of the law and sin. In the 
second place, if man is born cor- 
rupt, and is such from the first 
moment of his existence, he also 
sins spontaneously; but in being 
a spontaneous transgressor of the 


166 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


fallen and the fallen Adam, or between man by cre: 
ation and man by apostasy. Man as created has 
plenary power to be perfectly holy. Man as apos- 
ate is destitute of this power. According to Luther 
. and Caivin, the loss of power to good is one of the 

; inevitable effects of sin, so that sin might be defined 
to be an inability to holiness. Hence they refuse 

to attribute to fallen man those gifts and energies 

of unfallen humanity which they held to have been 

lost in and by the voluntary act of apostasy. After 

this act of self-will, which is subsequent to the cre- 

ative act, they concede to man no power to become 


| spiritually perfect and holy. The utmost to which 





he is competent, without renewing grace, is acts of 
external morality. “The churches,” says the Augs- 
burg Confession, “teach that the human will has a 
certain liberty sufficient for attaining morality (civi- 
lem justitiam), and choosing things that appear rea- 
sonable. But it has not the power, without the 
Spirit of God, to attain holiness or spiritual right- 
eousness, because the carnal man cannot (ov dvva- 
zac) know spiritual things (1 Cor. ii. 14). Augus- 
tine says this in the same words (Hypognosticon, 
lib, ii.), ‘We acknowledge that free will is in all 
men; that it has indeed a rational judgment by 
means of which it is able to begin and finish, with- 
out God’s grace, not those things which pertain to 
God, but those works that relate to this present 


law, he consents to that corrup- sin.” Sraprerus: Institutiones, 
tion, and thus it is also hisown Cap. XVI. § 58, 59. 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 167 


life—the good as well as the bad. The good, I 
say ; meaning those which are in their place right 
and proper: e. g.: to choose to work in the field, te 
choose to eat and drink, to choose to have a friend, 
to choose to have clothes, to choose to build a 
house, to marry a wife, to learn an art, or whatever 
allowable and proper thing it may be that pertains ign 
to the present life.’ The churches also condemn 

the Pelagians and others who teach that without Lot 
the Holy Spirit, by natural powers (naturae viri- Yam 
bus) alone, we are able to love God supremely.” * 
Consonant with these statements of the Augsburg” | 
Confession, is the following from the Apology. “'The 

human will is able, after a certain sort (aliquo modo), 

to attain civil righteousness, or the righteousness of 

works: It is able to converse about God, to render 

to God an external worship, to obey magistrates and 

parents in externals, to keep the hands from mur- 

der, adultery, and theft. . . . We concede, therefore, * d} 
to the will of man the power to perform the exter-- . y“, 
nal works of the law, but not the inward and spirit- Hier. 
ual works —as, for example, to truly reyere God, to Lp 
truly trust in God, to truly know and feel that God 

regards us with pity, hears our prayers, and pardons 7“ 

our sins, &c. These are the genuime works of the | 

first table of the law, which no human heart is a 

to perform without the Holy Spirit, as Paul says (2 

Cor. ii. 14): ‘The natural man, that is man using 


*Hase: Libri Symbolici, p. 15. 


168 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


only his natural powers, perceiveth not the things 
of God’”* The Formula Concordiae, the symbol 
of High Lutheranism, teaches that “before man is 
illuminated, converted, regenerated, and drawn by 
the Holy Spirit, he can no more operate, co-operate, 
or even make a beginning towards his conversion or 
regeneration, with his own natural powers, than can 
a stone, a tree, or a piece of clay.”* Luther's ex- 
pressions respecting the impotence of the sinful will 
are marked by his usual decision and boldness. At 
the Leipsic Disputation, he compared man to a saw 
in the hand of the workman; and in his commenta- 
ry upon Genesis xix. he says: “In spiritualibus et 
divinis rebus, quae ad animae salutem spectant, 
homo est instar statuae salis,in quam uxor patri- 
archae Loth est conversa ; imo est similis trunco et 
lapidi, statuae vita carenti, quae neque oculorum, 
oris, aut ullorum sensuum cordis usum habet.” In 
his work De servo arbitrio, written against Eras- 
{ mus, he compares the divine exhortations to obedi- 
ence addressed to men, to the irony of a parent who 
says ‘ Come now, to a little child, although he knows 
that he cannot come.’ 
The Reformed or Calvinistic division of the Pro- 
testants were equally positive and clear, in their as- 





1Hase: Libri Symbolici, pp. *Oompare also Lurner: On 
218-219. Galatians ii. 20. 

?Hase: Libri Symbolici, p. 
662. 


Y LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. 169 


rt 
ei of the bondage of the apostate will, and of 
the monergistic theory of regeneration. 

The First Helvetic Confession, an important 
Calvinistic symbol drawn up under the influence of 
Bullinger, makes the following statement. “ We at- 
tribute free will to man in this sense, viz.: that when 
in the use of our faculties of understanding and will 
we attempt to perform good and evil actions, we are 
able to perform the evil of our own accord and by 
our own power, but to embrace and follow out the 
good, we_are not able, unless illuminated by the 
grace of Christ, and impelled by his Spirit. For it 
is God who works in us to will and to do, according 
to his good pleasure; and from God is salvation, 
from ourselves perdition.”* The Second Helvetic 
Confession, drawn up entirely by Bullinger, is yet 
more explicit and detailed upon the subject of re- 
generation, and the relations of the human will to it. 
It considers the state of man in three respects: first, 
his state before his fall; second, his state after his 
fall; third, the nature of his agency in regeneration. 
Its language is as follows: “Man before the fall was 
upright (rectus) and free; he was able to remain 
holy, or to decline into evil. He declined to evil, 
and involved in sin and death both himself and the 
whole race of men. Next, we must consider the 
condition of man after the fall. The intellect of 
man was not taken away by the fall, neither was he 


1 NrEMEYER : CoHectio, pp. 116, 117. 


170 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


robbed of his will and changed into a stock or 
) stone; but his intellect and will were so changed 
ae and enfeebled (imminuta), that they cannot any 
ee longer perform what they could before the fall. 
gp) Whe intellect is darkened, and the will has been 
converted from a free into an enslaved faculty. For 
it is the servant of sin; not unwillingly, but willing- 
ly. For it is still a will, and not a nill (voluntas, 
non noluntas dicitur). Hence, in respect to sin, 
man is not coerced either by God or by Satan, but 
does evil of his own voluntariness (sua sponte) ; and 
in this respect exercises the freest possible choice. 
But in respect to holiness, the intellect of man does 
ot of itself rightly judge concerning divine things. 
The scripture requires regeneration in order to sal- 
vation. Hence our first birth from Adam contrib- 
utes nothing to our salvation. Paul says, ‘ The nat- 
_ural man perceiveth not the things of the Spirit of 
God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can 

*#- he know them, because they are spiritually dis- 
cerned. The same apostle asserts, that ‘we are 

not sufficient of ourselves to think any good thing 
~.»as of ourselves ; but our sufficiency is of God.’ But 
.- it ss evident that the mind or intellect is the guide 
“3% and leader of the will ; if therefore the guide is blind, 
it 13 easy to see how far the will also is affected. 
Wherefore, there is no free will to good in an un- 
renewed mau; no strength for acting holily. Our 
Lord, in the Gospel says: ‘ Verily, verily, I say unto 

you, whosoever committeth sin is the servant of 






5 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC THEORY. LV 


sin.” And the apostle Paul asserts that ‘the car- 
nal mind is enmity against God; for it is not sub- 
ject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. In 
the third place, we are to consider whether the re- 
generate have free will, and how far (an regenerati 
sint liberi arbitriil, et quatenus). In regeneration, : 
the intellect is enlightened by the Holy Spirit, so 
that it apprehends the mysteries and will of God. 
And the will itself is not only changed (muta- 
tur) by the Spirit; is strengthened in its en- 
ergies (instruitur facultatibus), so that it sponta- 
neously wills and performs the good. Unless we 
concede this we deny Christian liberty, and bring 
in legal servitude. The prophet (Jer. xxxi.; Ezek. 
XxXvi.) represents God as saying: ‘I will put my 
law in their inward parts, and write it in their 
hearts.” Our Lord (John vii.) also says: ‘If the Son 
make you free, ye shall be free indeed’ Paul, also, 
says to the Philippians (Phil. 1. 29) : ‘ Unto you it is 
given in the behalf of Christ, not only to believe on 
him, but also to suffer for his sake ;’ and again (Phil. 
1.6): ‘Iam confident that he which hath begun a 
good work in you, will perfect (éazreAéoec) it until 
the day of Jesus Christ;’ and again (Phil. ii. 18): 
‘It is God which worketh in you, both to will and 
to do.” 

Respecting man’s agency in regeneration, the 
Second Helvetic Confession teaches that the hu- 
man activity is the effect of the Divine activity. : 
“The regenerate,” says this creed, “in the choice 


i72 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


and working of that which is good, not only act 
passively, but actively also (regeneratos in boni 
electione et operatione, non tantum agere passive, 
sed active). For they are acted upon by God, that 
they themselves may act what they do act (aguntur 
enim a Deo, ut agant ipsi, quod agant). Rightly 
does Augustine adduce the fact that God is styled 
our helper (adjutor). But no one can be helped, 
except as there is activity in him (nequit autem 
adjuvari, nisi is, qui aliquid agit). The Manichaeans 
despoil man of all activity, and make him as a stock 
or stone.” ? 

By the above phrase “acting passively,” the 
formers of this creed appear to mean, that the sinful 
will, in relation to the strictly renewing agency of 
the Holy Spirit, is recipient, or is acted upon, while 
yet it is a will and not a stone; and by “acting ac- 
tively,” they mean that as a consequence of this 
passivity it becomes spontaneously active in holi- 
ness. The regenerating energy does not find or 
leave the human will inert and lifeless, like a stock 
or stone, but makes it willing and energetic to good, 
with the same energy and intensity with which it 
had been willing and energetic to evil. 


1NiEMEYER : Collectio in locis. 


MELANCHTHON’S SYNERGISM. 173 


§$ 3. Melanchthon’s Synergism. 


Melanchthon took a leading part in the con. 
struction of the Augsburg Confession and the Apol- 
ogy; both of which asserted the Augustinian doc- 
trine of original sin, and the monergistic theory 
of regeneration. But when the difficult points in- 
volved in the doctrine of grace and regeneration 
came to be discussed among the Protestants, and 
. the Calvinistic division, in particular, asserted the 
helplessness of the human will with great energy, 
and emphasized the tenet of election and predes- 
tination, Melanchthon receded somewhat from his 
earlier opinions, and adopted a species of synergism. 
He expressed his views in a revised form of the 
Augsburg Confession, which goes under the name 
of the Variata, and in his important theological 
manual, entitled Loci Communes. Instead of ex- 
plaining regeneration as Luther and Calvin did, and 
as he himself did when the Augsburg Confession 
was drawn up, as the effect of the Divine efficiency 
simply and solely, he asserts that “ concurrunt res 
causae bonae actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus Sanctus, 
et humana voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo 
Dei.” The human soul, according to Melanchthon, 
though apostate, yet retains an appetency faint and 
ineffectual, yet reat and inalienable, towards the 





bs 


- 


spiritual and the holy. Info this seeking, or faint > 


striving (clinamen) in the right direction, the grace 


174 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


of God enters, and brings it to a result. This form 
of synergism, though the nearest to monergism of 
any, because it reduces down the human factor to a 
minimum is, yet, not the monergism of Luther and 
Calvin. Hase, who is certainly not biassed in favor 
of monergism, remarks that “the synergism ema- 
nating from Melanchthon may be regarded as a re- 
mote tendency to Pelagianism ; first, in that the co- 
operation of man toward his own change of charac- 
ter (Bessrung) appears to be founded upon natpral 
endeavors, and not upon the inward operation of 
the Holy Spirit; and secondly, in that the non- 
resistance of the sinner at the commencement of the 
change of heart is represented as a positive active 
concurrence of will.”? 


§ 4. Zuingles Doctrine of Original Sin. 


The only one of the leaders of the Protestant 
Reformation who did not accept the Augustinian 
doctrine of original sin was Zuingle. This active 
and energetic mind seems to have inclined to that 
theory, prevalent in the second and third centuries, 
which we have designated by the general name of 
the Greek anthropology, and which reappeared in 
Semi-Pelagianism. But the opinions of Zuingle 
upon original sin were confined to the circle of his 

1Hase: Hutterus Redivivus, p. =r: Dogmengeschichte, IIT. 428. 


275. See further extracts in Compare [History of Symbols, su 
MiinscHEer-Von COLLN-NEUDEOK- ora. 


~ 


ZUINGLE’'S DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. 174 


own personal influence, and did not spread like 
those of Luther and Calvin through the Protestant 
churches. They were not adopted into any symbol, 
and did not constitute the foundation of any ecclesi- 
astical body. 

Zuingle sent a statement of his theological senti- 
ments to the diet at Augsburg in 1530, where so 
many religious parties were represented. It is en- 
titled Zuingle’s Fidei Ratio, and from it we extract 
the following representation of his views of original 
sin. “I think this in regard to original sin. That 
is properly sin which is transgression of the law ; for 
where no law is there is no transgression ; and where 
there is no transgression there is no sin properly so 
called,—that is to say, so far as by sin is meant 
wickedness, crime, villainy, or guilt. I acknowl- 
edge, therefore, that our first father sinned a sin 
that is truly sin,—that is, wickedness, crime, and 
turpitude. But those who are generated from that 
person did not sin in this manner,—for what one of 
us bit with his teeth the forbidden apple in Para- 
dise? Hence, whether we will or no, we are com- 
pelled to admit that orjginal sin, as it is in the pos- 
terity of Adam, z: sin, in the sense alrea- : 
dy spoken of; for it is ‘wet a crime committed &* 
against law. Consequently, it\is properly speak po 
ing a disease and condition. disease, because L 
as Adam fell from love of himself, so also do we oe 

wu 


fall. A condition, because as he became a slave,® 








and obnoxious to death, so also we are born Ne pee 


176 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


and children of wrath, and obnoxious to death . .. 
Adam died, on account of sin, and being thus dead, 
that is sentenced to death, in this condition [status ] 
he generated us. ‘Therefore we also die,—so far as 
he is concerned, by his fault and culpability; but 
so far as we are concerned, by our condition and 
disease, or, if you prefer, ‘sin, —but sin improperly 
so called. Let us illustrate by an example. A man 
is taken captive in war. Upon the ground of his 
own personal hostility to his captors, and treachery 
towards them, he deserves to be made a slave, and 
is so held. Now they who are born of him in this 
condition are slaves,—not by virtue of their own 
fault, guilt, or crime, but by virtue of their condi- 
tion [status], which condition is the consequence of 
the guilt of their father, who had deserved to come 
into it by his individual fault. The children in this 
instance are not laden with crime itself, but with 
the punishment, fine, loss, or damage of crime,—that 
is, with a wretched condition of servitude.” * 

The difference between this view, and that of 
the Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols from which 
we have quoted, is plain. So far as the wll is con- 
cerned, Zuingle does not hold the doctrine of the 

| Adamic unity, and hence he cannot concede from his 
position the doctrine of a common apostasy and guilt. 
The Adamic transgression, according to the Zuing- 
lian theory, was only nominally and by a mental 
~ fictiorthe transgression of the posterity, and hence 


1 NiEMEYER : Collectio, pp. 20, 21. 


ZUINGLE’S DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN. 177 


the sinfulness of it when attributed to the posterity, 
is only nominal. At the same time, he left unan- 
swered that question which drove Augustine to- 
wards the theory of Traducianism, viz.: Why are 
the posterity of Adam, who by the supposition are 
entirely innocent of Adam’s act of apostasy, visited 
with all the dreadful temporal and eternal conse- 
quences of that act? For Zuingle expressly says 
that the posterity, though guiltless of the primitive 
act of apostasy, are “born slaves, and children of 


wrath, and obnoxious to death.” 
VOL. 1.—12 


CHAPTER Vit 


THE ARMINIAN ANTHROPOLOGY. 


$1. Arminian theory of Original Sin. 


Tue Protestant Reformation reinstated, we have 
seen, the Augustinian anthropology. Both the Lu- 
theran and Calvinistic creeds teach the doctrines of 
the Adamic unity, both as to soul and body, of the 
imputation of the original act of apostasy to all 
men and the guilt of original sin, and of monergism 


in regeneration. 


The Arminians were a Protestant party who 
receded from this dogmatic position of the first Re- 
formers, and made some modifications of the doe- 


‘For sources see: ARMINIUS : 
Opera (translated by Nichols) ; 
Episcorius: Opera, Ed. Roter- 
dami, 1665; Limsorcuts: Theolo- 
gia Christiana; Branpt: History 
of the Reformation in the Low 
Countries, Vol. III.; Jeremy Tay- 


tor: On Original Sin; Jonn 
Taytor: On Original Sin ; Wurr- 
By : On Original Sin; Owen: Dis- 
play of Arminianism; Epwarps: 
On Original Sin; Hatiam: Lit- 
erature of Europe, Vol. II. (Har- 
pers’ Ed.). 


ARMINIAN THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 179 


trines of sin and grace which were in the direction | , 
of the Greek anthropology and the Semi-Pelagian- | 2 
ism of the Ancient Church, though not identical in 
every respect. 

The clearest and most particular statement of 
the Arminian system, in its first form, is found in the 
Confession or Declaration* drawn up by Episcopius(* 
and in the Apoloyy which he subsequently compos- 
ed in explanation and defence of it. The writings 
of Arminius, although they do not furnish any fore 
mal creed-statement, nevertheless throw much light 
upon the process by which Arminianism was grad- 
ually formed by a mind that had been trained up 
under Beza, and had reacted from his supra-lapsari- 
anism. 

The Arminian anthropology accepts the doctrine 
of the Adamic unity, and states it in substantially ng 
the same phraseology with the Lutheran and Cal- *, 
vinistic symbols; but it explains the phraseology 
very differently from them. The language of the 
Confession or Declaration, upon this subject, is the 


Li 


yee 


* Confessio sive Declaratio Re- 
monstrantium ; Apologia pro Con- 
fessione. Episcoprvs: Opera II. 
Ed. Roterdami, 1665. 

? The statement of Armmnits is 
also very closely similar in phrase- 
ology to that of the Calvinistic 
symbols. ‘The whole of this 
[Adamic] sin, however, is not pe- 
culiar to our first parents, but is 
common to the entire race and to 
all their posterity, who, at the 


time when this sin was commit- 
ted, were in their loins, and who 
have since descended from them 
by the natural mode of propaga- 
tion, according to the primitive 
benediction. For in Adam ‘all 
have sinned.’ Wherefore, what- 
ever punishment was brought 
down upon our first parents. has 
likewise pervaded, and yet pur- 
sues all their posterity. So that 
all men ‘are by nature the chil- 


180 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


following. ‘“ Adam together with Eve transgressed 
the law of God. By this transgression, man, in ac- 
cordance with the divine threatening, was made lia- 
ble to eternal death and manifold miseries, and was 
deprived of that primitive felicity which he had re- 
ceived in creation ... But since Adam was the 
stem and root of the whole human race . . . he in- 
volved all his posterity who, as it were (quasi), had 
been shut up in his loins and were to issue from him 
by natural generation, in the same death and mis- 
ery, and implicated them with himself, so that all 
men, indiscriminately, the Lord Jesus Christ alone 
being excepted, through this one single sin of Adam 
(per hoc unicum Adami peccatum) have been de- — 
prived of that primitive felicity, and have lost that 
true righteousness which is necessary in order to 
eternal life, and thus are born even now exposed to 
that death which we have mentioned, and to mani- 
fold miseries. And this is commonly denominated 
original sin. Jn respect to which, nevertheless, the 
doctrine must be held, that the most benevolent God 
has provided for all a remedy for that general evil 
which was derived to us from Adam, free and gra- 
tuitous in his beloved Son Jesus Christ, as it were a 
new and another Adam. So that the hurtful error 
of those is plainly apparent, who are accustomed to 


dren of wrath,’ obnoxious to con- wnius: Disputatio VIL (Nichols’ 
demnation, and to temporal as translation, I. 486). 
well as to eternal death.” Armi- 


vv /ARMINIAN THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 181 
° 
os 


& 


found upon that [original] sin the decree of absolute 
reprobation, invented by themselves.” * 

The doctrine of Redemption seems to be brought 
to view in the above statement, in such a connection 
as to imply, that the evil which has come upon the vod 
posterity of Adam is of the nature of a misfortune, g 
and not of a fault. It is ngt a sin that intrinsicall oo 
merits eternal reprobation, so that God would have})) 7 © j . 
been just had he provided no redemption from it. 
Mankind are indeed subject to loss by their connec- 
tion with the progenitor, but the Divine compassion 
has granted a compensation in the method of salva- 
tion. a 
Hence, when this phraseology respecting the I 
Adamie connection and sin comes to be interpreted bs “" 
in the Apology, we find that the Arminian theolo- lF-f. 
gians hold original sin to be original evd/ only, and * 7 
not guilt. The following extracts from the careful Os ' 
explanation given by Episcopius show this. “The 
Remonstrants do not regard original sin as sin prop- 
erly so called, which renders the posterity of Adam 
deserving of the hatred of God ; nor as an evil which 
by the method of punishment properly so called 
(per modum proprie dictae poenae) passes from 
Adam to his posterity; but as an evil, infirmity, 
injury (infirmitas, vitium), or by whatever other 
name it may be called, which is propagated to his 
posterity by Adam devoid of original righteousness. 


‘Oonressio Remonstrantium: Caput VII. 


182 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Whence it results, that all the posterity of Adam, 
destitute of the same righteousness, are wholly unfit 
for, and incapable of attaining eternal life,—either 
to return of themselves into favor with God, or to 
discover a way whereby they may return,—except 
God by his new grace go before them, and restore 
as well as supply (restituat ac sufficiat) new strength 
by which they can attain it. And this the Remon 
strants believe to have been signified by the expul- 
sion of Adam from paradise, the type of heaven. 
For this calamity (calamitas) happened not only to 
Adam, but was common with him to all the pos- 
, terity of Adam. But that original-sin (peccatum 
originis) is not evil in any other sense than this,— 
that it is not evil in the sense of implying guilt and 
desert of punishment (malumh culpae, aut malum 
poenae),—is plain. It is not evil in the sense of 
implying guilt, beeause to be born is confessedly an 
involuntary thing, and therefore it is an involuntary 
ing to be born with this or that stain (labes), in- 
rmity, injury, or evil. But if it is not_an evil in 
the sense of implying-gtilt, then it cannot be an evil 






in the sense of desert Qf punishment; because guilt 
and punishment are correlated ... So far, there- 
fore, as original sin is an evil, it must be in the sense 
ok in which the Remonstrants define the term; and 
wo is called original giz by a misuse of the word ‘sin’ 
“SS , (xarayonorixac). And this was the very sentiment 

A of Zuingle,—at least that which he at first asserted, 


af 


ARMINIAN THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 


183 


and defended; whether he afterwards retracted it, 


is not certain.” 4 


In defining the doctrine of imputation, the au- 
thor of the Apology denies that the posterity were 
one with Adam in the primal act of apostasy, and, 
consequently, affirms that the Adamic transgression 
cannot be imputed to the posterity as truly and 


properly their sin. 


“The Remonstrants acknowl- 


edge that the sin of Adam may be said to be im- 
puted to his posterity, so far forth as God has willed 
that the posterity of Adam should be born subject 
to the same evil to which Adam subjected himself 
by his sin,’ or, so far forth as God has permitted 
the evil, which had been inflicted upon Adam as a 
punishment, should flow and pass over to his pos- 
terity [not as puneshment, but as propagated evil]. 
But there is no ground for the assertion, that the sin 
of Adam was imputed to his posterity in the sense 
that God actually judged the posterity of Adam to} 
be guilty of, and chargeable with (reos), the same sin 


1 Apologia pro Confessione Re- 
monstrantium, Cap. VII. in Epis- 
copius: Opera II. 

2 Yet this “evil,” according to 
the statement in the Confessio 
sive Declaratio, is ‘‘ eternal death, 
together with manifold miseries.” 
Eternal death, therefore, falls as 
punishment upon Adam, and as 
evil but not punishment upon the 
posterity. In the Apology, it is 
taught that temporal death, or 
the death of the body, is not di- 


rectly a part of the penalty threat- 
ened to Adam. The body of 
Adam was mortal by creation, 
but in case he had not sinned, 
death would not have befallen it, 
by reason of a divine prevention, 
—‘“mortem homini primo natu- 
ralem fuisse, sed mortem, quae 
naturalis homini futura fuisset, 
non eventuram homini fuisse di- 
vino beneficio, nisi peccaret.” 
Apotoeia, Cap. VII. 


184 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


and crime (culpa) which Adam had committed. 
Neither scripture, nor truth, nor wisdom, nor divine 
benevolence, nor the nature of sin, nor the idea of 
justice and equity, allow that they should say that 
the sin of Adam was thus imputed to his posterity. 
Scripture testifies that God threatened punishment 
to Adam alone, and inflicted it upon Adam alone ; 
the Divine benevolence, veracity, and wisdom, do 
not permit that one person’s sin should be imputed, 
strictly and literally, to another person; it is con- 
trary to the nature of sin, that that should be re- 
garded as sin, and be properly imputed as sin, 
which was not committed by individual will (pro- 
pria voluntate) ; it is contrary to justice and equity, 
that any one should be charged as guilty, for a sin 
that is not his own, or that he should be judged to 
be really guilty who in respect to his own individ- 
ual voluntariness is innocent, or, rather, not guilty. 
And the injustice is the greater, in proportion as the 
punishment which follows the imputation is severer. 
Consequently, it is the height of injustice, when the 
penalty is an eternal suffering.”* Arminius, also, in 
his Apology or Defence, remarks: “It may admit 
of discussion, whether God could be angry on ae- 
count of original sin which was born with us, since 
it seems to be inflicted upon us by God as a punish- 
ment of the actual sin which had been committed by 
Adam, and by us in him [putatively or nominally, 


* Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantium, Cap. VII. 


ARMINIAN THEORY OF ORIGINAL SIN. 185 


i.e.] ... Ido not deny that it is sin, but it is not 
actual sin... We must distinguish between ac- 
tual sin and that which is the cause of other sins, 
and which on this very account may be denominated 
‘sin’ ”? Tn further proof of the position, that the 
hereditary evil which is transmitted by propagation 
does not render the soul worthy of eternal damna- 
tion, as it would if it were really and properly sin, 
the Apology makes the following statement respect- 
ing the character of infants: “The Remonstrants 
decide with confidence, that God neither will, nor 
justly can, destine to eternal torment any infants 
who die without actual and individual sins, upon the 
ground of asin which is called ‘ original,’ which is 
said to be contracted by infants by no individual 
fault of theirs, but by the fault of another person, 
and which is believed to be theirs for no other rea- 
son than that God wills arbitrarily to impute it to 
them. This opinion is contrary to the Divine be- 
~nevolence, and to right reason; nay it is uncertain 
which is greater, its absurdity or its cruelty.” 

These extracts are sufficient to prove that the 
Arminian theologians did not believe that the unity 
between Adam and his posterity, which they as- 
serted in their Confession or Declaration, was of 
such a nature as to make the first sinful act of Adam 
a common act of mankind, and thereby justify the 
imputation of original sin as truly and properly sin. 


* Arminius: Works by Nichols, I. 374. 


186 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Though employing the Augustinian phraseology 
respecting the Adamic connection, they put a dif: 
ferent interpretation upon it from that which is 
found in both Lutheran and Calvinistie symbols. 
Their objection to the doctrine that original sin is 
guilt, proceeds upon the assumption that Adam’s 
act of apostasy was purely individual, and that the 
posterity were not in the progenitor in any such 
real sense as the phraseology of their own doctrinal 
statements, if taken in its strict and literal accepta- 
tion, would imply. 


§ 2. Arminian Theory of Regeneration. 


The Arminian anthropology also accepts the doe- 
trine of the impotence to good of the apostate will, 
and states it in substantially the same phraseology 
with that of the Lutheran and Calvinistic symbols ; 
but it makes explanations and modifications that 
bring it into conflict with some fundamental posi- 
tions of the Reformers upon this subject. 

The Confession or Declaration of the Remon- 
strants makes the following statement: “Man has 
not saving faith from himself, neither is he regen- 
erated or converted by the force of his own free 
will; since, in the state of sin, he is not able, of and 
by himself, to think, will, or do any good thing,— 
any good thing that is saving in its nature, partic- 
ularly conversion and saving faith. But it is neces- 
sary that he be regenerated, and wholly rgnewed, 


ARMINIAN THEORY OF REGENERATION. 187 


by God in Christ, through the truth of the gospel 
and the added energy of the Holy Spirit,—in intel- 
lect, affections, will, and all his faculties,—so that he 
may be able (possit) rightly to perceive, meditate 


| upon, will, and accomplish that which is a saving 


good.” This taken by itself, and understood in its 
literal obvious sense, would express the monergism 
of Augustine, Anselm, and the Reformers ; but a the- 
ory of grace is associated with it that differs essen- 
tially from theirs. This theory is presented in the 
following extract from the Confession : “ Although 
there is the greatest diversity in the degrees in which 
grace is bestowed in accordance with the Divine 
will, yet the Holy Spirit confers, or at least is ready 
to confer, upon all and each to whom the word of 
faith is ordinarily preached, as much grace as is 
sufficient for generating faith and carrying forward 
their conversion in its successive stages. Thus, suf- 
ficient grace for faith and conversion is allotted not 
only to those who actually believe and are convert- 
ed, but also to those who do not actually believe, and 
are not in fact converted. . . . So that there is no 
decree of absolute reprobation.”? This view of grace 
is synergistic. Every man that hears the gospel re- 
ceives a degree of grace that is sufficient for regene- 
ration. If, therefore, he is not regenerated it must 
be from the want of some human efficiency to co- 
operate with the Divine; and therefore the differ- 


*Confessio sive Declaratio, ?Confessio sive Declaratio, 
Cap. XVII. Cap. XVII. 


TS8. p : HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the non-elect, is ultimately referable to the human 
will. So far as the divine influence is concerned, 
the saved and lost stand upon the same position, 
and receive a degree of grace that is sufficient to 
save. But the former makes the grace effectual by 
an act of his own will; while the latter nullifies it 
J by the same method. According to the monergistic 
a theory, on the contrary, no man receives a grace that 
- is sufficient for regeneration who does not receive 
such a degree of Divine influence as overcomes his 
hostile will; so that regeneration is not conditioned 
upon any human efficiency, but is the result of a 
sovereign and irresistible energy. The dependence 
upon grace, in regeneration, in the Arminian anthro- 
pology, is partial ; in the Calvinistic anthropology, 
is total. “Grace,” says Limborch,' “ is not the sol- 
tary, yet it is the primary cause of salvation ; for 
the co-operation of free will is due to grace as a 
primary cause; for unless the free will had been 
excited (excitatum) by prevenient grace, it would 
not be able to co-operate with grace.” Here the 
4 influence of grace upon the will is that of excitation 
‘ih or stimulation, and not of renovation. Hence Lim- 
i borch can properly denominate the will’s activity, 
co-operation. The faculty is inert and sluggish, as 
distinguished from averse and hostile, and hence it 

can co-work in its own regeneration. 


iat cv ence between the saved and the lost, the elect and 





? Theologia Christiana, Lib. IV. cap. xiv. § 21. 


ARMINIAN THEORY OF REGENERATION. 189 


The doctrine of human inability and divine 
grace is still further modified by the Arminian 
theologians, by the position that God cannot demand 
faith irrespective of the bestowment of grace. This 
is very explicitly asserted by Arminius, in his an- 
swer to the question: ‘Can God, now, in his own 
right, require from fallen man faith in Christ, which 
he cannot have of himself? Or does God bestow 
on all and every one, to whom the gospel is preach- 
ed, sufficient grace by which they may believe if 
they will?’ This was one of ‘ Nine Questions’ that 
were presented to the professors of divinity in the 
university of Leyden, for the purpose of obtaining 
their views; and to it Arminius gave the following 
reply: “The parts of this question are not opposed 
to each other; on the contrary they are in perfect 
agreement. So that the latter clause may be con- 
sidered as giving the reason, why God may require 
from fallen man faith in Christ which he cannot 
have of himself. For God may require this, since 
he has determined to bestow on man sufficient grace 
by which he may believe. Perhaps, therefore, the 
question may be thus stated: ‘Can God, now, in 
his own right, demand from fallen man faith in 
Christ which he cannot have of himself, though 
God neither bestows on him, nor is ready to be- 
stow, sufficient grace by which he may believe?’ 
This question must be answered by a direct negative. 
God cannot by any right demand from fallen man 
faith in Christ which he cannot have of ie 


190 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


except God has either bestowed, or is ready te 
bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe 
if he will.”* 

This doctrine that the obligation to faith does 
not rest upon fallen man irrespective of the aids of 
the Holy Spirit grew logically out of the Arminian 
definition of original sin. The inherited corruption 
has indeed brought man into such a condition that 
he cannot renew and save himself; but his cor- 
ruption is an ‘infirmity’ or ‘injury’ and not a sin 
and fault. It is physical evil, and not culpable 
transgression. It is the result of Adam’s individual 
act of apostasy, and not of an agency common to him 
and his posterity. The disability, therefore, under 
which man labors at birth is a misfortune, and not 
a crime. Original sin is not guilt. As a conse- 
quence, it is no more than equitable, that God 
should furnish a grace that shall be a sufficient as- 
sistance to overcome the inherited evil. In accord- 
ance with this view, the Apology of the Remon- 
strants teaches that God grants a common grace to 
the heathen, which if rightly used is sufficient to 
secure moral virtue and salvation. The argument 
is as follows: “ In order that an act may be morally 
good, it is sufficient if it accords with right reason, 
—i.e., if it proceeds from a mind which, though it 
be ignorant of the written law and the gospel, is 
really actuated by a desire for virtue, honesty, and 
probity, and does not intend to do anything con- 


1 Arminius: Works by Nichols, I. p. 383. 


ARMINIAN THEORY OF REGENERATION. 191 


trary to the divine will, and is not influenced by 
vain glory and self-love. For that a morally good 
act does not necessarily include the distinct inten- 
tion to do only that which the written law or gos- 
pel commands,—viz.: the positive desire to promote 
the divine glory, and faith in Christ,—is evident 
from the nature of the case; for there have been 
many in every age, and still are to this day, who 
never even heard of the written law and gospel, 
who, nevertheless, no one would venture to deny, 
were and are morally good and virtuous (quos 
tamen moraliter bonos ac virtuosos esse aut fuisse, 
nemo facile negaverit).” In answer to the objec- 
tion drawn from the text: “ Without faith it is im- 
possible to please God,” the Apology explains this 
to refer to a special divine approbation, such as was 
shown to Enoch in his translation. It has no gen- 
eral reference. Again, the text: “ Whatsoever is 
not of faith is sin,” does not refer to justifying faith, 
but to sincerity and confidence in the mind. With 
this, accords the following statement of Limborch, 
who ranks with Episcopius as authority in the 
estimation of the Dutch Arminians. The question 
is asked: Are all those who are destitute of the 
knowledge of the gospel to be numbered among 
the lost, upon the ground that they have no means 
whereby they can attain to eternal life? To this Lim- 
borch answers: “This does not appear at all con- 
formable to truth. . . . On the contrary, if certain 


* Apologia Remonstrantium, Cap. VI. Episcorrus: Opera II. 146. 





192 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


[pagans], in proportion to the measure of strength 
granted to them through that grace which is com- 
mon to all men, strive after natural uprightness 
(honestati naturali operam dent), we believe that 
they also are pleasing to God (Deo gratos esse), in 
proportion to the kind of life they lead, nor are cer- 
tainly excluded from salvation, and at the very least 
are not to be adjudged to eternal fire.” 

Such being the Arminian theory of original sin 
and regeneration, it was natural and logical that 
the Arminian statement of the doctrine of pre- 
destination and election should also differ from 
that of Augustine and Calvin in a very marked 
degree. Arminius’s first doubts in respect to the 
Calvinism in which he had been educated took 
their origin in this part of the system. Beza, under 
whom he had studied theology, had adopted the 
supra-lapsarian statement of the doctrine of pre- 
destination, which renders the doctrine more austere 
anil repelling than the infra-lapsarian® representa- 
say In his reaction, he, and his followers after 


1 Theologia Christiana, Lib. IV. 
cap} ii. 

? Supra-lapsarianism holds, that 
the decree to eternal bliss or eter- 
nal woe precedes, in the order of 
nature, the decree to apostasy ; 
Infra-lapsarianism holds that it 
succeeds it. According to the 
Supra-lapsarians, the primary de- 
cree is to bliss or woe; and the 
decrees to create men, that they 


shall apostatize, and from this 
apostasy some be recovered and 
some reprobatcd, are merely the . 
means of accomplishing the pri- 
mary decree. According to the 
Infra-lapsarians, the decrees to 
create men, and that they shall 
apostatize, are prior to that of 
election and reprobation ; because 
men are elected from out of a 
state of sin and ruin, or else are 


ARMINIAN THEORY OF REGENERATION. 193 


him, adopted a theory of election and predestina- 
tion which differs essentially from that of the Re 
formers, and from the Augustinian. It is the theory 
of conditional election; or of election upon the 
ground of a foreseen faith. 
Arminius’s views are explicitly stated by him- 

self, in his Declaration of Sentiments, which he de- 
livered before the States of Holland in 1608, and 
are as follows: “The first decree of God concernin ; : 
the salvation of man is that by which he decreed to 
appoint his Son, Jesus Christ, for a Mediator. TheQ 
second decree of God is that by which he decreed eo 
to receive into favor those who repent and ‘aid 
.. . but to leave in sin, and under wrath, all im- 
penitent persons and unbelievers. The third divine 3 
decree is that by which God decreed to administer, al 
in a sufficient and efficacious manner, the means 
which were necessary for repentance and faith. The\4 
fourth divine decree is that by which God ieee 
to save and damn certain particular persons. This , 
decree has its foundation in the foreknowledge of | 
God, by which he knew from all eternity those indi- 
viduals who would believe through his preventing 

grace,and through his subsequent grace would per- 
" severe, ... and by which foreknowledge, he like- | 
wise knew those who would not believe and perse- / 
vere.” 


eine 


reprobated in it. Election sup- mar, who endeavoured to commit 
poses apostasy as a fact. The the Synod to Supra-lapsarianism. 
Synod of Dort favoured Infra- ? Arminius: Works by Nichols, 
lapsarianism, in opposition to Go- I. 247. 


VOL. 11.—13 


194 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


,> Upon examining this phraseology it will be 
is concerned, the electing decree only furnishes the 
the administration of the means “in a sufficient and 

A 
\upon those who make the “means” which he be- 


WX found to teach that the decree of election is not a 
.ay decree to originate faith in the sinner, but to reward 
ie faith in him. So far as the production of faith itself 
“means” which are necessary for repentance and 
faith. The efficiency that is to use these means is 
S partly the energy of the Holy Spirit,—implied in 
ae 

~~” efficacious manner,”—and partly the energy of the 
human will. By this last, the decree of election 
is conditioned. God decrees to bestow salvation 
(stows, and the degree of divine influence which he 
ey actually efficacious by their own self-deci- 

sion.? 


$ 3. Recapitulation. 


A recapitulation of the principal characteristics 
of the Arminian anthropology, as derived from the 
original sources, gives the following particulars : 

1. The Arminians, in the controversy with the 
Calvinists, asserted that original sin is not guilt; and 
that a decree of reprobation to eternal punishment 
could not be founded upon it.2 2. The Arminians 


1 Compare History of Symbols. sufficient to condemn the whole 
2“ The Synod rejects the error human race, and merits temporal 
of those who teach that itis not and eternal punishment.” Oa- 
true that original sin of itself is nones Synodi Dordrechtanae,- 


RECAPITULATION. 


195 


held that original sin does not include a sinful incli- 
nation of the will; it is an inherited corruption 
whose seat is the physical and intellectual parts, but 


not the voluntary.’ 


3. The Arminians asserted that 


by reason of original sin, man of himself is unable to 
be morally perfect and holy; but inasmuch as the 





: Snaranemge 
to be morally perfect without the renewing grace 


of the gospel. 


4. Adam’s act of apostasy was pure- LS 


ly individual, and therefore cannot be imputed to 


his posterity as guilt. 


5. The will of man, though 
not competent to perfectly obey the law of God™ 


without the assisting influence of the Holy Spirit, is 
competent to co-operate with that assistance? 6. 
The influence of the Holy Spirit is granted uponC+ 
condition that the human will concurs and co-works. ¢ 


Cap. IIT. [V. Nremryer: Collec- 
tio, p. 717. 

1“The synod rejects the error 
of those who teach that spiritual 
gifts are not lost from the will of 
man in spiritual death, because 
the will was never corrupted in 
itself, but is only impeded by the 
darkness of the intellect and the 
inordinate appetites of the flesh: 
which impediments being remoy- 
ed, the will is able to exert its in- 
nate freedom,—that is, of itself, 
either to will or to choose, or not 
to will or not to choose whatso- 
ever good is set before it.” Ca- 


nones Syn. Dordrecht. Niemey- 
EER: Collectio, p. 713. 

? “The synod condemns the er- 
ror of those who teach that grace 
and free will are each partial and 
concurrent causes at the com- 
mencement of conversion; that 
grace does not precede the effi- 
ciency of the will in the order of 
causality,—that is, that God does 
not efficiently aid (juvare) the 
will of man to conversion, before 
the will itself moves and deter- 
mines itself.” Canones Synodi 
Dordrechtanae, NreEMEYER: Col- 
lectio, p. 715. 


196 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The success of the divine influence depends upon 
the use which man makes of his own will; conse- 
quently,election is conditional upon a foresight that 
a particular man will co-operate with the Holy 
Spirit. 


yA 


CHAPTER IX. 


TOTAL SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY. 


A review cf the ground we have gone over in 
Anthropology will help to generalize, and classify, 
the materials which we have thus collected from the 
various sources and authorities. 

In the jirst place, the doctrines of sin and grace, 
in their more difficult and scientific aspects, did not 
seriously engage the attention of the Church during 
the first three centuries after the closing of the New 
Testament Canon. No controversy arose respecting 
original sin and regenerating grace, until the open- 
ing of the 5th century. The Church, both East and 
West, generally held the doctrine of an inherited 
corruption as distinguished from an inherited guilt, 
the doctrine of synergistic regeneration, and was si- 
lent upon the doctrine of election and predestination. 
Secondly. At the same time, in these first centuries, 
previous to the Pelagian controversy, there were 
two tendencies at work, that had reference to the 


198 HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY. 


doctrine of original sin. One was, to convert the 
doctrine of inherited corruption or evil, into that of 
inherited guilt. The other was, to abolish the doe- 
trine of inherited corruption altogether. The first 
tendency reached its terminus in Augustinianism; 
the second in Pelagianism. Thirdly. The theory 
of Pelagius, which rejected the doctrine of original 
sin in any definition of it, was condemned by the 
whole Church, East and West. This left within the 
Church two main currents of opinion in anthropol- 
ogy,—that of the 2d and 3d centuries, and that of 
Augustine ; or, the Greek and Latin Anthropologies. 
The first was the doctrine of inherited evil but not 
inherited guilt, with its logical corollaries. The last 
was the doctrine of inherited guilt, with its logical 
results. ourthly. The Augustinian anthropology 
was rejected in the East, and though at first tri- 
umphant in the West, was gradually displaced by 
the Semi-Pelagian theory, or the theory of inherited 
evil, and synergistic regeneration. This theory was 
finally stated for the Papal Church, in an exact 
form, by the Council of Trent. The Augustinian 
anthropology, though advocated in the Middle Ages 
by theologians like Gottschalk, Bede, Anselm, Odo, 
and Bernard, slumbered until the Reformation, 
when it was revived by Luther and Calvin, and op- 
posed by the Papists. /%fthly. After Protestantism 
had become established, the old antagonism between 
the two theories of inherited guilt and inherited 
evil, again revived in the Calvinistic and Arminian 


TOTAL SURVEY. 199 


controversy, and has perpetuated itself down to the 
present time,—the whole of modern evangelical 
Christendom being ranged partly upon one side, 
and partly upon the other side of the line that sep- 
arates these two systems. 

The opposing currents of opinion in Anthropolo- 
gy, then, have been the following. In the Ancient 
Church, the Greek and Latin anthropologies in their 
more general forms prevail at first, and gradually 
pass over into the more distinct statements of Au- 
gustinianism and Semi-Pelagianism,—Pelagianism 
being rejected by both parties. In the Mediaeval 
Church, Semi-Pelagianism has sway, with the 
exception of some influential minds. At the Ref 
ormation, the Protestants re-instate Augustinian- 
ism, and the Papists maintain the mediaeval Sem 
Pelagianism. In the Modern Church, the Calvin- 
ists re-affirm the positions of the first Protestant 
symbols, while the Arminians recede from them to- 
wards the Semi-Pelagian theory,—both parties alike 
rejecting the Socinianism which had come into ex- 
istence, and which corresponds to the Pelagianism 
of the Ancient church. 


BOOK FIFTH. 





HES FORY 


SPOTH RIOLO GY. 


LITERATURE. 


AnsELMus: Cur Deus Homo ? 

Prravivs: De theologicis dogmatibus, Liber XII. 

BELLARMINvS: Disputationes de controversiis fidei adversus hujus 
temporis haereticos. 

GERHARDUS: Loci Theologici, Tom. IV. 

CanoneEs ConcrLit TRIDENTINI : in locis. 

Grotius: Defensio fidei catholicae de satisfactione. 

Limsorc#: Theologia Christiana, Liber II. 

Socrnus: Praelectiones Theologicae, Cap. XVI.—XVILII. 

Hooker: On Justification. 

Davenant: Disputatio de justitia (translated by Allport). 

Owen: On Justification. 

Magee: On Atonement and Sacrifice. 

Baur: Versdhnungslehre. 

Mo6uieR: Symbolik (translated by Robertson). 

Baur: Der Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus. 

EVANGELISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG, 1834: Geschichtliches aus der 
Verséhnungs-und Genugthuungslehre. 

Hasse: Anselm von Canterbury, Bd. IL 

REDEPENNING : Origenes. 


CHAPTER I. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF THE ANCIENT CHURCH. 


§ 1. Preliminary Statements. 


In presenting the history of the Doctrine of 
Atonement, we shall use the term in its strict signi 
fication, as denoting the expiatory work of Christ. 
Soteriology has sometimes been made to include the 
subjects of Christology and the Incarnation in such 
a manner that the distinctively piacular agency of 
the Redeemer constitutes only a very subordinate 
part of this division of Dogmatic History. The doc- 
trinal history of Petavius’ furnishes a striking ex- 
ample of this. This writer treats of the work of 
Christ under the general head of the Incarnation. 
While the entire work comprises sixteen books, 
each containing upon an average fifteen chapters, 
the sacrificial work of Christ is briefly discussed in 
one, or at most in two,” of the chapters of the twelfth 


? Petavivs: De theologicis dog- ? Chapters VI. and IX. 
matibus. 


204 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


book. This was owing partly to the fact that the 
Person of Christ, in this history of ecclesiastical 
opinions, was far more in the eye of the historian, 
than the work of Christ; and partly because the 
distinctively Protestant doctrine of vicarious satis- 
faction was not very much a matter of interest for 
the strenuous though learned Jesuit. While, there- 
fore, the history of the Arian and Sabellian heresies, 
and of the Monophysite and Monothelite controver- 
sles, is thoroughly written, aad drawn from the im- 
mediate sources, the opinions of the apostolic, pa- 
tristic, and scholastic periods, respecting the rela- 
tions of the work of Christ to Divine justice, are 
exhibited in a very meagre and unsatisfactory man- 
ner. 

Taking the term atonement in its technical sig- 
nification, to denote the satisfaction of Divine justice 
for the sin of man, by the substituted penal sufferings 
of the Son of God, we shall find a slower scientific 
unfolding of this great cardinal doctrine than of any 
other of the principal truths of Christianity. Our 
investigations in this branch of inquiry will disclose 
the fact, that while the doctrines of Theology and 
Anthropology received a considerably full develop- 
ment during the Patristic and Scholastic periods, it 
was reserved for the Protestant church, and the 
Modern theological mind, to bring the doctrines of 
Soteriology to a correspondent degree of expansion. 


GNOSTIC AND EBIONITE THEORIES. 205 


§ 2. Gnostic and Ebionite Theories of the Atone- 
ment. 


During the first two centuries, the Christian the- 
ologian was led to investigate the doctrine of the 
work of Christ, either by the attacks of heretics, or 
the defective statements of pretended believers. As 
in the history of the doctrine of the Trinity, we 
found exact statements to be forced upon the church 
by the inaccurate statements of false teachers, so we 
shall see in the history of the doctrine of Atonement, 
that the truth received its scientific development no 
faster than the Christian mind was urged up either 
to a defensive, or a polemic position, by the activity 
of the heretic or the latitudinarian. There were 
two heretical views of the Atonement, during the 
first two centuries, which, inasmuch as they affected 
the true view of the work of Christ, gave direction 
to the orthodox statements of it. These were the 
Gnostic and the Hbionite. 

Gnosticism appeared in two forms, and broach- 
ed two theories respecting the Person and work of 
Christ. That of Basilides (4. p. 125) affirmed only 
a human suffering in the Redeemer, which was not 
explatory, for two reasons: first, because as merely 
human it was finite, and inadequate to atone for the 
sins of the whole world of mankind; and, secondly, 
because the idea of substituted penal suffering is in- 
admissible. Penal suffering, or sutfering for pur- 


206 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


poses of justice, Basilides maintained, of necessity 
implies personal criminality in the sufferer, and 
therefore can never be endured by an innocent per- 
son like Christ. The principle of vicarious substi- 
tution, in reference to justice, is untenable. The 
Gnosticism of Marcion (a. D. 150) affirmed a divine 
suffering in the Redeemer, which however was only 
apparent, because the Logos having assumed a do- 
cetic, or spectral human body, only a seeming suffer- 
ing could occur. This suffering, like that in the 
scheme of Basilides, could not of course be expia- 
tory. It was merely emblematical,—designed to 
symbolize the religious truth, that man in order to 
his true and highest life must die to the earthly 
life. The Hdzonite denied any connection between 
man and God in the Person of the Redeemer, other 
than that which exists in the life of any and every 
man. Rejecting the doctrine of expiation altogeth- 
er, he occupied the position of the Jew, whom Paul 
so constantly opposes, and insisted upon a purely 
legal righteousness. 

If now we examine these Gnostic and Judaizing 
theories, we find that they agree in one capital re- 
spect,—viz.: in the rejection of the Scripture doc- 
trine of a real and true expiation of human guilt, 
The Gnostic and the Ebionite, though differing 

1“ For Thou hadst not forgiven by the crucifixion of a phantasm, 
me any of these things in Christ: which I believed Him to be?” 
nor had He abolished by His cross AveustinE: Confessions, V. ix. 


the enmity which by my sins I 16. 
had incurred. For how could He, 


SOTERIOLOGY OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. 207 


much in their general notions respecting the Person 
of Christ, both agreed in regard to his atoning 
work. Both alike rejected the doctrine of atone- 
ment, in the strict and proper meaning of the term, 
as signifying the satisfaction of justice. 


§ 3. Soteriology of the Apostolic Futhers. 


The first endeavour of the orthodox mind, in 
opposition to these heretical opinions, was, conse- 
quently, to exhibit the nature and purpose of the 
sufferings and death of Christ. So far as their 
nature is concerned, they were uniformly and dis- 
tinctly affirmed to be the sufferings and death of a 
theanthropic Person,—i. e., a being in whom Deity 
and humanity were mysteriously blended in the 
unity of asingle personality. With respect to their 
’ purpose, the point with which we are more immedi- 
ately concerned, we shall find less distinctness in the 
earlier than in the later periods of the history of 
this doctrine ; yet at the same time, an unequivocal 
statement that the purpose of Christ’s death is judi- 
cial, and expiatory of human guilt. 

In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, we ob- 
tain the views of the Church upon the doctrine of 
the Atonement during the first half century after 
the death of the last inspired apostle (4. p. 100- 
150). Examining them, we find chiefly the rep- 
etition of Scripture phraseology, without further at- 
tempt at an explanatory doctrinal statement. There 


208 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


is no scientific construction of the doctrine of Atone: 
ment in the writings of these devout and pious dis- 
ciples of Paul and John; yet the idea of vicarious 
satisfaction is distinctly enunciated by them. Poly- 
carp (+168), the pupil of John, writes in his Epistle 
tothe Philippians: “Christ is our Saviour; for through 
grace are we righteous, not by works; for our sins, 
he has even taken death wpon himself, has become 
the servant of us all, and through his death for us 
our hope, and the pledge of our righteousness. The 
heaviest sin is unbelief in Christ; his blood will be 
demanded of unbelievers ; for to those to whom the 
death of Christ, which obtains the forgiveness of 
sins, does not prove a ground of justification, it 
proves a ground of condemnation.” “Our Lord 
Jesus Christ suffered himself to be brought even to 
death for our sins; ... let us, therefore, without 
ceasing, hold steadfastly to him who is our hope, 
and the earnest of our righteousness, even Jesus 
Christ, ‘who dare our sins in his own body on the 
tree’”'  JIgnatius (+ 116), the pupil of John, is 
perhaps somewhat less urgent than Polycarp, in 
respect to the point of vicarious satisfaction. He 
seems more inclined to consider the work of Christ 
in reference to the sanctification than the justifica- 
tion of the believer. It is a favourite view with 
him, that the death of Christ brings the human 
soul into communion with Christ. It is the means 


1Potycarpus: Ad Philippos, 1, 8. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. 209 


of imparting that principle of spiritual life whick 
was lost in the fall. Christ’s redemptive work is a 
manifestation of love, of self-denying and self-impart- 
ing affection on the part of the Redeemer, by which 
a corresponding affection is wrought in the heart 
of the believer. And yet the expzatory agency of 
Christ is explicitly recognized by Ignatius. In one 
passage, he speaks of Christ as the One “ who gave 
himself to God, an offering and sacrifice for us.” In 
another place, he bids believers to “stir” themselves 
up to duty, “by the blood of God.” In another place, 
he remarks that “if God had dealt with us accord- 
ing to our works, we should not now have had a be- 
ing;” but that now under the gospel, we “ have peace 
through the flesh, and blood, and passion of Jesus 
Christ.”* In Barnabas, the pupil of Paul, we find a 
clear expression of the atoning agency of the Redeem- 
er. Such phraseology as the following contains the 
doctrine of justification as distinguished from sancti- 
fication: “The Lord endured to deliver his body 
to death, that we might be sanctified by the re 
mission of sins which is by the shedding of that 
blood.” * Clement of Rome, a disciple of Paul, in his 
First Epistle to the Corinthians speaks, generally, 
more of Christ’s work than of other parts of the 
Christian system, and dwells particularly upon his 
death. The view of Christ’s sufferings, he says, . 


‘TIewatius: Ad Ephesos, 1; Ad 7 BarnaBas: Epistola, 5. 
Magnesios, 10; Ad Trallios (Pre- 
face). 
vou. 1.—14 


210 j HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


consumes pride, teaches us humility, and draws us 
to the death of penitence (c. 7). Hence it is a chief 
sign and duty of a Christian continually to have the 
death of Christ before his eye. His meaning in 
this, says Dorner, is not merely that Christ has pre- 
sented us an example of humility and patience, 
though this thought is not foreign to Clement 
(c. 16); but his death is the principle, or efficient 
cause of true repentance,—i. e., works that repent- 
ance which in faith receives actual forgiveness of 
sins. For “his blood was given for us, was poured 
out for our salvation; he gave, by the will of God, 
his body for our body, his soul for our soul” (c. 49). 
Every explanation of these passages, continues Dor- 
ner, is forced, which does not find in them the idea 
of vicarious substitution, and this not merely in the 
sense of a subjective disposition, like that which led 
Christ to suffer for the good of others, but an ob- 
jective work producing objective results, in refer- 
ence to the Divine nature and government.’ Hence, 
the name so frequently given to Christ in the Epis- 
tle to the Hebrews of “high priest” is very com- 
mon in Clement. The following extracts exhibit 
the distinctness with which Clement discriminated 
justification from sanctification : “ Let us look stead- 
fastly to the blood of Christ, and see how precious 
his blood is in the sight of God, which being shed 
for our salvation hath obtained the grace of repent- 


Dorner: Person Christi, I. 138 sq. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. 211 


ance to the whole world. ... We are not jus- 
tified by ourselves, neither by our own wisdom, or 
knowledge, or piety, or the works which we have 
done in holiness of heart, but by that faith by which 
almighty God hath justified all men from the be- 
ginning.”’ In tke statement that “we are not jus- 
tified by the works which we have done in holiness 
of heart,” the most subtle form of the doctrine of 
justification by works is precluded, fourteen cen- 
turies before its enunciation at Trent. 

It is evident from this examination of the very 
brief writings of the Apostolic Fathers, that they 
recognized the doctrine of atonement for sin by the 
death of the Redeemer as one taught in the Scrip- 
tures, and especially in the writings of those two 
great apostles, John and Paul, at whose feet they 
had most of them been brought up. They did not, 
however, venture beyond the phraseology of Serip- 
ture; and they attempted no rationale of the dogma. 
Their unanimous and energetic rejection of the doc- 
trine of justification by works evinces that they did 
not stand upon the position of legalism. The evan- 
gelical tenet was heartily and earnestly held in their 
religious experience, but it was not drawn forth from 
this its warm and glowing home, into the cool and 
clear light of the intellect, and of theological science. 
The relations of this sacrificial death to the justice 
of God on the one hand, and to the conscience of 


*CremMens Romanus: Ad Corinthos, 7, 82. 


912 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


man on the other,—the judicial reasons and grounds 
of this death of the most exalted of Personages,— 
were left to be investigated and exhibited in 
later ages, and by other generations of theolo 
gians. 


§ 4. Karly Patristic Soteriology. 


Passing from the Apostolic to the Primitive 
Fathers, we find some progress in the scientific 
statement of the doctrine of Atonement. Yet, 
taken as a whole, the body of Patristic theology 
exhibits but an imperfect theoretic comprehension 
of the most fundamental truth in the Christian sys- 
tem,—imperfect, that is, when compared with the 
very able scientific construction of the doctrine 
of the Trinity which we have found in the Patristic 
writings. 

One characteristic of the Early Patristic Soteri- 
ology which strikes the attention is the important 
part which the doctrine of Satan plays in it. The 
death of Christ is often represented as ransoming 
man from the power and slavery of the devil. Such 
passages as Colossians li. 15, and Hebrews ii. 14,— 
“ Having spoiled principalities and powers [Satanic 
dominion |, he made a show of them openly, triumph- 
mg over them in it. ... That through death 
he might destroy him that had the power of death, 
that is, the devil,”—-were made the foundation of 


EARLY PATRISTIC SOTERIOLOGY. 213 


this view... The writer who exhibits it more plainly 
and fully than any other, is Irenaeus ( + 200 ?). 
As an illustration of his sentiments, we quote a 
passage from the first chapter of the fifth book 
of his important work, Adversus Haereses: “The 
Word of God [the Logos], omnipotent and not 
wanting in essential justice, proceeded with strict 
justice even against the apostasy or kingdom of evil 
itself (apostasiam), redeeming from it (ab ea) that 
which was his own originally, not by using violence, 
as did the devil in the beginning, but by persuasion 
(secundum suadelam), as it became God, so that 
neither justice should be infringed upon, nor the 
original creation of God perish.” ? 

Two interpretations of this phraseology are pos- 
sible. The “persuasion” may be referred to Satan, 
or to man; and the “claims” alluded to may be 
regarded as those of the devil, or of law and jus- 
tice. The first interpretation is that of Baur, who 
thinks that he discovers a heretical idea in Irenaeus, 
the great opponent of heretics ; a Gnosticising tend- 
ency in the most vehement opposer of Gnosticism. 
According to Baur, Irenaeus substitutes the Devil 
for the Demiurge, in his scheme, so that the differ- 
ence between himself and his opponents is merely 
nominal. The Gnostic, with his crude notions of a 

? Perhaps a text like Isaiah xlix. ? Tren sEvs: Adversus Haereses, 
24: “Shallthe prey betaken from V. i. 1 (Ed. Harvey). See further 
the mighty, or the lawful captive extracts from Irenaeus, in Min- 


be delivered?” falls into the same scHER-VoN COLLy, I. 426, 
class. 


914 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


Supreme Deity, and a descending series of inferior 
divinities, very naturally attributed to the inferior 
being what properly belongs only to the Supreme 
God. Creation, for example, was the work of a sub- 
ordinate divinity, the Demiurge in his terminology. 
The Creator of the world and the God of Chris- 
tianity, in the Gnostic scheme, were two distinct 
beings, in necessary and irreconcilable hostility to 
one another. Man has fallen into the power of the 
Demiurge and his demons, and redemption, accord- 
ing to the Gnostic, is the endeavor of the Highest 
Divinity to deliver man from their power. 

Now, according to Baur, Irenaeus, living in the 
very midst of the heat and glow of this ingenious 
and imposing system of speculation, though intend- 
ing to oppose it with all his might, was yet uncon- 
sciously affected by the spirit of the time, and 
moulded into his own system elements that were 
purely Gnostic. The notion of a conflict between 
the Redeemer and the Demiurge, Baur contends, 
laid the foundation for the first form of the orthodox 
theory of the atonement.’ The ransoming of man 
from the power and slavery of Satan, in the view 
of this writer, is equivalent to the ransoming of man 
from the power and bondage of the Demiurge and 
his demons; and, accordingly, we have in the 
treatise of Irenaeus, though written professedly 
against the Gnostic scheme, only an expansion of 


’ Baur: Versohnungslehre, 28, 29. 


EARLY PATRISTIC SOTERIOLOGY. DAS 


the same general notions that appear in the Ophite 
and Marcionite Gnosticism." 

But the other view which may be taken of this 
phraseology of Irenaeus, and of the Early Fathers 
is unquestionably the correct one, and to this we 
turn our attention; first making some preliminary 
remarks respecting the Early Patristic Soteriology. 
It is not to be denied that in the writings of the 
first three centuries, disproportionate attention is 
bestowed upon the connection between redemption 
and the kingdom of darkness, and upon the relation 
of apostate man to Satan. The attribute of divine 
justice ought to have been brought more con- 
spicuously into view by the theologian of this 
period, and the person and agency of the devil 
have retired more into the back-ground. It was 
reserved for a later age, as we shall see, to make 
this modification in the mode of apprehending the 
doctrine, and thereby bring the Soteriology of the 
church into closer agreement with the general 
instructions of revelation. For it is very plain that 
in seizing so rankly, as the theological mind of this 
age did, upon those few texts in which the connec- 
tion and relations of Satan with the work of Christ 
are spoken of, and allowing them to eclipse those 
far more numerous passages in which the Re- 
deemer’s work is exhibited in its reference to the 
being and attributes of God, it was liable to a one- 


*Compare Doryer’s criticism upon this view of Baur. Person 
Christi, I. 497 (Note). 


216 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


_ sided construction of the doctrine. Redemption un- 
questionably in one of its aspects looks hell-ward. 
The kingdom of Satan does feel the influence of the 
mediatorial plan, and any theory that should en- 
tirely reject this side and relation of the atone- 
ment would be destitute of some features that are 
distinctly presented in the Scripture representations 
of the general doctrine. But it was an error in the 
Soteriology of these first ages that a subordinate 
part of the subject should have been made so promi- 
nent, and in some instances so exclusive a charac- 
teristic. Having made this concession, however, in 
respect to the scientific value of the Early Patristic 
theory of the atonement, we proceed to show that 
there was a difference in kind between it and the 
Gnostic theory, and no essential difference between 
it and the later Protestant theory. This difference 
consists in the recognition of the judicial and piacu- 
lar nature of Christ’s work. 

All true scientific development of the doctrine 
of the Atonement, it is very evident, must take its 
departure from the idea of divine justice. This 
conception is the primary one in the Biblical repre- 
sentation of this doctrine. The terms, “ propitia- 
tion” and “sacrifice,” and the phraseology, “made 
a curse for us,” “made sin for us,” “ justified by 
blood,” “saved from wrath,” which so frequently 
occur in the revealed statement of the truth, im- 
mediately direct the attention of the theologian to 
that side of the divine character, and that class of 


EARLY PATRISTIC SOTERIOLOGY. 217 


- divine attributes, which are summed up in the idea 
of justice. And as we follow the history of the 
doctrine down, we shall find that just in proportion 
as the mind of the Church obtained a distinct and 
philosophic conception of this great attribute, as an 
absolute and necessary principle in the divine na- 
ture, and in human nature, was it enabled to specify 
with distinctness the real meaning and purport of 
the Redeemer’s Passion, and to exhibit the rational 
and necessary grounds for it. 

Now turning to the writings of the Patristic 
period, we shall see that the sufferings and death 
of the Redeemer are, in the main, represented as 
sustaining their most immediate and important rela- 
tion to the justice of God. It is not to be dis- 
guised that the distinctness with which this is done 
varies with different writers. We shall find in this 
period, as in every other one, some minds for whom 
the pollution of sin is more impressive than its 
criminality, and in whose experience the doctrine of 
justification is less formative than the doctrine of 
sanctification. For, in tracing the construction of 
a systematic doctrine, we are to observe that there 
may be agreement between the views of two differ- 
ent writers, while yet one grasps the subject with 
much greater firmness, discriminates with much 
greater distinctness, and affirms with much greater 
confidence and certainty, than the other. Again, 
the neglect to make the positive and scientific state- 
ment is by no means tantamount to a denial of the 


918 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


positive and scientific statement. The mind may 
merely be in obscurity, and unable to take a clear 
scientific view, much more, to present one. But its 
tendency is towards the thorough systematic state- 
ment, and though unable to make it itself would 
cordially accept it when made by another mind. 
Compare Irenaeus with Anselm, for example. That 
part of the work against the Gnostic heretics which 
treats of the atonement is by no means equal in 
clearness, discrimination, and fullness, to the Cur 
Deus Homo ; and yet it would be incorrect, for 
this reason, to represent the soteriology of Irenaeus 
as contradictory to that of Anselm. In these in- 
stances, in which the difference between two writers 
is owing to further expansion, and not to intrinsic 
contradiction in opinions, the text applies, “ He that 
is not against us, 1s for us.” 

Consider, for example, the following extract 
from the Epistle Ad Diognetum. “God himself 
gave up his own Son a ransom for us (vzég sar), 
the holy for the unholy, the good for the evil, the 
just for the unjust, the incorruptible for the cor 
ruptible, the immortal for the mortal. For what 
else could cover our sins, but his righteousness? In 
whom was it possible for us the unholy and the un- 
godly to be justified, except the Son of God alone ? 
O sweet exchange! O wonderful operation! O un- 
looked for benefit! That the sinfulness of many 
should be hidden in one, that the righteousness of 


EARLY PATRISTIC SOTERIOLOGY. 219 


one should justify many ungodly.”* Is not the 
whole doctrine of vicarious satisfaction contained in 
these words? Would not the attempt to find their 
full meaning short of this require the same sort of 
effort, and ingenuity, which must be employed in 
order to explain away the element of vicariousness 
from such Scripture texts as teach that the Re 
deemer was “ made sin,” was “made a curse,” and is 
a propitiatory sacrifice? The silence of the writer 
respecting those questions which arise when the 
scientific construction of the doctrine is attempted,— 
such as: How is the penal suffering of the Divine 
substitute made efficacious to the sinner? How is 
this suffermg an infinite and adequate one ?—the 
silence upon these and kindred questions, the an- 
swer to which would involve a fuller development 
of the doctrine of the Person of Christ than had yet 
been made, and the neglect to enter into a system- 
atic construction, is very far from being evidence that 
the writer of this Epistle rejected the doctrine of 
pardon through expiation, as Baur contends.? For 
one needs only to ask the question: Would a the- 
ologian who positively and totally rejected the doc- 
trine of satisfaction have expressed himself at all in 
the terms of this extract? to see that the faith and 
feeling of an Anselm and a Luther dwelt in the 
heart of this writer of the second century. 


‘Epistola ad Diognetum. Jus- doubtedly belongs to the 2d cen- 
TrInus Martyr: Opera, p. 238, Ed. tury. 
Par. 1742. Though probably not ? Baur: Versdhnungslehre, 26 
the work of Justin Martyr, it un- (Note). 


220 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


Returning again to Irenaeus, we find in the very 
extract cited by Baur as proof that Irenaeus sub- 
stituted the Devil for the Demiurge in his soteri- 
ology, the evidence that he too took his departure 
from the attribute of divine justice. For why 
could not the Deity deliver man from Satan by 
force, by the mere exercise of the divine omnipo- 
tence? Because, in the words already cited, “ the 
Logos, omnipotent and not wanting in essential 
justice, proceeded according to strict justice even 
towards the kingdom of evil (apostasiam), redeem- 
ing from it that which was His own originally, not 
by violence but by persuasion, as it became God, so 
that neither justice should be infringed upon, nor 
the original creation of God perish.” In this ex- 
tract, Baur asserts that diabolum is the elliptical 
word, so that the “ persuasion” exercised by God 
terminates upon Satan. The Deity persuades the 
Devil to relax his grasp upon a being who originally 
belonged to God, and has come into the power of 
Satan only by deception, and consequently by in- 
justice. To this interpretation there are three 
objections.! 

1. This mode of representing the relation be- 
tween the Supreme Being and the Satanic Spirit 
implies a dualistic theory of God and universe; but 
there is no dualism in the system of Irenaeus. In 
the Gnostic theory, the two beings, and the two 

1“ Whether Irenaeus regards sentation, but Origen teaches this 


the ransom as actually paid tothe unmistakably.” Hasse: Anselm, 
devil, is not clear from his repre- II. 487. 


EARLY PATRISTIC SOTERIOLOGY. 221 


kingdoms of light and darkness, stand very nearly 
upon an equality. It would be in keeping with 
Gnostic ideas, to represent the Holy One as plying 
the Evil One with arguments and entreaties to 
release acreature whom he could not deliver by vir- 
tue of resources within himself. - But there is no 
No one can peruse the 
five books against the Gnostic heresies, without see- 
ing on every page evidences of that exalted idea of 
the Supreme Being which pervades the Scriptures, 
and which utterly forbids that leveling process by 
which the Infinite Jehovah is degraded to a mere 
rival of Satan, and by which the kingdom of darkness 
becomes as eternal and independent as the kingdom 
of light. If we do not find the Soteriology of 
Trenaeus as fully elaborated as that ef the Reform- 
ers, we do find that his Theology, in respect to 
the point of the absolute supremacy of God over 
evil as well as good, is as distinct and scriptural as 
that of Calvin himself. We must therefore refer 
the “ persuasion,” spoken of in this extract from 
Trenaeus, to man; such indeed is indisputably the 
reference in other passages.’ 


such dualism in Irenaeus. 


Irenaeus means to 


Compare IreNarts: Adver- 
sus Haereses, V. xxv. (Ed. Har- 
vey). Some light is thrown upon 
the meaning of the word “‘jus- 
tice ” in the extract under consid- 
eration, by the following passage 
from Adversus Haereses, III. vi. 
(Ed. Harvey): “ Haerere itaque 
fecit et adunivit quemadmodum 


praediximus, hominem deo. Si. 


enim homo non vicisset inimicum 
hominis, non justé victus esset 
inimicus.” Here the word “‘jus- 
té” evidently signifies jitness or 
adaptation. He who redeems 
man must be both God and man, 
—as Irenaeus proceeds to argue 
inthe context. See, also, DoRNER: 
Person Christi, I. 479 (Note). 


999 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


teach, that as man fell freely, by the deception and 
persuasion of the Devil, so he must be recovered 
from his fall in a manner consistent with moral free- 
dom. Mankind did not apostatize through compul- 
sion, but by persuasion (suadendo) ; consequently 
their redemption must take the same course, even 
though Satan should derive advantage from this 
renunciation of the use of power on the part of the 
Almighty, and the consequent possibility, by reason 
of the appeal to the free will of the creature, of 
man’s still remaining his slave. 

2. Again, the “ justice” spoken of in this extract, 
by which the method of salvation is limited, is plainly 
an attribute in the Divine Nature, and not a mere 
claim of the Devil upon either man or God which re- 
quires satisfaction. The two attributes of omnipo- 
tence and justice are exhibited side by side, and the 
latter limits the former, by virtue of its necessary 
moral character. The former is merely a natural at- 
tribute, and unallied with a moral one like justice, or 
still more if opposed to it, would not be the attribute 
of a holy and good Being. Isolated omnipotence is 
isolated force, and as such belongs properly to the 
pantheistic conception of the Deity. In the theistic 
conception, all the natural attributes are regulated 
by the moral, and cannot be regarded as operating 
in isolation from each other, or in opposition to each 
other. This Irenaeus clearly teaches, in saying that 
the “ Logos all powerful, and perfectly just, yet pro- 
ceeds in strict justice even in respect to the apostate 


EARLY PATRISTIC SOTERIOLOGY. 223 


world itself.” The doctrine taught in this phrase. 
ology is the same that is contained in the Protestant 
statement of the doctrine of the atonement, viz. : 
that the work of Christ preserves the harmony of 
the divine attributes in the plan of redemption, so 
that the omnipotence of the Deity shall not over- 
throw the justice of the Deity, by arbitrarily remit- 
ting the penalty due to transgression without any 
satisfaction of law. 

8. Still another evidence that Irenaeus contem- 
plated the “justice” whose claims were to be satis- 
fied by the atonement of the Son of God, as intrinsic 
in the Deity, and not extrinsic in Satan, is found in 
the fact that he held to the absolute and not merely 
relative necessity of the death of Christ, in order to 
human salvation. We shall have occasion hereafter 
to allude to this point, and therefore shall touch it 
briefly here. 

In discussing the nature of the atonement, the 
question naturally arises: Does the necessity of ex- 
piation in order to pardon arise from the nature of 
the case, or from an arbitrary arrangement? could 
the Deity have dispensed with any or all satisfac- 
tion of justice, or is justice of such an absolute and 
necessary character, that it would be as impossible 
to save the guilty without an antecedent satisfaction 
of this attribute, as it would be for God to lie? 
Now, in answering this question, Irenaeus is found 
among that class of the Fathers who affirm the ab- 


294 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


solute necessity of an atonement;*—another class 
inclining to the view of a relative necessity, or a 
necessity dependent upon the optional will and ap- 
pointment of God. This is conclusive evidence that 
he could not have regarded the chief and sole ob- 
stacle in the way of human redemption as consist- 
ing in Satan’s character and claims. For nothing 
extrinsic to the Deity could thus znexorably limit 
the divine omnipotence. Yet, according to Irenaeus, 
this omnipotence is thus limited. The necessity of 
atonement is absolute and unavoidable. The lim- 
itation must, therefore, be a se/f-limitation, and pro- 
ceed from an immanent attribute in the Deity, and 
this attribute is eternal justice. 

We conclude this sketch of the opinions of Ire- 
naeus with -a paraphrase and expansion of Dorner’s 
summing up.” “Justice, in the scheme of Irenaeus, 
stands between the physical attributes of infinity, 
omnipotence, etc., and the ethical attributes of com- 
passion and love, as a protector and watch. For this 
reason, God will and can accomplish no work that 
is spiritual in a merely physical manner; he must 
win over man by the manifestation of that which is 
spiritual,—that is, by the highest and fullest possible 
exhibition of his love. But love is of two kinds, 
active and passive; the former manifests itself by 
doing something fo its object, the latter by suffering 
something for it. The highest and fullest manifes- 


‘TrenaEvs: Adversus Haere- * Dorner: Person Obristi, I- 
ses, III. xix- (4 Uarvey). 480. 


EARLY PATRISTIC SOTERIOLOGY. 225 


tation of love would consequently include the pas- 
sive form of the affection, as well as the active form, 
—an endurance namely, of suffering in behalf of the 
object of benevolence, if suffering is necessary from 
the nature of the case. But suffering is absolutely 
necessary, because now that sin and guilt have come 
into the world divine justice cannot be satisfied 
except by penal infliction. Consequently the mani- 
festation of the love of God takes on a passive as 
well as active form, and vicariously bears the pen- 
alty of guilt in the place of the criminal.” 

For these reasons, therefore, it is impossible to 
concede the position of Baur, that the foundations 
of the Church doctrine of the atonement were laid 
in the theory of the satisfaction of the claims of 
Satan, and not of divine justice. If this theory can 
be found in any of the Christian Fathers, it must be 
in Irenaeus. But this writer shows no traces of sucha 
dualism as is implied in a struggle between God and 
Satan. He represents the limitations in the method 
of redemption as being of an absolute and imexora- 
ble nature, such as can proceed only out of an im- 
manent attribute of the Godhead. One of the most 
important portions of his work? is devoted to the 
proof that the sufferings of Christ were real, and 


1Trenarvus: Adversus Haere- 
ses, III. xix. (Ed. Harvey). It is 


found of satisfaction done by the 
sufferings of Christ to divine jus- 


a singular assertion of NEANDER 

(Church History, I. 642) that in 

the writings of Irenaeus, “not 

the slightest mention is to be 
vol. 1.—15 


tice,”—especially, as he finds the 
doctrine of satisfaction in the 
comparatively brief and indirect 
statements of Justin Martyr. 


9256 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


not, as the Gnostic maintained, spectral and docetic; 
and this for the purpose of showing that the satis- 
faction made for sin was real and absolute. It can- 
not, therefore, be supposed that this influential 
church Father of the early centuries was involved, 
without being aware of it, in the errors of Gnos- 
ticism, and that his Soteriology is only a modifica- 
tion of a scheme which he spent his best strength in 
combating. 


§ 5. Alexandrine Soteriology. 


Passing from Irenaeus to the school of Alexan- 
drine theologians, we come to less correct and dis- 
criminating views of the atonement. This school, 
of whom Clement of Alexandria and Origen were 
the founders and heads, felt the influence of the 
Gnostic systems to some extent, besides being it- 
self animated by a remarkably strong speculative 
spirit. The Alexandrine theologian was unduly 
engaged with those questions respecting the origin 
of the material universe, and of moral evil, which 
had so bewildered the mind of the Gnostic. Men 
like Origen desired to answer these questions, and 
in the endeavour oftentimes lost sight of those 
more strictly theological subjects which address 
themselves to the moral consciousness of man, 
and are connected with his religious character and 
future destiny. ‘Such thinking upon such subjects 


ALEXANDRINE SOTERIOLOGY. 227 


falls more properly within the sphere of cosmogony 
and theosophy, than of theology. 

We had occasion to observe, that the Gnostics 
all agreed in denying the wicariousness and judi- 
cial intent of Christ’s suffering, however greatly 
they differed among themselves upon other poinis. 
Neander remarks that Basilides “ admitted no such 
thing as objective justification in the sight of God, 
or forgiveness of sin in the sense of deliverance from 
the guilt and punishment of sin. Every sin, whether 
committed before or after faith in the Redeemer, or 
baptism, must, according to his scheme, be in like 
manner expiated by the sufferings of the individual 
himself.”* But though the word “ expiate ” is em- 
ploved in this statement of the opinions of Basi- 
lides, it is plain from the fact that a forensic justifi- 
cation is excluded, that it can be employed only in 
the sense of purification. Suffering is disciplinary 
only. The scheme of Basilides did not recognize sin 
in the form of guilt, and thereby related to law and 
justice. It was evil, disharmony, corruption, and 
‘bondage ; but not a crime originated by the free 
will of a responsible creature, distinct from, and ac- 
countable to his creator. The “expiation” of sin 
spoken of was only the disciplinary suffering which 
the individual sinner undergoes, in the process of 
purification. It was not penal, or satisfactory to 
justice. 

The school of Valentinus held the same general 


? Neanver: Church History, I. 412, 413. 


228 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


views upon this point, with that of Basilides. Ptole. 
maeus, one of the leading disciples of Valentinus, 
writing to Flora, a Christian woman whom he en- 
deavoured to convert to Gnostic views, represents 
punitive justice as something irreconcilable with the 
perfect goodness of the Supreme God, from whom 
he contends this world with its evil and suffering 
could not have sprung. On the contrary, he repre- 
sents justice, in the strict sense, to be the peculiar 
attribute of the Demiurge, and hence a sort of 
medium quality lying between the perfect goodness 
of the supreme Deity, and unmixed evil. In ac- 
cordance with these views, he supposed that that 
portion of the Old Testament economy which was 
penal and judicial in its nature proceeded from the 
Demiurge; and, as contradicting the essential char- 
acter of the Supreme God who is unmixed benevo- 
lence, was afterwards wholly abolished by the Sav- 
iour. In consistency with these views, he regarded 
the capital punishment of the murderer as only a 
second murder, because it is retributive instead 
of disciplinary and educational, and the state gen- 
erally as belonging only to the kingdom of the 
Demiurge, because it is founded upon and repre- 
sents that retributive justice which is altogether 
foreign from the Supreme God." 

There is no need to quote from the opinions of 
other schools of Gnosticism, in further proof that the 
attribute of justice was subtracted from the nature 


*Neanper: Church History, I. 487-439. 


ALEXANDRINE SOTERIOLOGY. 229 


of the Supreme Being, and placed in that of an in- 
ferior, and, to some extent if not entirely, hostile 
one. Justice is regarded in this scheme as some- 
thing wnjust, tyrannical, not founded in reason, and 
therefore not found in the Supreme Deity. That 
such a view should be taken of an attribute so fun- 
damental to all sovereignty and dominion, is not 
strange, when we consider the radical error and 
fatal defect of the system. Gnosticism did not hold 
the doctrine of creation from nothing; it held only 
that of development out of antecedents. As a con- 
sequence it could not logically hold the doctrine of 
a free finite will. There was for it no truly and 
strictly accountable moral agent. Man, like nature, 
was an evolution from the essence of the Supreme 
Deity, not directly indeed, but really, through a 
descending and a degenerating series of powers and 
attributes. The successive grades of this evolution 
become feebler and feebler as they recede further 
from the aboriginal fountain of existence, until man 
appears, the last link and refuse of the interminable 
series, the feeble vanishing point of a primarily 
tremendous process of life and energy. Now where 
upon this scheme, is there any free will or free agency 
for man? Where, any finite unit distinct from the 
Deity, capable of self-determination, left free to re- 
main holy as created or to fall into evil, and held 
responsible for the use of this high but hazardous 
endowment? Is it strange that such a being as this, 
the poor remnant and dreg of a course of develop 


230 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


ment that has been degenerating and corrupting for 
ages upon ages, a miserable wreck thrown upon the 
shores of existence by the ebb and flow of tides fluctu- 
ating through infinite space and everlasting time,—is 
it strange that such a being as this, with no true cen- 
tre and starting point of its own, should be affirmed 
to sustain no legitimate relations to such an awful 
attribute as retributive justice? Is it strange that in 
the plan by which such a being was to be redeemed 
from the evil and misery which are inevitably con- 
nected with such a descending series of evolutions, 
no provision was needed or was made for gut or 
crime, and that only a purifying process constitutes 
the entire process of human restoration, according 
to the Gnostic ? 

Now the school of Clement and Origen, though 
opposing the Gnostic system with earnestness, was 
nevertheless influenced and affected by it to some 
extent. To how great an extent, is a somewhat dis- 
puted question amongst dogmatic historians. We are 
inclined to regard the views of Origen concerning the 
doctrine of Atonement and all the related topics, as 
being at a greater remove from the scriptural data 
and view, than concerning the other doctrines of 
Christianity. This was the weak point at which the 
latitudinarian tendencies of this remarkable man 
showed themselves with most distinctness and en- 
ergy,—as indeed the doctrine of Atonement was not 
the strongest side of the Patristic system generally. 

There were several opinions in the scheme of 


ALEXANDRINE SOTERIOLOGY. 237i 


Origen which tended to confuse and injure his gen- 
eral view of the doctrine whose history we are in 
vestigating. They were the following: 

1. The opinion that all finite spirits were created 
in the beginning of creation, that their number un- 
dergoes no increase, and that their history is that of 
alternate fall and redemption, from eternity to eter- 
nity. Origen held that God could not create an 
infinite number of rational beings, because his prov- 
idence could not extend to every particular of a 
series as boundless as himself.! Hence, ali the va- 
riety that is to be seen in the history of the created 
universe does not spring from the continual pro- 
duction of new creatures, but from changes in the 
old and preéxisting number. God did not create 
by new and different orders of beings, as angel and 
man. The history of man is only the change which 
has resulted from the apostasy of a determinate 
number of angelic spirits, in the angelic world, who 
are to be both punished and redeemed in this their 
mundane state of existence. 

The effect of such a theory as this would nat- 
urally be, to diminish the degree and amount of 
evil involved in the apostasy of a rational spirit. 
It makes the event too common. If alternate 
fall and recovery is the order of the universe, then 
it is impossible that the former should be the 
most dreadful of catastrophes, or the latter the 


? OnicEnEs : De Principiis, II. 8 (Tom. I. 703, Ed. Basil, 1572). 


232 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 

most wonderful of divine interferences. If when 
the responsible creature falls, he falls for once and 
for evermore, and there is from the nature of the 
case no salvation except by a divine intervention, 
which constitutes a remarkable anomaly in the 
Divine economy, and does not at all belong to the 
natural order of the universe, then sin and redemp- 
tion have a stupendous meaning upon both sides. 
But if apostasy is to be expected with regular uni- 
formity as the cycles roll around, and redemption is 
to be repeated with the same uniformity whenever 
the occasion occurs, and the occasion occurs repeat- 
edly, it is evident that nothing but very low con- 
ceptions can result of the nature of moral evil, and 
of its expiation and removal.’ The doctrine of 
the preéxistence and apostasy of a fixed number of 
rational spirits in one mode of being, and their post- 
existence and redemption in another mode of being, 


1 Origen held that the efficacy 
of Christ’s death extended to the 
entire apostate world, quoting in 
proof Coloss. i. 20: “By him to 
reconcile all things unto himself, 
whether they be things in earth, 
or things in heaven,” and also 
Heb. ii. 9: Christ “tasted death 
for every man,” meaning every 
sinful creature. He remarks 
(Com. in Johan. II. 6, and I. 40) 
that Christ is “the great high 
priest not only for man but for 
every rational creature” (martés 


Noyixov Ty dma& Svciav), Oom- 


pare, also, Com. in Matt. xiii. 8. 
On Rom. v. 10, he remarks, “ tan- 
tam esse vim crucis Christi et 
mortis ejus quae ad sanitatem et 
remedium non solum humano 
huie nostro ordini, sed coelestibus 
virtutibus ordinibusque sufficiat.” 
Origen also taught that Christ’s 
redeeming agency still continues 
in his state of exaltation, and that 
he is saving the apostate continu- 
ally, until the entire apostate uni- 
verse is restored. See THoma- 
stus: Origenes, p. 230, 59. 


ALEXANDRINE SOTERIOLOGY. 233 


and so onward endlessly, is wholly unfavourable to 
just views of the awful nature of moral evil as crime 
before law, and of the tremendous nature of spir- 
itual apostasy as an event that can be remedied 
only by the most unusual and extraordinary efforts 
of the Supreme Being. 

2. A second opinion of Origen which tended to 
a defective and erroneous conception of the doctrine 
of Atonement was, that punishment is not judicial 
but disciplinary. In his Homilies upon Ezekiel 
he makes the following statement: “If it had not 
been conducive to the conversion of sinners to em- 
ploy suffering, never would a compassionate and 
benevolent God have inflicted punishment upon 
wickedness.”’ Here, plainly, the judicial and retrib- 
utive nature of punishment is entirely overlooked, 
and by implication, denied. In other places, he 
represents reformation as being the object of punish- 
ing the sinner ; but since punishment fails, God sends 
his Son to break the strength of sin, so that man’s 
suffering may be spared. The death and sufferings 
of Christ are represented as operating in a mystic, and 
somewhat magical way, upon the world of demons 
and of evil, so that the power of sin over mankind is 
shaken, and they are thereby redeemed. The right- 
eousness of God, says Origen, is seen in the fact that 
God does not declare sinners to be righteous and 
show them favour, but in the fact that he first makes 


1 REDEPENNING: Qrigenes, II. 407. 


934 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


them holy, and then remits their punishment.’ Men 
are justified by being sanctified. Such statements 
show that the judicial relations of sin are omitted in 
Origen’s soteriology. The remission of sin is made 
to depend upon arbitrary will, without reference to 
retributive justice, as is evinced by his assertion that 
God might have chosen milder means to save man, 
than he did; e. g., that he might by a sovereign act 
of his will have made the sacrifices of the Old Testa- 
ment to suffice for an atonement for man’s sin.? 

3. A third opinion of Origen conducing to a 
defective view of the atonement was, that the pun- 
ishment of sin is not endless.* This opinion flows 
logically from the preceding one that punishment 
is not penal, but disciplinary. For an eternal suf- 
fering for sin, from the nature of the case, cannot 
consist with the amendment. of the sinner. When, 
therefore, owing to the exceeding strength of hu- 
man sinfulness, punishment has so lost its reform- 
ing power that even if continued forever no change 
of character could be wrought by it, God sends the 
Redeemer who by his death in a mysterious way 
breaks this power of sin, and thereby restores him 
to holiness. The death of Christ is thus a manifes- 
tation of love alone, and not of love and justice in 
union. Clement of Alexandria, the teacher of Ori- 
gen, makes the following representations, according 


1OricENES: Com. in Rom. iii. ?REepEPENNrNG: Origenes, IJ.409. 
See RepEPENNING: Origenes, II. *Oricenes: Hom.19, in Jerem.; 
409. De Princip. I. 6. 


ALEXANDRINE SOTERIOLOGY. 235 


to Redepenning. “The deep corruption of mankind 
fills God, whose compassion for man is as unlimited 
as his hatred towards evil, not with anger, for he is 
never angry, but with the tenderest and most pitiful 
love. Hence he continually seeks all men, whom he 
loves for their own sake and their resemblance to 
God, as the bird seeks her young who have fallen 
from the nest. His omnipotence, to which nothing 
is impossible, knows how to overcome all evil, and 
convert it into good. He threatens, indeed, and pun- 
ishes, but yet only to reform and improve; and 
though in public discourse the fruitlessness of re- 
pentance after death be asserted, yet hereafter not 
only those who have not heard of Christ will receive 
forgiveness, but it may be hoped that the severer 
punishment which befalls the obstinate unbelievers 
will not be the conclusion of their history. For 
man, like every other spiritual being, can never lose 
his free will. By means of this power, at all times, 
here and hereafter, noble minds, aided by that 
divine power which is indispensable to success, are 
lifting themselves up from ignorance and deep 
moral corruption, and are drawing nearer in greater 
or less degree, to God and the truth.”? 

Upon looking carefully at each of these three 
opinions of Origen, it is easy to perceive that they 


1 REDEPENNING: Origenes, 1.183 are: Cohortatio, 74, 79, 82, 89; 
-135. The citations from Clem- Stromata, VI. 763, 764. VII. 832, 
ent, upon which Redepenning re- 895, 860. I. 369; Paedegogus, I. 
lies for the above representation, 102, 137, 140, 142, 149. III. 302. 


236 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


are incompatible with the doctrine of a satisfaction 
of divine justice. The repeated fall of the soul 
being a part of the course and constitution of the 
universe, it is absurd to put this event into any sort 
of relation to such an attribute as that of eternal 
justice, except it be a figurative one. If punish- 
ment is merely corrective, it is impossible to regard 
it as retributive, and to provide for its remission by 
the judicial suffering of a substituted victim, and 
that, too, an infinite one. And if punishment is not 
in its own nature endless and absolute, but may be 
stopped at any point at the option of the sove- 
reign, then it is absurd to speak of any such claims 
of justice as necessitate an infinite suffering for 
moral evil, such as can be endured only by the finite 
transgressor in an endless duration, or by the infi- 
nite substitute in a limited period. 

Still it ought to be added, that oftentimes the 
phraseology of Origen, and many of his represen- 
tations taken by themselves, favour the doctrine of 
vicarious atonement,—so much so that Thomasius, 
who has composed a valuable monograph upon 
Origen, contends that this doctrine may be found 
in this Father, as well as in Irenaeus. Were it not 
that the opinions which have been specified enter 
as constituent parts into the theological system of 
the Alexandrine School, it would not be difficult to 
quote many passages from the writings of Clement 
and Origen whose most natural meaning would im- 
ply the strict and technical doctrine of vicarious 


ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 237 


satisfaction. But these fundamental principles, that 
have been mentioned, are so contrary to the doc- 
trine of Christ’s. expiation, that we are compelled 
to give these passages a modified meaning, and to 
acknowledge that only a very defective and erro- 
neous conception of this cardinal truth of Chris- 
tianity is to be found in the Alexandrine Soteri- 


ology.’ 


§$ 6. Soteriology of Athanasius, and the Greek 
Fathers. 


Before proceeding to exhibit the history of the 
doctrine of Atonement in the Polemic period (A. 
D. 254-730), it is pertinent to make an intro- 
ductory remark respecting the general course of 
theologizing in this age. The subjects upon 
which the ecclesiastical mind expended most re- 
flection during these five centuries were those of 
Theology with the cognate subject of Christology, 
and Anthropology. It was natural, consequently, 
that in the polemic heat and energy of the period, 
those parts of the Christian system which were most 
vehemently assailed, and which stood in greatest 
need of exact definition and strict phraseology, 


*This is also Mosuem’s opin- III. §27. For extracts from Ori- 
ion: Commentaries, IJ. 161 sq. gen respecting the doctrine of 
Compare also the whole of Mo- atonement, see: Minsouer-Vow 
sheim’s criticism of Origen’s the- Cdzuy, I. 427, 
ologizing: Commentaries, Cent. 


238 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


should acquire the fullest development, and some 
what at the expense of other portions. Hence, the 
subtle and profound statement of the doctrine of 
the two natures in the one Person of Christ em- 
ployed the mind of the theologian of this period, 
more than the exhibition of the doctrine of the 
work of Christ. The anthropological doctrine of 
sin, during the controversy with Pelagius, was 
discussed with a prevailing reference to the work 
of the Holy Spirit. Its subjective relations to the 
will of the creature, more than its objective relations 
to the justice and moral government of the creator, 
constituted the subject-matter even of this contro- 
versy, which was yet better fitted than any other one 
of this Polemic period to result in a more scientific 
construction of the doctrine of Atonement. 

We need not, therefore, be surprised to find that 
even in this age of great theological activity, the 
cardinal truth of Christianity did not receive its 
fullest examination and clearest statement. Still, 
in this instance as in the previous one, we are not to 
regard mere silence, or a failure to make a distinct 
statement, as tantamount to the denial and rejection 
of the truth. This we found to be the error in the 
judgment which the school of Baur passes upon the 
soteriology of the Apologetic period (A. D. 100- 
254); and although there is less liability to 
commit it in reference to the Polemic period, be- 
cause an evident advance in the mode of appre- 
hending the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction is ap- 


ai 


ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 239 


parent, still the same species of argument, derived 
from the failure to reduce the doctrine to a per- 
fectly scientific form, might be built upon the yet 
incomplete soteriology of the Polemic period. The 
argument in this case is precisely the same in kind 
with that which should seek to prove that the un- 
lettered believer, whose theological knowledge is 
mostly in his heart and experience, positively rejects 
the doctrine of atonement, or the doctrine of the 
trinity, because he is unable to analyse and com- 
bine its elements, and place them in the unity of a 
comprehensive system. Having made this prefa- 
tory remark, we proceed now to take the measure 
of the attainments of the ecclesiastical mind of 
this period, respecting the doctrine in question. 
And in the outset, it is obvious to the investigator, 
the moment he passes over from the one period to 
the other, that some scientific progress has been 
made. The tone is firmer and bolder, the discrimi- 
nation is clearer and truer, and the dogma stands 
out with greater prominence from the mass of heret- 
ical and opposing theories. 

Turning to the works of the leading theologians 
of this age, we are able to determine how far the 
catholic mind had advanced toward a scientific and 
self-consistent theory of the atonement. 

Athanasius (+ 373), though laying out the chief 
strength of his powerful intellect in the trinitarian 
controversy, is distinct and firm in maintaining the 
expiratory nature of the work of Christ. He recognizes 


240 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


its relations to the attribute of divine justice, and has 
less to say than his predecessors respecting its rela- 
tions to the kingdom and claims of Satan. The 
more important bearings of the doctrine of vicarious 
satisfaction, it is evident, were now beginning to re- 
ceive a closer attention, while less stress was laid upon 
its secondary aspects. We can find in the represen- 
tations of Athanasius, the substance of that doctrine 
of plenary satisfaction of eternal justice by the the- 
unthropic sufferings of Christ which acquired its 
full scientific form in the mind of Anselm, and 
which lies under the whole Protestant Church and 
theology. 

Athanasius composed no tract or treatise upon 
the Atonement, and we must consequently deduce 
his opinions upon this subject from his incidental 
statements while discussing other topics. In his 
Discourses (Orationes) against the Arians, there are 
frequent statements respecting the work of Christ, 
in connection with those respecting his person and 
dignity, and from these we select a few of the most 
distinct and conclusive. “Christ as man endured 
death for us, inasmuch as he offered himself for that 
purpose to the Father.” Here, the substitutionary 
nature of his work is indicated. “ Christ takes our 


1 Andere Lehrer, wie Athana- ung unter welcher Gott, ohne 
sius und Cyrillus Hieros. legen Verletzung seiner Wahrhaftig- 
den Begriff einer Gott abgetrage- keit, den Menschen den ihnen ge- 
nen Schuld zum Grunde, und se- drohten Tod erlassen konnte.” 
hen indem Tode Jesu die Beding- Minscuer-Von Coxty, I. 425. 


; ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 241 


sufferings upon himself, and presents them to the 
Father, entreating for us that they be satisfied in 
him.” Here, the piacular nature of his work is 
taught, together with his intercessory office. “The 
death of the incarnate Logos is a ransom for the sins 
of men, and a death of death.”* “ Desiring to annul 
‘our death, he took on himself a body from the 
Virgin Mary, that by offering this unto the Father 
a sacrifice for all, he might deliver us all, who 
by fear of death were all our life through subject 
to bondage.”’ “Laden with guilt, the world was 
condemned of law, but the Logos assumed the con- 
demnation (#giuc), and suffering in the flesh gave 
salvation to all.”® Here, the obligation of the guilty 
world is represented not as relating to Satan but to 
law ; and the Redeemer assumes a condemnation, or 
in the modern Protestant phraseology becomes a 
voluntary substitute for the guilty, for purposes of 
legal satisfaction. 

There are two other portions of the writings of 
Athanasius which are very valuable, as indicating 
the opinions that prevailed in the Church during 
the 4th century respecting the being of God and 
the person of Christ, and incidentally respecting 
the doctrine of Atonement. They are the Aoyog 
zxava “EdAjvay (Oratio contra Gentes), and the 


1 Armanasius: Contra Arianos, I. 60; compare Cont. Arianos, I. 


I. 41; IV. 6; J. 45. 51; II. 62. Dorner: Person 
2 Arwanastus: Defensio Fidei Christi, I. 955, remarks that simi- 
Nicaenae, § 14. lar statements are frequent in the 


* ArHanasius: Contra Ariancs, two Gregories, and Basil. 


VOL, i.- 1€ 


249 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


ITs rig évavdgaanosws rou Aoyou (De incarna 
tione Dei). These tracts exhibit a remarkable 
union of the best elements of the Grecian philoso- 
phy, with the most inward and cordial reception of 
Christianity ; and show that the “father of ortho- 
doxy,” as he was called, did not shrink from a meta- 
physical construction of Christian doctrines, and 
believed that they could be defended and main- 
tained upon the necessary grounds of reason. In his 
Oratio contra Gentes, aimed against the erroneous 
views of the popular skeptical philosophy of the 
day, he endeavors to evince the absolute independ- 
ence and self-sufficiency of the Deity, in opposition 
to a theory that would identify him with creation, 
or make him a part of it. Having established this 
fundamental position of religion, he then proceeds 
in his tract De Lncarnatione to show that the Lo- 
gos, both before and after his incarnation, partakes 
of this same self-sufficiency, which he has shown in 
his previous discussion belongs to the necessary idea 
and definition of God. This leads him indirectly 
to speak of the atonement of Christ, in its relations 
to the necessary nature and character of the God- 
head, and in so doing he gives expression to views 
which harmonize exactly with the modern Protes- 
tant view of the doctrine. 

“Suppose,” he says, “that God should merely 
require repentance in order to salvation? This 
would not in itself be improper, did it not conflict 
with the veracity of God. God cannot be un: 


ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 243 


truthful, even for our benefit. Repentance does not 
satisfy the demands of truth and justice. If the 
question pertained solely to the corruption of sin, 
and not to the guilt and ill-desert of it, repentance 
might be sufficient. But since God is both truthful 
and just, who can save, in this emergency, but the 
Logos who is above all created beings? He who 
created men from nothing could suffer for all, and 
be their substitute. Hence the Logos appeared. He 
who was incorporeal, imperishable, omnipresent, 
manifested himself. He saw both our misery and the 
law’s threatening; he saw how inadmissible (ézozor) 
it would be for sin to escape the law, except through 
a fulfilment and satisfaction of the law. Thus behold- 
ing both the increasing depravity of men, and their 
condemnation to death, he had compassion upon 
them, and assumed a body not from any necessity 
of nature (gvosws &xohoudia), for his essence is in- 
corporeal.”’ In another place, in this treatise upon 
the Incarnation, he makes the statement that “the 
first and principal ground of the Logos’ becoming 
man was that the condemnation of the Jaw, by 
which we are burdened with guilt and eternal pun- 
ishment, might be removed by the payment of the 
penalty.”* This is the strongest possible statement 
of the doctrine of penal satisfaction. For Athanasius 
is by no means disposed to overlook or underesti- 


1 Armanastus: De Incarnatio- ? ArHANasius: De Incarnatio- 
ne, c. vii. See Dorner: Person ne, c. xi.-xiv., quoted by Dorner: 
Christi, I. 837. Person Christi, I. 840. 


244 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


mate the fact that one purpose of the incarnation was 
to reveal the Godhead to man. He emphasizes the 
truth that the Word became the “light of men.” 
And yet in this passage he asserts that the first and 
principal ground of the incarnation is not the illu- 
mination of the human soul, but the expiation of its 
guilt. In this extract, the prophetic office of Christ 
is set second to his priestly, as distinctly as in the 
writings of the Reformers themselves. Comparing 
Athanasius, then, with the theologians of his cen- 
tury, we find that his view of the Atonement, with 
respect to the two vital points of substitution and 
satisfaction, was second to none in explicitness and 
firmness. He refers the death of Christ to the ne- 
cessary nature and attributes of God without any 
ambiguity, embarrassment, or confusion of mind, 
and joins on upon the Biblical idea of a sacrifice to 
satisfy offended law and justice, with as much 
clearness and energy as any theologian previous 
to the time of Anselm. 

The historical development of the doctrine, how- 
ever, evinces as we follow it down the centuries that 
the same gradual progress in acquiring a sczentific 
understanding of the Scripture representations is 
going on, which we have found in other branches of 
dogmatic history. Queries now begin to be made 
whether the representation of a ransom paid to 
Satan has not been too prominent in the catholic 
soteriology, and whether the other relations of the 


ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 245 


work of Christ should not be investigated and ex: 
hibited. We find, for example, Gregory Nazianzen 
(+390) expressing doubts, and raising inquiries, 
that indicate that the theological mind was sinking 
more profoundly into the substance of revelation, 
and drawing nearer to a correct logical construction 
of the great doctrine. “ We were,” he says, “under 
the power of the Evil One, since we had sold our- 
selves to sin, and had received in exchange the lust 
for iniquity. If, now, a ransom is given only to the 
one who has possession of the thing to be ransomed, 
then I ask to whom was the price of ransom given ? 
To the Evil One himself? Shameon the rash thought 
(yew riz USoews)! Then the robber would receive 
not merely from God, but God himself as a ransom 
and exceeding rich reward for his tyranny. Or is 
the ransom paid to the Father? But here the ques- 
tion arises, in the first place, why should it be? for 
God is not the being who is forcibly retaining us in 
his power. And, in the second place, what reason 
can be assigned why the Father should take delight 
in the blood of his only-begotten Son ? since he did 
not even accept Isaac who was offered to him by his 
father Abraham, but changed the sacrifice of a ra- 
tional being into that of an animal? Or, is it not 
plain that the Father received the ransom, not be- 
cause he himself required or needed it, but for the 
sake of the divine government of the universe (07 
oizovouiay), and because man must be sanctified 


246 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


through the incarnation of the Son of God.”? Here, 
although the completely adequate statement con: 
tained in the Anselmic and Reformed soteriology 
is not made, there is an approximation to it. The 
divine government requires this death of Christ, 
though the divine nature does not. But it would 
be impossible to follow out the position that the 
principles by which the administration of the uni- 
verse is conducted require an atonement for sin, 
without coming to the yet deeper and more ultimate 
position of the Anselmic theory that the nature and 
attributes of the Godhead also require it. For 
what is God’s moral government but an expression 
of God’s moral character ; and that which is needed 
in order to satisfy the objective principles of the 
former is needed to satisfy the subjective qualities of 
the latter. 

If we examine the soteriology of the Greek 
Church during the last half of the 4th and the first 
half of the 5th centuries, we meet with very clear 
conceptions of the atonement of Christ. The distinct- _ 
ness of the views of Athanasius upon this subject 
undoubtedly contributed to this ; for this great mind 
exerted as powerful an influence upon the Eastern 
doctrinal system, generally, as Augustine exercised 
over the Western. Athanasius, we have seen, re- 
ferred back, in his analysis of the doctrine, to the 
veracity of God. God had threatened death as the 


*Grecorivs Naz.: Oratio, gorius Naz. p. 436. Baur: Ver: 
XLII. Compare Uttmann: Gre- sdhnungslehre, p. 88. 


ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 24% 


punishment of sin. If, now, sin were remitted with. 
out any infliction of any kind, either upon the sin- 
ner or his Redeemer, the truth of God would be 
turned into a lie. The next step, consequently, was 
to the conception of an exchange or substitution of 
penalty; and Athanasius himself took this step. 
The substitute (#eraAdnjdov) for the death of the 
sinner was the death of the Saviour. This idea of 
substitution runs through all the Greek soteriology 
of the 4th and 5th centuries, and prepared the way 
for further statements concerning the nature and 
worth of Christ’s sufferings, some of which we will 
now specify. 

Cyril of Jerusalem (+386), and Husebius of 
Caesarea ( + 340), in the earlier part of the 4th cen- 
tury, had already urged the point that Christ took 
the penalty of sin upon himself, and furthermore 
that his sufferings were not of less worth than those 
of mankind, because he was a theanthropic Person 
in whom divinity and humanity were perfectly 
blended. In this connection, Cyril gives utterance 
to a statement respecting the value and sufficiency 
of Christ’s sufferings which reminds of those strong 
statements of Luther upon this subject, which a legal 
spirit finds it so difficult to interpret or understand. 
He thus expresses himself. “Christ took sin upon 
his own body. He who died for us was no insig- 
nificant (g0c) creature, he was no mere animal 
victim (ovx nv ne0Scarov aicdyroyv), he was no mere 
man, he was not an angel, but he was God incarnate. 


248 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


The iniquity of us sinners was not so great as the 
righteousness of him who died for us; the sins we 
have committed are not equal to the atonement 
made by him who laid down his life for us.”* 
Eusebius reasons as follows upon Christ’s satis- 
faction: ‘“‘How then did he make our sins to be 
his own, and how did he bear our iniquities? Is 
it-not from thence, that we are said to be his 
body, as the apostle speaks, ‘Ye are the body 
of Christ, and members, for your part, or of one 
another. And as when one member suffers all 
the members suffer, so the many members sinning 
and suffering, he, according to the laws of sym- 
pathy in the same body, seeing that being the 
Word of God he would take the form of a servant 
and be joined to the common habitation of us all, 
took the sorrows or labours of the suffering mem- 
bers on him, and made all their infirmities his own, 
and according to the laws of humanity, bore our sor- 
row and labour for us. And the Lamb of God did 
not only these things for us, but he underwent tor- 
ments, and was punished for us (@dAe xal inég Huav 
xohuctsis xak tiuwpiay vUmooyav, AY autos méV 
ouvx agethey); that which he was no ways exposed 
to for himself, but we were so by the multitude of 
our sins; and thereby he became the cause of the 
pardon of our sins; namely, because he underwent 
death, stripes, reproaches, transferring the thing 


100 rogavry fv Tay duaptwdav Tos 7) Stxatoovrn. CyEILus HreRos. : 
¥ dvouia, don Tov imepamo3vnoxov- Catecheses, Lib. XIII. § 33. 


ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 249 


which we had deserved to himself; and was made 
a curse for us, taking to himself the curse that was 
due to us; for what was he, but a price of redemp- 
tion for our souls? In our person, therefore, the 
oracle speaks,—whilst freely uniting himself to us, 
and us to himself, and making our (sins or) passions 
(aay) his own, he says, ‘I have said, “ Lord be 
merciful to me, heal my soul, for I have sinned 
against thee.”’”' The conceptions of vicariousness 
and infinite worth, in connection with the sufferings 
of the Redeemer, were very plainly at work in the 
mind of the Eastern theologians, so far as it was 
represented by men like Cyril of Jerusalem, and 
Eusebius of Caesarea, 

But these conceptions were wrought out into 
still greater clearness in the Eastern Church, by 
those controversies respecting the Person of 
Christ which commenced soon after the Trinita- 
rian controversy was ended, and continued for more 
than two centuries. The student of doctrinal histo- 
ry is generally wearied by the minuteness and tedi- 
ousness of those pertinacious analyses which were 
connected with the Nestorian, the Monophysite, and 
Monothelite controversies. They were undoubtedly 
too much prolonged, and, what is of more impor- 
tance, were too often prosecuted with an ambitious, 
an envious,.or a malignant temper. But they were 
nevertheless productive of some good results, to the 


*Evszprus: Demonstratio Ev- by Owzn: On Justification, Ch. 
angelica, Lib. X. c. 1, quoted viii. 


250 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


general system of Christian doctrine. The Nes. 
torian controversy, in particular, had the effect to 
bring in juster views of the nature of Christ’s Per- 
son, and consequently of the real nature of his suf 
ferings. The error of Nestorianism was the exact 
opposite to that of Eutychianism, so far as concerns 
the sufferings of Christ. The Eutychians held that 
the suffering was purely and solely of deity, while 
the Nestorian party taught that it was purely and 
solely of humanity. For although Nestorianism ac- 
knowledged the alliance of God with man in Jesus 
Christ, it so separated the two natures from each 
other in his Person, that the suffering which the 
Redeemer endured derived no character or value 
from his divinity, and was in reality not different 
from that of any mere man. The Church, in op- 
position to Nestorianism, contended that the mere 
juxtaposition of two natures, so that each should 
still remain a personality by itself, was inconsistent 
with the catholic doctrine of a peculiar species of 
suffering which must not be attributed either to 
sole deity or sole humanity, but to a theanthropric 
Person combining both species of being. 

In this controversy, Cyril of Alexandria ( + 444) 
took a leading part, and in his writings we find 
very exalted conceptions of the worth and efficacy 
of Christ’s atoning death, springing naturally out 
of his apprehension of the union of the two natures 
in one personality. Since, in the scheme of Cyril 
the two elements, the divine and the human, were 


ATHANASIUS AND THE GREEK FATHERS. 201] 
blended in the most thorough manner possible, short 
of a mixture or confusion which should change each’ 
into a third species of substance neither human nor 
divine (an error against which the catholic mind 
was careful to guard),—since there was this thor- 
ough union and personal interpenetration of deity 
and humanity in the theory of Cyril,—it is easy 
to see that the sufferings of a Personage so consti- 
tuted could be regarded as of strictly infinite value. 
Hence a very common idea, and one frequently 
emphasized in the writings of Cyril, is, that Christ 
did not suffer as a mere ordinary man suffers, that 
his blood was not the blood of a common man,— 
for if it were, it could not suffice for the salvation 
of the whole world,—and that only a God-Man 
could suffer, One for all, and once for all.’ 

We find this same distinct recognition of the 
vicarious nature of Christ’s sufferings, and of their 
adequacy for purposes of atonement, in that dis- 
tinguished theologian of the 8th century, John of 
Damascus (+ 750). The opinions of this mind 
were highly esteemed in the Greek Church, and 
in the Oriental Church generally. His "Exdjocs 
atorews (Hxpositio fidet) was long the text-book 
in systematic theology at the East, and exerted 


‘See the quotations from Cy- 
ril’s Com. in Johannem, in Baur: 
Versohnungslehre, p. 102 (Note). 
Baur’s inferences, however, are 
drawn too much from detached 
passages, and not enough from 


the general drift of Cyril’s soteri- 
ology. Oyril went to the verge 
of Eutychianism at the time of 
the council of Ephesus, but after- 
wards retreated from it, and ac- 
cepted the decisions at Chalcedon. 


252 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


no little influence upon the Scholastic theology of 
the Latin Church. After the division of the twa 
churches, the Western theologians devoted less and 
less attention to the writings of the Greek Fathers, 
but John Damascene, standing as he did at the 
opening of the era of Scholasticism, and partaking 
strongly of the systematic spirit which prevailed in 
it, was studied with interest and effect by the Latin 
Schoolmen. Upon the subject of the atonement, 
this writer follows the general views of the preced- 
ing Greek theologians, especially Athanasius and 
Gregory Nazianzen. We have already noticed the 
doubts expressed by this latter writer, whether the 
death of Christ sustained so much relation to the 
claims of Satan as the earlier soteriology had im- 
plied, and whether its highest and principal refer- 
ence was not to the attribute of justice in the Di- 
vine Nature. John Damascene does not merely 
raise the query, but expresses himself with energy 
upon the point. “He, who assumed death for us, 
died, and offered himself a sacrifice to the Father; 
for we had committed wrong towards him (avr@ 
netAnupeAnxamev), and it was necessary for him 
to receive our ransom (Avrgoy), and we thus be de- 
livered from condemnation. For God forbid that 
the blood of the Lord should be offered to the 
tyrant!”? 


?Jonannes Damasoenvs: Expositio Fidei, II. xxvii. 


AUGUSTINE AND GREGORY THE GREAT. 253 


§ 7. Soteriology of Augustine, and Gregory the 
Great. 


Augustine (+ 430) is a writer whose opinions 
upon any subject deserve examination, and espe- 
cially upon the cardinal truth of the Christian sys- 
tem. He marks the period immediately succeeding 
that represented by the Greek theologians of the 
4th century, during which the spirit of investigation 
and of science was passing from the declining Ori- 
ental, to the strengthening Western churches. His 
prominent position, moreover, in the history of the 
Christian system generally, would lead us to infer a 
very great influence from his writings in the con- 
struction of so fundamental a doctrine as that of the 
Atonement. Upon examination, however, this ex- 
pectation is somewhat disappointed. The strength 
and energy of Augustine’s intellect were expended 
upon other parts of the Christian system; so that 
the subject of Soteriology did not receive such a 
profound and satisfactory treatment from him, as 
did that of Anthropology. Augustine’s view of 
the work of Christ is essentially that of the Fathers 
who had preceded him; neither falling short, nor 
making any marked advance in scientific respects. 
Indeed, he seems to take very nearly the view which 
we have seen to have been held by Irenaeus re- 
specting the judicial aspects of the doctrine. The 
claims of Satan are sometimes recognized in connec- 


254 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


tion with those of justice, as in the following pas 
sage, which is very similar in its phraseology to 
that of Irenaeus. “God the Son being clothed 
with humanity subjugated even the devil to man, 
extorting nothing from him by violence, but over- 
coming him by the law of justice; for it would 
have been injustice if the devil had not had the 
right to rule over the being whom he had taken 
captive.” * In other passages, as also in Ignatius, 
the claims of Satan are not noticed, and only the 
connection between man’s sin and God’s justice is 
alluded to,—the reconciliation between the two 
antagonisms being effected, as in the Protestant 
statement of the doctrine, by an expiatory sacrifice. 
“All men,” he says, “are separated from God 
by sin. Hence they can be reconciled with him, 
only through the remission of sin, and this only 
through the grace of a most merciful Saviour, and 
this grace through the one only victim of the most 
true and only priest.” ? In another place, alluding 
to our Lord’s comparison of his own crucifixion 
with the lifting up of the serpent by Moses, Augus- 
tine thus expresses himself: ‘“ Our Lord did not in- 
deed transfer sin itself into his flesh as if it were 
the poison of the serpent, but he did transfer death ; 
so that there might be, in the likeness of human 


? Aveustinus: De libero arbi- gratiam misericordissimi salvato- 
trio, III. x. (Ed. Migne, I. 1285). ris, per unam victimam verissimi 

2“Non ergo reconciliari nisi sacerdotis.” Aveustryus: De 
peccatorum remissione, per unam_ pec. mer. I. lvi. 


AUGUSTINE AND GREGORY THE GREAT. 255 


flesh, the punishment of sin without its personal 
guilt, whereby both the personal guilt and punish- 
ment of sin might be abolished (solveretur) from 
human flesh.” * 

These passages, and many others like them scat- 
tered all through his writings, prove indisputably 
that Augustine held the doctrine of vicarious satisfac- 
tion, That he did not hold it, however, in a form 
as perfectly well-discriminated as that in which it 
appears in the Anselmic theory, and still more in 
the soteriology of the Reformation, there is equally 
clear proof. Augustine sometimes confuses justifi- 
cation with saniification, from not limiting the 
former term to its strict signification as the antith- 
esis of sanctification. He sometimes employs “jus- 
tificatio” as equivalent to the whole work of re- 
demption. The difference between the judicial and 
the renovating side of redemption was not always 
kept in view by that usually sharp and aquiline 
eye. We find some few passages in Augustine 
which can be construed, and are by the Papal 
writers, to mean that man is justified in part by an 
inherent or subjective righteousness. This inward 
righteousness is indeed regarded as the work of 
God in the soul, and not the product of the human 
will. This we should expect, of course, from a mind 
holding with such energy and firmness as did 


* Aveustinus: De pec. mer. I. 7 (Ed. Migne, IV. 592) ; Confes- 
lx. Compare Enarratio in Ps. 1.  siones, p. 239. 


256 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


Augustine to the doctrines of total depravity, and 
prevenient grace. Man cannot, indeed, attribute 
this inward and subjective righteousness to himself 
as the author, and, so far, a sense of merit and a 
legal spirit would be excluded. But Augustine, 
judging from a few passages in his works, was not 
always careful, as were Luther and Calvin when 
treating of the grounds of justification, to direct at- 
tention to the fact that so far as the guilt of man 
is concerned, no possible amount of inward right- 
eousness, even though wrought in the soul by the 
Holy Spirit, can be an atonement, or ground of ac- 
quittal from condemnation. Holiness of heart con- 
tains nothing of the nature of an expiation. This 
is found only in judicial suffering. 

It is not an adaptation of means to ends, there- 
fore, when justification is sought to be accomplished 
by sanctification. The “justification of the wngod- 
ly,” of which St. Paul speaks,—i. e. the judicial 
acquittal from condemnation, of a soul that is still 
polluted with indwelling sin, and will be more or 
less until it leaves the body,—cannot of course be 
founded upon any degree of holiness that has been 
wrought within it by the Holy Spirit. It must 
rest altogether upon an outward and finished work, 
namely the atoning suffering of the Son of God. 
This declarative act of God, whereby, on the ground 
of the objective satisfaction made to law by the 
Redeemer, he forgives the past, must be carefully 
distinguished from the subjective transforming work 


AUGUSTINE AND GREGORY THE GREAT. De 


- of God in the soul, whereby he secures its holiness 
for the future. 

Augustine is not always careful to mark this 
distinction. The term “justification” is sometimes 
cenfused -with that of “sanctification,” by being 
made to include it. The following passage from 
his treatise against Julian is in point. “God justi- 
fies the ungodly not only by remitting the sins he 
commits, but also by giving him inward love, which 
causes him to depart from evil, and makes him holy 
through the Spirit.”* According to the Reformed 
symbols, justification rests only upon remission of 
sins, and remission of sins only upon the atonement 
of Christ. To implant a principle of love, is no part 
of justification. It is with reference to this occasion- 
al confusion of the two constituent parts of redemp- 
tion, and the attribution to one of what belongs to 
the other, that Calvin makes the following remark: 
“The opinion of Augustine, or at least his manner 
of expression, is not to be altogether praised. For 
though he excellently despoils man of all the praise 
of righteousness, and ascribes the whole to the 
grace of God, yet he refers grace to sanctification, 
in which we are regenerated by the Spirit to new- 


* Aveustinus: Opus imperfec- infused righteousness is the 


tum contra Julianum, II. clxv. 

Compare Wiccers : Augustinism, 

p- 201. Davyenant, On Justifica- 

tion, I. 202, and elsewhere, con- 

tends in opposition to Bellarmin 

that Augustine never teaches that 
vor. 1.—17 


ground and cause of justification, 
though he often employs the term 
‘‘justificatio,” sometimes in the 
sense of absolution from condem- 
nation, and sometimes of sanctifi- 
cation. 


HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


ness of life.”1 The implication of Calvin’s criticism 
here evidently is that the grace which remits pen- 
alty should be referred solely to the atoning work 
of Christ, and not at all to the sanctifying agency 
of the Holy Ghost. God acquits the human soul 
from condemnation because the Son of God has ex- 
plated its guilt, and not because a holy character 
has been produced within it. This latter is the 
consequent and not the antecedent. “Whom he 
justifies,” upon an entirely objective ground, him 
he sanctifies by a subjective operation in the 
soul. ? 

Another evidence that Augustine’s view of the 
doctrine of Atonement shared in the imperfect 
science of the Patristic period, is found in the fact 
that in some places, at least, he teaches only a rea- 
“They are fool- 


tive necessity for an atonement. 


ish,” he says, “who say 


Carvin : Institutes, III. xi. 

7The following reference to 
Augustine’s phraseology is made 
in Luruer’s Table Talk (Bell’s 
Trans. Ed. 1652, p. 208). ‘‘ Philip 
Melanchthon said to Luther, the 
opinion of St. Austin of justifica- 
tion (as it seemeth) was more per- 
tinent, fit, and convenient, when 
he disputed not, than it was when 
he used to speak and dispute ; for 
this he saith: ‘We ought to cen- 
sure and hold that we are justi- 
fied by faith, that is by ou regen- 
eration, or being made new cre:- 
tures.’ Now if it be so, then we 


that the wisdom of God 


are not justified only by faith, but 
by all the [inward] gifts and vir- 
tues of God given to us. Now 
what is your opinion, sir? Do 
you hold that a man is justified 
by this regeneration as is St. Aus- 
tin’s opinion? Luther answered 
and said, I hold this, and am cer- 
tain that the true meaning of the 
gospel and of the apostle is, that 
we are justified before God gra- 
tis, for nothing, only by God’s 
mere mercy wherewith and by 
reason whereof he imputeth right- 
eousness unto us in Christ” 
OweEN (Justification, Chap. IV.) 


AUGUSTINE AND GREGORY THE GREAT. 259 


could not liberate men otherwise than by God’s as- 
suming humanity, being born of a woman, and suf- 
fering at the hands of sinners.” * 
he thus expresses himself: “When the question is 
asked whether there was no other way whereby 
God could liberate man, than by his Son’s becoming 
incarnate and undergoing the suffering of death, it 
is not enough merely to say that this is a good way, 
but also to show, not that no other mode was in the 
power of him who can subject all things to his con- 
trol, but that no more suitable mode could have 
been adopted.”? Here, the divine omnipotence is 
separated from the divine justice, and the possibil- 


In another place, 


also alludes to this widening out 
of the term justification so as to 
include sanctification, as liable 
to introduce error into soteriolo- 
gy. “The Latin derivation and 
composition of the word ‘jus- 
tificatio,’ would seem to denote 
an internal change from inhe- 
rent unrighteousness to right- 
eousness; by a physical motion 
and transmutation, as the school- 
men speak. For such is the sig- 
nification of words of the same 
composition. So ‘sanctification,’ 
‘mortification,’ ‘ vivification,’ and 
the like, all denote a real internal 
work on the subject spoken of. 
Hereon, in the whole Roman 
school, justification is taken for 
the making of a man to be inhe- 
rently righteous by the infusion 
of a principle or habit of grace. 

. . And this appearing [appar- 


ent] sense of the word possibly 
deceived some of the ancients, as 
Austin in particular, to declare 
the doctrine of free gratuitous 
sanctification, without respect to 
any works of our own, under the 
name of justification. For neither 
he, nor any of them, ever thought 
of a justification before God, con- 
sisting in the pardon of our sins 
and the acceptation of our per- 
sons as righteous, by virtue of 
any inherent habit of grace in- 
fused into us, or acted by us.” 

* Aveustinus: De agone Chris- 
tiano, c. 10. 

? Aveustinus: De Trinitate, 
XI. x. “I am truly ashamed 
of those divines, who have no- 
thing more commonly in their 
mouths, both in their disputa- 
tions and discourses to the people, 
than ‘that God might by other 


260 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


ity of an infringement upon the moral attribute by 
the arbitrary might of the natural attribute is con- 
ceded within the sphere of the infinite. But this is 
to degrade the infinite to the level of the finite, by 
subjecting it to the same limitations and hazards 
with the finite. The necessity of an atonement is 
made to depend ultimately upon the divine option. 
It is not founded in the divine nature, or in the 
attribute of justice. This theory, if logically car- 
ried out, conducts to the position of Origen, that 
God might by an act of mere will have constituted 
the sacrifice of bulls and goats a sufficient sacrifice 
for human guilt. But logic could not stop-even at 
this point. For inasmuch as there is no absolute and 
metaphysical necessity of an atonement, and the 
whole provision for satisfying justice is resolved in 
the last analysis into an optional act on the part of 
God, it follows that, so far as the Divine Being is 
concerned, an atonement might be dispensed with 
altogether. For the same arbitrary and almighty 
will that was competent to declare the claims of 
justice to be satisfied by the finite sacrifice of bulls 


means have provided for the safe- 
ty and honor of his justice, but 
that that way by the blood of his 
Son was more proper and becom- 
ing.’ So said Augustine of old: 
but what then? Of that absolute 
power, which they dream of, by 
which he might, without any in- 


tervening sacrifice, forgive sins, 
not the least syllable is mention- R 
ed in the whole sacred writings: 
nor am I afraid to affirm that a 
more convenient device to weak- 
en our faith, love, and gratitude 
cannot be invented.” Owrn: On 
Divine Justice, Part II. Chap. vii. 


1 


AUGUSTINE AND GREGORY THE GREAT. 261 


and goats would be competent, also, to declare that 
those claims should receive no satisfaction at all. 
Any principle that is surrendered in part is surren- 
dered entirely. But it would be unjust to impute 
to Augustine, and those other Fathers who in this 
period hesitated to assert the absolute necessity of 
the sufferings of Christ in order to the salvation of 
man, the logical consequences of their position. They 
were afraid of limiting the power of God, and the 
more so, in contrast with the claims of Satan, of 
which we have seen they made far too much; and 
the undiscriminating statements which fall from 
them in such connections can be properly cited only 
to show, that it was reserved for an eye that saw 
more profoundly than did theirs into the idea of 
eternal justice, and a mind that apprehended the 
Pauline distinction between justification and sancti- 
fication more accurately and adequately than did 
theirs, to make the final scientific construction of 
the doctrine of Atonement. 

This deficiency in Augustine’s soteriology com- 
pared with the Anselmic and Protestant finds its 
natural explanation in the fact, that the energy of 
his mind was almost entirely absorbed in the doc- 
trine of the soul’s renovation by divine influence. 
In the first place, his own inward experience had 
been eminently that of spiritual bondage, corrup- 
tion, and pollution. The need of grace in the form 
of a renewing, strengthening, and purifying power, 


262 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


had been very vividly and painfully felt by him.* 
In the second place, the controversy with Pela- 
gius directed the attention of Augustine still more 
earnestly to the doctrine of renovation and sancti- 
fication by the Holy Ghost. The doctrine of the 
atonement, though consequentially involved and in 
peril if the views of Pelagius should be rigorously 
run out to their ultimate, did not, nevertheless, 
come very much into the controversy. From these 
two causes then,—by reason of a peculiarity in his 
own religious experience, and the polemic interest 
which he felt,—the force and depth of Augustine’s 
intellect were drawn off from the atonement proper, 
and expended upon that side of the general doe- 
trine of redemption which relates to the delivery 
of the soul from the power and pollution, as distin- 
gnished from the guilt and condemnation, of sin. 
Following the history of the doctrine of Atone- 
ment downward in the Latin Church, we find in 
the century succeeding that in which Augustine 
produced his principal treatises, one writer whose 
tone is firm, and whose views are discriminating, 
but from whom, however, such a tone and view 
would not have been expected considering his eccle- 
slastical position and circumstances. This writer is 


Gregory the Great, bishop of Rome (+ 604). He 


' This, of course, is not to be the need of grace in the form of 
understood in the sense of deny- an atonement and remission of 
ing that Augustine had any ex- sin. It is spoken in a compara- 
perience of sin as guilt, and of _ tive sense only. 


AUGUSTINE AND GREGORY THE GREAT. 263 


stands at the opening of that era of power and in- 
fluence which the Roman Church was destined to 
pass through, as the acknowledged head of Western 
Christianity. Occupying such a position, and being 
the first marked representative of the hierarchical 
spirit which was now to mould and corrupt Chris- 
tianity for a thousand years to come, we are nat- 
urally surprised to find in the theological writings 
of one whom some regard as the first pope, repre- 
sentations of the atoning work of Christ so much in 
accordance with the Pauline conception of it. The 
views of Gregory are expressed with even more 
clearness and firmness than those of some preced- 
ing theologians, who were yet less immediately 
connected with that distinctively Roman Church 
whose greatest guilt consists in mutilating and nul- 
lifying the most strictly evangelical of all the Chris- 
tian doctrines, that of justification solely through 
the atonement of the Son of God. 

In his writings, Gregory lays great stress upon 
the idea of a sacrifice offered in the death of Christ. 
He starts from the conception of guilt, and from 
this derives immediately the necessity of a thean- 
thropic sacrifice. “Guilt,” he says,’ “can be extin- 
guished only by a penal offering to justice. But it 
would contradict the idea of justice, if for the sin of 
a rational being like man, the death of an irrational 
animal should be accepted as a sufficient atonement. 


1Grecorius Maenus: Moralia in Jobum. XVII. xlvi. 


264 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


Hence, a man must be offered as the sacrifice for 
man; so that a rational victim may be slain for a 
rational criminal. But how could a man, himself 
stained with sin, be an offering for sin? Hence a 
sinless man must be offered. But what man de- 
scending in the ordinary course would be free from 
sin? Hence, the Son of God must be born of a 
virgin, and become man for us. He assumed our 
nature without our corruption (culpa). He made 
himself a sacrifice for us, and set forth (exhibuit) for 
sinners his own body, a victim without sin, and able 
both to die by virtue of its humanity, and to cleanse 
the guilty, upon grounds of justice.” ? 

With regard to the question: To whom is this 
sacrifice offered ? in other words: To what extent 
do the claims of Satan come into view in Gregory’s 
scheme? even Baur, with all his determination to 
find the doctrine of Satan’s claims in the Catholic 
soteriology, makes the following remark upon the 
passage from the Moralia just quoted: “It is not 
indeed expressly said that the sacrifice is offered to 
God, but this is implied in the conception of a sacri- 
fice. Not in the devil consequently (though Greg- 
ory cannot indeed altogether get rid of the notion 
of a devil), but only in God, does the cause lie why 
Jesus must die for the sin of man.” ? 


1“Fecit pro nobis sacrificium, quae et humanitate mori, et jus- 
corpus suum exhibuit pro pecca-  titia mundare potuisset.” 
toribus, victimam sine peccato, ? Baur: Versodhnungslehre, 93. 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. 265 


§ 8. Recapitulatory Survey. 


We have now traced the history of the doctrine 
of Atonement down to the opening of the Scholas- 
tic Era, and before commencing the account of the 
course of this great truth of Christianity during this, 
and the following period of the Reformation, we will 
briefly cast a glance backward over the course we 
have travelled. 

It was remarked in the beginning of this history, 
that the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction acquired 
its scientific form more slowly than did the other 
great truths of Christianity, and that it was reserved 
for the Modern Church to give it an expansion and 
definition equal to that which the doctrines of The- 
ology and Anthropology had received in the Ancient 
Church. The history thus far verifies the remark. 
We have seen that the Apostolic Fathers merely 
repeated the Scripture phraseology which contained 
the truth that was warm and vital in their Chris- 
tian experience, but did not enunciate it in the 
exact and guarded statements of a scientific for- 
mula. Next, we find the Primitive Fathers of the 
2d and 38d centuries endeavouring to exhibit the 
doctrine in a more speculative form. Their success 
was but partial; for secondary elements and truths 
were made too prominent, while strictly primary 
elements and truths, though not denied or rejected, 
were yet not presented with sufficient boldness in 


266 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


their scientific schemes. The claims of God and of 
the attribute of justice were thrown too much into 
the background, by those of Satan. And yet the 
judicial aspects of the subject were continually 
pressing themselves with increasing force upon the 
reflection of theologians. A more moderate and 
scriptural view of the kingdom of Evil, and of its head 
and prince, was gradually taking the place of that 
exaggerated conception which, in reality, bordered 
too much upon the dualism of the East, to be en- 
tirely consonant with that truth which the prophet 
sought to enforce upon the Persian monarch, when 
he proclaimed that God “makes peace and creates 
evil.” Satan and his kingdom, while a real exist- 
ence was conceded to both, were beginning to be 
seen in their true relations to Jehovah, who is as 
supreme in reference to the kingdom of sin, as to 
the kingdom of holiness. The sufferings of the 
God-Man began to be contemplated by the scien- 
tific mind more exclusively in their relations to the 
attributes and government of God. Though the 
claims of Satan were still, to some extent, regarded 
as the ground of the necessity of Christ’s death, the 
drift of speculation was steadily towards the simple 
position; that the atonement was made for the satis- 
faction of justice alone, and that the only claims 
that are cancelled by it are the claims of law and 
of God. 

It is necessary, however, to call attention to a 
new phenomenon which begins to appear in the 5th 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. 267 


and 6th centuries, in order to obtain a full view of 
the state of this doctrine at the close of the Patris- 
tic period, and particularly in order to account for 
the great change that came over it, in the Papal 
period which succeeded. The religious experience 
of the church itself, during the last half of the first 
six centuries, was undergoing a great change. In 
the first place, the sense of sin was declining gen- 
erally. The more secular and temporal aspects of 
Christianity, owing partly to the alliance between 
Church and State, and still more to the corrupt 
tendencies of human nature itself, were eclipsing its 
more directly spiritual relations to the character 
and necessities of sinful humanity. Hence there 
was a declining sense of the need of redemption, in 
the church at large. Moreover, to aggravate the 
evil, the attention of the earnest and thoughtful 
minority was somewhat drawn away from the aton- 
ing work of Christ, to human substitutes for it in the 
form of penances. What little sense of guilt there 
was in the church, was somewhat dissipated, or at 
least made more shallow, by being expended upon 
those “sacrifices which can never take away sin.”* 
In the second place, as we have had occasion to 
observe in the instance of Augustine, there was 
some confusion of ideas coming into the theoretical 


‘The tendency to mix works example, represents martyrdom 
with faith pertains to every age, as a codperating ground of for- 
and is found very early in dog- giveness. See Prsey’s transla- 
matic history. Trrturiian, for tion of Tertullian, I. 106, Note b. 


268 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


construction of the doctrine itself. This was partly 
a cause, and partly an effect of that decline in the 
popular experience which we have just spoken of; 
for we are reminded at this point, as we are at 
every point in the internal history of the Church, 
that the process of decline is one of development, 
and that the relation of the corrupting elements to 
each other is not that of mere cause and effect, but 
of action and reaction. Perhaps, if the feeling of 
guilt in Augustine’s mind had been as poignant and 
penal as it was in Luther’s, or if his eye had been 
as penetrating and judicial upon this single topic as 
was that of Calvin; perhaps if this great theolo- 
gian of the Patristic period had been as thorough 
and profound upon this side of the subject of sin, as 
he was upon the other, a statement of the doctrine 
of justification by faith without works might have 
been originated in the 5th century, that by the 
blessing of God would have prevented the Papacy, 
and precluded those ten centuries of “voluntary 
humility,” worshipping of saints, and justification 
by works. When the popular feeling of a period is 
becoming less correct and healthy, nothing in the 
way of means does so much towards a change and 
restoration, as strict accuracy, which is the same as 
strict orthodoxy, in the popular creed. The creed 
may, indeed, in the outset be far in advance of the 
eneral sentiment and feeling, but being not only 
he truth but the whole truth, and not only the 

hole truth but nothing but the truth, it begins to 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. 269 


draw magnetically upon the human mind, until it 
eventually brings it close and entirely up to its own 
height and vantage ground. In the period of which 
we are speaking, or more properly in the latter part 
of it, it was coming to be the popular feeling, that 
the pardon of past sin must depend, to some extent 
at least, upon the character and works of the indi- 
vidual; that the atonement of the Son of God must, 
in some slight degree at least, be supplemented, or 
strengthened, or perfected, by the works or the 
feelings of the believer. Even when there was the 
strictest orthodoxy in referring the holy character 
or works to the influences of the Holy Spirit, there 
was error, and in reality the germ of the Papal 
theory, in referring the remission of past transgres- 
sion to renovated character and righteous works, as 
a procuring cause in connection with the death of 
the Redeemer. It was defective soteriology, to rep- 
resent sanctification in conjunction with the atone- 
ment of Christ as a ground of pardon. A keener 
vision, that could see the distinction between the 
guilt of sin and its pollution, would not have con- 
founded the work of the Sanctifier with that of the 
Atoner. A clearer discrimination, which could 
separate the penal and retributive elements of sin- 
from its blinding, corrupting, and enslaving effects 
upon a rational spirit, would not have blended and 
confused the two parts of redemption in such a man- 
ner that one was liable to disappear from the mind 
and reflection of the Church. In short, a more 


270 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


scientific and technical accuracy, a stricter reference 
of each of the two elements in sin to the vo corre- 
sponding sides of redemption, would have contrib- 
uted greatly to fasten the eye of the individual 
upon his relations to eternal justice, and upon that 
infinite oblation which, alone and of itself, sets the 
criminal once more in right relations with this fun- 
damental attribute. In this way, the notion that a 
finite sacrifice can expiate guilt, either wholly or in 
part, or that the struggle after holiness, even if sue- 
cessful, can offset transgression and pacify conscience, 
would have been more likely to have been banished 
from the Church. 

These germs of corruption in the soteriology of 
the Church, which we have thus noticed as begin- 
ning to appear during the last half of the Patris- 
tic period (a. p. 400-600), were gradually un- 
folded during the four centuries that intervened 
between the decline of the Patristic theology, and 
the breaking forth of the Scholastic. With the ex- 
ception of John of Damascus in the Greek Church, 
and Alcuin and Scotus Erigena in the Western, this 
period of four hundred years (a. p. 600-1000) 
is marked by no individual minds of much historic 
character and power. Of these, the Greek theolo- 
gian and the spiritual guide of Charlemagne are by 
far the most biblical in their opinions concerning 
the doctrine whose history we are investigating. 
The views of John Damascene we have already 
briefly noticed, and those of Alcuin agreed with 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. oud 


those of Augustine. The soteriology of Erigena 
was essentially defective, and could not be other- 
wise, springing as it did from a pantheistic view of 
the Trinity and of the Person of Christ. According 
to him, the incarnation was merely the immanence 
of God in the world,—a popular way of expressing 
the philosophic truth that God acquires distinct self- 
consciousness in the creature. Ail that was said, in 
a former part of this history, respecting the incom- 
patibility of the Gnostic pantheism with the doc- 
trine of man’s distinct existence, real freedom, and 
amenability to retributive justice, applies with full 
force to the pantheism of this remarkable man, who 
seemed to stand by himself, and whose pantheistic 
views, it ought to be observed, were rejected and 
opposed by the church and the clergy of his time. 
But the decline in respect to true views of the 
vicarious atonement of Christ, during this interme- 
diate period, was owing to more general causes, than 
merely the opinions and influence of leading individ- 
uals. The masses of merely nominal Christians who 
began to be brought into the Church, after its tri- 
umph over Paganism was complete and its alliance 
with the State was perfected, constituted a body 
without a sonl,—an aggregate of professing Chris- 
tians without any religious experience. ‘That pain- 
ful process of self-knowledge, of conviction of guilt 
and sense of need of divine grace, which ought to 
initiate and precede all profession of Christianity, 
was too generally unknown in those large masses of 


272 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


population who in these centuries bore the name, 
and enjoyed all the external rights and privileges 
of church members. Here and there, undoubtedly, 
there were individual minds, or a community, in 
whom the experience of the day of Pentecost was to 
be found,—a consciousness of sin, a cry for mercy, 
and a self-despairing recumbency upon the atone- 
ment of the Redeemer, even though confused and 
beclouded by the notions. of the time respecting the 
additional need of personal penances and ecclesiasti- 
cal absolutions. But the Church as a whole knew 
little of this experience, and hence, while holding in 
a passive and hereditary manner the Patristic state- 
ments respecting the Trinity and the Person of 
Christ, it was coming to hold a theory respecting 
Sin and Redemption that was altogether opposed 
to that form of doctrine which had prevailed during 
the first four centuries, in both the Eastern and the 
Western Church. 


b 
boar 


CHAPTER II. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF THE MEDIAEVAL CHURCH. 


$1. Anselm’s Theory of Satisfaction. 


Arter this rapid glance at the condition of the 
doctrine of atonement during the last half of the 
first ten centuries, we pass to the examination of 
the soteriology of the Scholastic age. It begins 
with Anselm’s (+1109) theory of satisfaction, elab- 
orately wrought out in his Cur Deus Homo? It is 
remarkable that the bursting forth of a new spirit 
of inquiry, the dawning of a new era after five 
hundred years of stagnation and darkness, should 
have commenced with the sudden appearance of a 
mind of such remarkable depth, clearness, and 
living piety, as that of Anselm. We do not find 
the usual antecedents and gradual preparation, for 
the advent of such a spirit. The sun rises without 
a dawn, or a morning twilight. In the very open- 
ing of a new era which followed close upon a period 


of great superstition, and misapprehension of the 
VOL. 1.—18 


274 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


true nature of sin and atonement, we find a view 

of the work of Christ, decidedly in advance of the 

best soteriology of the Patristic age, and agreeing 

substantially with that of the Reformation. Such 

phenomena as these, in the history of the church, 

seem to conflict with the doctrine of historical de- 

velopment, because it is so difficult to discover any 

connection between antecedents and consequents. 

The truth is, however, that we are not able to de- 

tect the connection, because of the deficiency in our 

knowledge of the interior life of those distant and 

dark ages. God undoubtedly, in this as in all other 

instances in which he does not employ a miracu- 

lous agency, conducted the process upon the ordinary 

principles of his administration, and made it a con- 

tinuity, though marked by sudden and striking 

changes. It finds its analogy in those processes in 

the vegetable world, in which the one common 

principle of life, after periods of long external 

slumber, breaks forth into unusual external power 

and splendour; as when the dull and prickly cac- 

tus suddenly, and to all outward appearance with- 

out any preparation, bursts into a gorgeous flower. 

In this tract, entitled Cur Deus Homo ?*, Anselm 

aa . begins and ends with the idea of an absolute neces- 

- sity of an atonement, in order to the redemption 

re of man. Everything is referred to a metaphysical, 

), or necessary ground, and hence we have in this 
yo 4. 


wn Translated in the BrstiorHeca Sacra, Oct. 1854, and Jan. 1855. 


‘ 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF SATISFACTION. yt es 


theory the first metaphysique of the Christian doc- 
trine of Atonement. Not that the idea of a meta- 
physical necessity. in reference to the atonement 
was entirely unknown up to this time. We have 


already noticed, that an Athanasius had distinctly 
urged that necessity-of an expiation in order to for- 
giveness of sin which is founded in the divine attri- 
butes of justice and veracity, and we have found 
this view, for substance and informally, in all the 
better Patristic soteriology. But we have this 
view, now for the first time, in Anselm’s tract, re- 
duced to a systematic and scientific form, and 
cleared of those excrescences which were connected 
with it in the Ancient Church. Anselm is the firs 
instance in which the theologian plants himself 
upon the position of philosophy, and challenges for 
the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, both a ra- 
tional necessity, and a sdjentific rationality. The 
fundamental position of the Cur Deus Homo is, that 
the atonement of the Son of God is absolutely or 
metaphysically necessary in order to the remission 
of sin. Anselm concedes by implication, through- 
out his work, that if it cannot be made out that the 
Vicarious satisfaction of divine justice by the thean- 
thropic suffering of Jesus Christ is required by a 
necessary and immanent attribute~of the Divine 
Nature, then a scientific character cannot be vindi- 
eated for the doctrine; for nothing that is not 
metaphysically necessary is scientific. Hence, in 
the very beginning of the tract, he affirms that a 


276 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


mere reference to the divine_benevolence, without 
any regard to the divine justice, cannot satisfy the 
mind that is seeking a necessary basis in the doc- 
trine of atonement. For benevolence is inclined to 
dispense with penal suffering, and of itself does not 
demand it.’ 

It is not the attribute of mercy, but the attri- 
bute of justice, which insists upon legal satisfaction, 
and opposes an obstacle to the salvation of a sin- 
ner. Setting aside, therefore, the divine justice, 
and taking into view merely the divine compassion, 
there does not appear to be any reason why God — 
should not by an act of bare omnipotence deliver 
the sinner from suffering and make him happy. 
This conducts Anselm to that higher position from 
which the full-orbed nature and character of the 
Deity is beheld, and he proceeds to show that com. 
.p 7 | passion cannot operate in an isolated and independ- 

we, ent manner in the work of redemption, and that if 
VW anything is done for the recovery and weal of the 
é | transgressor, it cannot be at the expense of any 
Y | necessary quality in the divine nature, through the 
/mere exercise of an arbitrary volition, and an un- 
' bridled omnipotence. 
' The leading positions, and the connection of 
ideas, in this exceedingly profound, clear, and logi- 
cal tract of the 11th century, are as follows. 





1 AnsELMus: Cur Deus Homo, Proslogium, ec. 8, $, and Hass: 
I. 6. Compare also AnseLmus: Anselm von Canterbury, II. 275. 


ANSELMW’S THEORY OF SATISFACTION, 277 


Beginning with the idea of sin, Anselm defines 
this as the withholding from God what is due to 
him from man. Sin is debt... But man owes to 


God the absolute and entire subjection of his will, WA: 
at all times, to the diyine law and _y yine law and will. This is we, 
not given, and hence the guilt, or debt, of man topele 
Deity. The extinction of this guilt does not con 

sist in simply beginning again to subject the will 
entirely to its rightful sovereign, but in giving. 
satisfaction for the previous cessation in so doing, 

God has been robbed of his honour in the past, and Frame 
it must be restored to him in some way, while at ey 

the same time the present and future honour due to fob, 
him is being given. But how is man, who is still alo,%, « 
sinner and constantly sinning, to render this double 
satisfaction, viz.: satisfy the law in the future by 
perfectly obeying it, and in the past by enduring 

its whole penalty? It is impossible for him to 

render | it; and yet this impossibility, argues An- = 
selm, does ‘not relgase him from his indebtedness "Aiea 


guilt, because this impossibility is the effect of a 
free act, and a free act must be held responsible ca fra 
o« ‘ 





all its consequences, in conformity with the ethical 
maxim, that the cause is answerable for the effect. 
But now the question arises: Cannot the love and 
compassion of God abstracted from his justice come | 
in at this point, and remit the sin of man without nt 
Aor ee 
_ 


?This is in accordance with petition, “forgive us our debts” 
Christ’s definition of sin, in the (é@esAnuara). 


278 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


any satisfaction? This is impossible, because it 
would be irregularity (aliquid inordinatum), and 
injustice. If unrighteousness is punished neither in 
the person of the transgressor, nor in that of a 
proper substitute, then unrighteousness is not sub- 
ject to any law or regulation of any sort; it enjoys 
more liberty than righteousness itself, which would 
be a contradiction and a wrong. Furthermore, it 
would contradict the divine justice itself, if the 
~ creature could defraud the creator of that which is 
his due, without giving any satisfaction for the rob- 


fe bery. Since there is nothing greater and better 


than God, there is no attribute more just and 
ee necessary than that punitive righteousness innate 

Pe to deity which maintains the honour of God. This 
justice, indeed, is God himself, so that to satisfy it, 
is to satisfy God himself. 

Having in this manner carried the discussion 
into the very heart of the divine nature, and shown 
that a necessary and immanent attribute of the 
Deity stands in the way of the non-infliction of 
punishment and the happiness of the transgressor, 
Anselm proceeds to consider the possibility of sat- 
isfying the claims of justice,—the claims of Satan 
being expressly denied. There are two ways, he 


+ says, in which this attribute can be satisfied. First, 
the punishment may be actually inflicted upon the 


é - . 
|: transgressor. But this, of course, would be incom- 
- .\ patible with his salvation from sin, and his eternal 
appiness, because the punishment required is eter 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF SATISFACTION. 279 


nal, in order to offset the infinite demerit of rob- 
bing God of his honour. It is plain, therefore, that 
man cannot be his own atoner, and render satisfac- 
tion for his own sin. A sinner cannot justify a sin- 4 


ner, any more than a criminal can pardon his own 7 
crime. ‘The second, and only other way in which Ren 
the attribute of justice can be satisfied is by sub- ye 
stituted or vicarious suffering. This requires the 
agency of another being than the transgressor. 

But here everything depends upon the nqture and 
chayacter of the Being who renders the substituted 
satisfaction. For it would be an illegitimate pro- 

cedure to defraud justice by substituting a less for , 

a more valuable satisfaction. It belongs, therefore, ~ 

to the conception of a true vicarious satisfaction, 

that something be offered to justice for the sin of 

man that is greater than the finite and created, or, 

in Anselm’s phrase, is “ greater than all that is not 

God.” In other words, an ¢nfinite value must per- 

tain to that satisfaction-which is substituted for the 
sufferings of mankind. But he who can give, and 

has the right to give, out of his own resources, 
something that is greater than the finite universe, 

must himself be greater than all that is not God, or 4p 
than all that is finite and created. But God at Pal we 
is greater than all that is not God, or the created 

universe. Only God therefore can make this satis- \ 
faction. Only Deity can satisfy the claims of Deity. 

But, on the other hand, man must render it, other- 

wise it would not be a satisfaction for man’s sin. 


280 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY, 


“wer” 


” 


We 


i 


Consequently, the required and adequate satisfac- 
tion must be theanthropic, i. e., rendered by a God- 
Man. As God, the God-Man can give to deity 
more than the whole finite creation combined could 
render. Furthermore this theanthropic obedience 
and suffering was not due from the mere humanity 
of Christ. This was sinless and innocent, and jus 
tice had no claims, in the way of suffering, upon it. 
And, moreover, only a man’s obedience, and not 
that of a God-Man, could be required of a man. 
Consequently this (Divine-Human obedience \and 
suffering was a surplusage, in respect to the man 
Christ Jesus, and might overflow and inure to the 
benefit of a third party,—in other words, to the 
benefit of the transgressor for whom it was volun- 
tarily rendered and endured. 

This satisfaction made by incarnate Deity to 
meet the claims of one of his own attributes, An- 
selm represents as even more than an equivalent 
for the sin of mankind. We meet with phraseol- 
ogy in the second book of the Cur Deus Homo ?,* 
upon this point, that is strikingly like that which 
we have noticed in Cyril of Jerusalem? “ You 
have indeed most plainly proved,” says the pupil 
with whom the dialogue is carried on, “that the 
life of this man is of so sublime, and so precious a 
nature as to suffice for satisfying what is due to jus- 


1 AnsELtMus: Our Deus Homo, * Ante, p. 248. 
Ie; 145 17. 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF SATISFACTION. 281 


tice for the sins of the whole world, and infinitely 
more.” In another place, it is remarked that “ the 
life of the God-Man is greater incomparably than 
those sins which are exceeded beyond all power of 
estimation by his death.” And in another passage, 
the infinite dignity and worth of the atoning death 
of the incarnate Deity is sought to be exhibited, by ie 
the following questions and answers. “If that God- 
Man were here present before you, and, you mean- 
while having a full knowledge of his nature and 
character, it should be said: ‘Unless you slay that 
Person the whole world and the whole created uni- 
verse will perish, would you put him to death, in 
order to preserve the whole creation? I would not, 
even if an infinite number of worlds were spread 
out before me. But suppose again, it were said to 
you: ‘You must either slay him, or the guilt and 
misery of all the sins of the world will come upon 
you’? I would say, in answer, that I would sooner 
incur the aggregated guilt and misery of all the 
sins, past and future, of this world, and also of all 
the sin in addition that can possibly be conceived 
of, rather than incur the guilt of that one sin of 
killing the Lord of Glory.”? 

The limits of this work do not permit a fuller 


1 There isa “direction” for the its thorough rejection of self-mer- 
visitation of the sick, composed by it, and its vital acceptance of the 
ANSELM (Opera I. 686, Ed.Migne), atonement of Christ. It runs as 
which is not excelled even by the follows, in the version of OwENn 
salient evangelism of Luther, in (On Justification), ‘ Dost thou 


282 


HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


examination of this remarkable composition, which 
exhibits a depth, breadth, and rigour of thinking, 
that is not surpassed by any production of the same 


believe that thou canst not be 
saved but by tle death of Christ? 
The sick man answereth, yes. 
Then let it be said to him: Go 
to, then, and whilst thy soul 
abideth in thee, put all thy con- 
fidence in this death alone, place 
thy trust in no other thing, com- 
mit thyself wholly to this death, 
cover thyself wholly with this 
alone, cast thyself wholly on this 
death, wrap thyself wholly in this 
death. And if God would judge 
thee, say, Lord, I place the death 
of our Lord Jesus Christ between 
me and thy judgment; and other- 
wise I will not contend, or enter 
into judgment with thee. And 
if he shall say unto thee, that 
thou art a sinner, say, I place 
the death of our Lord Jesus 
Christ between thee and my sins. 
Tf he shall say unto thee, that 
thou hast deserved damnation, 
say, Lord, I put the death of our 
Lord Jesus Christ between thee 
and all my sins; and I offer his 
merits instead of (pro) my own, 
which I ought to have, but have 
not. If he shall say that he is 
angry with thee, say, Lord, I 
place the death of our Lord 
Jesus Christ between me and 
thy anger.” In Migne’s edition, 
after the self-commendation of 
the soul into the hands of God, 
there follows an invocation of the 


Virgin which is manifestly an in- 
terpolation of some zealous and 
unscrupulous Papist. It is as fol- 
lows: ‘ Postea dicat, Maria, ma- 
ter gratiae, mater misericordiae, 
tu nos ab hoste protege, et hora 
mortis suscipe: per tuum ergo, 
Virgo, Filium, per Patrem, et 
Spiritum Sanctum, praesens adsis 
ad obitum meum, quia imminet 
exitus. Amen.” The difference 
between the Mariolatry of this 
passage, and the Paulinism of the 
‘‘direction” for visiting the sick, is 
too great to have proceeded from 
the same intuition. The use of 
“nos” indicates that it is part of 
an ecclesiastical liturgy. In the 
first extract, the first person sin- 
gular is intense all the way 
through. 

It is difficult in the light of 
such an extract as this, as well 
as of the positions of the Cur 
Deus Homo? to account for the 
statement of Neanper (Church 
History, IV. 500), that ‘the idea 
of a passive obedience, the idea 
of a satisfaction by suffering, of 
an expiation by assuming the 
punishment of mankind” was 
“far from Anselm.” Neander 
thinks that Anselm held only to 
the doctrine of a satisfaction by 
obedience of the law,—what he 
calls. satisfactio activa. In this 
he agrees with Baur, 


ANSELM’S THEORY OF SATISFACTION. 283 


extent in theological literature, and deserves to be 
studied and pondered by every Protestant divine. 
For it is obvious to remark that such a view of the 
atonement as is here exhibited is thoroughly Bibli- 
cal, and thoroughly Protestant. There may be in- 
cidental views and positions in this tract, with 
which the modern theologian would not wholly 
agree; but certainly so far as the general theory 
of vicarious satisfaction is concerned this little trea- 
tise contains the substance of the Reformed doc- 
trine ; while at the same time, it enunciates those 
philosophical principles which must enter into every | 
scientific construction of this cardinal truth of Chris- 
tianity. On both the theoretic and the practical 
side, it is one of the Christian classics. 

For in distinctly denying the claims of Satan, 
and in distinctly asserting the absolute and inde- 
feasible claims of justice, the Anselmic theory im- 
parts a necessary and metaphysical character to the 
doctrine of Atonement, by virtue of which it be- 
comes scientific, and defensible at the bar of first 
principles. It enables the inquirer to see that no , 
other mode is possible,—that there is no alternative 
for the divine benevolence, but either to leave 
the guilty transgressor to the natural and ordinary 
course of justice, or else to deliver him from it by 
satisfying its claims for him and in his stead. Baur, 
indeed, makes the objection that the attribute of 
justice entirely overrides and suppresses that of 
love ; and that this exact and absolute satisfaction 


vs 


ey 


284 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


of all the claims of legal justice, though imparting 
great compactness and self-consistence to the the- 
ory, yet denudes it of all its tender and merciful 
features and aspects. He remarks,’ that according 
to the Anselmic theory of satisfaction, the whole 
work of redemption is carried out “not for the 
sake of man, but solely for the sake of God,”—for 
the sake of an inward necessity grounded in the 
essence of Deity. But this does not follow by any 
means. -On the contrary, the compassion of God is 
seen in its most tender, because its only sef-sacri- 
Jjicing form, in this light and flame of justice and 
law. The “inner necessity” of the divine nature 
does, indeed, require that justice be maintained by 
the punishment of sin. But Baur forgets that, in 
Anselm’s view there are two ways in which sin can 
\ be punished. And the fact that God chooses the 
|} one that spares man and tasks God,—the fact that 
he satisfies his own justice for the sinner, instead of 
leaving the sinner to satisfy it by an endless misery 
in his own person,—shows in the most conclusive 
and affecting manner that Redemption has man’s 
welfare in view, as well as the best interests of the 
universe, and the majestic glory of the divine 
nature. With good right does Anselm say, at the 
close of his investigation, “the compassion of God, 
which appeared to be lost entirely when we were 
considering the justice of God and the sin of man, 


‘Baur: Versohnungslehre, 170. 


—E—— 


ANSELW’S THEORY OF SATISFACTION. 285 


we have now found to be so great and so consistent 
with justice, that nothing greater or more just can 
be conceived of. For what compassion can equal 
the words of God the Father addressed to the sin- 
ner condemned to eternal punishment, and having 
no means of redeeming himself: ‘Take my only- 
begotten Son, and make him an offering for thy- 
self’; or the words of the Son: ‘Take me, and 
ransom thy soul’? For this is what both say, 
when they invite and draw us to faith in the gos- 
pel. And can anything be more just than for God 
to remit all debt, when in this way he receives a 
satisfaction greater than all the debt, provided only 
it be offered with the right feeling ?”? 

In closing this brief sketch of Anselm’s theory 
of the Atonement, it is evident that if his views 
and experience, as exhibited in the Cur Deus 
Homo ?, could have become those of the church of 
which he was a member and an ornament, the re- 
vival of the doctrine of justification by faith in the 
Lutheran Reformation would not have been needed. 
Such a profound and spiritual conception of sin, 
such a clear and penetrating consciousness of guilt, 
such adoring and humbling views of the divine 
majesty, such calm and searching apprehensions of 
the divine justice, such annihilation of human merit 
in the eye of law, and such an evangelic estimate of 
the atonement of the God-Man, if they could have 


1 AnsELMuUS: Cur Deus Homo? II. 20. 


286 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


been made elements and influences in the general 
religious experience of the Western Church, that 
eleventh century would have exhibited a spirit of 
judgment and of burning, of profound humility 
and self-denial, of purity and self-consecration, that 
would have been a dazzling contrast to the actual 
religious character which it presents. But the so- 
teriology of Anselm, though exerting no little influ- 
ence through his immediate pupils, did not pass 
over into the church at large. The sphere of 
his activity was the Norman and Anglo-Norman 
Churches. These were then upon the frontiers of 
Christendom, and the metropolitan clergy, as well 
as the imperial church, knew little or nothing of 
that vigorous and vital piety, and that profound 
and thorough theologizing, which in one of the 
darkest centuries in church history was radiating 
from the cloister of Bec, and the see of Canter- 
bury.’ 


§ 2. Soteriology of Abelard and Lombard. 
The Roman Catholic Church in the Middle 


Ages, as does every ecclesiastical organization of . 
the present day that is connected with the state, 
contained within its communion a variety of opin- 
ions and views, some of which were directly op- 


‘For the life and labors of Anselm, see the excellent monograph of 


_ Hasse. 


i 


ABELARD AND LOMBARD. 287 


posed to others. To the theory of Anselm which 
we have just exhibited, stands in the very sharpest 
contrast the theory of Abelard (+ 1142). The acute- 
ness of this Schoolman was not sufficiently regulated 
by moral earnestness, and informed by a profound 
religious experience. We perceive immediately, in 
passing from the writings of Anselm to those of 
Abelard, that we are in communication with a very 
different spirit. The lofty heights of contempla- 
tion and the abysmal depths of experience have 
vanished. Attributes like that of justice, and facts 
like that of sin, are far less transcendent in their 
meaning and importance. The atonement is looked 
at from a much lower level. 

Abelard begins and ends with the benevolence 
of God. This is divorced from and not limited by 
his holiness, and is regarded as endowed with the 
liberty of indifference. The deity can pardon upon 
repentance. There is nothing in the Divine Nature 
which necessitates a satisfaction for past transgres- 
sion, antecedently to remission of penalty. Like 
creating out of nothing, redemption may and does 
take place by a fiat, by which sin is abolished by a 
word, and the sinner is received into favour. Noth- 
ing is needed but penitence in order to the remis- 
sion of sin. The object of the incarnation and death 
of Christ, consequently, is to produce sorrow in the 
human soul. The life and sufferings of the God- 
Man were intended to exert a moral impression 
upon a hard and impenitent heart, which is thereby 


288 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


melted into contrition, and then received into favour 
by the boundless compassion of God. Abelard at- 
tributes much to the intercessory agency of the Re- 
deemer. As the God-Man who has perfectly obeyed 
the divine law, Christ possesses a weight of influ- 
ence with the Father which secures blessings for 
the sinful. In such connections, he alludes to the 
idea of justice. Christ was perfectly holy and just 
himself, and it is “just” that such a being should be 
heard in behalf of those for whom he became incar- 
nate and suffered. But by justice is here meant 
merely fitness or propriety. When it comes to the 
properly judicial and retributive attribute in the 
Divine Nature, Abelard denies the doctrine of satis- 
faction, and contends that God may remit the pen- 
alty by a sovereign act of will. The only characteris- 
tic which the theory of Abelard possesses in com- 
mon with that of Anselm is its denial that the 
claims of Satan were satisfied by the death of the 
Redeemer. “Ifa slave,” says Abelard, “should de- 
sert his master, his master could justly demand that 
he be given up. But if a slave should seduce his 
fellow-slave from obedience to the master of both 
of them, how absurd it would be for this slave to 
set up a claim to the services of the one whom he 
had seduced.” * 

That very celebrated Schoolman Peter Lombard 
(+ 1164), whose influence and authority in the 


* ABELARD: Com. ad Rom. Lib. Cértn : Dogmengeschichte, IL. 
IT; quoted in Minscuer-Von 168. 


BERNARD AND ST. VICTOR. 289 


Roman Church is hardly second to that of Aquinas 
himself, declared decidedly for the soteriology of 
Abelard, and against that of Anselm. In his the- 
ory, the influence of the death of Christ is spent 
upon the subjective character of the individual soul, 
in softening, subduing, and sanctifying. At the 
same time, however, Lombard’s representation ap- 
parently, but only apparently, verges towards the 
Anselmic theory. The claims of justice are met 
to a limited extent by the sufferings of the Re- 
deemer. They deliver man from the temporal penal 
consequences of sin, provided baptism be adminis- 
tered and penance be performed. Lombard’s prin- 
cipal work, entitled Liber Sententiarum, is a collec- 
tion of all the views of the Roman Catholic Church, 
and an attempt to combine them into one system. 
But such an eclecticism as this, which endeavours to 
harmonize the theory of Anselm with that of Ab- 
elard, must necessarily fail. Lombard’s real views 
were the same as those of Abelard, and the fact 
that the work of Christ must be supplemented by 
baptism and penance accounts for the remarkable 
popularity which the Liber Sea has always 
enjoyed in the Papal Church. 


§ 3. Soteriology of Bernard and Hugh St. Victor. 
In the writings of Bernard of Clairvaua (+1153), 


we meet a more evangelical view of the atoning 


VoL. 11.—19 


290 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


work of Christ. He combats the soteriology of 
Abelard, as he also does his other doctrinal opin- 
ions. First, he opposes the view which Abelard 
held in common with Anselm, that Satan has no 
claims upon man, and that no Satanic claims are 
met by the sacrifice of Christ. Bernard, though 
not a mystic proper, had a mystical tendency. He 
belonged, as was noticed in the history of Philo- 
sophical Systems, to the Mystic Scholastics. Deep- 
ly devout in his spirit, he also cherished a high 
veneration for the opinions of the Fathers, especially 
Augustine. The rejection of a theory which en- 
tered so extensively into the soteriology of the 
Primitive Fathers, as did that of Satan’s claims, was 
regarded with disfavour by Bernard, even though 
the pious and orthodox Anselm had given it his sane- 
tion. Connected, moreover, as it was in the in- 
stance of Abelard with other views that were un- 
doubtedly heterodox, and with a rationalistic spirit, 
it was natural that a mind inclined like Bernard’s to 
rest in a traditional and received orthodoxy should 
oppose this rejection of the old doctrine of Satan’s 
claims. 

Secondly, Bernard opposes the opinion of Abelard 
that remission of sins may occur by a sovereign act 
of will, without any satisfaction of the claims of law. 
His own religious experience was too thorough, and 
his respect for the opinions of the past too implicit, 
for him to adopt a theory that renders the Old 
Testament sacrificial ceremony an inexplicable enig- 


BERNARD AND ST. VICTOR. 291 


ma, deprives the New Testament representations of 
their meaning, and agrees substantially with the 
later Socinian theory of redemption. At the same 
time, we do not find Bernard agreeing with Anselm 
respecting the metaphysical necessity of satisfaction. 
He hesitates to denominate sin an infinite evil, and 
to attribute to it an infinite guilt. As a conse- 
quence, he is not boldly distinct in asserting the in- 
finite worth of the satisfaction of Christ. He is not 
ready, with Anselm, to assert an absolute necessity, 
intrinsic to the divine nature, for an atonement, 
but prefers to stand with Augustine upon the ground 
of a relative necessity founded upon the optional 
will and arrangement of God. In short, the differ- 
ence between these two theologians, who undoubt- 
edly were much alike so far as concerns their religious 
experience and practical use of truth, consists in the 
fact that Anselm was a metaphysician, and could 
not stop until he had traced back his faith to the 
eternal and necessary principles of the divine na- 
ture and government; while Bernard could hold 
the doctrine at a middle position, without subject- 
ing it to the rigorous tests and conclusions of sci- 
ence, to whose methods he was somewhat disinclined, 
from his mystical tendency. 

Of similar general character with Bernard, was 
that other interesting Mystic Scholastic, Hugo St. 
Victor (+ 1140). His view of the atonement, how- 
ever, approaches somewhat nearer, in technical re- 
spects, to that of Anselm, than did that of Bernard. 


292 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


While unwilling to give up the old patristic notion 
of a satisfaction of Satan’s claims, he is distinct in 
asserting and exhibiting the relations of the work 
of Christ to the divine nature. The sacrificial ele- 
ment, as distinguished from the legal, is very ap- 
parent in this Schoolman. He speaks often of the 
Deity as propitiated, and fastens upon those pass- 
ages of Scripture in which this Old Testament idea 
is presented. “The Son of God,” he says, “ by 
becoming a man paid man’s debt to the Father, 
and by dying expiated man’s guilt.”’ Here, both 
the legal and the sacrificial elements are combined 
in one proposition. 


§ 4. Soteriology of Bonaventura. 


Thus far, we have been examining the opinions 
prevalent in the first part of the Scholastic Age— 
viz., in the 11th and 12th centuries. The highest in- 
tensity and energy of the systematizing spirit does 
not display itself until we pass into the last half of 
the period. The Schoolmen of the 13th and 14th 
centuries, though originating no views of more origi- 
nality, on either side of the subject, than those of 
Anselm and Abelard, yet put the existing materials, 
whether derived from the Patristic or the Earlier 
Scholastic soteriology, into a more systematic and 


1 Hugo St. Victor: De sacramentis, c. 4. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BONAVENTURA. 293 


comprehensive form. Among these later School- 
men, we shall direct attention first, and with some 
particularity, to Bonaventura (+1272). 

This author, following the analytic and exhaus- 
tive method introduced by Peter Lombard, dis- 
cusses the subject of the atonement under the six 
following questions. First: Whether it was fit in 
itself (congruum) that human nature should be 
restored by God. Secondly: Whether it was more 
fitting that human nature should be restored by a 
satisfaction of justice, than by any other method. 
Thirdly: Whether any sinless creature could render 
satisfaction for the whole human race. Fourthly: 
Whether any sinful man assisted by divine grace 
could make satisfaction for his own sins. Fifthly: 
Whether God was under obligation to accept the 
method of satisfaction by the death of Christ. 
Sixthly: Whether God could have saved the human 
race by some other method. We present the entire 
plan of his work, not for the purpose of following it 
out into each of its divisions, but in order to show 
by an example the acute, analytic, and all-compre- 
hending method of handling subjects which was so 
peculiar to the later Schoolmen like Bonaventura, 
Alexander Hales, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas 
Aquinas. When subjected to the torture of such 
a scrutinizing and searching analysis, a doctrine or 
truth must necessarily be torn into pieces, and ex- 
amined down to its minutest filaments and elements. 
The invention of the Scholastic method had the 


294 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


same effect in the intellectual world, that the inven- 
tion of the cotton gin, and of the roller with revolv- 
ing knives, has had in the material. Subjects are 
reduced to their fibre. 

In order to give, within as brief a space as pos- 
sible, the views of Bonaventura, we will exhibit the 
trains of thought in his answer to the second of 
these questions, viz.: “ Was it more fitting that 
human nature should be restored by a satisfaction 
of justice, than by any other method?” In an- 
swering this question in the affirmative, Bonaven- 
tura proves that the restoration of human nature 
by a satisfaction is the most fitting method, because 
most conducive to the maintenance: 1. of the Di- 
vine justice; 2. of the Divine wisdom; 3. of the 
Divine omnipotence ; 4. of the Divine honour and 
majesty. He comes to his conclusion, by the fol- 
lowing train of reasoning. Redemption by the 
method of legal satisfaction is the most fitting 
method, because God is both merciful and just, and 
consequently doth attributes should be manifested 
and maintained together. Hence it was fitting that 
God should demand satisfaction for the dishonour 
and injury done to himself by man’s transgression, 
and if man could not render this satisfaction, to 
provide a Mediator who could satisfy for him and 
in his stead. If God had been inherently unwilling 
to pardon sin, and had inexorably insisted upon the 
infliction of penalty upon the criminal, he could not 
have manifested his attribute of mercy. If, on the 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BONAVENTURA. 295 


other hand, he had pardoned sin without any satis- 
faction of law, he could not have manifested his at- 
tribute of justice. Thus the method of forgiveness 
through a satisfaction is the most befitting, taking 
into view the entire nature and character of God. 
But the same fitness is apparent if we take into 
view the nature and character of man. The object 
in restoring the human race is to conduct it from a 
state of guilt to a state of justification, and from a 
state of misery to a state of glory. Inasmuch as 
man has done dishonour to the majesty of God, it 
is fitting that he should do honour to the justice of 
God by enduring punishment; and as it is more 
praiseworthy in the innocent man to obtain eternal 
life by merit than without merit, so also it is more 
praiseworthy in the guilty man to be reconciled to 
God through a satisfaction of all legal claims, than 
by a method that disregards and tramples upen 
them. 

After having in this manner established the 
affirmative of the question, Bonaventura proceeds 
to specify and refute some objections to his posi- 
tion. 1. It is first objected, that nothing can be so 
fitting and proper in God as the manifestation of 
his*kindness and compassion, and that the forgive- 
ness of sin without a penal satisfaction would be the 
greatest proof of such compassion. To this it is re- 
plied, first, that the fitness of anything is founded in 
its necessity. It is necessary that God should be 

_ just, but not necessary that he should show mercy. 


26 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


Hence, it follows that compassion towards a crim- 
inal is not more fitting and proper than justice 
towards him. But, secondly, it is not true that re- 
mission by a mere volition that involves no sacri 
fice upon the part of God is a greater evidence of 
love, than remission through the blood of his Only- 
Begotten Son. There is no benevolence greater 
than that which endures suffering and death for 
another’s welfare. 2. It is secondly objected, that 
the Divine independence and self-sufficiency would 
appear in a finer light, if God were to pardon with- 
out any satisfaction. To this it is replied, that the 
requirement of an atonement does not imply any 
conditioning of the Creator by the creature, for it 
is a divine attribute which demands the satisfaction 
of law. God is wholly independent of man in the 
work of redemption, though not independent of his 
own nature and character. As God requires obe- 
dience to his law, not because he is dependent upon 
his creatures, but because his nature and attributes 
demand it, so he requires an atonement for the 
same reason. 3. It is thirdly objected, that the 
Divine omnipotence would be more impressively 
exhibited in pardoning sin without a satisfaction, 
than with one. To this it is replied, that if the 
Divine omnipotence should abolish the claims of 
the Divine justice by an act of arbitrary will, one 
attribute in the Godhead would destroy another. 
But this would be suicidal; and a suicidal exercise 
of power is not the most impressive mode of ex- 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BONAVENTURA. 297 


hibiting power. Even if this could be conceived 
as possible, and the Divine omnipotence were re- 
garded as able to restore the human race by a 
word, in the exercise of a naked and lawless al- 
mightiness, God would yet be obliged to prefer the 
more difficult because the more regular method of 
restoration through an atonement. 4. It is ob- 
jected, in the fourth place, that the restoration of 
man without a satisfaction of justice would lay him 
under greater obligation to love and praise God. 
This is denied, because the surrendry of the Only- 
Begotten Son of God obligates the redeemed far 
more than a mere remission of sin without any sub- 
stituted suffering would. That God incarnate en- 
dured the pains of death for us is a fact of even 
greater impressiveness than the forgiveness of sin 
itself. The foundation of human salvation is even 
greater than the salvation. 5. Fifthly, it is ob- 
jected that God by forgiving sin without an atone- 
ment sets an example that can be imitated by man, 
while on the other scheme he cannot be imitated 
by his creatures. To this it is replied, that man in 
his private and individual capacity is not required 
to imitate God in all respects, and particularly when 
the judicial attributes of his character are involved. 
Punishment and retribution belong solely to the 
Godhead. “Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith 
the Lord” (Rom. xii. 19). This attribute cannot 
be wielded at all by man, except as delegated to 
civil power and authority. But in respect to be- 


298 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


nevolence, and the disposition to sacrifice self for 
the good of another,—the chief attribute which the 
individual man needs to have in view for imita- 
tion,—God in giving his Son as a judicial substi- 
tute for his rebellious creatures has set forth the 
highest possible example for imitation. 6. It is ob- 
jected, in the sixth place, that it would be more 
fitting in God to restore the human race imme- 
diately, and without any such intervention of the 
creature as occurs in the assumption of human 
nature by the Son. Immediate rather than instru- 
mental agency is more worthy of God. This is de- 
nied, because it is characteristic of Infinite Good- 
ness to permit the creature to co-work with itself, 
so far as the nature of the creature allows of this. 
In the work of redemption, such a co-operation is 
not only possible but necessary, in order to sympa- 
thy between the Redeemer and the redeemed. In 
the work of creation no such co-operation of the 
Finite with the Infinite is possible, because the 
energy is not spent upon already existing mate- 
rials, 

In answering the third and fourth questions, 
viz.: whether a sinless created being could make 
satisfaction for the human race, and whether a sin- 
ful man if assisted by divine power could atone for 
his own sins,—Bonaventura takes the negative with 
energy and decision. Any single individual, how- 
ever exalted he might be, is still finite, and com- 
pared with God, whose honour has been injured, is 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BONAVENTURA. 299 


on a common level with all other creatures. Con- 
sequently, his suffering would not be equivalent to 
the sufferings of an entire race of beings. More- 
over, the idea of a satisfaction requires that it be 
rendered by the same species of being by whom the 
offence was committed. Consequently, the atone- 
ment for man’s sin must be made in man’s nature, 
and not in an angelic. It would not be fitting that 
the human race should owe its salvation to another 
species of created beings. Hence only a God-Man 
ean render satisfaction,—man, that humanity may 
suffer; God, that the suffermg may be of infinite 
value. In answer to the objection, that the life of 
Christ was of more value than his death, as life gen- 
erally is better than death, and that consequent- 
ly the life without the death would have been a 
more adequate satisfaction, Bonaventura asserts that 
the idea of satisfaction necessarily involves that of 
penal suffering, thus identifying those two concep- 
tions, satisfaction and expiation, which Baur, we 
have noticed, mistakenly asserts are not identified 
with each other in the Anselmic theory. 

To conclude this notice of Bonaventura, we re- 
mark that the influence of Anselm upon him is very 
apparent, and very great. He is on the side of An- 
selm St. Victor and Bernard, against Abelard and 
Peter Lombard, and exhibits the truth with a clear- 
ness of understanding, an acuteness of analysis, and 
a systematizing talent that render him one of the 
most interesting writers among the Schoolmen. At 


300 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


the same time, this writer, like others of whom we 
have spoken, differed from Anselm in respect to the 
question: Is this conceded necessity of a satisfaction 
of divine justice, absolute or relative? Is satisfac- 
tion of law necessary because God wills it, or does 
he will it because it is necessary? We have found 
Anselm maintaining the absolute and metaphysical 
necessity of satisfaction in order to remission, and 
declaring it to be impossible from the very nature 
of God to dispense with it, if the guilty is to be 
saved. As the necessary nature of right and wrong 
does not depend upon the optional will of God, 
neither does the necessity of an atonement rest 
upon it. He was led to this because he regarded 
it as contradictory to the idea of God, to conceive 
of a schism in the Deity, and an intestine conflict 
between the divine attributes. He held that the 
philosophical idea of God excludes that possibility 
of acting contrary to truth and justice, by the exer- 
cise of bare will, which attends a finite and proba 
tionary nature like that of man. Anselm, conse- 
quently, could not distinguish as did Bonaventura 
and some of the later Schoolmen, two kinds of om- 
nipotence in the divine nature, one of which is regu- 
lated, and the other unregulated, by the other attri- 
butes of the Godhead. Alexander Hales (+1245), 
in answering the standing question: Can human 
nature be restored without a satisfaction ? brings 
out this distinction of an abstract and a concrete 
omnipotence in the following manner. “ When it 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BONAVENTURA. 301 


is said that God cannot restore human nature with- 
out a satisfaction, it is to be observed, with due 
respect to the opinion of the blessed Anselm, that 
divine power is to be contemplated in two forms,— 
absolutely, or by itself alone, and relatively, or in 
connection with other attributes (cum ordine). In 
contemplating the divine power as absolute, we 
conceive of a certain infinite energy (virtus) in the 
Deity that is abstracted from the rest of his nature, 
and transcends all limitations; and with respect to 
this form, the divine power cannot have terms set 
to it (non est determinare) ; and it 1s conceded that 
considered in thts mode, the divine omnipotence is 
able to restore human nature without a satisfaction. 
But in contemplating the divine power relatively, 
we consider it in its references to justice and mercy, 
and so considered, it is conceded that omnipotence 
ean do nothing except in accordance with justice 
and mercy.” * 

The doctrine that there is an abstract omnipo- 
tence in God by which he might have pardoned 
sin without an atonement, if applied by a rigorous 
logic, would neutralize all that clear and cogent ar- 
gumentation which we have seen Bonaventura em- 
ployed to show, that it is “ more fitting that human 
nature should be restored by a satisfaction of jus- 


‘Hates: Summa, Pars III, Works IV. 125 (Harpers’ Ed.); 
Quaestio i, Membrum 4. Quoted CupwortH: Intellectual System, 
by Baur: Versdhnungslehre, II. 532 (Tegg’s Ed.). 

215. Note. Compare Hattam: 


302 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOG\. 


tice, than by any other method.”’ For it implies 


that it is possible for the natural attributes of God 
to be at war with his moral ones; in other words, 
that the Infinite Creator is subject to that same pos- 
sibility of illegitimate action that pertains to a finite 
and mutable creature. It implies that the philoso- 
phical idea of the Deity does not prevent his being 
conceived of as acting contrary to a part of his own 
nature.* The doctrine of the metaphysical possi- 


? BoNAVENTURA sometimes 
makes statements respecting the 
two kinds of omnipotence that 
are in flat contradiction to his 
reply to the objection, that “the 
omnipotence of God would ap- 
pear in a more striking light, if 
sin were remitted without an 
atonement.” He says, e. g.: 
“God might have liberated man 
by the method of mere compas- 
sion, nor would there have been 
anything prejudicial to justice in 
this, if God had so willed it. For 
he could have abolished all de- 
merit, and have restored man to 
his primitive condition by his om- 
nipotence alone, and there would 
have remained in the universe 
nothing inordinate nor unpunish- 
ed.” Bavr: Versdhnungslehre, 
228. 

*This idea of an “ abstract” 
omnipotence accompanies the 
history of the doctrine of atone- 
ment down from the earliest, to 
the latest times. In the Ancient 
Church, /renaeus (Adv. Haer. ITI. 


xx.), Cyril of Jerusalem, Basil, 
and Ambrose, contend for an ab- 
solute necessity of Christ’s satis- 
faction; while Athanasius, Au- 
gustine, Cyril of Alexandria, 
Theodoret, and John Damascene 
assert only a relative necessity. 
In the Mediaeval Church, Anselm, 
and perhaps Hugh St. Victor, as- 
sert an absolute, while Abelard, 
Bernard, Lombard, Hales, Bona- 
ventura, and Aquinas (Cont. Gent. 
IV. liv. lv.) concede only a rela- 
tive necessity. In the 17th cen- 
tury, the subject was discussed by 
Owen, and Twisse (the prolocutor 
of the Westminster Assembly) ; 
the former asserting, and the lat- 
ter denying, the absolute neces- 
sity of a satisfaction. See OwEn’s 
tract, On the Nature of Justice. 
GrerHarD (Loci IV. Ixxxiv.) 
claims that Augustine wavered 
between the two views; but he 
is mistaken, as is evident from 
Aug. De Trinitate, XIII. x. et 
alia. Neanper (IV. 497) re- 
marks, that Augustine “started 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BONAVENTURA. 303 


bility of the remission of sin without a satisfaction 
of justice, furthermore, implies that the natural at- 
tributes of God are more central and ultimate than 
his moral and ethical,—that might in the Deity is 
more fundamental and absolute than right. Logi- 
cally, it takes the key-stone out of the arch upon 
which the whole doctrine of an atonement rests. 
For on this scheme, when the final centre of truth 
is reached, a satisfaction of justice can be dispensed 
with; omnipotence in God “cannot have terms set to 
it,” and therefore it can abolish the claims of law, 
without satisfying them. It was, however, merely a 
speculative opinion in many instances. For many 
of its advocates were equally earnest with their op- 
ponents, in contending for the inexorable necessity 
of a satisfaction, when the attribute of justice is 
taken into view ; but they were not equally consist- 
ent with them, in holding the opinion that justice 


the inquiry whether any other 
way would have been possible; 
and, considered from the point 
of view of the divine omnipo- 
tence, he believed the answer 
must be in the affirmative.” 
Hooker (Eccl. Pol. V. li.) teaches 
a relative necessity. 

* Owen (Dissertation on Divine 
Justice, Chap. IT.) notices the self- 
contradiction there is, in conced- 
ing that justice is an essential 
attribute in God, and yet that it 
can be set aside by an act of phys- 
ical omnipotence, in the follow- 
ing terms: “To me, these argu- 


ments are altogether astonishing ; 
viz., ‘That sin-punishing justice 
should be natural to God, and 
yet that God, sin being supposed 
to exist, may either exercise it or 
not exercise it. They may also 
say, and with as much propriety, 
that truth is natural to God; but 
upon a supposition that he were 
to converse with man, he might 
either use it, or not ; or, that om- 
nipotence is natural to God; but 
upon a supposition that he were 
inclined to do any work without 
(extra) himself, that it was free to 
him to act omntpotently or not.” 


304 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


itself might be abstracted, and the problem solved 
at a yet more central point in the divine nature, at 
which power is isolated from all the ethical attri- 
butes of Deity, and becomes lawless, and capable 
of doing anything and everything. * 


§ 5. Soteriology of Aquinas. 


Thomas Aquinas (+1274) deserves particular 
attention, in the history of the doctrine of atone- 
ment. He is the strongest systematizer among the 
Schoolmen, and on account of his important posi- 
tion in the Mediaeval Church and theology merits 
a detailed examination. But inasmuch as his opin- 
ions upon the atonement resemble so closely those 
of Bonaventura, whose views we have discussed 
somewhat at length, we are relieved from the ne- 
cessity of a minute investigation. ~ 

The dogmatic views of Aquinas respecting the 
atonement are found in the third part of his Summa 
Theologiae, or system of divinity.? He employs 
the same analytic method so common to the School- 
men, and exhausts the subject by a series of ques- 
tions and their answers. The first inquiry is con- 


*Tt is important to inquire, different from saying that he 
whether oftentimes this might could have dispensed with satis- 
not have been the question in faction altogether. 
the mind: ‘“ Could not the Deity ? Aquinas: Summa Theologiae 
have provided an atonement in Quaestiones, XLVI.—XLIX. 
another way?” This is very 


SOTERIOLOGY OF AQUINAS. 305 


cerning the nature of Christ’s Passion. He en- 
deavours to exhibit its nature, by proposing twelve 
queries, of which we give only the two following: 
1. Was it necessary that Christ should suffer in 
order to the salvation of man? 2. Was any other 
method of human salvation possible? Aquinas 
answers the first of these questions, in accordance 
with the metaphysics of Aristotle, by distinguishing 
the different modes of conceiving. of “ necessity.” 
If, by necessity be meant that which from its very 
nature cannot but be, and whose non-existence can- 
not be conceived of, then there was no necessity for 
the sufferings of Christ. That the Logos should be- 
come incarnate, and die upon the cross, is not 
founded in any antecedent and a@priori necessity 
in the constitution of the Divine Being or of the 
universe. The necessity is subsequent and a@ poste 
riori,—i. €., is consequent upon the origin of moral 
evil, and even then only in case it is proposed to 
save transgressors from the consequences of their 
transgression, a procedure which is itself entirely 
optional upon the part of God, inasmuch as he is 
under no necessity to redeem mankind from their 
sins. Again, if by necessity external compulsion be 
meant, then the sufferings of Christ were not neces- 
sary. But, thirdly, a thing is necessary when it is 
indispensable in order to the attainment of some 
other thing, and in this sense the death of Christ is 
necessary. It is not, indeed, a matter of necessity, 
that man’s sin should be pardoned, but if it be par- 


VOL, 11.—20 


306 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


doned, it is necessary that Christ should first make 
satisfaction to justice for its commission. Suppos- 
ing the fact of sin and the fact of a divine intention 
to deliver man from it be given, then, says Aqui- 
nas, the sufferings of Christ become necessary, both 
in respect to the attribute of justice, and the attri- 
bute of mercy,—in respect to justice, because Christ 
by his sufferings must completely satisfy its claims ; 
in respect to mercy, because, in man’s condition of 
inability to satisfy the demands of the law for him- 
self, God can display no higher compassion than in 
providing a satisfaction for him, and in his stead. 
In answering the second question, viz.: Whether 
redemption could have been accomplished in some 
other method? Aquinas defines his position re- 
specting the metaphysical necessity of atonement. 
Even though it is, abstractly considered, possible to 
save man in some other manner, it becomes impos- 
sible, he says, when once God has determined to 
accomplish the work in the way and manner he 
has. Aquinas, like Bonaventura, holds only to a 
relative necessity of the atonement. He, too, while 
contending with great earnestness and intellectual 
acumen, that a satisfaction for sin must be made to 
justice before sin can be remitted, 77, and so long 
as, justice is taken into the account, yet asserts the 
possibility of throwing this attribute out of the ae- 
count, in a determination of what the Supreme 
Being is able to do. His reasoning is as follows. 
“If God had willed to liberate man from sin with- 


SOTERIOLOGY OF AQUINAS. 307 


out any satisfaction, he would not have done any- 
thing contrary to justice. For he is not like a 
human or finite judge. The human judge cannot, 
without injury to justice, dismiss a criminal without 
punishment, because it is his function to inflict pun- 
ishment upon crime committed against another than 
himself,—say, against another man, or against the 
general weal, or against a higher officer than him- 
self. But God is the supreme judge and chief good 
of the whole universe, and there is no other being 
than himself with whose interests he, as a judge, is 
intrusted. Consequently, if God sees fit to remit that 
penalty which has been affixed to law only for his 
own glory, no injustice is done, more than when a 
man forgives his fellow-man an injury done to him- 
self alone, without requiring any satisfaction at his 
hands.” This reasoning, it is evident, is founded 
upon the same view with that of Bonaventura, re- 
specting the relation of the physical to the moral 
attributes of God. It assumes that the former are 
more central and fundamental than the latter, and 
asserts the possibility of their disjunction in the 
Divine administration. It implies the right of om- 
nipotence to abolish justice ; the right of power to 
nullify law. For although the offence of sin is com- 
mitted against the same Being who is the judge 
and punisher of sin, yet if as sovereign he should 
pardon it without the satisfaction of law, he would 
unquestionably put honour upon his omnipotence 
and dishonour upon his justice. The physical at- 


308 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 

tribute would thus be all-controlling, and the Di- 
vine nature would become a mere unlimited and 
characterless force. An inward schism and self- 
defection would take place in the Deity, whereby 
one part of his nature, by a purely arbitrary act of 
his own, would be set in contradiction to another 
part; whereby the physical attributes would be 
arrayed in hostility to the ethical, in the very place 
of their harmony and equilibrium. 

We find in Aquinas several new points raised, 
respecting the work of Christ. The first relates to 
the mode in which the atonement of the Son of God 
becomes available to the believer. Aquinas an- 
swers the objection that merit and demerit are per- 
sonal, and that therefore vicarious satisfaction is 
impossible, by the doctrine of the wnio mystica ex- 
isting between the believer and the Redeemer.’ 
Founding his view upon the statement of St. Paul 
(Eph. v.30), that believers are members of the body, 
the flesh, and the bones of the Lord, he supposes, 


*The word “mystical” was customs, or usages of men know 


employed in the sense of ‘ mys- 
terious,” and signified that which 
is unique, and anomalous. Christ’s 
Person is ‘‘ mystical” ; his suffer- 
ings are “‘mystical”; and the 
relation between him and the 
believer is ‘“ mystical.” Owxzn 
(On Justification, Ch. VIII.) re- 
marks that ‘‘ Christ and believers 
are neither one natural person, 
nor a legal or political person, 
nor any such person as the laws, 


or allow of. They are one mys- 
tical person, whereof, although 
there may be some imperfect re- 
semblances found in natural or 
political unions, yet the union 
from whence that denomination 
is taken between him and us, is 
of that nature, and arises from 
such reasons and causes, as no 
personal union among men (or 
the union of many persons) has 
any concern in.” 


SOTERIOLOGY OF AQUINAS. 309 


that a peculiar species of connection exists between 
the Church and its Head, by virtue of which the 
common principles and maxims that pertain to in- 
dividual and secular life cease to be applicable. The 
relation of the believer to the Son of God is not the 
external one, of one individual to another individ- 
ual, but an anomalous one, whereby a communion 
of interest and moral life is established, so that the 
sinner united by faith to his Saviour may become a 
ground and cause of judicial infliction upon his aton- 
ing Substitute, and the incarnate Word may become 
the sinner’s sin-offering, and atonement. We do 
not find in Aquinas very full, or very clear, repre- 
sentations upon this difficult point; but this idea of 
the mystical oneness between Christ and the Church 
pervades his soteriology with considerable boldness. 
Though allusions are made to it in the earlier 
writers, especially in connection with the cognate 
doctrine of the unity of Adam and his posterity, yet 
it may be said that the “angelic doctor,” as he was 
termed in the panegyrical phraseology of the time, 
was the first to give it prominence in the theory of 
Redemption. 

The second new point we notice in this writer 
is the distinction between satesfactio and meritum. 
In the Anselmic theory, the work of Christ was 
contemplated in its relations to justice solely. The 
deliverance of man from condemnation was the 
great object in view. This is the prevalent mode 
of contemplating the subject in the Patristic, and 


310 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


the Earlier Scholastic soteriology. But we find 
Aquinas raising that question which was afterwards 
so earnestly discussed in the Calvinistic and Armi- 
nian controversies of the 17th century,—the ques- 
tion, namely, whether Christ did not earn for the 
believer a title to eternal life, as well as of freedom 
from condemnation to eternal death. Aquinas an- 
swers this question in the affirmative, and makes 
the technical distinction between the satisfaction 
which Christ made by his sufferings to justice, and 
the merit of his obedience to the law by virtue of 
which the redeemed are entitled to the rewards of 
eternity. In other words, we find in the theory of 
Aquinas an anticipation of the later distinction be- 
tween the “active” and “ passive” righteousness of 
Christ. 

A third new point observable in the soteriology 
of Aquinas is the doctrine of a superabundance in 
the merits of Christ. The Passion of the Redeemer 
was not merely sufficient, it was also a superabun- 
dant satisfaction for the sins of the human race. 
This position needs to be carefully distinguished 
from the statements of Anselm, in which he gives 
expression to his view of the infinite worth of 
Christ’s satisfaction. There was little danger of 
magnifying the value of the Redeemer’s Passion, in 
connection with the infinite demerit of sin, and 
hence the Anselmic theory is far more satisfactory 
than that of Aquinas, in respect to the point under 
review. This later Schoolman, though intending to 


SOTERIOLOGY OF AQUINAS. oil 


follow the opinions of the earlier, imperceptibly de- 
parts from him, by reason of a less spiritual and 
profound view of the nature of moral evil. Hence, 
in regard to the distinction between justification 
and sanctification, we find Aquinas involved in the 
confusion which .we have noticed in Augustine. 
There is much less affinity between the soteriology 
of the Reformation and that of the “ angelic doctor,” 
than between it and that of Anselm; and, to this 
day, the Roman Catholic theologians of the more 
intelligent and devout class, who are not satisfied 
with the lowest forms of the Papal soteriology, and 
yet are not prepared for the New Testament theory 
in its purity, appropriate the opinions of Aquinas 
rather than those of Anselm. There is little doubt 
that the doctrine of a superabundance in the satis- 
faction of Christ, in connection with a defective view 
of the degree and amount of evil that was to be 
atoned for by it, contributed toward the distinctively 
Papal theory of works of supererogation, and of a 
treasury of merit at the command of the Church. 
The distinctively Romish soteriology of Aqui- 
nas is betrayed when he comes to treat of the re- 
mission of sin, and particularly when he specifies 
the ground of it. Anselm, we have seen, referred 
it solely to the atoning work of Christ. In his the- 
ory, justification is the simple and sole act of God, 
whereby he acquits the guilty on the ground of the 
infinite satisfaction that has been made for sin. So 
far as the pardon of sin is concerned, man can do 


312 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 

nothing. The crimmal cannot pardon himself, nei- 
ther can be purchase or earn a pardon by satisfying 
the claims of law. He cannot do this in part. The 
sinner is totally dependent upon God for the re- 
mission of sin, both in respect to the declarative 
act by which he is acquitted, and in respect to all 
that judicial procedure and apparatus of atonement 
which must precede the declarative or justifying 
act. In the Anselmic scheme, as in the Protestant, 
remission of sin is the pure, simple, and sole act of 
Deity, without any co-operation or assistance from 
humanity.’ But not so in the theory of Aquinas. 
Notwithstanding all that he has said, and well said, 
respecting the claims of justice, and the vicarious 
satisfaction of the Son of God, Aquinas, as does 
the subsequent Tridentine scheme, vitiates all that 
he has hitherto maintained on these points, by 
teaching that the remission of sin depends fo a cer- 
tain extent upon the character and conduct of the 
The 
confusion of justification with sanctification, which 
we have observed in some passages of Augustine, 
re-appears in Aquinas in a more distinct and settled 


individual, as a ground, or procuring cause. 


1Romans xi. 6. “And if by 
grace, then it is no more of 
works: otherwise grace is no 
more grace. But if it be of 
works, then it is no more grace, 
otherwise work is no more work. 
Galatians v. 2-5. ‘Behold I 
Paul say unto you, that if ye be 


circumcised, Christ shall profit 
you nothing. For I testify again 
to every man that is circumcised, 
that he is a debtor to do the 
whole law. Christ is become of 
no effect unto you, whosoever of 
you are justified by the law: ye 
are fallen from grace.” 


SOTERIOLOGY OF AQUINAS. 313 


statement. In conformity with this view, Aquinas 
represents the expiatory value of the atonement as 
dependent upon the believer’s conformity to law. 
In order that the satisfaction of Christ may be an 
adequate one for the sinner, he must be “config- 
ured” to Christ. The atonement is not sufficient 
alone and by itself. It must be supplemented by 
personal character and good works, and in some 
cases by penances. This “configuration” to Christ, 
requisite in order that His satisfaction may be com- 
plete, is brought about in a sacramental manner by 
baptism. In case of sin after baptism, the believ- 
er must be “configured” to Christ by a per- 
sonal suffering in the form of penance, as well 
as by the acceptance of the sufferings of the Re- 
deemer. Aquinas concedes that the suffering 
of Christ is of far greater value than that of the 
man himself, yet plainly teaches that the latter 
enters as a co-operating factor with the former, in 
laying the foundation for the remission of the com- 
mitted sin. It is not in itself sufficient to atone for 
sin, but in connection with the sacrifice of Christ it 
has a value of its own which cannot be dispensed 
with in making up the full sum of legal satisfaction. 
The penance of the baptized man is imperfect; it 
has not the merit of condignity (condigna peccato) ; 
but it is graciously accepted in connection with, and 
reliance upon, the satisfaction of Christ.’ 


1 Aquinas (Summa, Quaestio requisite that those who sin after 
xlviii. Artic. 3) asserts that “itis baptism should be configured to 


314 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


We have in these views of Aquinas sufficient 
reason for asserting, that notwithstanding the cor- 
rectness of his soteriology up to a certain point and 
in certain relations, the fatal errour of the Romish 
theory is contained in it. This errour, to state it in 
a word, does not consist in denying the need of a 
satisfaction of justice, or even the great value of 
Christ’s satisfaction for sin, but in asserting in con- 
nection with this, the necessity of a co-operating and 
completing satisfaction on the part of man. The 
amount of this finite element varies in different 
writers and ages of the Romish Church, but the pre- 
sence of the element itself in any amount is what 


the suffering Redeemer through 
something of penalty or passion 
which they endure in themselves, 
which nevertheless is far from 
being a strict offset for sin (con- 
digna peccato), even though the 
sacrifice of Christ codperate with 
it.’ Again (Summa, Pars III. 
Quaest. i. Art. 1), Aquinas distin- 
guishes two kinds of satisfaction, 
—that of the God-man, and that 
of man. The first is that of “ con- 
dign” or strict satisfaction, as the 
act of God incarnate. The sec- 
ond, that of man, may be said to 
be ‘imperfectly sufficient, by rea- 
son of the willingness of the of- 
fended party to accept it, although 
it is not a strict and literal satis- 
faction.” The boldest form of 
stating the doctrine of a codper- 


ating satisfaction on the part of 
man is fuund in Gasrret Bret, 
(Sententiae, Lib. III. Distinct. xix, 
Conclus. 5). ‘Though Christ's 
passion is the principal ground of 
merit upon which grace is con- 
ferred, nevertheless it is not the 
sole and total meritorious cause, 
because with the merits of Christ 
there always concurs some act of 
him who receives grace, which 
[act] has either the merit of con- 
dignity, or congruity.” See Baur: 
Versdhnungslehre, 248, 3851. 
Compare with Aquinas’s distinc- 
tion of two kinds of satisfaction, 
one of which does not satisfy, 
Pascat’s account of the “ prox- 
imate power” and ‘sufficient 
grace” of the Jesuits, in the first 
and second Provincial Letters. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF DUNS SCOTUS. oro 


distinguishes the distinctively Papal from the dis. 
tinctively Protestant theory of the atonement.’ 


§ 6. Soteriology of Duns Scotus. 


A controversy respecting the atonement sprang 
up between Duns Scotus and the followers of Aqui- 
nas, which involved fundamental principles in ethics 
and religion, and divided the Romish Church into 
two great parties of Thomists and Scotists. Duns 
Scotus denied the Anselmic doctrine that sin is of 
infinite demerit, and consequently denied that the 
suffering of Christ is of infinite value.” The rela- 
tion of the atonement of the Son of God to the sin 
of mankind, he maintained, is merely an arbitrary 


and constituted one. 


1The thoroughly Papal idea of 
adding to personal merit by works 
is expressed with great naiveté by 
Sr. Smuon (Memoires, Vol. I. Ohap. 
iii, St. John’s Translation). “‘ The 
king particularly expressed his 
regret that my father [who had 
just deceased] had not been able 
to receive the last sacraments. 
I was able to say that a very 
short time before, my father had 
retired for several days to Saint 
Lazare, where was his confessor, 
and added something on the piety 
of his life.” The idea of a good 
man’s expiating his own sins in 
part is continually appearing in 


The principle upon which he 


the lives of the most exemplary 
of the Roman Catholics. For 
example, TILLEMONT, a Jansenist, 
and a very devout and pure- 
minded man, thus writes to his 
brother who was sub-prior of 
La Trappe: “Everybody is not 
obliged to fast as you do at La 
Trappe, but everybody is obliged 
to resist the desires of concupis- 
cence, which pride and the re- 
mains of our corruption constant- 
ly excite in us, and to expiate the 
sins into which we thus fall.” 
Brarp: Port Royal II. 182. 

? Baur : Versdhnungslehre, 
250 sq. 


316 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY, 


founded his theory was: “Tantum valet omne crea 
tum oblatum, pro quanto acceptat Deus illud, et non 
plus.”* There is no énterior fitness and adaptation 
between Christ’s atonement and man’s sin. God was 
pleased to accept this particular sacrifice as an offset 
and equivalent for human transgression, not from 
any intrinsic value in it, but because he so pleased. 
He might have accepted any other substitute, or he 
might have dispensed with accepting any substitute 
at all.? In opposition to this view, the followers 
of Aquinas maintained the old Anselmic theory of 
the infinite demerit of sin, and the infinite and ob- 
jective value of Christ’s satisfaction. In this con- 
troversy, the soteriology of the adherents of Aquinas 
is more in harmony with the Protestant view and 
feeling ; so that we might reverse what Melanchthon 
remarks of Augustine, and say, that “the opinion 
of Aquinas is more pertinent, fit and convenient 
when he disputed than it was when not disput- 
ing.” And yet it would be difficult to see how 
the followers of Aquinas could in the end avoid the 
conclusions of Duns Scotus, if they started from that 
doctrine of a relative necessity of satisfying justice 
which we have seen Aquinas held, in common with 
all the Schoolmen excepting Anselm. If omnipo- 
tence and bare will are more ultimate in the Divine 
Nature than justice and truth are, then it is difficult 


‘Duns Scotus: Dist. xx. lib. ?7Gernarprs: Loci Theologici, 
iii, in Sent. Lombardi, Quaest.I. Tom. IV. p. 122. 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. M7 


to see how Scotus can be censured for holding, that 
in the last analysis God can dispense with an atone- 
ment altogether, and that whatever value the exist- 
ing judicial provision possesses in the divine plan, it 
possesses not in itself, but solely by virtue of its op- 
tional acceptance by the Omnipotent One who is 
not limited by anything, not even by his own moral 
attributes. The controversy, however, ran high be- 
tween the adherents of Aquinas and Scotus,—the 
Dominican order generally siding with the former, 
and the Franciscan with the latter. The Nominal- 
ists in philosophy also naturally favoured the views 
of Scotus, as his theory was that of a nominal and 
putative satisfaction, in distinction from a real and 
objective one. The extravagantly speculative minds 
of the age, those who have given the reputation of 
hair-splitting and excessive dialectics to Scholasti- 
cism, also adopted the positions of Scotus. 


$ 7. Recapitulatory Survey. 


Casting a swift glance backward over this Scho- 
lastic period, we recapitulate the following facts, as 
the summary of what we have found in the- history 
of the doctrine of Atonement. 

1. The doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, or sub- 
stituted penalty, was the general form of doctrine 
among all classes of minds within the pale of the 
Church, as it was in the Patristic period. All pro- 
fess to adopt it, and its explicit denial or rejection 


318 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


was deemed heresy. The Socinian position was not 
taken or defended by the Mediaeval theologians. 
2. The doctrine of vicarious satisfaction was held 
in the purely Biblical form by Anselm, without 
mixture of foreign elements, or subtraction of intrin- 
sic and essential characteristics. Had the Anselmic 
soteriology prevailed in the theory and practice of 
the Church generally, the Reformation of the 16th 
century would have occurred in the 11th. 3. The 
doctrine of vicarious substitution was not maintained 
in this pure and unqualified form by the successors 
of Anselm. Some of them, and those nearest to him 
in time, did not adopt his theory in its strictly sci- 
entific form, while yet they retained in feeling and 
practice its substantial features. Others, and these 
the later Schoolmen, while retaining the doctrine 
nominally and in phraseology, in reality essentially 
altered it; first, by confounding sanctification with 
justification, and, secondly, by teaching that an 
additional merit derived either from the church 
through its sacraments, or from voluntary penance 
on the part of the individual, is requisite in order 
that the satisfaction of Christ may be a complete 
and efficacious one. 4. In the departure from the 
Anselmic theory of an absolute as distinguished 
from a relative satisfaction, we find the germs of 
the subsequent Papal soteriology which during the 
middle and latter part of the Scholastic period shoot 
up with rankness and luxuriance. 


CHAPTER III. 


THE PAPAL SOTERIOLOGY. 


$1. Preliminary Statements. 


Tue history of the doctrine of Atonement 
in the Middle Ages has disclosed two tendencies 
within the Western Church, in respect to the 
nature of Christ’s work,—the one strict, and the 
other lax. The first has its representative in An- 
selm, and its expression in the theory of an infinite 
and real satisfaction. The second has several repre- 
sentatives, because it involves a descending scale. 
Some of the immediate successors of Anselm,— 
such as Bernard, the St. Victors, and Bonaven- 
tura,—retained the substance of the Anselmic view 
in their practical representations, yet at the same 
time in their theoretic statements made some modi- 
fications of the scientific positions of Anselm; of 
which the most important was the adoption (by 
Bonaventura for example) of the doctrine of the 
“relative” necessity of the atonement. The logical 
force and implication of these modifications was 


320 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


neutralized, in a great measure, by the reliance of 
the heart upon the Person and work of the Re- 
deemer, in the instances, certainly, of the penitent 
and devout Bernards and St. Victors. But the 
tendency itself was off and away from the strict 
exactitude of science, and it could not remain sta- 
tionary. We have already noticed in Aquinas, and 
still more in Lombard, the theory of a mixed justi- 
fication, resting partly upon the work of Christ, and 
partly upon the works of the individual; while the 
Abelards and Scotuses made statements of the doe- 
trine of atonement that were regarded by Bernard 
and the adherents of Aquinas as positively hereti- 
eal. The consequence was that in process of time 
the strict tendency was entirely overcome by the 
lax one. The Anselmic theory disappeared en- 
tirely from the heart of the Roman Church, and 
remained concealed’ in, at most, a very narrow cir- 
cle, until it burst forth with renewed energy and 
vitality in the soteriology of the Reformation. The 
lax theory prevailed, becoming more loose and lati- 
tudinarian as the corruption of both theory and 
practice advanced within the Papal Church, until 
it finally obtained a distinct expression, and an 
ecclesiastical authority, in the Soteriology of the 
Council of Trent. 

*This council was formally Sept. 17, 1549; was re-convened 
opened at Trent, Dec. 18, 1545; at Trent, May 1, 1551; was sus- 
held its first session, Jan.7,1546; pended, April 28, 1552; was re- 


was transferred to Bologna, March opened, Jan. 18, 1562, and sat to 
12, 1547; was there dissolved, Dec. 4, 1563. 


TRIDENTINE SOTERIOLOGY. 321 


-§ 2. Soteriology of the Council of Trent. 


The Tridentine theory makes inward holiness 
in conjunction with the merits of Christ the ground 
of justification. It founds human salvation upon 
two corner-stones. The doctors of Trent construct 
their exact and formal definition of justification out 
of that one element of error which, we have seen, 
somewhat vitiated the soteriology of Augustine. 
The unintentional confounding of the distinction 
between justification and sanctification, which ap- 
pears occasionally in the Patristic writers, becomes 
a deliberate and emphatic identification, in the 
scheme of the Papal Church. 

The Anselmic and Protestant soteriologies mean 
by the term “justification,” that divine act, instan- 
taneous and complete, by which sin is pardoned. 
If we distinguish the entire work of redemption into 
two parts, a negative and a positive, justification in 
the Pauline and in the Reformed signification would 
include the former and would include nothing more. 
Justification is the negative acquittal from condem- 
nation, and not in the least the positive infusion of 
righteousness, or production of holiness. This posi- 
tive element, the Reformers were careful to teach, 
invariably accompanies the negative; but they were 
equally careful to teach that it is not identical 
with it. The forgiveness of sin is distinct and dif- 
ferent from the sanctification of the heart. It is an 


VOL. 11.—21 


322 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 

antecedent which is always followed, indeed, by its 
consequent; but this does not render the consequent 
a substitute for the antecedent, or one and the same 
thing with it. But the Council of Trent resolved 
justification into sanctification, and in the place of a 
gratuitous justification and remission of sins through 
the expiation of the Redeemer, substituted the most 
subtle form of the doctrine of justification by works 
that has yet appeared, or that can appear. For the 
doctors of Trent do not teach, in their canonical 
statements, that man is justified and accepted at the 
bar of justice by his external acts of obedience to 
the moral or the ecclesiastical law. This is, indeed, 
the doctrine that prevails in the common practice 
of the Papal Church, but it is not the form in which 
it appears in the Tridentine canons. According to 
these, man is justified by an ¢mward and spiritual 
act which is denominated the act of faith; by a 
truly divine and holy habit or principle infused by 
the gracious working of the Holy Spirit. The 
ground of the sinner’s justification is thus a divine 


* The WESTMINSTER ConFESSION 
thus states the distinction between 
justification and sanctification. 
*‘ Although sanctification be in- 
separably joined with justifica- 
tion, yet they differ, in that God 
in justification imputeth the right- 
eousness of Christ; in sanctifica- 
tion, his Spirit infuseth grace, and 
enableth to the exercise thereof; 
in the former, sin is pardoned ; in 


the other, it is subdued ; the one 
doth equally free all believers 
from the revenging wrath of 
God, and that perfectly in this 
life, that they never fall into con- 
demnation ; the other is neither 
equal in all, nor in this life per- 
fect in any, but growing up to 
perfection.” (Larger Catechism, 
Q. 77.) 


TRIDENTINE SOTERIOLOGY. 323 


and a gracious one. God works in the sinful soul to 
will and to do, and by making it inherently just jus- 
tifies it. And all this is accomplished through the 
merits and mediation of Jesus Christ; so that, in 
justification there is a combination of the objective 
work of Christ with the subjective character of the 
believer. This statement is the more subtle, because 

it distinctly refers the infused grace or holiness to 
God as the author, and thereby seems to preclude 

the notion of self-righteousness. Butitisfundamen- % 
tally erroneous, because this infused righteoanead Wight 
or holiness of heart, upon which remissi sins ot 
rests in part, is not pzacular, aS init nothing ~ 
of the nature of a satisfaction to justice.’ So far 
forth, therefore, as infused grace in the heart is 
made a ground and procuring cause of the pardon 

of sin, the judicial aspects and relations of sin are 
overlooked, and man is received into the Divine 
favor without any true and proper expiation of his 
guilt. The Papal theory of justification, consequent- 

ly, stands upon the same level in the last analysis 
with the Socinian, or with any theory that denies 
the necessity of a satisfaction of justice? 


*“Then what is the fault of the ? In this respect, Romanism and 
church of Rome? Not that she Rationalism are two extremes 
requireth works at their hands that meet. See the views of 
which will be saved: butthatshe Sartorius on “the affinity of 
attributeth unto works @ power Romanism and Rationalism,” in 
of satisfying God for sin.” Brstiorneca Saora, Jan. 1851. 
Hooxer: On Justification, Works 
IIL. 538 


324 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


The following extracts from the Canones of the 
Council of Trent enunciate the Roman Catholic so- 
teriology. “ Justification is not the mere remission 
of sins, but also the sanctification and renovation 
of the inward man through the voluntary reception 
of grace and gifts of grace; whereby an unjust man 
becomes just, the enemy a friend, so that he may be 
an heir according to the hope of eternal life. .. The 
only formal cause of justification is the justice (justi- 
tia) of God, not that by which he himself is just, 
but that by which he makes us just,—that namely 
by which we are gratuitously *enewed by him in the 
spirit of our minds, and are not only reputed, but 
really are and are denominated just, receiving jus- 
tice into ourselves each one according to his own 
measure, which the Holy Spirit imparts to each as 
He pleases, and, also, according to each one’s own 
disposition and co-operation. . . When the Apostle 
asserts that man is justified by faith and gratuitously, 
his language is to be understood in that sense which 
the constant agreement of the Catholic Church has 
affixed to it; in such a manner, namely, as that we 
are said to be justified by faith, because faith is the 
beginning of human salvation, the foundation and 
root of all justification [1. e. of all virtue], without 
which it is impossible to please God (Heb. xi. 6). 
And we are said to be justified gratuitously, because 
none of those things which precede justification, 
whether faith or works, merits the grace itself of 


TRIDENTINE SOTERIOLOGY. 3295 
justification.” These citations from the Canons of 
the Council of Trent are sufficient to show that the 
theologians there assembled regarded justification as 
a renewing and sanctifying act on the part of God, 
and not a declarative one. It is not that Divine act 
whereby sin is pardoned, but whereby sin is purged. 
But that the doctrine of gratuitous remission of 
sin upon the sole ground of Christ’s satisfaction was 
thrown out of the Tridentine theory of justifica- 
tion, is yet more apparent from the anathematizing 
clauses which were added to explain and guard the 
so-called catholic faith. “If any one shall say that 
the sinner is justified by faith alone, in the sense 
that nothing else is required which may co-operate 
towards the attainment of the grace of justification, 
and that the sinner does not need to be prepared 
and disposed [for the reception of the grace of justi- 
fication], by the motion of his own will: let him be 
accursed. . . If any one shall say, that men are jus- 
tified either by the sole imputation of the righteous- 
ness of Christ, or by the sole remission of sin, to the 
exclusion of that grace and charity which is shed 
abroad in their hearts by the Holy Spirit, and which 
inheres in them, or shall say that the grace whereby 
we are justified is merely and only the favor of 
God: let him be accursed. Jf any one shall say 
that justifying faith is nothing but confidence in the 
divine mercy remitting sin on account of Christ, or 


?Canones Conortu Tripentint: De Justificatione, vii. viii. 


Pe 


326 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


that this faith is the sole thing by which we are jus- 
tified : let him be accursed.”* It will be perceived 
from these extracts, that the Tridentine theologian 
regarded “ justification” as prospective and not re- 
trospective, in its essential nature. It is not the for- 
giveness of “sins that are past,” but the cure and 
prevention of sins that are present and future. The 
element of guilt is lost sight of, and the piacular 
work of Christ is lost sight of with it; and the 
whole work of redemption is interpreted to be 
merely a method of purification. Thus the Triden- 
tine theory implies, logically, that_sin_is not_guilt, 
but only disease and pollution. Furthermore, ac- 
cording to the Papal theory, justification is not in- 
stantaneous but successive. It is not a single and 
complete act upon the part of God, but a gradual 
process in the soul of man. For it is founded upon 
that inward holiness or love which has been infused 
by divine grace. But this advances from one de- 
gree to another, never being perfect in this life, and 
never standing still. The consciousness of being jus- 
tified before God, even if it could rest upon such an 
imperfect foundation at all, must fluctuate with all 
the changes in the internal experience. And as mat- 
ter of fact, the Council of Trent declares that a man 
cannot be certain of being justified, and condemns 
those who affirm such certainty in the following 
terms: “ Although it is necessary to believe that no 


?Qanones Conoitu Tripentini: De Justificatione, ix. xi. xii, 


TRIDENTINE SOTERIOLOGY. oat 


sin is, or ever has been, remitted except gratuitously 
by the Divine mercy on account of Christ, yet no 
one who affirms with confidence and certainty 
(jactat) that his sins are remitted, and who rests in 
this confidence alone, is to be assured of remission.” 
According to the Papal soteriology, the assurance 
of the remission of sins, and of acceptance at the bar 
of God, must rest upon the degree of holiness that 
has been infused, and not simply and solely upon 
Christ’s oblation for sin. Hence it cannot in this 
life attain to certainty, because the inward holiness 
never in this life attains to perfection. Justification 
is not instantaneous and complete, but gradual and 
incomplete, because the infused righteousness out 
of which it issues is imperfect. This is distinctly 
taught in the tenth chapter of the “ decree” con- 
cerning Justification. “Therefore being thus justi- 
fied, and made friends of God and members of his 
household, and going from strength to strength, 
they are renewed, as the Apostle teaches, day by 
day: that is to say, by mortifying their fleshly 
members, and yielding them as instruments of right- 
eousness unto sanctification, through the observance 
of the commands of God and the church, their right- 
eousness itself being accepted through the grace of 
Christ, and their faith co-operating with their good 
works, they grow [in holiness], and are justified 
more and more. This increase of justification (justi- 
tiae), the Holy Church seeks when she prays: 
‘Give unto us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and 


328 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


997 


charity.” By these positions of the Council of 
Trent, the effect of justification is substituted for the 
cause. That inward holiness which succeeds the 
forgiveness of sins is made to take the place of the 
atoning death and the imputed righteousness of the 
Redeemer. The ground of justification is thus a 
personal and subjective one. It is, consequently, 
imperfect and incomplete, and must be supple- 
mented by greater measures of holiness and attain- 
ments in piety, and also by the external penances 
and good works required by the Church. “If any 
one shall assert,” says the 24th Canon concerning 
Justification, “that the righteousness received [in 
justification] is not preserved and also increased 
before God by good works; but that good works 
are only the fruit and signs of a justification already 
attained, and not the cause of an increase of justifi- 
cation: let him be accursed.” 


$ 3. Soteriology of Bellarmin. 


The theory enunciated at Trent received a fur- 
ther expansion and defence from Roman Catholic 
theologians. Of these, the most distinguished was 
Robert Belarmin, whose Disputationes, published 
in 1581, constitute the most elaborate explication 
and defence that has yet been made of the Papal 
Dogmatics. The theory of justification as stated 


‘For sharp and effective criti- min, see Davenant: On Justi- 
cism of the positions of Bellar- fication, I. 164, seq. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BELLARMINE. 329 


in detail by the expounders of the Decrees and Can- 
ons of Trent embraces the following particulars. 
Justification is two-fold, and is denominated the 
“first” and “second.” The first justification is the 
infusion or communication of an inherent principle 
or habit (habitus) of grace or charity; the second 
justification is the good works, or right life, that 
results from this. By the first justification original 
sin is extinguished, and the habits of sin are ex- 
pelled. This justification is obtained by the exer- 
cise of faith, of which the meritorious and procuring 
cause is the obedience and satisfaction of Christ. 
But at this point, the Romish theory introduces a 
distinction that wholly neutralizes the evangelical 
element introduced by this latter statement. This 
distinction is one borrowed from the later Schoolmen, 
particularly Thomas Aquinas,—the distinction, viz., 
between meritum ex condigno, and meritum ex con- 
gruo, or merit from desert, and merit from fitaess. 
This distinction is thus defined by Aquinas, with 
his usual acuteness and clearness. “A meritorious 
work of man may be considered in two aspects; 
first, as proceeding from the free will of man, and 
secondly, as proceeding from the grace of the Holy 
Spirit. If it be considered from the first point of 
view, there can be in it no merit of condignity or 
absolute desert; because of the inequality between 
man and God, whereby it is impossible for the 
creature to bring the Creator under absolute obliga- 
tions. But if it be considered from the see ad point 


330 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


of view, as proceeding from the influence of the 
Holy Spirit, the work of man may have the merit 
of congruity or fitness; because it is fitting that God 
should reward his own grace as a thing excellent in 
itself.”' This distinction between two species of 
merit is connected, in the Tridentine theory of justi- 
fication, with the doctrine of a “ preparation” and 
predisposition for justification, in such a manner 
that although the name of merit is warily avoided, 
the thing itself is not. Man is prepared for justifi- 
cation, i.e. for the infusion of righteousness, by the 
common operations of his mind under common or 
prevenient grace. But this grace of preparation 
merits more grace, not by virtue of the merit of con- 
dignity indeed, but of congruity. And so onward, 
step by step, to the very end of the process of justi- 
fication. Itis easy to see how this subtle distinction, 
when coupled with the doctrine of an antecedent 
preparation, nullifies all the force of the statement 
that the obedience and satisfaction of Christ is the 
meritorious cause of a sinnet’s justification. For 
this antecedent preparation, as defined by the Can- 
ons of the Council, amounts to nothing more than 
a historical faith, or an assent to divine revelation? 
But this is called a species of believing, which, upon 
the principle of congruity or fitness, deserves more 

‘Aquinas: Summa. Pt. II.i. liberemoventur in Deum, creden- 
Qu. 114. Art. 4. See Minsoner- tes vera esse quae divinitus reve- 
Von Cét~tn: Dogmengeschichte lata et promissa sunt.” CANONES 


§ 133, 6. Concern Tripentin1: De Justi- 
* “idem ex auditu concipientes, ficatione, vi. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF BELLARMINE. 331 


grace. And this increase or fresh accession of grace 
is a gratia gratum faciens,—that is, an infused grace 
that expels the habit of sin, and thus justifies or 
makes acceptable to God. So that justification in 
the last analysis takes its start from the ordinary 
operations of the human mind, under the common 
influences of God’s Spirit and Providence, and ends 
with being an inward and infused righteousness, 
upon the ground of which the ungodly is set in right 
relations to God.? 

The difference between the Papal and the Prot- 
estant soteriology is enunciated by Baur with his 
usual strength and discrimination, in the following 


terms. 


1“ Salvation by Christ is the 
foundation of Christianity; as 
for works, they are a thing sub- 
ordinate no otherwise than be- 
cause our sanctification cannot be 
accomplished without them. The 
doctrine concerning them is a 
thing builded upon the founda- 
tion; therefore the doctrine 
which addeth unto them the 
power of satisfying, or of merit- 
ing, addeth unto a thing subordi- 
nated, builded upon the founda- 
tion, not to the very foundation 
itself. Yet is the foundation by 
this addition consequently over- 
thrown, forasmuch as out of this 
addition it may be negatively 
concluded, [that] he which mak- 
eth any work good and accept- 
able in the sight of God to pro- 


“The Protestant doctrine of justification 


ceed from the natural freedom of 
our will, he which giveth unto 
any good works of ours the force 
of satisfying the wrath of God for 
sin, [or] the power of meriting 
either earthly or heavenly re- 
wards, he which holdeth works 
going before our vocation in con- 
gruity to merit our vocation, [or] 
works following our first to merit 
our second justification and by 
condignity our last reward in the 
kingdom of heaven, pulleth up 
the doctrine of faith by the roots. 
For out of every one of these po- 
sitions, the plain direct denial 
thereof may be certainly con- 
cluded.” Hooxer: On Justifica- 
tion (Works, IT. 588). Compare 
Lutner: On Galatians, 129-30 
(Carter’s Ed.), 


332 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


starts from the most profound consciousness of sin 
as guilt, Man is justified, subjectively, through the 
confident assurance that his sins are forgiven, and 
this assurance is through the act of faith, which is 
a purely receptive act; and he is justified, objec- 
tively, through a purely declarative act of God, 
which has reference to him as an individual. In 
both its subjective and its objective aspect, justifi- 
cation is consequently the imputation, merely, and 
not the infusion, of the righteousness of Christ, and 
is Instantaneous and complete. The great difference 
between this view and the Papal theory of justifi: 
cation lies in the fact, that the Papal theory is not 
occupied with the negative side of the subject, viz.: 
the pacification of the conscience in respect to a 
guilt that lies in the past, but rather with the posi- 
tive side, viz.: the imparting of a new principle and 
habit of sanctification. The principle of justification, 
in the Tridentine soteriology, is not faith, in the 
carefully discriminated and deep sense of the Prot- 
estant doctrine of justifying faith,—in reality it is 
not faith in any sense, but is Jove,—and justification 
is not a mere instantaneous and complete declara- 
tion of being righteous, but a making righteous by 
the infused grace of the Holy Ghost, which is sue- 
cessive and gradual in its nature.” ? 


? Baur : Dogmengeschichte, ant soteriology, see Riverus: 
§ 105. Ed. 1847. For a clear Synopsis Purioris Theologiae, pp. 
statement of the difference be- 417-419. 
tween the Papal and the Protest- 


CHRAPTER.. IV. 


SOTERIOLOGY OF THE REFORMERS. 


§$ 1. Forerunners of the Reformation. 


ly the age immediately preceding the century of 
the Reformation, we have had occasion to notice a 
few men who were forerunners of that great move- 
ment. They were minds that had become weary 
of the fruitless dialectics into which Scholasticism 
had degenerated, and that craved a warmer and 
more vital Christianity than was prevailing in the 
great mass of the Church. We should naturally 
expect to meet with evangelical views of the Atone- 
ment in the writings of these men, and the expecta- 
tion is not disappointed. 

Wickliffe (+ 1404?) the English Reformer pre- 
sents the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction with dis- 
tinctness, though in connection with some specula- 
tions respecting the nature of sin that are somewhat 
peculiar. But the most remarkable of these early 


*Compare Uttmann: Reformers before the Reformation. 


3b84 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


reformers, so far as the doctrine of atonement is 
concerned, is John Wessel (+ 1489), a man whom 
Hagenbach describes in the following terms: 
“'Trained up in Scholasticism, he announced the 
coming end of Scholasticism, insisted upon Serip- 
ture as the sole foundation of belief, upon faith 
without works as the ground of justification, and 
upon an inward and vital piety in the heart.”? So 
much has this remarkable man in common with the 
great German reformer, that Ullmann has entitled 
his interesting biography of him: “ John Wessel, a 
forerunner of Luther.” Wessel is Lutheran indeed, 
in his conceptions and statements of the doctrine 
of atonement. “It is,” he says, “the greatest of 
wonders that the very same divine justice which is 
armed with an eternal law of threatening and con- 
demnation towards the transgressor, should in the 
day and hour of judgment not only hold back the 
sword of vengeance, and absolve from the punish- 
ment threatened, but should raise the criminal to 
heights of glory and happiness. Who does not 
wonder to see the truthfulness of threatenings con- 
verted into the truthfulness of promises, so that 
strict truth is kept on both sides, and in both as- 
pects? These two contradictions are reconciled in 
the Lamb of God, the infinite atonement of Christ. 
Christ, himself God, himself the priest, himself the 
sacrifice, has made satisfaction to himself, for him- 


‘ Hacensacy: Dogmengeschichte, 336 (Note). 


PROTESTANT AND ANSELMIC SOTERIOLOGIES. 335 


self, and of himself.! In Christ we behold not 
only a reconciled but a reconciling deity ; an incar- 
nate God who, in the sinner’s place, and for the sin- 
ner’s salvation, furnishes what his own attributes of 
holiness and justice require.” 


$2. The Protestant and Anselmic Soteriologies 
Compared. 


The Reformation of the Church in the 16th 
century begins and ends in the doctrine whose 
history we are investigating. So much has been 
written, and so much is known, concerning the 
general aspects of the doctrine of atonement during 
this era in Church History, that we shall confine 
our examination to what was special and peculiar 
in the soteriology of the Reformers. 

We have seen that the dogmatic substance of 
the Protestant theory may be traced from the be- 
ginning. The constituent elements are, it is true, 
much more apparent in some theories and ages, 
than in others; but the doctrine itself of vicarious 
satisfaction cannot be said to be the discovery of 
any one age. Having a Biblical origin, and finding 
all its data and grounds in the revealed word, we 
trace its onward flow from this fountain through 
the centuries, sometimes visible in a broad and 


*“Tpse Deus, ipse sacerdos, ipse cit.” Wnsszz: De Causis Incar- 
hostia, pro se, de se, sibi satisfe- mnationis, c. 17. 


336 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


. 


gleaming current, and sometimes running like a 
subterranean river silent and unseen in the hearts 
and minds of a smaller number chosen by Provi- 
dence to keep alive the apostolic faith, and to pre- 
serve unbroken the line of the invisible and true 
Church, even though the external continuity were 
interrupted and broken. Men like Anselm and 
Wessel prepare us for men like Luther and Cal- 
vin ; and in taking up the thread of our narrative 
we proceed to a comparison of the Anselmic with 
the Protestant construction of the doctrine of atone- 
ment. 

1. There is a difference between them, but this 
difference is formal and not material. The An- 
selmic view is predominantly objective in its charae- 
ter. Sin is contemplated in its relations to the 
being and attributes of God, and consequently the 
atonement is viewed in the same reference chiefly. 
This is the excellence of the theory, and in this con- 
sists its validity before the bar of reason and sci- 
ence. The eternal and necessary grounds of Christ’s 
work, as they exist in the nature of Deity and in 
the constitution of the moral universe, are clearly 
exhibited, and thus the whole domain of soteriol- 
ogy is made to rest upon the metaphysical and uni- 
versal principles of reason and justice. The soteri- 
ology of the Reformation, while adopting with equal 
heartiness this objective view of the Anselmic the- 
ory, unites with it in a greater degree than did this 
latter, the subjective element of faith. The atten- 


PROTESTANT AND ANSELMIC SOTERIOLOGIES. 337 


tion of the theologian in the latter part of the 
Scholastic period, as we have seen in the sketch 
of Aquinas, had been directed to the mode in 
which the sinner comes into possession of that 
atoning work by which sin is expiated; but this 
point did not engage the thoughts of Anselm to 
any very great extent. Aquinas solved the diffi- 
culty by the doctrine of the wnio mystica; but 
this, with him, possessed too much of a sacramental 
and magical quality, and was disjoimed from the 
principle of intelligent belief. One of the first 
characteristics of the Protestant view of the atone- 
ment that strikes the attention is the part which the 
principle of faith plays in all the discussions. The 
attention is now turned to that act im man by which 
the act and work of God is appropriated. This was 
a natural consequence of the change that was taking 
place in the general religious views of Christendom. 
v (The mind was not satisfied with an objective and 
outward salvation, however valid and reliable it 
might be. It desired a consciousness of being 
saved. It craved an experience of salvation. The 
Protestant mind could not rest in the Church; 
neither could it pretend to rest in an atonement 
that was unappropriated. The objective work of 
Christ on Calvary must become the subjective ex- 
perience and rejoicing of the soul itself. If we may, 
in this connection, employ the simple and affecting 
phraseology of the dying “ Young Cottager,” we 
may say that Protestantism reposes upon “ Christ 


VOL. 1.—22 


338 IISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


there and Christ here,” Christ on the mediatorial 
throne, and Christ in the believing heart,—that it 
unites in a living synthesis the objective atonement 
with the subjective faith in it. 

While, however, the principle and act of faith 
occupies such a prominent place in the soteriology 
of the Reformation, we should not fail to notice 
that it is never represented as a procuring cause of 
‘nstification. It is only the instrumental cause. 
Protestantism was exceedingly careful to distin- 
guish justification from legal righteousness on the 
one hand, and from sanctification by grace on the 
other. It could not, consequently, concede to any 
species of human agency, however excellent, a piac- 
ular and atoning efficacy. Hence, we find none of 
that supplementing or perfecting of the work of 
Christ, by the work of the creature, which we no- 
ticed in the Papal soteriology. And this applies 
to the highest of acts, the act of faith itself. Faith 
itself, though the gift and the work of God, does 
not justify, speaking accurately, but merely accepts 
that which does justify. A few extracts from the 
principal symbols of the Reformation will set this in 
aclear light. The Formula Concordiae, a Lutheran 
creed drawn up to explain more fully the views of 
the Augsburg Confession and guard them against 
misapprehension, thus defines the term “ justifica- 
tion.” “The word justification signifies to pro- 
nounce just, to absolve from the eterna] punish- 
ment of sin, on account of the satisfaction of Christ. 


PROTESTANT AND ANSELMIC SOTERIOLOGIES. 339 


. .. Sometimes the word regeneration is used for 
the word justification ; in this case, it is necessary 
to explain carefully, lest the renovation which fol. 
lows justification should be confounded with justi- 
fication. . . . The order and distinction between 
faith and good works, between justification and 
renovation, or sanctification, should be carefully 
observed. For good works do not precede faith, 
and sanctification does not precede justification. 
But in the instance of conversion by the Holy 
Spirit, faith is first enkindled by hearing the gos- 
pel promise of pardon. This faith then appre- 
hends and appropriates the grace of God in Christ ; 
by which faith, the man (persona) is justified. But 
when the man is justified (i. e. declared free from 
condemnation) then he is renovated and sanctified 
by the Holy Spirit, and then from this renovation 
and sanctification the fruits, that is the good works, 
follow spontaneously. Neither, [though thus dis- 
tinguished from each other, and set in a series] can 
these parts of salvation be separated from each 
other in actual experience, as if, e. ¢., true faith in 
Christ’s atonement could stand for a while in con- 
junction with an unrenewed will; but in the order 
of causes and effects, of antecedents and conse- 
quents, they are so distributed. For, as Luther 
says, ‘faith and works are inseparably connected ; 
but it is faith alone and without works that appro- 
priates the atonement, and thereby justifies, and 
yet faith does not remain alone, [ but acts itself out, 


340 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


and thus produces works].”' The Confessio Bel. 
gica, a Calvinistic creed, thus defines the doctrine 
of justification. ‘ We believe that the Holy Spirit 
kindles true faith in our hearts, which faith em- 
braces Jesus Christ with all his merits, makes him 
its own, and peculiar (proprium) to itself, and 
seeks nothing further beyond him. MHence we 
rightly say with Paul, that we are justified by 
faith alone, or by faith without works. At the 
same time, if we speak with strict accuracy, we by 
no means understand that our act of faith is that 
which justifies us [i. e. obtains for us the remission 
of sin], but that the act of faith is the instrument 
by which we seize hold of the atonement of Christ, 
which alone satisfies the law and thereby obtains 
the remission of sin.” ? 

In this way, the Protestant soteriology was an 
advance upon the Anselmic, by being more com- 
prehensive and complete. Agreeing with it per- 
fectly so far as the objective work of Christ is con- 
cerned, it made further and fuller statements re- 
specting the mode in which the external becomes 
internal, in the experience of the individual. It 
also differed from the Anselmic, in respect to a sec- 
ondary topic, in rejecting the notion of Anselm that 
the number of the saved exactly equals the number 

*Hase: Libri Symbolici, pp. rately speaking, it is only the 
685-693. atonement that justifies, i e. 
2? Conressio Bercioa: Art. 22. frees from condemnation; as it 


-—Faith justifies in the sense in is the food that nourishes, and 
which eating nourishes. Accu- not the mere act of masticating. 


PROTESTANT AND ANSELMIC SOTERIOLOGIES. 341 


of the fallen angels, and that redemption was intend- 
ed to keep the number of pure and holy spirits good. 

2. A second difference between the Anselmic 
and the Protestant soteriology is seen in the formal 
distinction of Christ’s work into his active and his 
passive righteousness. By his passive righteous- 
ness is meant his expiatory sufferings, by which he 
satisfied the claims of justice, and by his active 
righteousness is meant his obedience to the law as 
arule of life and conduct. It was contended by 
those who made this distinction, that the purpose 
of Christ as the vicarious substitute was to meet the 
entire demands of the law for the sinner. But the 
law requires present and perfect obedience, as well 
as satisfaction for past disobedience. The law is 
not completely fulfilled by the endurance of pen- 
alty only. It must also be obeyed. Christ both 
endured the penalty due to man for disobedience, 
and perfectly obeyed the law for him; so that he 
was a Vicarious substitute in reference to both the 
precept and the penalty of the law. By his active 
obedience he obeyed the law; and by his passive 
obedience he endured the penalty. In this way his 
vicarious work is complete. Some writers contend 
that the distinction between the active and passive 
righteousness can be traced in the Patristic soteri- 
ology, and would find it wherever they find a sub- 
stantially correct view of the atonement.’ But 


'This is done by an able writer in the EvaneELisoHeE KiroHen- 
ZEITUNG for 1834, p. 523 (Note). 


342 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


this is undoubtedly an extreme statement that 
cannot be made good. The utmost that can be 
claimed is, that there are passages in the Fathers, 
in which the beginnings of such a distinction may 
perhaps be detected by logical implication, but the 
distinction itself is nowhere formally made in the 
Patristic soteriology. The only writer in whom 
it appears with any distinctness previous to the 
Reformation is Aquinas, whose distinction between 
satisfactio and meritum has been noticed. Up to 
the time of the Reformation, the Christian mind 
was engaged with a prominence that amounted to 
exclusiveness with the question: “ How is the soul 
to be delivered from condemnation?” The further 
question: “ How is the soul to acquire a title to 
eternal life?” was not answered, and probably did 
not come much into the mind. The earliest sym- 
bol of the Reformation does not make the distine- 
tion in question. The Augsburg Confession, and 
the Apology drawn up in defence of it (A. D. 1530), 
treat only of the expiation of guilt, and Christ’s 
passive or atoning righteousness. The larger and 
smaller Catechisms of Luther do the same. The 
Formula Concordiae, drawn up in 1576, is the only 
Lutheran symbol in which the distinction in ques- 
tion appears. Its statement is as follows: “That 
righteousness which is imputed to faith, or to the 
believer, of mere grace, is the obedience, suffering, 
and resurrection of Christ, by which he satis- 
fied the law for us, and expiated our sins. For 


PROTESTANT AND ANSELMIC SOTERIOLOGIES. 343 


since Christ was not only man, but truly God and 
man in one undivided person, he was no more sub- 
ject to the law than he was to suffering and death 
[i.e. if his Person, merely, be taken into account, 
without any reference to his vicarious relations], 
because he was the divine and eternal Lord of the 
law. Hence, not only that obedience to God his 
Father which he exhibited in his passion and death, 
but also that obedience which he exhibited in volun- 
tarily sulyecting himself to the law and fulfilling 7 
for our sakes is imputed to us for righteousness, so 
that God, on account of the total obedience which 
Christ accomplished (praestitit) for our sake be- 
fore his heavenly Father, both in acting and in 
suffering, in life and in death, may remit our sins 
to us, regard us as holy and righteous, and give us 
eternal felicity.” Here, Christ’s fulfilment of the 
law is represented as the ground and procuring 
cause of eternal blessedness for the believer. 

In the Reformed or Calvinistic symbols, we find 
the fact to be similar. The earlier confessions do 
not make the distinction, while the later do. The 
Second Helvetic Confession, drawn up by Bullinger 
in 1564, the most authoritative of the Reformed sym- 
bols, contains only a hint of the doctrine of the ac. 
tive righteousness, if indeed it contain one at all. 
The phraseology is as follows: “By his passion or 

death, and thus by everything which he did and per- 


1Hase: Libri Symbolici, p. 68. 


344 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


formed for our sakes by his advent in the flesh, our 
Lord reconciled the celestial Father to all believers, 
expiated sin, conquered death, broke the power of 
condemnation and of hell, and by his resurrection 
from the dead brought back and restored life and 
immortality. For he is our righteousness, life, and 
resurrection, in fine the fullness and absolution of 
all believers, as well as their most abundant safety 
and sufficiency.”’ The Heidelberg Catechism, com- 
posed in 1562, by Olevianus and Ursinus, seems to 
regard the holiness and obedience of Christ as a 
part of the atonement for sin which he made. The 
answer to the 36th question runs as follows: “ Be- 
cause he is our Mediator, and by his innocence and 
perfect holiness covers my sin, in which I was con- 
ceived, that it may not come into the view of God.” 
The Formula Consensus, drawn up by Heidegger 
and Turretine in 1675, and adopted by the Swiss 
Churches, expressly distinguishes between the ac- 
tive and passive righteousness of Christ; and it, 
moreover, reckons the former in with the latter as 
constituting part of the entire work of satisfaction, 
in opposition to the views of Piscatorius, who con- 
tended that the holiness of Christ does not justify 
in the forensic and objective sense, but only as it 
becomes the inward principle of the soul,—adopting 
substantially the Tridentine theory of justification 
by sanctification. The statement of the Consensus 


} NigMEYeER: Collectio, p. 486. 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. 345 


is as follows. “ Christ rendered satisfaction to God 
the Father, by the obedience of his death, in the 
place of the elect, in such sense that the entire obe- 
dience which he rendered to the law through the 
whole course of his life, whether actively or pas- 
sively, ought to be reckoned into the account of his 
vicarious righteousness and obedience.” * 


§ 3. Recapitulatory Survey. 


We have thus traced the history of this cardinal 
truth of Christianity down to the Reformation,—a 
point at which it received its fullest expansion, and 
became entirely free from those foreign elements 
which we have seen mixing with it in its preceding 
history. The doctrine was now that of pure and 
complete satisfaction of law. The claims of Satan, 
which so interfered with the full exhibition of the 
truth in the Ancient Church, exerted no influence 
upon the Protestant construction of the doctrine. 
The Atonement was referred solely to the divine 
attribute of justice, and was held to be absolutely 
necessary,—though the Scholastic controversy re- 
specting relative and absolute necessity was not re- 
vived. Again, that vitiating element in the Tri- 
dentine soteriology,—the combination of human 
works, either internal or external, in greater or in 


1 NIEMEYER: Collectio, p. 734. 


346 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


less degree, with that of Christ, in making up the 
sum of satisfaction.—was now entirely purged out. 
The human soul was delivered from condemnation, 
solely by the obedience and sufferings of the Son 
of God. Faith itself does not justify, but only ac- 
cepts and appropriates that satisfaction of law made 
by Christ which completely justifies, alone and of 
itself. 


“a6 


i as 


CHAPTER Y. 


THE GROTIAN SOTERIOLOGY. 


$1. Preliminary Statements. 


We have seen that the assertion of a relative 
necessity, only, for the satisfaction of Christ was 
made in its most unqualified form, and drawn out 
to its last consequence, by Duns Scotus in his con- 
troversy with the followers of Aquinas. He laid 
down the proposition that “ every created oblatio 
or offering is worth what God is pleased to accept 
it for, and no more.” Upon this proposition, he 
founded the theory of “ acceptilation” The term 
acceptilatio, or accepti latio, is borrowed from the 
Roman law. In the Pandects of Justinian, it is de- 
fined to be “an acquittance from obligation, dy 
word of mouth, of a debtor by a creditor;” and in 
the Institutes of Justinian, it is called “an imagin- 
ary payment.”* Primarily, the term does not be- 


‘Est autem acceptilatio ima- obligation is also freed (tollitur) 
ginaria solutio.” Justintanus: by acceptilation. This is an im- 
Institut. Lib. II. Tit.29.—“ An aginary payment, for if Titius 


cha 


kK 


348 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


long to the province of criminal, but of commercial 
law. <A creditor is an absolute owner of his own 
property, and if he pleases to discharge his debtor 
from his obligation to pay the debt which he owes 
him, he can do so by a word without any literal 
payment being made. He can call the debt paid, 
and it is paid. Or he can cancel the entire debt 
upon the payment of a part only. This arbitrary 
and optional acceptance of nothing for something, 
or of a part for the whole of a debt, is “ acceptila- 
tion.” The term acceptilatio, when transferred as 
it was by Scotus to the doctrine of Christ’s satisfae- 
tion, signifies that God accepts this satisfaction, not 
because a strictly infinite value belongs to the suf- 
ferings of the God-Man (for Scotus denied this), 
but because, in his infinite benevolence, he is will- 
ing to content himself with a satisfaction that is 
not strictly infinite. Hence, in Scotus’s theory, the 
atonement of Christ is sufficient to satisfy the 
claims of law because God is willing to regard it 


wishes to remit payment of that 
which is due to him by a verbal 
contract, he can do so by per- 
mitting the debtor to put to him 
the following question: ‘Do you 
acknowledge to have received 
that which I promised you?’ 
Titius then answering ‘I do.’ The 
acknowledgment may also be 
made in corresponding Greek 
words, ¢yers AuBov Syvapia téca ; 
éxyo AaBov. In this way verbal 
contracts are dissolved, but not 


contracts made in other ways: it 
seemed natural that an obligation 
formed by words should be dis- 
solved by words; but anything 
due by any other kind of contract 
may be made the subject of a stip- 
ulation, and be freed by accep- 
tilation (per acceptilationem dis- 
solvi). And as part only of a 
debt may be actually paid, so ac- 
ceptilation may be made of a part 
only.” Sanpers: Institutes of 
Justinian, p. 493. 


PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS. 349 


as such, although in strict fact it is insufficient. 

This is justified upon the principle which Scotus 

lays down, that any oblation is worth what the 

Deity is willing to rate it at. Its value is not in} 
trinsic and real, but acquired and nominal. 

The controversy between the Thomists and 
Scotists, upon this and kindred points, was con- 
tinued down to the Reformation, and has never 
been settled to this day within the Romish Church. 
At the time of the Reformation, we have seen that 
both Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians adopted 
the Anselmic theory of a strict satisfaction. This 
soteriology enters into all the Lutheran and Calvin- 
istic symbols of the continent, and into the Episco- 
palian, Presbyterian, and Congregational symbols 
of England and America. So far, therefore, as the 
principal Protestant creeds are concerned, the the- 
ory of an absolute necessity of atonement, and a 
strict satisfaction of justice by the suffering of 
Christ, is the prevalent one. But the theory ofa  , 
relative necessity was revived in the 17th century, yi 
and stated in an elaborate manner, by the distin- 
guished scholar and jurist Hugo Grotius (+ 1645). 
It. was also adopted and maintained by the leaders 
of the Arminian party, Episcopius, Limborch, Cur- 
cellacus,' and constituted one of the distinctive 


1“ The elder Lutheran and Cal- from the infinite dignity of his 
vinistic theologians defended the Person. The Arminian theolo- 
intrinsic and strict equivalence of _ gians, Episcopius, Limborch, Cur- 
Christ's satisfaction, as flowing cellaeus, and others, on the con- 


350 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 

points of difference between their soteriology, and 
that of the Reformers. As the Grotian theory is 
the best form in which the doctrine of a relative 
necessity of the atonement has been stated, and as 
it has exerted considerable influence upon the his- 
tory of this doctrine during the last two centuries, 
it merits a particular examination. 


§ 2. Grotian idea of law and penalty. 


The soteriology of Grotius is founded upon his 
Cidea of law and punishment,)and the relation which 


these susta 
is a positive sta 
says, “something in 










mere product 


trary, asserted only an acceptila- 
tio, or accepted value, in reference 
to Christ’s satisfaction, and upon 
the express ground of a relative 
and not absolute necessity of a 
satisfaction of divine justice by a 
God-man.” Erscu-Gruser: En- 
cyclopiidie, Art. Acceptilatio. At 
the 112th session of the Synocé 
of Dort, “‘ Professor Usselburgh, 
at the desire of the President 
(Bogermann), discoursed of the 
satisfaction of Christ for sin, in 
opposition to the Socinians and 


to God. Law, according to Grotius, 
e or enactment. 
-d in God, or in the Divine 
will and nature, but is on 
(voluntatis quidam effectus 


part of God, by which he him- 


“Tt is not,” he 


ect of his w will” 


aw, therefore, is a 


Vorstius. He maintained, in the 
first place, that God could not 
forgive sin without satisfaction. 
Secondly, that Christ had given 
such satisfaction properly and 
truly, and not according to any 
previous acceptilation.” Branpt: 
History of the Reformation in 
Netherlands. Book xxxix. (Vol. 
III. p. 256). 

‘Grotius: Defensio Fidei, Cap. 
iii. pp. 60, 310. Ed, Amstelae- 
dami, 1679. 


GROTIAN IDEA OF LAW.’ 351 


self is not bound, because it is his own work. As 


the enactor of a positive statute, he has the same 
power to alter it, or to abrogate it, which the law- 
making power among men possesses. The penalty 


of law, consequently, is likewise a positive, and not 
a natural and necessary arrangement. It does not 


spring inevitably and naturally out of the very 
nature of law, and the very being of God, but is at- 
tached to the statute by a positive decision of the be 
Deity,—which decision is optional and mutable.) 
Hence, both law itself, and the penalty of law, in re 
Grotius’s view, may be modified in part, or even ie 
abolished altogether by an act of the Governor of 
the universe, because the workman has plenary 
power over his work. The following extracts from 
the writings of Grotius exhibit his opinions with 
sufficient clearness, “ All positive laws,” (and Gro- 
tius has mentioned the law of Eden as such,) says 
Grotius, “are relaxable. Those who fear that if we 
concede this we do an injury to God, because we 
thereby represent him as mutable, are much de- 
ceived. For law is not something internal in God, 
or in the will itself of God, but it is a particular 
effect or product of his will. But that the effects 
or products of the Divine will are mutable is very 
certain. Moreover, in promulgating a positive law 
which he might wish to relax at some future time, 
God does not exhibit any fickleness of will. For 


God seriously indicated that he desired that his law 
should be valid and obligatory, while yet at the same 


c 


Soe HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


time he reserved the right of relaxing it, if he saw 
fit, because this right pertains to a positive law from 
the very nature of the case, and cannot be abdicated 
by the Deity. Nay more, the Deity does not abdi- 
eate the right of even abrogating law altogether, as 
is apparent from the instance of the ceremonial 
law. . . It is objected to this view, that it is nat- 
urally just that the guilty should be punished with 
such a punishment as corresponds to their crime, 
and therefore that punishment is not a matter of 
optional choice, neither is it relaxable. In answer 
to this objection, it is to be noticed that it (does not 
always follow that(injustice is done when justice is 
not done. For as it does not follow that if a king 
is to be called generous who has given a thousand 
talents to some one, he is therefore to be called un- 
generous if he has not given it, so it is not a univer- 
sal truth that if a thing may be done with justice, 
it cannot therefore be omitted without injustice. 
As in physics, so in morals, a thing may be called 
‘natural and necessary’ in a strict sense (proprie), 
and in a less strict sense (minus proprie). In phys- 
ics, that is strictly natural and necessary which be- 
longs to the very essence of a thing,—as, for example, 
for a sentient creature to have sensation; and 
that is less strictly natural which is as it were fitted 
and accommodated to a thing,—as, for example, 
for a man to use his right hand. In like manner, 
there are in morals certain things which are strictly 
natural and necessary, which follow necessarily from 


GROTIAN IDEA OF LAW, 353 


the relation of the things themselves to rational 


o 


natures,—as, for example, that perjury is unlawful ; 

and there are other things which are less strictly 

natural and necessary,—as, for example, that the son 

should succeed the father [in the government]. pe 
That, therefore, he who sins deserves to be punished, oh 
and is therefore punishable, follows from the very, 

relation of sin and the sinner to a superior power on 
and is strictly natural and necessary. But that any a 
and every sinner be punished with such a@ punish- 

ment as corresponds with his guilt is not absolutely 
(simpliciter) and universally necessary; neither is 

it strictly natural, but only fitted and accommodated eons 
to nature (sed naturae satis conveniens). Whence” =™ 
it follows, that nothing prevents the relaxing of the 
law which orders this punishment. There is no 

mark or sign of irrevocability in the law, in the case 

of which We are speaking, neither is the law agcom-2 

panied with a promise; therefore, neither of these as 
two things stands in the way of a relaxation of the by. 
law. Furthermore, a threat to punish is not like a) yet 
promise to reward. For from the promise to re- fa 
ward, there accrues a certain right or claim on the 

part of him to whom the promise is made : ; but the 

threat of punishment only declares the transgressor’s _ 

desert of penalty, and the right to punish on the 

part of him who threatens. Neither is there any 

reason to fear lest God’s veracity should suffer in 

case he does not fulfil all his threatenings. For all 
threatenings, excepting those to which the token of 


VOL, 11.—23 


354 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


irrevocability attaches, are to be understood as in 
their very nature diminishing nothing from the 
right of the author to relax them, if he shall think 
proper. . . At the same time, there are reasons that 
dissuade from the exercise of this right. These 
may arise from the nature of law in the abstract, or 
from the nature of a particular law. It is common 
to all laws, that in relaxing them something sonal 
‘to be worn away from their authority. It is pecu- 
liar to this law [i. e. the moral law given in Eden], 
that although it is not characterized by an inflexible 


“~ rectitude as we have remarked, it is yet very con- 


. Ve ponent to the nature and order of things. From 


which it follows, not indeed that this law is never 
ff to be relaxed, but that it is not to be relaxed with 
facility, or for a slight cause. And the all-wise 
Legislator had a most weighty cause for relaxing 
this law, in the fact that the human race had lapsed 
into sin. For if all mankind had been given over 
to eternal death, as transgressors, two most beauti- 
ful things would have utterly perished out of the 
universe,—reverence and religion towards God, on 
the part of man, and the exhibition of a wonderful 1, 
beneyolence towards man, on the part of God. But 
in relaxing the law, God not only followed the most 


wen weighty reasons for so doing, but also adopted a 
ae peculiar and singular mode of relaxing it, concern- 


ing which we shall speak hereafter.” * 


Defensio Fidei, Caput iii. p. 810. Ed. Amstelaedami, 1679. 


a 


GROTIAN IDEA OF LAW. 355 


This idea of the Divine law as a posttive enact 
ment, Grotius borrowed from the province of human 
jurisprudence. As the earthly law-making power, 
be it despotic or republican, promulgates a statute, 
and constitutes a certain act, which is otherwise in- 
nocent, criminal by a positive enactment forbidding 
it, so does the heavenly law-giver. The law-maker 
in both instances, consequently, is higher than the 
law, because the law is the effect or product of his 
volition. By this idea and definition of law, Grotius 
reduces everything back to the arbitrary and op- 
tional will of God, and thus differs from Anselm 
and the Reformers. According to them, the Divine 
will cannot be separated from the Divine nature, in 
this manner. God’s law is not positive and arbi- 
trary but natural and necessary, because_it flows ou 


we 


Let 


s 


of his essential being. The Divine will is the ex| ¥ 


ecutive of the Divine essence. Law, therefore, is not 
the effect or figment of mere and isolated will, but 
of will in immutable harmony with truth and right. 


Both law and_penalty, consequently, in the theory 
of the Reformers are inevitable and inexorable 


efflux of the Divine Essence, and contain nothing of | 


an optional or muta ature. They can no more 


be “relaxed,” or waived, than the attributes of om- 
nipotence or omniscience can be. They are not be- 
low the Deity, as a positive statute respecting bank- 
ing, or commerce, is below the law-making power, 
but they are the pure and necessary issue of the 
principles of justice in the Divine Mind. Neither 


3 


856 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


is law above the Deity. For it is the Divine Nature 
itself, proclaiming and manifesting itself throughout 
the universe. It, therefore, possesses the same 


wet necessary, natural, and immutable qualities that the 





Divine Essence itself possesses, and is incapable of 
* “ relaxation.” 


§ 3. Grotian theory of relaxation and substitution. 


Having laid down this definition of law and 
penalty, and stated the relation which God sustains 
to both, Grotius next proceeds to the deduction 
upon which he builds his theory of satisfaction, viz. : 
that it is competent for God to relax the claims of 
the law, and save the transgressor. The notion of 


+) relaxation (relaxatio), and,not satisfaction, of Jaw 


shapes the whole scheme of Grotius. The principal 
points, and the course of thought in it are as follows. 

Man, on account of sin, deserves to be punished ~ 
with eternal death, in accordance with the divine 
statute and penalty announced in Gen. ii. 17. But 
this statute, as matter of fact, is not executed, for 
believers are free from eternal death and condem- 
nation. At the same time there is no abrogation 
of the law, because we see it executed upon unbe- 
lievers.' The fact then is, that between the execu- 
tion of the law at the one extreme, and the entire 
and formal abrogation of the law at the other, there 


?Grotivs: Defensio, Cap. iii. pp. 10,310. Ed. Amstelaed. 1679, 


GROTIAN THEORY OF RELAXATION. 


comes in a meee course of procedure on the part 
of the Lawgiver. This middle course, Grotius de- 
nominates a “tempering” (temperamentum) of the 
law, a “ relaxing” (relaxatio) of its claims, “so that 
although the law still continues to exist, its rigorous 


ght 


ae 


2 


and exact obligatoriness is dispensed with, in ref- 
erence to a certain class of persons,” viz. believers eee 


Such a tempering or relaxation can occur, because “, 
that statute in Gen. 11. 17 belongs to the class we 
positive laws, which are relaxable (relaxibiles) ee 
the pleasure of the legislator. And _ besides this, 
it is neither necessary nor required by justice, that | 
the sinner should suffer a punishment exactly cor- 
respondent to his transgression, but only that he be 
punished. Relaxation of law then is possible. This 
relaxation consists in merely dispensing with her 
pentilty,—the law as a precept or tule of duty i aE: 
untouched and unrelaxed. 

But if these positions are correct, and there is 
nothing in the being and attributes of God that ne- 
cessitates the strict and exact infliction of a threat- 
ened penalty,—if God by an act of will can relax, 
and even abrogate, a positive enactment of his own, 
then why does he not do it merely and simply? 


—_ 


5 


Why the sufferings of Jesus Christ? Why the re 
ee 


UC 


1Grotius: Defensio, Cap. iii. Reward when promised must be 
p. 311.—Grotius excepts as un- paid ; but punishment when 
relaxable those particular statutes threatened may be waived by 
which are accompanied with an the moral governor. 
oath, or a promise of reward. 


7 NS Se | 


W 


398 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY, 


Jaxation in and by an atonement? In answering 
this question, Grotius gives the remainder of his 
scheme.—Although the Deity can remit the en 
tire penalty without any satisfaction or penal 
infliction so far as his own inward nature is con- 
cerned, he cannot prudently do so, so far as 
the created universe is concerned. God does not 
exist in the solitude of his own eternity; if he 
did, he might dispense with an atonement, and 
relax or abrogate law by a mere act of will. He 
has called a creation into existence, and towards 
that creation he sustains the relation of Ruler and 
Governor. The necessities and requirements of the 
created universe render it unsafe to exercise his 
power and right to remit the penalty of law without 
any satisfaction of any kind. On the ground, there- 
fore, that the interests of the creature need it, and 
not on the ground that the attributes of the Creator 
require it, must there be an atonement in order to 
remission. God possesses the right to relax and 
even to abrogate the penalty of law; but this is 
prejudicial to the creature. Hence the relaxation 
of law must be accompanied with a provision that 
shall prevent the evil consequences of such a proce- 
dure. So many and so great sins cannot be remit- 


pw ted with safety to the interests of creation, unless 


r3” God at the same time give some kind of expression 
aA to his detestation of sin. The sufferings and death 


we of the Son of God are an exemplary exhibition of 


God’s hatred of moral evil, in connection with which 
ee 


GROTIAN THEORY OF RELAXATION. 359 


it is safe and prudent to remit that penalty, which 
so far as God and the Divine attributes are con- 
cerned, might have been remitted without it.* 

The idea of “ satisfaction” in the scheme of Gro- 
tius is thus a very different one from that of Anselm 
and the Reformers, and a comparison of the two will 
throw light upon both. According to Anselm, vi- 
carious satisfaction is the substitution of a strict 
equivalent for the penalty due to man. 
ings and death of God incarnate are equal in dignity 
and value to the endless sufferings of a race of crea- 
tures. In Anselm’s view, there can be no relaxation 
of law, because it flows from the divine nature itself, 
and therefore “ one jot or one tittle shall in no wise 
pass from the law till all be fulfilled.” The vicarious 
satisfaction of law in the Anselmic theory, conse- 
quently, denotes the substitution of an exact and lit 
eral equivalent,—as when a debt of one hundred 
dollars in silver is paid with one hundred dollars in 
gold. That which is substituted is of literally equal 
value, though not identical in kind. The sufferings 


The suffer- : 


! 


} 


® 


5: 


of Christ are not zdentical with those of the sinner,— 4 


for the very idea of substituted sufferings excludes 


*Grotius: Defensio Fidei, cap. 
v.—In the Grotian scheme, the 
remission of penalty, being a re- 
laxation of law, is attended with 
evil consequences; and the suf- 
ferings of Christ are only an ex- 
pedient for remedying these evil 
consequences to the universe. 


But in the Anselmic theory, the 
remission of penalty is a regu- 
lar and legal procedure, because 
Christ’s atonement satisfies all 
legal claims; and there are, con- 
sequently, no evil consequences 
to the universe to be remedied. 


360 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


identity, even if it were possible for the God-Man to 
suffer remorse,—but they are of strictly equal value, 
and hence are a literal and exact satisfaction ; so that 
in the substitution there is not the slightest relaxation 
or waiving of the claims of justice, any more than 
there is in the above-mentioned instance in which a 
loan of silver is exactly and literally repaid in gold. 
. According to Grotius, on the other hand, vicarious 
NH catnfaction is not_a strict equivalent, but an accepted 
and nominal equivalent. It is not a guid pro quo, 
which in and of itself extinguishes legal claims, but 
an aliud pro quo, which prevents the evil conse- 
quences of a relaxation of legal claims. In the Gro- 
3 tian theory, whenever a guilty person is released by 
the substituted sufferings of another, it is not upon 
the ground of the entzinsic sufficiency of these suffer- 
ings, but because of their being accepted as sufficient 
by the law-making power. “It is necessary,” says 
Grotius, “that an act of the ruler should come in, in 
order that the punishment (poena) of one person 
should obtain the deliverance of another. For the 
law requires, that he who committed the fault 
should receive the punishment. Now, this act of 
the ruler, so far as it relates to the\law, is aration) 
but so far as it relates to the(criminal is remissjon.” * 
< This “interfering act,” Grotius extends to the value 
of the thing substituted, and not merely to the prin- 
ciple of substitution. For the Anselmic theory 


‘Grotius: Defensio, Cap. vi. See Bavr: Versdhnungslehre, 425 
(Note). 


GROTIAN THEORY OF RELAXATION. 361 


concedes that the substitution of penalty must occur 
by an “interfering act” of the Supreme Judge; but 
it differs from the Grotian, in that it maintains that 
when the principle of vicariousness has been adopted, 6 
it then becomes necessary that that which is substi- ia 
tuted should be a literal and not_a nominal equiva- 
lent. According to Grotius, the “interfering act” (a 
of the Supreme Judge not only establishes the prin- ‘ 
ciple of vicariousness, but also imparts to that which ° 
is offered in the place of the sinner’s punishment a 
nominal and accepted value, by which, though in- 5 
trinsically insufficient, it becomes a sufficient com- 
pensation or satisfaction. 
Grotius’s idea of satisfaction appears yet more 
clearly in what he says in reply to an objection of 
Socinus. Socinus urged against the theory of a 
strict satisfaction that it is incompatible with com- 
passion,—that if the claims of justice are rigorously 
and completely satisfied, then there is no mercy. 
Grotius, instead of giving the reply which Anselm 
and the Reformers gave,—viz.: that it is God and 
not man who makes the satisfaction, and that God’s 
mercy consists in satisfying justice in the sinner’s 
place,—answers as follows: “ What Socinus says is, 
indeed, not altogether destitute of truth; but it is 
true only in case the term ‘satisfaction’ is taken, 
contrary to its signification as a legal term, to de- 
note the strict and complete payment (solutio) of all . 
that is due. But when one takes the place of the 
debtor, and gives something dzfferent (aliud) from 


362 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


what is due, then there is a relaxation and remis- 
sion.” ' At this point, the difference between Grotius 
and Anselm is plainly apparent. Anselm maintains, 
that that which is substituted must be of strictly 
equal value with that for which it is substituted. 
The sufferings of Christ endured in the place of the 
sinner’s sufferings strictly and completely satisfy the 
claims of law. They do not satisfy nominally and 
because God pleases to regard them as an equiva- 
lent; but they really are a full equivalent, and he 
accepts them because they are. Grotius, on the 
contrary, maintains, that that which is substituted 
need not be of strictly equal_value with that foi 
which it is substituted. God can “relax” or waive 
the full demands of justice, and by his arbitrary 
decision (acceptilatione) constitute a partial equiva- 
lent a full and complete one. Hence, he explains 
1 Cor. vi. 20,—‘“ye are bought with a price,”—by, 
“solutione agua liberati sumus;” and defines the 
“ransom” spoken of in 1 Tim. ii. 6, as a Awrgoy or 
price of such a sort (tale Avrgov seu pretium) that 
the deliverer endures something similar to that 
which impends upon the guilty; and remarks that 
Christ has freed men from the penalty of eternal 
death, “aliguid dando.”® This “aliquid,” he de- 
fines to be such a suffering of Christ as is a remedy 
wh Sh eas the evil consequences of relaxing the strict t claims 
of law; but not such a suffering as is a strict and 


_.1 Grotius :-Defensio, Cap. vi. ?Grotius: Defensio, Cap. vi. 
§ 7; viii. § 6; ix. $3. 


GROTIAN THEORY OF RELAXATION. 363 


plenary satisfaction of all the claims of justice, ren- 
dering relaxation of law unnecessary, and having no 
evil consequences to be remedied. Grotius entitles 
his work, a defence of the doctrine of “ satisfaction ; ” 
but it is rather a defence of the doctrine of “ relax- 
ation.” He combats the theory that the claims o 
justice are “satisfied” to their full extent, and up 
holds the theory that they are “ waived ” to a cer- 
tain extent. The vicarious sufferings of Christ are 
a device by which to escape the ill effects of relax- 
ing legal claims, and not a method of completely 
cancelling those claims. The demands of law, in 
accordance with Grotius’s idea/ of law and of the 
power of the law-giver, are set aside, instead of 
being met. There is nothing in the Divine nature 
that prohibits this. And this power and right to 
relax the exact claims of justice enables God to ac- 
cept a nominal for a real satisfaction.—to make the 
expression of his detestation of sin take the place 
of the strict infliction of the penalty of sin. This 
secures_the welfare of the created universe, which’ 
is the only thing to be provided for. 

We have spoken of the Grotian theory as the 


? The following extracts throw mors, et quidem aeterna, erat in 
light upon the Grotian scheme. obligatione.” Defensio, vi. ‘‘ Pre- 
“Dare aliquid, ut per id ipsum tii natura ea est, ut sui valore aut 
alter a debito liberetur, est sol- aesiimatione alterum moveat ad 
vere aut satisfacere.” Defensio, concedendam rem aut jus ali- 
ix. The death of Christ is not quod, puta impunitatem.” De- 
“ solutio rei ipsius debitae, quae fensio, viii. 
ipso facto liberet: nostra enim 


364 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


final statement of the doctrine of a relative satisfac- 

tion, and as the re-appearance of the Scotist doctrine 

of acceptilation. Yet Grotius disclaims this. “For 

«+, acceptilation,” says Grotius, “denotes the act by 
por" which a creditor without any compensation at all, 
without any payment of any sort (citra ullam solu- 

ni? tionem), absolutely extinguishes an indebtedness. 
ae / Hence this conception has application only in civil 
on ') Jaw, and not at all in criminal. For, first, no one 
y ever heard of any of the old writers who has denom- 
inated the remitting of punishment an_acceptila- 

tio. An act of acceptilation presupposes something 
A that can be accepted. But in the case of punish- 
ment, the ruler merely executes an infliction, but 

q( receives nothing. Secondly, acceptilation is the 
=| oppasite of every soptand kind of satisfaction. But 
Christ has offered a satisfaction of some sort; con- 
sequently the idea of acceptilation has no place in a 

, theory of the atonement.”’ In reply to this, it is to 

x. 5~* be observed that it is the principle involved in the 
al i notion of acceptilation, and not the mere term itself, 
oe which is the matter of importance. Scotus trans- 
e ferred the term from the commercial to the judicial 
province, when he taught that the Deity could ac- 
cept a nominal satisfaction as a real one. In doing 
this, the Deity acts upon the same principle that the 
commercial creditor does, when he accepts an imag- 
inary payment, or a partial payment, in lieu of a 








*Grotits: Defensio, Cap. vii. 


GROTIAN THEORY OF RELAXATION. 365 


complete one. It is really an act of acceptilation, 
when God regards as an equivalent for the suffer- 
ings of man that which is not a strict equivalent for 
them, as it is when a creditor accepts a part of the 
debt as a complete payment. But this principle 
of a nominal and accepted value is confessedly the 
constituent principle in the Grotian soteriology. | 
Grotius’s definition of law as a positive enactment, 
of penalty as a positive and arbitrary matter, of the 
consequent power of the Divine legislator to relax 
or even abrogate the law and the penalty, and 
his denial that the sufferings of Christ are a strict 
equivalent,—all the elementary paits of his theory 
are so defined and put together, as to allow of that 
“interfering act” by which a nominal satisfaction 
may be accepted as a sufficient and a real one 
The Grotian theory cannot, therefore, escape the 
charge of adopting Scotus’s doctrine of acceptilation, 
by the remark that acceptilation pertains to the prow 
ince of commercial law, while substituted penalty 
belongs to that of crimin . The fact that with. 
in the province of soteriology it is judicial suffering 
that is exchanged, while within the province of 
trade and commerce it is money that is exchanged, 
does not at all affect the principle upon which the 
exchange is made. And if, in the former sphere, 
a kind of suffering that is not a strict legal equiva- 
lent is accepted as such by an arbitrary act of will, 
it is ethically, and in principle, precisely the same 
kind of transaction with that in which only a part 


366 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 

of a pecuniary debt is accepted as full payment, by 
an act of will on the part of the creditor, or, in the 
phrase of the Roman law, “by word of mouth.”* 


§ 4. Critical estimate of the Grotian Soteriology. 


The Grotian soteriology, it is evident from this 
investigation, is a middle theory which participates 
in the peculiarities of the two theories between © 
which it endeavours to steer,—viz. the Anselmic 
and the Socinian. 1. It is allied with the soterio- 
logy of Anselm and the Reformers, by its assertion 
that the atonement is required by the interests of 
the universe. In contemplating God as a Ruler, 
who protects the welfare of his creation by a moral 
government, and who will not, therefore, relax the 
penalty of transgression without making an expres: 
sion of his abhorrence of sin, Grotius rejects the sys- 
tem of Socinus which altogether excludes vicarious 
suffering and combats it. This feature enters into 
the soteriology of the Reformers, also, though only 
as a secondary and subordinate one. According to 


| 


1 Baur (Versohnungslehre, 428) 
truly remarks in reference to 
Grotius’s disclaimer, that ‘ there 
is no other theory to which the 
conception of acceptilation may be 
applied with greater right, than 
that of Grotius.” And THotucK 
(Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, 


1834, p. 604) speaks of “the 
Scotist or Patristic theory of satis- 
faction” as being revived in the 
Protestant Church by Grotius. 
Tholuck, however, is in error in 
regarding the Patristic and Scotist 
soteriologies as identical. 


ESTIMATE OF THE GROTIAN SOTERIOLOGY. 367 


the Anselmic view, the sufferings of Christ are re. 
quired primarily by the imperatives of the Divine 
Nature, and this is the reason why they are required 
by the Divine Government. In adopting, therefore, 
the secondary reasons and grounds for the atone- 
ment, the Grotian theory, so far, harmonizes with 
the soteriology of the Reformation. 2. The Groten | 
theory is allied with that of Socinus, in its( denial 
that the satisfaction of Christ_is required by the 
nature and attributes of God. ) The departure of 
Grotius from the Church doctrine consists in what 
he denies, and not in what he asserts. The assertion 
that the welfare of the universe necessitates the suf: 
ferings of Christ in order to the remission of sin 
would be agreed to by Anselm and Calvin, but 
would be dissented from by Socinus. And, on tke 
other hand, the assertion that the attribute of jus- 
tice immanent in the Divine Nature, does not inex- 
orably require a strict and full satisfaction in order 
to the remission of sin, would be dissented from by 
Anselm and Calvin, but would be agreed to by 
Socinus. The assertion that the moral law is a pos- 
itive enactment, the mere product of the Divine 
will, that consequently it can be relaxed or even 
abrogated by the law-maker, and that consequently 
there is no intrinsic_necessity for the atonement _in 
the being and character of God,—all these are So- 
cinian positions. ) 

From these positions, there flow certain logical 
conclusions that affiliate the Grotian scheme with 


368 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


that of Socinus, and set it in antagonism to that of 

the Reformers. They are the following. 1. The 

death of Christ, according to Grotius, is exemplary 

and not retributive ; because it is not required by 

the Divine nature, but solely by the external neces- 

sities of the universe, and that outward relation 

which God sustains to his creatures as a protector 

of their welfare. But according to Anselm, and 

Jt Reformers, the death of Christ is both retrib- 

utive and exemplary. Its primary characteristic 

is that it satisfies judicial claims; and its exemplary 

aspect is its secondary one. The Reformers con- 

tended that the Deity exhibits his abhorrence of 

sin in the ordinary course of his administratio... 

and that, therefore, the incarnation and suffering 

F of Deity in the flesh, being an extraordinary pro- 
y »” cedure, must have, for its primary purpose, some- 
‘4 y thing more than merely teaching that God is dis- 
pleased with sin. There is no doubt upon this 

-s point ; for this lesson is taught by the punishment 
of the fallen angels, and by the judgments of God 

in the earth,—all of which are exemplary of God’s 
abhorrence of sin, and have a direct and strong ten- 

dency to prevent sin. The atonement, according 

to Anselm, is expiatory first, and exemplary after. 

wards ; according to Grotius it is exemplary only. 

2. In the Grotian scheme, the sufferings of Christ 

occur for the purpose of preventing future sin, and 

not for the purpose of atoning for past sm. The 

guilt of past sin may be abolished without strict 


ESTIMATE OF THE GROTIAN SOTERIOLOGY. 369 


satisfaction, because there is no immanent necessity 
in the Divine Nature, inexorable and such as cannot 
be relaxed or waived, for the infliction of plenary 


exemplary expression of God’s abhorrence of sin is 
required in order to deter from sin in the future, 
But where the Grotian soteriology finds no diffi- 
culty at all, there the Anselmic finds the chief diffi- 
culty in the way of human salvation. According to 
Anselm, the primal necessity of the incarnation and 
theanthropic suffering of the Eternal Son of God/ 


penalty for sins that are past; and hence only an 


lies in the fact that the very nature and attr me oe 
of Deity require that the guilt of past sin_be com- z am 


pletely expiated. Were the prevention of sin in 
the future the sole, or the chief obstacle, this could 
be secured by the agency of the Holy Spirit, in re- 
newing and sanctifying the human heart. In re- 
spect, then, to the relations which the atonement 
sustains to the being and attributes of God, the 
Grotian soteriology adopts substantially Socinian 
principles and positions; while, so far as concerns 
the relations of the atonement to the external 
universe and the welfare of the finite creature, it 
adopts the positions of the Anselmic-Protestant so- 
teriology. 


VOL. 1,—24 


= 


“Fx, 


CHAPTER VI. 


THE ARMINIAN SOTERIOLOGY. 


$1. Positive Statements. 


Tue Arminian soteriology was formed after Gro- 
tius had published his, and the two theologians most 
concerned in its construction were Curcellaeus and 
LIimborch. ‘Their aim was to avoid what they 
deemed to be the extremes of the Socinian doe- 
trine and that of the Church. ‘“Sententia nostra,” 
they say, “inter duas hasce extremas media est.” 

The leading idea of the Arminian soteriology is 
that of a sacrificial offering. The death of Christ, 
like the death of the animal victim in the Mosaic 
economy, has for its purpose the deliverance of the 
guilty from punishment. And ‘at this point, the 
Arminian theologian would remedy what he re- 
garded as a defect in the Grotian scheme. Accord- 
ing to Grotius, the death of Christ was designed to 
protect the interests of the created universe solely, 
and did not stand in relations to the Divine Nature. 







1 Lowporon : Theol. Christ. III. xxii. 


POSITIVE STATEMENTS. 371 


But the Arminian divine contended that Christ’s 

death, as that of a sacrifice, had reference to God 

as well as to the universe. Limborch in criticising 
Grotius’s Defensio Fidei, which the latter had sent 

to him, remarks that the gist of the matter in re- 

spect to the doctrine of the atonement lies in the 
question: “ An Christus morte sua, circa Dewm ali- 

quid effecerit?” and contends that he did. In this 

respect, the Arminian theory looks in the direction 

of the Anselmic and Reformed. But it differs from 

it, when it proceeds to specify what it is that the 

death of Christ effects in reference to the Divine 

Nature. This is done in the following particulars. 

1. The death of Christ is denominated a sacrifice, 

but a sacrifice is not the payment of a debt, nor is 

it a complete satisfaction of justice for sin. It is 

merely the(divinely-appointed condition\which pre- 

cedes the forgiveness of sin. God saw fit under the : 
Mosaic economy to connect the remission of nyo 
with the previous death of a lamb or a goat. If Taal 
the Israelite would offer up the victim in the way 

and manner appointed, then God promised to for- / 
give him. In the same way, God in the new dis- 
pensation connects the pardon of transgression al 
the death of Jesus Christ. In neither instance, are 
the claims of justice satisfied. They are waived by _ 
an act of cgmpassion that is exerted in connection = 
with the offering of the Son of God as a sacrifice. 
* Christ,” says Curcellaeus,’ “did not make satisfac- 


s 


‘CurcELLagus: Institutio Religionis Christianae, Lib. V. Cap. xix, 15. 


/ 
e 


372 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


tion by enduring the punishment which we sinners 
merited. This does not belong to the nature of a 
sacrifice, and has nothing in common with it. For 
sacrifices are not payments of debts, as is evident 
from those offered under the law. The beasts that 
were slain for transgressors did not expiate the pen- 
alty which they merited, nor was their blood a sufii- 
cient Avrgoy for the soul of man. But they were 
AX niations only, by which the transgressor endeay- 
oured to turn (flectere) the mind of God to com-. 
passion, and to obtain remission from him. Hence 
the formula in the law applied to those who had 
expiated their sins by offering a sacrifice: ‘ And it 
shall be forgiven him.’ (Leviticus iv. 26, 31, 35, 
&e.)” 2. Respecting the question, whether the suf- 
ferings of Christ were penal and judicial, the Ar. 
minian divines made the following /statements. 
Christ as a real and true offering for our sins 
endured the greatest sufferings in our stead, and 
thereby warded off the punishment which we merit. 
The sufferings of Christ may be regarded as penal, 
or of the nature of punishment, not in the sense 
that he endured the same thing which man de- 

: os tate to endure, but in the sense that by the will 
"and appointment of God the sufferings which he 
underwent taok the place of a peyalty, so that his 
= sufferings have the_same_ effect in reconciling God 
to man, and procuring the forgiveness of sin, that 


S =< the sinner’s endurance of the ishment due to his 
J 


sins would have had. “Jesus Christ,” says Lim- 


pei MS 


POSITIVE STATEMENTS. 373 


borch,“ may be said to have been punished (puni- 
tus) in our place, in so far as he endured the 
greatest anguish of soul, and the accursed death of 
the cross for us, which were of the nature of a 
vicarious punishment in the place of our sins 
(quae poenae vicariae pro peccatis nostris rationem 
habuit). And it may be said that our Lord satis- 
fied the Father for us by his death, and earned 
righteousness for us, in so far as he satisfied, not — 
the rigor and exactitude of the divine justice but, 
the just as well as compassionate will of God 
(voluntati Dei justae simul ac misericordi), and 
went through all that God required in order to 
our reconciliation.”? According to these positions, 
the sufferings of Christ were not a substituted pen- 
alty, but a substitute for a penalty. A substituted 
penalty is a strict equivalent, but a substitute for 
‘a penalty, may be of inferior worth, as when a par- 
tial satisfaction is accepted for a plenary one, by 
the method of acceptilation ; or, as if the finite sacri- 
fice of the lamb and the goat should be constituted 
by the will of God an offset for human transgres- 
sion. And the term “ satisfaction,” also, is wrested 
from its proper signification, in that the sufferings 


of Christ are asserted to be a satisfaction of benevo--. 


lence. “Our Lord satisfied . . . not the rigor and 
exactitude of divine justice, but the just and com- 
passionate will of God,”—a use of language as sole- 


1 Lmwporca : Theol. Chr., III. xxii. 2, 


| 


o 


374 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


eistical as that which should speak of smelling a 
sound. 


$2. Arminian Objections to the Theory of Satis- 
faction. 


Having made these positive statements respect- 
ing the vicariousness of Christ’s sufferings and their 
penal aspect, the Arminian divines make the fol- 
lowing negative statements explanatory of their use 
of these terms. * 

1. Christ did not endure the full penalty due 
to man, because he did not endure eternal death, 
either in degree or in time. He did not endure it 
egree, because he did not undergo absolute 
despair while under the burden of the wrath of 
God. And he did not endure it through an end- 
less duration. 2. If Christ has ggmpletely atoned 
for our sins by enduring the full penalty, then 
there is nothing more that Divine grace can do for 
YW 2 The remission of our sins is no longer a matter 
) (of Divine compassion, but of the Divine justice, 
which has been fully satisfied. 38. If Christ has 
made plenary satisfaction for us, God has not the 

*} right to demand either faith or obedience from us. 
Neither has he the right, in case we do not render 
obedience, to deprive us of the benefits of Christ’s 
death, and punish us for our sins, because it would 






yet 


-_— 





zi 
5 


?See Curcettakvs: Institutio Religionis Christianae, Lib. VII. Cap. i. 


ARMINIAN OBJECTIONS. 375 


be unjust to exact a double punishment for one and 
the same sin. 

The first of these objections, it is obvious to re- 
mark, overlooks the divinity of the substitute for 
man. An infinite person suffering in a finite time 
yields an infinite suffering, with even more exacti- 
tude than a finite person or race suffering in an 
endless time. The Person of Christ in respect to 
his divinity is strictly infinite; but man’s punish- 
ment though endless is not strictly infinite. The 
woe of the lost is eternal only a parte post. Though 
it has no ending, it has a beginning, and therefore is 
not metaphysically infinite. The second objection 
is answered by the consideration, that the plenary 
satisfaction of Divine justice for the sinner by the 
Divine Being himself is the highest conceivable 
form of compassion,—because it is the compassion 
of self-sacrifice. And the fact, that after the claims 
of law have been completely met by the voluntary 
sacrifice of the Son of God, there are, of course, no 
further claims to be “relaxed” or “waived,” does 
not disprove the infinite pity that vicariously satis- 
fied them. The third objection proceeds upon the 
baseless assumption, that because God has made an 
atonement for human sin, each and every man by 
that mere fact is entitled to its benefits. After the 
atonement has been made, it is still the property 
and possession of the Maker, and he may do what he 
will with his own. He may elect to whom he will 
apply it, and to whom he will not apply it. 


a 


! 


<b 
A 
oy 
| 


CHAPTER VII. 


THE SOCINIAN SOTERIOLOGY. 


$1. Socinian Idea of Justice. 


Tue theory of Socinus respecting the work of 
Christ is stated with great directness and clearness. 
Rejecting, as he did, all mystery, and reducing 
Christianity to the few first principles of natural 
ethics, it was comparatively easy for him to be 
explicit in his statements, and transparent in his 
style. 

The foundation of his theory is seen in his idea 
and definition of Divine justice. The doctrine of 
atonement, as held in the Church, rested upon the 
position that justice is of a necessary nature, and is 
an immutable attribute of God. If now it could be 
shown that this definition of justice is an erroneous 
one, the main support of the theory of satisfaction 
falls away.’ Hence Socinus bent his efforts to re- 

1 Soornus (De Servatore, III. i.) Christ’s satisfaction would be 
remarks: “If we could but get thoroughly exposed, and would 


rid of this justice, even if we had vanish.” 
no other proof, that fiction of 


SOCINIAN IDEA OF JUSTICE. 377 


move this foundation. ‘There is no such justice in 
God,” says Socinus, “as requires absolutely and in- 
exorably (omnino) that sin be punished, and such 
as God himself cannot repudiate. There is, indeed, 
a perpetual and constant justice in God; but this 
is nothing but his moral equity and rectitude, by 
virtue of which there is no depravity or iniquity in 
any of his works. This is the justice which the 
Scriptures speak of, and which is as conspicuous in 
forgiving sins, as in punishing them. But that kind 
of justice which we are accustomed to call by this 
name, and which is seen only in the punishment of 
sin, the Scriptures by no means dignify with this 
name, but denominate it sometimes the severity of 
God, sometimes vengeance, sometimes wrath, fury, 
indignation, and by other terms of this sort. Hence, 
they greatly err who, deceived by the popular use 
of the word justice, suppose that. justice in this sense 
is a perpetual quality in God, and affirm that it is 
infinite. For they do not perceive that if this were 
the fact, God must eternally be severe and inflict 
retribution, and could never forgive sin; all which 
is contrary to the Scriptures, which teach that God 
is slow to anger and of great mercy. Hence it 
might with much greater truth be affirmed that 
that compassion which stands opposed to justice is 
the appropriate characteristic of God ; and the very 
opposite doctrine to that maintained by our oppo- 
nents might be asserted, viz.: that God could not 
punish sin, because his mercy requires that sin in 


378 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


any event (omnino) be forgiven. But in fact both 
positions are false. For, as that justice which com- 
monly goes under this name, and which is opposed 
to mercy, is not an immanent characteristic of God, 
but only the effect or product of his volition, so that 
mercy which is opposed to justice is not an internal 
(propria) quality of God, but only the effect and 
product of his volition. Hence, inasmuch as that 
mercy which is often attributed to God does not 
prevent him from punishing any one whom he 
pleases to punish for sin, still less does that puni- 
tive justice which is very rarely (raro admodum) 
attributed to God prevent him from pardoning any 
one whom he pleases, without any satisfaction of its 
claims.’” 

From this extract, it is plain that Socinus con- 
ceived of the attributes of justice and mercy as less 
central than will. By a volition, God may punish 
a sin, or he may let it go unpunished. He has as 
much right to do the latter as the former. There 
is no éntrinsic right or wrong in either case that 
necessitates his action. Justice like mercy is the 
product of his optional will. It is easy to see that 
by this definition of justice Socinus takes away the 
foundation of the doctrine of atonement; and that 
if it be a correct definition, the Socinian theory of 
forgiveness upon repentance is true. If sin is pun- 
ishable only because God so determines; and if he 


1 Socrnus: Praelectiones Theologicae, Caput XVI. (Bibliotheca Fra 
trum Polonorum, I. 566). 


SOCINIAN OBJECTIONS. 379 


decides not to punish it, then it is no longer pun- 
ishable,—if punitive justice is the product of mere 
will, and may be made and unmade by a volition, 
then it is absurd to say that without the shedding 
of blood, or the satisfaction of law, there is no re- 
mission of sin.* 


§ 2. Socinian Objections to the Theory of Sates- 
faction. 


The first objection of Socinus to the doctrine 
of satisfaction was, that it excludes mercy. If sin 
is punished it is not forgiven, and conversely if sin 
is forgiven it is not punished. The two ideas of 
satisfaction and remission exclude and expel each 


1 PrrEesTLEY (Theol. Rep. I. 417) 
takes the position, that “‘ justice 
in the Deity can be no more than 
a modification of that goodness or 
benevolence which is his sole 
governing principle,” and from 
this he draws the inference, that 
“under the administration of 
God, there can be no occasion to 
exercise any severity on penitent 
offenders.” If justice is ultimate- 
ly resolvable into benevolence, it 
follows that it has no indefeasible 
claims ofitsown. Whether pun- 
ishment shall be inflicted in any 
given instance will depend upon 
the decisions of benevolence. 
Justice is not co-ordinate with 
benevolence, but is subordinate 


to it. Macrr (Atonement, No. 
xxiv) makes the following crit- 
icism upon this postulate of Priest- 
ley: ‘“‘ Why speak of justice as a 
‘modification of the divine bene- 
volence,’ if it be nothing different 
from that attribute; and if it be 
different from it, how can beney- 
olence be the ‘sole governing 
principle’ of the divine adminis- 
tration? The word justice, then, 
is plainly but a sound made use of 
to save appearances, as an attri- 
bute called by that name has usu- 
ally been ascribed to the Deity; 
but in reality nothing is meant by 
it, in Dr. Priestley’s application 
of the term, different from pure 
and absolute benevolence.” 


380 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


other. If God’s justice is satisfied by the infliction 
of judicial suffering, there is no room for the ex- 
ercise of his mercy. If God has received a com- 
plete equivalent for the punishment due to man, 
then he does not show any compassion in remitting 
his sin.’ But this objection overlooks the fact, that 
the equivalent is not furnished by man, but by God. 
Were the atonement of Christ the creatures obla- 
tion to justice, Socinus’s objection would have force. 
But it is God, and not man who satisfies the claims 
of justice for the sinner. According to the Church 
doctrine, therefore, the ideas of satisfaction and 
mercy are combined and harmonized in a vicarious 
atonement, or the assumption of penalty by a com- 
petent person. If the sinner himself should pay 
the penalty (as the objection of Socinus implies if 
it is to have any force), there would be no vica- 
riousness in the suffering, and there would be the 
execution of justice merely without any mercy. 
But when the principle of vicariousness, or substi- 
tuted penalty, is introduced, and the incarnate Son 
of God endures the punishment due to sin, in the 
sinner’s stead, doth attributes are exercised and mani- 
fested together. For justice is satisfied by the suf- 
fering which is undergone by the Substitute, and 
the Substitute certainly shows the height of love 
and compassion in undergoing it. ‘“ Righteousness 
and peace meet together.” The truth is, that this 


*Soormts: Praelectiones Theologicae, Cap. XVIII. (Bib. Frat. Pol. 
Tom. I. 570, sq.). 


SOCINIAN OBJECTIONS. 38] 


objection of Socinus, which is one of his most plausi- 
ble, begs the whole question in dispute by de 
Jining mercy in its own way. It assumes that the 
ideas of satisfaction and mercy exclude each other, 
in such a manner that they never can be harmo- 
nized in any plan of redemption. It assumes that 
mercy consists in waiving and abolishing justice by 
an act of pure will. From this premise, it follows 
of course that where there is any satisfaction of 
justice by the endurance of its demands, there is 
no mercy ; and where there is any waiving or abol- 
ishing of these demands, there is mercy. A com- 
plete atonement, consequently, would exclude mercy 
entirely; a partial atonement would allow some 
room for mercy, in partially waiving legal claims; 
and no atonement at all would afford full play for 
the attribute, by the entire nullification of all judi- 
cial demands. 

2. The second objection of Socinus to the Church 
doctrine of atonement was, that substitution of pen- 
alty is impossible. An innocent person cannot en- 
dure penal suffering, cannot be punished, because 
sin is personal (corporalis). God himself asserts 
(Deut. xxiv. 16; Ezekiel xviii. 20), that “the 
fathers shall not be put to death for the children, 
neither shall the children be put to death for the 
fathers; every man shall be put to death for his 
own sin. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. The 
son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither 
shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the 


382 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and 
the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.” 
If, then, by the sentence and decree of God, neither 
the son ought to be punished for the sins of the 
father, nor the father for the sins of the son, how 
can it be possible that God should be willing to 
exact the punishment of man’s sins from any other 
being (ab alio ullo). Penalty is not like a pecuni- 
ary debt. One person can pay a sum of money for 
another, because money is impersonal, But one 
being cannot satisfy justice for another, because 
punishment is personal. Justice permits no vica- 
riousness and no substitution; but requires that 
the very identical soul that has sinned shall suffer. 
There is no way, therefore, to deliver the guilty 
from penalty, but by an act of sovereign will. Jus- 
tice is made by will, and can therefore be abolished 
by will whenever the Supreme Sovereign pleases 
to do so. God possesses the right, if he chooses, to 
arrest the stroke of law, because both the law and 
its penalty are his own product. And when, and 
only when, he thus arrests the operation of law by 
a sovereign volition, and without any substitution 
of penalty, he shows mercy. * 

8. The third objection which Socinus made to 
the doctrine of vicarious atonement was, that even 
if vicarious penalty were allowable and possible, 
Christ has not rendered an equivalent for the sin of 


*Soormnvus: Praelectiones, Cap. XVIII. (Bib. Frat. Pol. I. 570). 


SOCINIAN OBJECTIONS. 383 


man. The law threatens eternal death. Every in- 
dividual transgressor owes an endless punishment 
to justice. It would be necessary, therefore, that 
there should be as many substitutes as there are 
sinners, because one substitute could suffer but one 
endless suffering. But that Christ did not endure 
endless death is evident from the fact that he rose 
from the dead. Moreover, the Scriptures assert 
(1 Cor. xv. 17) that “if Christ be not radsed, your 
faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins.” Butif it be 
Christ’s death that saves man, as the Church theory 
teaches, there is no need of his resurrection. Since, 
therefore, Christ did not suffer eternal death, but 
rose again from the dead, and since it is said that 
unless he had risen from the dead, sin would not 
have been forgiven, it follows that he did not obtain 
the forgiveness of man’s sins by the method of judi- 
cial satisfaction through his sufferings and death. 
It is indeed said that the dignity of Christ’s person 
makes his sufferings of infinite worth. But God is 
no respecter of persons. Christ simply endured a 
finite pain, which of course could not be an equiva- 
lent for the sin of a whole world. His suffering 
was disciplinary, and not judicial. It was not a 
penal agony endured for purposes of justice, but was 
a natural and necessary part of his personal prepa- 
ration for eternal glory. The captain of our salva- 
tion was made perfect in his own character by suf- 
fering (Heb. ii.10). Being found in the fashion of 
a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient 


384 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore 
God also hath highly exalted him, ete. (Phil. it. 
2 ie 

4. Socinus contended, in the fourth place, that 
the obedience of Christ could not be a vicarious 
obedience. Christ was obligated to obey the law 
for himself as an individual, and therefore he could 
not obey it for others. This is evident from the 
fact that he was rewarded for his obedience and for 
his sufferings, as any other individual is. But even 
if his obedience could avail for another, it could 
avail for only a single individual of the human fam- 
ily. The alleged dignity of his Person does not re- 
lieve the difficulty. A human nature is incapable 
of rendering an infinite obedience; and that the 
Divine Nature which is Supreme and receives obe- 
dience from all creatures should itself render obedi- 
ence, is absurd? 

5. A fifth objection urged by Socinus against 
the Church soteriology is, that the ideas of satisfac- 
tion and imputation which are associated in it are 
self-contradictory. If a complete satisfaction of the 
claims of justice has been made, this settles the mat- 
ter. To make this objective and finished payment 
of a debt to depend upon an act of imputation upon 
the part of God, and of faith upon the part of man, 
is self-contradictory. If Christ has endured the 


1Soomtvs: Praelectiones Theo- 2?Soomus: Praelectiones Theo- 
logicae, Cap. XVIII. (Bib. Frat. logicae, Oap. XVIII. (Bib. Frat. 
Pol. I. 570-578). Pol. I. 571-8). 


SOCINIAN OBJECTIONS. 385 


penalty due to man for sin, this is a fact, and cannot 
be affected by either the belief or the unbelief of 
the creature. An atonement that cancels the sin of 
the world, logically frees that world from condem- 
nation. But according to the Church doctrine none 
are saved from condemnation unless this satisfaction 
is imputed by God, and received in the act of faith 
by man." 

6. Sixthly, Socinus contended that if Christ 
made complete satisfaction for all the sin of man, 
both past and future, it follows that not only no 
other satisfaction is required, but that personal holi- 
ness is not necessary. Inasmuch as the Scriptures 
teach that without righteousness no one can enter 
the kingdom of God, the advocates of the doctrine 
of satisfaction betake themselves to the notion of an 
imputed righteousness, by means of which man, 
though sinful and polluted, is accounted or reckoned 
to be holy. Hence it follows from the Protestant 
doctrine of imputed righteousness, that even with- 
out true and actual holiness future blessedness is 
attainable.” 

The positive part of Socinus’s soteriology is 
found in the position, that forgiveness is granted 
upon the ground of repentance and obedience. 
There are no legal obstacles in the way of pardon, 
because the will of God is sovereign and supreme 


1Soornus: De Christo Serva- 2?Soomvus: De Obristo Serva- 
tore, Pars IV. Cap. iii.(Bib. Frat. tore, P. IV. Oap. iii. (Bib. Frat. 
Pol. II. 217). Pol. Tom. IT. 217). 


VOL. 11.—25 


386 HISTORY OF SOTERIOLOGY. 


over law and penalty. Nothing is necessary, con- 
sequently, but sorrow for sin, and an earnest pur- 
pose to obey the commandments. Christ has set an 
example of obedience, and man is to follow it in the 
exercise of his natural powers. 


BOOK SIXTH. 





HISTORY 


Heo © Ei A T OL... Gi Ne 





CHAPTER I. 


SECOND ADVENT OF CHRIST. 


§ 1. Milenarianism. 


Millenarianism, or Chiliasm, is the doctrine of Q 
two resurrections (Rev. xx.),—the first, that of th 
righteous dead at the time of the second advent o ae 
Christ, and the second that of the righteous and the 
wicked at the end of the world,—and a personal 
corporeal reign of Christ between them, for a thou- 
sand years, upon the renovated earth. It is sub- 
stantially the same with the Later-Jewish doctrine 
of a Messianic kingdom upon earth. The Jews at 
the time of the Incarnation were expecting a per- 
sonal prince, and a corporeal reign, in the Messiah 
who was to come; and one of the principal grounds 
of their rejection of Christ was the fact that he re- 
presented the Messiah’s rule as a spiritual one in the 
hearts of men, and gave no countenance to their lit- 
eral and materializing interpretation of the Messi- 
anic prophecies. The disciples of Christ, being 
themselves Jews, were at first naturally infected 


390 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


with these views, and it was not until after that 
Pentecostal effusion of the Holy Spirit which so en- 
larged their conceptions of the kingdom of God, and 
with which their inspiration properly begins, that 
they rose above their early Jewish education. In 
none of their inspired writings do we find such an 
expectation of Christ’s speedy coming as prompted 
the question: “Lord, wilt thou at his time restore 
again the kingdom to Israel?” (Actsi.6). For the 
answer of Christ to this inquiry had given them 
to understand, that before this event could occur 
Christianity must be preached in “ Jerusalem, and 
in all Judea, and in Samaria, and wnto the uttermost 
* part of the earth” (Acts i. 8). 

There being this affinity between Millenarian- 
ism and the Later-Jewish idea of the Messiah and 
his kingdom, it is not surprising to find that Mille- 
narianism was a peculiarity of the Jewish-Christian, 
as distinguished from the Gentile-Christian branch 
of the church, at the close of the first century. It 
appears first in the system of the Judaistic-Gnostic 
Cerinthus, the contemporary and opponent of the 
apostle John. Of the Apostolical Fathers, only 
Barnabas, Hermas, and Papias exhibit in their 
writings distinct traces of this doctrine,—the latter 
teaching it in its grossest form, and the first two 
holding it in a less sensuous manner. There are no 
traces. of Chiliasm in the writings of Clement of 
Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Tatian, Athengoras, and 


@3 & 
oa 


MILLEN ARIANISM. 391” 


Theophilus of Antioch. The inference from these 
facts, then, is, that this tenet was not the received 
faith of the church certainly down to the year 150. 
It was held only by individuals, These, in some 
instances, as in that of Cerinthus, were in hostile 
and positively heretical relations to the church. 
And in the instance of those whose general catho- 
licity was acknowledged—as Barnabas, Hermas, and 
Papias,—there was by no means such a weight of 
character and influence, as would entitle them to be 
regarded as the principal or sole representatives of 
orthodoxy. On the contrary, these minds were 
comparatively uninfluential, and their writings are 
of little importance. The ecclesiastical authority of 
Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp is certain- 
ly much greater than that of Barnabas, Hermas, and 
Papias. So far as concerns the Apostolic age, then, 
the testimony of history goes to show that the lit- 
eral and materializing interpretation put upon the 
teachings of Isaiah and St. John concerning the 
second coming of Christ, by the Millenarian, was 
not the most authoritative one,—although prevalent 
among the Jewish as distinguished from the Gentile 
Christians, and gradually becoming prevalent in the 
church generally, from a cause that will be noticed 
hereafter. A further incidental proof of the posi- 
tion, that Millenarianism was not the received and 
authoritative faith of the church from the death of 
the Apostles to the year 150, is found in the fact 
?HacensaonH: History of Doctrine, § 75, n. 6. (Smith’s Ed.). 


~% e 


Pr 92 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 
er" that it does not appear in the so-called Apostles 
Creed. This symbol was not, indeed, drawn up by 
the Apostles, but it is undoubtedly the substance 
of the short confessions of faith which the catechu- 
mens of the Apostolic Church were accustomed to 
make upon entering the church; so that it is a 
full statement of what passed for the substance of 
Christianity with them. But in this symbol there 
is not the slightest allusion to two resurrections 
and a corporeal reign of Christ between them. The 
only specifications are, that Christ shall come from 
heaven “to judge the quick and the dead;” and 
that there is a “resurrection of the body,” and a 
“life everlasting” [immediately succeeding, is the 
implication ]. 
The period between the year 150 and 250 is the 
oe blooming age of Millenarianism; and yet even in 
47? “this period it does not become the catholic faith, as 
embodied in the catholic creed. Some minds now 
adopt the literal interpretation of the Old Testa- 
ment prophecies, and subject them to a very sensu- 


Q. us € is. Jrenaeus and Tertullian give glowing 
ez descriptions of the Millennial reign. Anti-Christ 
together with all the nations that side with him 


will be destroyed. All earthly empires, and the 
Roman in particular, will be overthrown. Christ 
will again appear, and will reign a thousand years, 
in corporeal presence on earth, in Jerusalem, which 


1TrenaEvus: Contra Haereses, V. xxv. 36. TrErRTULLIANUS: Adver- 
sus Marcionem, iii. 24. 


MILLENARIANISM. 393 


will be rebuilt and made the capital of his king- 
dom. The patriarchs, prophets, and all the pious, 
will be raised from the dead, and share in the feli- 
city of this kingdom. The New Jerusalem is de- 
pictured in the most splendid colors. The meta- 
phors of Isaiah (liv. 11, 12), are treated as proper 
terms. Irenaeus‘ describes the foundations of the 
rebuilt Jerusalem as literally carbuncle and sap- 
phire, and its bulwarks crystal; and regards it as 
actually let down from heaven, according to Rev. 
xxi.2. Tertullian puts the same interpretation with 
Irenaeus upon this text, and for confirmation refers 
to the report, that in the Parthian war, in Judea a 
city was observed to be lowered down from the sky 
every morning, and to disappear as the day ad- 
vanced. The earth was to become wonderfully | 
fertile. Irenaeus’ cites with approbation from pate 
pias the statement, that there would be vines havi 
ten thousand branches, and each branch ten thou- 
sand boughs, and each bough ten thousand shoots, 
and each shoot ten thousand clusters, and each clus- 


ter ten thousand berries, and each berry would 
yield twenty-five measures of wine. Jo 
The Millenarian tendency became stronger as’ ne 
the church began, in the last half of the second es 

century, to feel the persecuting hand of the govern- the 


ment laid upon it. The distressed condition of the 
people of God led them to desire and pray for an 


1Trenarts: Adversus Haere- ?Trenarts: Adversus Haere- 
ses, V. xxxiv. ses, V. Xxxiii. 


394 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


advent of the Head of the church that would extin. 

guish all his enemies. It was natural that the doe- 

trine of the personal reign of Christ should be the 

most prevalent when the earthly condition of the 
church was the most intolerable. So general had 

{)'| the tenet become in the last half of the 2d century, 
JA. \that Justin Martyr’ declares that it was the belief 
of all but the Gnostics. But Irenaeus,’ on the con- 

trary, speaks of opposers of Millenarianism who 

held the catholic faith, and who agreed with the 
Gnostics only in being Anti-Millenarians; although 

he is himself desirous to make fit appear that Anti- 
Millenarianism is of the naturg of heresy. Gaius, a 

* presbyter of Rome about the year 200, attacks the 
Millenarian views of the Montanist Proclus, and de- 
EP” clares Millenarianism to be the invention of Cerin- 
thus, and the Apocalypse a writing of this heretic. 

9° (Cyprian maintains the Millenarian theory with his 

) OY sat anor and moderation. Yet, Millenarianism 
) does not appear in the catholic creed as an article of 
faith. Both Irenaeus and Tertullian, in their writings 
against heretics, present brief synoptical statements 

of the authorized faith of the church ;* but in none 

of them do we find the Millenarian tenet. In their 
synopses, there is nothing more said upon eschatolog- 

> ieal points, than is contained in the Apostles’ Creed. 






\ Justinus Martyr: Dialogus STrenazus: Ady. Haer. I. x; 
cum Tryphone, Cap. 80, 81. Jil. iv. Trerrotpranus: De virg. 

2TrEnaEus: Adversus Haere- vel. Cap. i.; Adv. Prax. Oap. ii.; 
ses, VY. xxxi. 1. De praescr. haer. Cap. xiii. 


MILLENARIANISM. 395 


The 3d century witnessed a very decided opposi- 
tion to Millenarianism,—a fact which evinces that its 
blooming period was a brief one of about a hundred 
years. The Alexandrine School, under the lead of 
Clement and Origen, made a vigorous attack; and 
in the last part of the 3d century, Dionysius, bishop 
of Alexandria, succeeded by dint of argument in re- 
pressing a very gross form of Millenarianism that at 
was spreading in his diocese, under the advocacy of 
Nepos and Coracion. After the 3d century, ghee 
tenet disappears very generally. Lactantius (+ 330) a 
is the only man of any note in the 4th century who 
defends the system. Augustine adopted the theory(hys 
in his earlier days, but rejectedit afterwards. That 
Chiliasm could not have been generally current in 
the beginning of the 4th century, is proved by the 


manner in which Husebius speaks of it. Describing a 
the writings of Papias, he remarks that they contai res 


“ matters rather too fabulous.” Among these “ mat- Gi. 
ters,” he enumerates the opinion of Papias, that yo 






“there would be a certain millennium after the 
resurrection, and that there would be a corporeal 
reign of Christ on this very earth; which things he 
appears to have imagined, as if they were author- 
ized by the apostolic narrations, not understand- 
ing correctly those matters which they propounded 
mystically, in their representations. For he was 
very limited in his comprehension, as is evident 
from his discourses, yet he was the cause why most 
of the ecclesiastical writers, urging the antiquity of 


396 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


the man, were carried away by a similar opinion,— 
as, for instance, Irenaeus, or any other that adopted 
similar sentiments.”* Had Millenarianism, in the 
first quarter of the 4th century, been the received 
belief of any considerable portion of the catholic 
church, a writer like Eusebius, whose respect for 
everything catholic and ecclesiastical was very high, 

_ would not have spoken of it as “ fabulous.” 
The history of Millenarianism after the year 400 
Vi reduceable to a very short compass. During the 
ar Middle Ages, it can hardly be said to have had any 
Wa existence as a doctrine; though at the close of the 
?tenth century, there was an undefined fear and ex- 
\aie ye pectation among the masses that the year 1000 
\¥* would witness the advent of the Lord. In the 
period of the Reformation, Millenarianism made its 
appebrance in connection with the fanatical and 
ox tendencies that sprang up along with 
the great religious awakening. Hence, the symbols 
when|they notice the doctrine at all do so in terms 
of condemnation. The Augsburg Confession con- 
9A demns Chiliasm in conjunction with the doctrine of | 






a limited future punishment; both tenets being 
held by the Anabaptists of that day. “ Damnant 
Anabaptistas, qui sentiunt hominibus damnatis ac 
diabolis finem poenarum futurum esse. Damnant 
et alios, qui spargunt Judiacos opiniones, quod ante 
resurrectionem mortuorum pii regnum mundi occa- 


'Evsseivs: Ecel. Hist. III. xxxix. 


~ 


MILLEN ARIANISM. 397 


paturi sint, ubique oppressis impiis.”’ The English 
Confession of Edward VI, from which the Thirty 
Nine Articles were afterwards condensed, condemns 
it in nearly the same terms as the Augsburg. “Qui 
millenariorum fabulam revocare conantur, sacris lite- 
ris adversantur, et in Judaica deliramenta sese prae- 
cipitant.”? The Belgic Confession guards the state. 
ment respecting the second advent of Christ, by én 
teaching that the time of its occurrence is unknown 
to all created beings, and that it will not take place 
until the number of the elect is complete. “ Credimus 
‘Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, quando tempus 
a Deo praestitum, quod omnibus creaturis est igno- 
tum, advenerit, et numerus electorum completus 
fuerit, e caelo rursus venturum, etc.” * 

The history of Chiliasm since the Reformation 
presents few points of importance. During the 
present century, individual minds in England and 
America, and upon the Continent of Europe, have 
attempted to revive the theory,—in some instances, 
in union with an intelligent and earnest orthodoxy ; 
in others, in connection with an uneducated and 
somewhat fanatical pietism. The first class is re- 
presented by Delitzsch and Auberlen in Germany, 
and by Cumming, Hiliott, and Bonar in Great 
Britain; the second class by the so-called ye 
ists and Millerites in the United States. 

The facts, then, established by this account of 


*Hase: Libri Symbolici, p. 14. ? NreMEYER: Collectio, p. 600, 
‘Niemeyer: Collectio, p. 387. 


398 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY, 


Millenarianism in the Ancient, Mediaeval, and Mod. 
ern Churches, are the following: 1. That Millena- 
he rianism was never the oecumenical faith of the 
a . church, and never entered as an article into any 
of the creeds. 2. That Millenarianism has been the 


‘ opinion of individuals and parties only,—some of 
or -Whom have stood in agreement with the catholic 
.. faith, and some in opposition to it. 
j 


§ 2. Catholic Theory of the Second Advent. 


The pressure of persecution being lifted off, the 
church returned to its earlier and first exegesis of the 
Scripture data concerning the end of the world, and 
the second coming of Christ. The representations 
in Rev. xx. were once more interpreted by those in 
Matt. xxv., which speak only of an advent at the 
day of judgment; and by the instructions given by 
St. Paul, in 2 Thess. ii., to correct the erroneous in- 
ference which the Thessalonian Church had drawn 
from his first Epistle to them, “that the day of ~ 
Christ is at hand.” The personal coming of Christ, 
it was now held, is not to take place until the final 
day of doom; until the gospel has been preached 
“unto the uttermost part of the earth” (Acts 1. 8); 
until the Jews have been converted to Christianity, 
after “the fulness of the Gentiles be brought in” 
(Rom. xi.); and until that great apostasy has oc- 
curred which is mentioned by St. Paul (1 Thess. i1 


a 


CATHOLIC THEORY. 399 
A 


3). The eschatology of the oldest/symbol became 
the oecumenical doctrine, and the Church in all its 
ages, without even a hint of any other appearance 
of the risen Redeemer, has confessed in the phrase- 
ology of the Apostles Creed its belief, that “He 
ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand 
of God the Father Almighty ; from thence he shall 
come to judge the quick and the dead.” 


CHAPTER II. 


THE RESURRECTION.» 


$1. The Intermediate State. 


THE opinions of the Early Fathers concerning 
the residence of the soul in its disembodied state, 
between death and the resurrection, were somewhat 
fluctuating. The idea of a Hades, or under-world, 
where departed spirits dwell, was familiar to the 
Hebrew mind as it was to the Greek, and so far as 
this idea passed over to Christianity it tended to 
the doctrine of a state intermediate between this 
earthly life, and the everlasting abode of the soul 
assigned to it in the day of judgment. Justin 
Vartyr represents the souls of the righteous as 
taking up a temporary abode in a happy, and 
those of the wicked in a wretched place; and stig- 
matizes as heretical the doctrine that souls are im- 
mediately received into heaven at death.? Tertul- 


1The materials in this and the Hacensacu: History of Doctrine 
succeeding chapter are derived (Smith’s Ed.). 
mostly from BaumearTEN—Crv- *Justinvus Martyr: Dialogus 
situs : Dogmengeschichte, and cum Tryphone, $$ 5. 80. 


THE INTERMEDIATE STATE. 401 


lian held that the martyrs went at once to the 
abode of the blessed, but that this was a privilege 
peculiar to them, and not granted to other Chris- 
tians.1 Cyprian, on the other hand, says nothing of 
an intermediate state, and expresses the confident 
belief that those who die in the Lord, by pestilence 
or by any other mode, will be at once taken to 
him? In the Alexandrine School, the idea of an 
intermediate state passed into that of a gradual 
purification of the soul, and paved the way for the 
later Papal doctrine of purgatory.® 

The doctrine of an intermediate state not only 
maintained itself, but gained in authority and infiu- 
ence during the Polemic period (250-730). Am- 
brose taught that “the soul is separated from the 
body at death, and after the cessation of the earth- 
ly life is held in an ambiguous condition (ambiguo 
suspenditur), awaiting the final judgment.”* Au- 
gustine remarks that “the period (tempus) which 
intervenes between the death and the final resur- 
rection of man, contains souls in secret receptacles, 
who are treated according to their character and 
conduct in the flesh.”* “The majority of ecclesias- 
tical writers of this period,” Hagenbach remarks, 
“believed that men do not receive their full re- 


*TeRTuLiiants: De anima, ly; * Awprosius: De Cain et Abel, 
De resurrectione, xliii. Ten: 

* Cypriants: Ady. Demetrium; ’ Aveustinus : Enchiridion, 
De mortalitate. cix, : 


* REDEPENNING: Origenes, 235. 


VoL. u.—26 


402 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


ward till after the resurrection of the body.” Here 
and there, however, there was a dissenting voice. 
Gregory Nazianzen supposed that the souls of the 
righteous, prior to the resurrection of the body, are 
at once admitted into the presence of God; in 
which opinion he seems to be supported by Genna- 
dius, and Gregory the Great. Eusebius also de- 
clares that Helena, the mother of Constantine, went 
immediately to God, and was transformed into an 
angelic substance. 

In the Middle Ages and the Papal Church, the 
doctrine of an intermediate state was, of course, re- 
tained and defended in connection with that of 
purgatory. In the Protestant Church, the doctrine 
of purgatory was rejected ; but some difference of 
sentiment appears respecting the intermediate state. 
Calwin combatted the theory of a sleep of the soul 
between death and the resurrection (Psychopan- 
nychy), which had been revived by some of the 
Swiss Anabaptists, and argues for the full con- 
sciousness of the disembodied spirit. The Second 
Helvetic Confession expressly rejects the notion 
that departed spirits reappear on earth. Some 
theologians endeavored to establish a distinction 
between the happiness which the disembodied 
spirit enjoys, and that which it will experience 
after the resurrection of the body. They also dis- 
tinguished between the judgment which takes place 
at the death of each individual, by which his des- 
tiny is immediately decided, and the general judg- 


THE INTERMEDIATE STATE. 403 


ment at the end of the world. Speaking generally, 
the doctrine of an intermediate state has found 
most favour in the Lutheran division of Protestants. 
In the English Church, since the time of Laud, the 
doctrine has found some advocates, chiefly in that 
portion of it characterized by high church views, 
and a Romanizing tendency. The followers of 
Swedenborg adopt the tenet, in a highly gross and 
materializing form. 


§ 2. The Resurrection Body. 


The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was 
from the beginning a cardinal and striking tenet of 
the Christian Church. The announcement of it by 
Paul at Athens awakened more interest, and pro- 
voked more criticism, than any other of the truths 
which he taught (Acts xvii. 382). All the early 
Fathers maintain this dogma with great earnestness 
and unanimity, against the objections and denial of 
the skeptics,—of whom Célsus is the most acute and 
scoffing in his attacks. Most of them believed in 
the resuscitation of the very same body that lived 
on earth. Only the Alexandrine School dissented 
upon this point. Justin Martyr affirms that the 
body will rise again with all its members. Even 
cripples will rise as such, but at the moment of 
resurrection will be made physically perfect. re 
naeus asserts the identity of the future with the 


404 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


present body. Tertullian wrote a tract upon the 
resurrection, maintaining that the very same body 
will be raised that was laid in the grave. He an- 
swers the objection that certain members of the 
body will be of no use in the future life, by the re- 
mark that the bodily member is capable of both a 
lower and a higher service. Even upon earth, the 
mouth serves not only for the purpose of eating, 
but also of speaking and praising God. Cyprian 
follows Tertullian in his representations. Clement 
of Alexandria, and Origen, on the other hand, adopt 
a spiritualizing theory of the resurrection.. Origen 
teaches that a belief in the doctrine of the resurrec- 
tion of the body is not absolutely essential to the 
profession of Christianity, provided the immortality 
of the soul be maintained. Yet he defended the 
church dogma against the objections of Celsus, re- 
jecting, however, the doctrine of the identity of the 
bodies, as giving a handle to scoffers. These ideal- 
izing views of the Alexandrine School were adopted 
by several of the Eastern theologians; for example, 
Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory Nyssa, and perhaps 
Basil. But they were combatted at both the 
East and the West, with great vehemence. Jerome 
maintained the identity of the resurrection-body 
with that laid in the grave, in respect to the very 


‘Synesius of Cyrene acknowl- was interpreted, by some, as an 
edged that he could not adoptthe entire denial of the doctrine of 
current view in the church re-_ the resurrection. 
specting the resurrection, which 


THE RESURRECTION BODY. 405 


hairs and teeth. This last he proves by the “ gnash- 
ing of teeth” in the world of woe. Augustine, in 
the earlier part of his Christian life, was somewhat 
inclined to the spiritualizing view of the Alexandrine 
School; but afterwards defended the more sen- 
suous theory, though being careful to clear the doc- 
trine of gross and carnal additions. Chrysostom as- 
serted the identity of the two bodies, but directs 
particular attention to the Pauline distinction of a 
“natural body” and a “spiritual body.” Gregory 
the Great maintained substantially the same views 
with Augustine. 

The doctrine of the Ancient Church, that the hu- 
man body will be raised with all its component parts, 
passed into the Middle Ages, and was regarded as the 
orthodox doctrine. Thomas Aquinas, founding upon 
the Patristic theory, goes into details. “The resur- 
rection will probably take place toward evening, for 
the heavenly bodies which rule over all earthly mat- 
ter must first cease to move. Sun and moon will 
meet again at that point where they were probably 
created. No other matter will rise from the grave 
than what existed at the moment of death. If all 
that substance were to rise again which has been 
consumed during the present life, it would form a 
most unshapely mass. The sexual difference will 
exist, but without sensual appetites. All the organs 
of sense will still be active, with the exception of 
the sense of taste. It is, however, possible that 
even this latter may be rendered more perfect, and 


406 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


fitted for adequate functions and enjoyments. Hair 
and nails are one of the ornaments of man, and are 
therefore quite as necessary as blood and other 
fluids. The resurrection bodies will be exceedingly 
fine, and be delivered from the corpulence and 
heavy weight which is now so burdensome to them; 
nevertheless, they will be tangible, as the body of 
Christ was touched after his resurrection. Their 
size will not increase after the resurrection, nor will 
they grow either thicker or thinner. To some ex- 
tent they will still be dependent on space and time ; 
yet the resurrection bodies will move much faster, 
and more easily, from one place to another, than our 
present bodies; they will be at liberty to follow 
the tendencies and impulses of the soul. They are 
glorified, bright, and shining, and can be perceived 
by glorified eyes alone. But this is true only in 
reference to the bodies of the blessed. The bodies 
of the damned are to be ugly and deformed, incor- 
ruptible, but capable of suffering, which is not the 
ease with the bodies of the saints.”* These repre- 
sentations afterwards found their vivid embodiment 
in the poetry of Dante, and the painting of Raffaelle 
and Michael Angelo. Scotus Hrigena endeavoured 
to revive the ideas of Origin, but his opinions found” 
no favour. 
The Patristic theory of the resurrection body 

was transmitted, also, to the Protestant churches, 


? Aquinas: Summa, P. iii. Qu. 75; quoted by Hacensacu; His- 
tory of Doctrine, § 204. 


THE RESURRECTION BODY. 407 


and the history of the dogma in modern times ex- 
hibits comparatively few variations from the tradi- 
tional belief,—and these, mostly in the line of Ori- 
gen’s speculations. 


CHAPTER If 


THE FINAL STATE. 


§ 1. Day of Judgment. 


Tue doctrine of a general judgment was, from 
the first, immediately connected with that of the 
resurrection of the body. Mankind are raised from 
the dead, in order to be judged according to the 
deeds done in the body. The Fathers founded 
their views of the day of doom upon the represen- 
tations and imagery of Scripture. They believed 
that a general conflagration would accompany the 
last judgment, which would destroy the world; 
though some ascribed a purifying agency to it. 
Some of them, like Zértullian and the more rhetori- 
cal of the Greek Fathers, enter into minute details, 
while others, like Augustine, endeavour dogmat- 
ically to define the facts couched in the figurative 
language of Scripture. These two classes also per- 
petuate themselves in the Mediaeval Church. In 
the Middle Ages, it was a popular opinion that the 
judgment would take place in the valley of Jehos- 
aphat. But it was found difficult to unite in a 


PUGATORY. 409 


single scene all the various imagery of Scripture— 
such for example, as the darkening of the sun and 
moon, and yet the effulgence of light accompanying 
the advent of the judge. Hence theologians like 
Aquinas (Qu. 88, Art. 2.) maintained that the 
judgment would take place mentaliter, because the 
oral trial and defence of each individual would re- 
quire too much time. In the Modern Church, the 
course of thought upon this doctrine has been sim- 
ilar to that in the Ancient and Mediaeval. The 
symbols of the different Protestant communions ex- 
plicitly affirm a day of judgment at the end of the 
world, but enter into no details. Individual specu- 
lations, as of old, vibrate between the extremes of 
materialism and hyper-spiritualism. 


§ 2. Purgatory. 


The doctrine of purgatory was intimately con- 
nected with that of an intermediate state, and was 
developed along with it. In proportion as the con- 
dition of the soul between death and the resurrec- 
tion was regarded as very different from its con- 
dition after the final judgment, it was natural that 
the intermediate state should be looked upon as one 
in which the everlasting destiny is not irrevocably 
fixed, and in which there might possibly be a de- 
liverance from evil and peril. Those of the early 
Fathers who held the doctrine of an intermediate 


410 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


place, made no practical distinction between the 
condition of the soul previous to the resurrection, 
and its condition after it. 'The wicked were misera- 
ble, and the good were happy,—and that eternally. 
The chief difference between the intermediate state, 
and the final state, for either the sinner or the saint 
was, that in the former the soul is disembodied, and 
in the latter it is “ clothed upon” (2 Cor. v. 2). But 
in course of time, the difference between the inter- 
mediate and the final state of the soul became 
greatly magnified. The Scripture doctrine that 
there are degrees of reward and punishment in the 
future world was construed by some of the later 
Fathers in such a manner, as to bring the lowest 
grade of reward into contact with the lowest grade 
of punishment, and thereby to annihilate the differ- 
ence in kind between heaven and hell. Thus, the 
intermediate state gradually came to be regarded as 
the region in which the spirit is in a vague and un- 
decided position in respect to endless bliss and woe, 
and consequently as one in which the escape from 
everlasting misery is still possible. 

The doctrine of a purification of believers, only, 
in the intermediate state, shows itself as early as the 
4th century. The cleansing was confined to those 
who had become partially sanctified in this life. 
Augustine supposes that the teachings of St. Paul 
in 1 Cor. iii. 11-15 imply, that the remainders of 
corruption in the renewed soul may be purged away 
in the period between death and the final judgment. 


REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 411 


The idea of a purifying fire is distinctly presented 
by Gregory Nazianzen. But the Papal doctrine of 
purgatory does not yet appear. It is not until the 
time of Gregory the Great (+604), that the doc- 
trine attains its full form. He lays it down as an 
article of faith, and is the first writer who clearly 
propounded the idea of a deliverance from purga- 
tory by intercessory prayer, and masses for the dead 
(sacra oblatio hostiae salutaris). ‘“ Comparing,” says 
Hagenbach,' “ Gregory’s doctrine with the earlier, 
and more spiritual notions concerning the efficacy 
of the purifying fire of the intermediate state, we 
may adopt the statement of Schmidt, that ‘the be- 
lief in a lasting desire after a higher degree of per- 
fection, which death itself cannot quench, degenerated 
into a belief in purgatory.” 

The dogma of purgatory, thus gradually formed, 
passed into the Middle Ages, and was embodied 
firmly in the Papal system by the decisions of the 
Council of Trent. Its place and influence in the 
Papal Church are well known. 


§ 3. Hternal Rewards and Punishment. 


That the blessedness of the good is unchanging 
and eternal, has been the uniform faith of the Church 
in all ages. Representations concerning the nature 
of this happiness vary with the culture, and intellec- 


‘Hacenpacy: History of Doctrine, § 141. 


412 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


tual spirit, of the time or the individual. Justin 
Martyr regards the blessedness of heaven as con- 
sisting mainly in the continuation of the happiness 
of the millennial reign, heightened by the enjoy- 
ment of immediate intercourse with God. Origen 
holds that the blessed dwell in the aérial regions, 
passing from one heaven to another as they progress 
in holiness. At the same time, he condemns those 
who expect sensuous enjoyment in the heavenly 
state. The soul will “have a clear insight into the 
destinies of men, and the dealings of Providence. 
Among the teachings of God in that higher state, 
will also be instruction about the stars, ‘ why a star 
is in such and such a position, why it stands at such 
and such a distance from another, etc. But the 
highest and last degree is the intuitive vision of 
God himself, the complete elevation of the spirit 
above the region of sense.” The Greek theolo- 
gians, like Gregory Nazianzen and Gregory Nyssa, 
adopted the views of Origen, and taught that the 
blessedness of heaven consists in enlarged knowl- 
edge of divine things, intercourse with the saints 
and angels, and deliverance from the fetters of the 
earthly body. Augustine believed that the heavenly 
happiness consists in the enjoyment of peace which 
passes knowledge, and the vision of God which can- 
not be compared with bodily vision. One important 
element in the happiness of the redeemed, according 
to him, is deliverance from all hazards of apostasy, 
sin, and death,—the non posse peccare et more. 


ETERNAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT. 413 


The Schoolmen, while holding the essential fea- 
tures in the Patristic theory, endeavoured to system- 
atize this subject, as they did every other one. They 
divided heaven into three parts,—the visible heaven, 
or the firmament; the spzrdtual heaven, where saints 
and angels dwell; and the intellectual] heaven, where 
the blessed enjoy the beatific vision of the Trinity. 
Degrees of happiness are bestowed according to the 
grade of perfection. Agwinas supposed different 
gifts of blessedness, denoted by the corona aurea 
which is bestowed upon all the blessed, and the 
particular awreolae for martyrs and saints, for monks 
and nuns. Some of the Mystics, as Suso, describe 
the heavenly happiness under imagery derived from 
lovely Alpine valleys, and bright meadows, and the 
joyful abandonment of heart incident to the open- 
ing of the vernal season. But they are careful to 
remark, that all such descriptions are only an image 
of an ineffable reality. 

The Modern Church maintains the doctrine of 
everlasting blessedness in essentially the same form 
with the Ancient and Mediaeval. The tendencies to 
materialize, or to spiritualize it, vary with the grades 
of culture and modes of thinking. The popular mind 
still instinctively betakes itself to the sensuous image- 
ry and representations, with Justin Martyr and Ter- | 
tullian; while the educated intellect seeks, with Ort 
gen, the substance of heaven in the state of the soul. 
“Most certainly,” says one of this class, “ there is per- 
fect happiness beyond the grave, for those who have in 


414 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


this world begun to enjoy it, and this is by no means 
different from that which we may here at any time 
begin to possess. We do not enter into this state 
of happiness, merely by being buried. Many will 
seek happiness in the future life, and in the infinite 
series of future worlds, as much in vain, as in the 
present life, if they think it can be found in any 
thing but that which is now so near to them, that it 
can never be brought nearer,—viz., the Eternal.” 
The punishment inflicted upon the lost was re- 
garded by the Fathers of the Ancient Church, with 
very few exceptions, as endless. Clement of Rome 
(Ep. ii. 8) affirms, that “after we leave this world, 
we are no longer able to confess sin, and to turn 
from it” (ovx é&re duvausta éxsi @Louolhoynoactuas 
7 wavavosiv ére). Justin Martyr (ante,Vol.i.p. 128) 
asserts the eternity of future punishments, in oppo- 
sition to Plato’s doctrine, that they would last a 
thousand years. Minucius Felix (Cap. 35) remarks 
of the damned: “ Nec tormentis, aut modus ullus 
aut terminus.” Cyprian (Ad. Demetr.), in similar 
terms, says of the lost: ““Cremabit addictos ardens 
semper gehenna, et vivacibus flammis vorax poena, 
nec erit, unde habere tormenta vel requiem possint 
aliquando, vel finem. Servabantur cum corporibus — 
suis animae infinitis cruciatibus ad dolorem... . 
Quando istine excessum fuerit, newllus jam poent- 
ventiae locus est, nullus satisfactionis effectus: hic 
vita aut amittitur, aut tenetur; hic saluti aeternae 
cultu Dei, et fructu fidei, providetur.” Augustine 


ETERNAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT. 415 


argues that the misery of the lost will be endless, 
from the use of the word eéacos in Matt. xxv. 41, 
46, which, he maintains, must have the same signi- 
fication when applied to the punishment of the evil, 
as to the recompense of the good. “If both things 
are alike aiwycoc, then the term must be interpreted 
to mean either that both are transitory, or that both 
are everlasting. ‘Eternal’ punishment and ‘eter- 
nal’ life are contrasted with each other. To say 
that ‘eternal’ life will have no end, but that ‘eter- 
nal’ punishment will have an end, is absurd.” Re 
specting the nature of the punishment, Augustine 
considers that separation from God constitutes the 
severity and dreadfulness of it; but leaves it to the 
individual to choose between the more sensuous, or 
the more spiritual mode of interpretation,—adding, 
that it is better to unite them together Chrysos- 
tom employs his powerful eloquence in depicting the 
everlasting torments of the lost; but remarks that 
it is of more consequence to know how to escape 
hell, than to know its locality or its nature. 

The only exception to the belief in the eternity 
of future punishment, in the Ancient Church, ap- 
pears in the Alexandrian School. Their denial of 
the doctrine sprang logically out of their anthropo- 
logy. Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, we have 
seen, asserted with great earnestness the tenet of a 
plenary and inalienable power in the human will to 


* Aveustinus : Enchiridion, § 112; De moribus ecclesiae, c. 11; /4a 
civitate, X XI. lx. 10. 


416 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


overcomesin. The destiny of the soul is thus placed 
in the soul itself. The power of free will (avre£ou- 
ocov) cannot be lost, and if not exerted in this 
world, it still can be in the next; and under the full 
light of the eternal world, and the stimulus of suf- 
fering there experienced, nothing is more probable 
than that it will be exerted. Hence, in opposition” 
to the catholic faith, Origen maintained the doce- 
trine of the final restoration of all human souls. 
At the same time, he acknowledged that this doc- 
trine might easily become dangerous to the uncon- 
verted, and sometimes speaks of an eternal condem- 
nation, and the impossibility of conversion in the 
world to come. Yet, in close connection with this 
very statement, he calls the fear of eternal punish- 
ment a beneficial “deception” appointed by God. 
“For many wise men,” he says, “ or such as thought 
themselves wise, after having apprehended the real 
and absolute truth respecting endless punishment, 
and rejected the delusion, have given themselves 
up to a vicious life. So that it would have been 
much better for them to have continued in the de- 
lusion, and believed in the eternity of future punish- 
ment.”* The views of Origen concerning future 
retribution were almost wholly confined to his 
school. Faint traces of a belief in the remission of 


1Clement and Origen both tracts in Bavmearten-Crusivs: 
found the final recovery of Satan Dogmengeschichte, II. 218. 
and his angels, upon this abiding ? BauMGARTEN-Crusivs: Dog- 
existence of free will to good in mengeschichte, JI. 390; Hacen- 
the rational spirit. See the ex- sacH: History of Doctrine, § 78. 


ETERNAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT. 417 


punishments in the future world are visible in the 
writings of Didymus of Alexandria, and in Gregory 
Nyssa. The annihilation of the wicked was taught 
by Arnobius. With these exceptions, the Ancient 
Church held that the everlasting destiny of the 
human soul is decided in this earthly state. 

The Mediaeval Church received the traditional 
doctrine respecting endless retribution. Heaven 
and hell were separated by an absolute and impas- 
sable gulf, but the intermediate space between them 
was subdivided into purgatory, which lies nearest 
to hell; the limbus infantum, where all unbap- 
tized children remain; and the limbus patrum, 
which is the abode of the Old Testament saints, and 
the place to which Christ went to preach redemp- 
tion to the spirits in prison. ‘This last limbus was 

also called Abraham’s bosom. Aquinas considers 
the torments of the damned to consist in useless re- 
pining and murmuring. They can change neither 
for the better, nor for the worse. They hate God, 
and curse the state of the blessed. Mystics like 
Suso describe the misery of the lost, in the same 
vivid and sensuous phrase in which they depict 
the happiness of the saints. “O! separation, ever- 
lasting separation, how painful art thou! O! the 
wringing of hands! O! sobbing, sighing, and weep- 
ing, unceasing howling and lamenting, and yet never 
to be heard. . . Give us a millstone, say the damned, 
as large as the whole earth, and so wide in circum- 
ference, as to touch the sky all around, and let a 


VOL. 11.—27 


418 HISTORY OF ESCHATOLOGY. 


little bird come once in a hundred thousand years, 
and pick off a small particle of the stone, not larger 
than the tenth part of a grain of millet, after another 
hundred thousand years let him come again, so that 
in ten hundred thousand years he would pick off as 
much as a grain of millet, we wretched sinners 
would ask nothing but that when this stone has an 
end, our pains might also cease; yet even that can- 
not be!” The Inferno of Dante delineates the Me- 
diaeval ideas of final retribution in letters of fire. 
The Dantean inscription upon the infernal gate: 
“Leave all hope behind, ye who enter here,” ex- 
presses the sentiment of the Mediaeval Church, 
with scarcely an exception. Even the adventurous 
Scotus Hrigena, though suggesting a revival of 
Origen’s theory of the restitution of all things, did 
not deny the eternity of the punishments of hell. 
He attempted to combine both doctrines, by assert- 
ing the abolishment of evil considered as a kingdom, 
or asystem, while yet it might continue to exist for- 
ever in certain incorrigible individuals. 

The Modern Church has accepted the traditional 
faith upon this subject. In proportion as the inspi- 
ration and infallibility of Revelation have been con- 
ceded, the doctrine of an absolute and therefore 
endless punishment of sin has maintained itself,—it 
being impossible to eliminate the tenet from the 
Christian Scriptures, except by a mutilation of the 
canon, or a violently capricious exegesis. The de- 
nial of the eternity of future punishments, in modern 


ETERNAL REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT. 419 


times, has consequently been a characteristic of those 
parties and individuals who have rejected, either 
partially or entirely, the dogma of infallible inspi- 
ration. 


Ad 








BOOK SEVENTH. 





HISTORY 


OF 


SYMBOLS. 


LITERATURE. 


GuerricKe: Allgemeine Christliche Symbolik. 

Winer: Comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschie- 
denen Christliche Kirchenparteien. 

Watcu: Introductio in libros Ecclesiae Lutheranae symbolicos. 

Catovius: Synopsis Controversiarum. 

HasE: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Evangelicae (Lutheran Symbols), 

Meyer: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Lutheranae. 

NieMEyYER: Collectio Confessionum in Ecclesiis Reformatis publi- 
catorum (Calvinistic Symbols). 

Aveusti: Corpus Librorum Symbolicornm (Calyinistic Symbols). 

STREITWOLF: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiav Catholicae (Roman Catb- 
olic Symbols). 

Kiwmet: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiae Orientalis (Greek Symbols). 


CHAPTER I. 


ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL SYMBOLS. 


$1. Preliminary Statements. 


Tue subject of Symbolics naturally follows that 
of Special Dogmatic History. The construction of 
single doctrines by the thinking of the Church is suc- 
ceeded by their combination in 
sions of faith; and, therefore, thehistory of the first 
process should be completedby that of the second. 
The importance of thistopic is apparent, in the first 
place, from its yery close connection with that of 
systematic theology. It differs from it, as the pro- 


‘reeds and confes- 








cess differs from the product; as the history of a 
science differs from the science itself. Theology con- 
structs the compact and solid creed, while Symbolies 
gives an account of its plastic and flowing construc- 
tion. The two subjects are therefore reciprocally 
related, and connected, by that great law of action 
and re-action which prevails in the mental world, as 
that of cause and effect does in the material. Hence, 
one serves to explain, verify, or modify, the other. 


Again, the history of Creeds is important, be- 


424 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


cause it imparts clear and precise conceptions 

of the differences between ecclesiastical denom- 
inations. Each particular branch of the Chris- 
tian Church possesses its peculiarities, by virtue of 
which it is denominational and particular. It is 
sometimes difficult to specify this point of differ- 
ence; so much so, that the hasty observer often- 
times concludes, from the general similarity in their 
religious experience, that there is really no differ- 
ence between the doctrinal bases of all those de- 
nominations who “hold the head,” and are properly 
called evangelical. The peculiarities of evangelical 
churches appear with more distinctness in their 
creeds, than in their religious experience ; and hence 

the scientific observer must leave the sphere of feel- 

ing and practice, and pass over into that of theory 
and dogmatic statement, in order to reach the real 
difference between the varieties of Christians. For 
there is a difference. Organizations cannot be 

| founded, and, still less, maintained from age to age, 
upon mere fictions and imaginary differences. Tried 

. a by the test of exact dogmatic statement, there is a 
ie plain difference between the symbol of the Armin- 
ian, and that of the Calvinist; but tried by the 
test of practical piety and devout feeling, there is 
KY? but little difference between the character of John 
Wesley and that of John Calvin. And this for two 
reasons. In the first place, the practical religious life 

is much more directly a prodyct of the Holy Spirit, 
than is the speculative construction of Scripture 


PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS. 425 


truth. Piety is certainly the product of divine 
grace ; but the creed is not so certainly formed un- 
der a divine illumination. Two Christians, being 
regenerated by one and the same Spirit, possess one 
and the same Christian character, and therefore, 
upon abstract principles, ought to adopt one and 
the same statement of Christian belief. On attempt- 
. Ing its construction, however, they pass into the 
sphere of the human understanding, and of human 
science, and it is within this sphere that the diver- 
gence begins, and the foundation for denominational 
existence is laid. In the second place, the diver- 
gence is seen in the creed rather than in the charac- 
ter, because one mind is more successful in un- 
derstanding and interpreting the Chnstian experi- 
ence itself, than another is. Unquestionably, evan- 
gelical denominations would be much more nearly 
agreed in their dogmatic theology, if the power of 
accurate statement were equally possessed by all. 
But one individual Christian comprehends the Chris- 
tian experience more clearly and profoundly than 
another, who yet, by virtue of his regeneration, is 
equally a subject of it; and, as a consequence, he 
comprehends the Scriptures more profoundly, and 
is better qualified than his fellow Christian to con- 
struct a clear, comprehensive, and _ self-consistent 
ereed. All doctrinal history evinces, that just in 
proportion as evangelical believers come to possess 
a common scientific talent for expressing their com- 
mon faith and feeling, they draw nearer together 


-“_ 


426 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


so far as regards their symbolic literature. While, 
on the contrary, a slender power of self-reflection 
and analysis, together with a loose use of terms, 
drives minds far apart within the sphere of scientific 
theology who often melt and flow together within 
the sphere of Christian feeling and effort. Science 
unites and unifies wherever it prevails; for science 
is accuracy in terms, definitions, and statements, _ 
In the third place, the history of Symbols is im- 
portant, because it contributes to produce this talent 
of clear apprehension, and power of accurate state- 
ment. Symbolics affords a comparative view of 
creeds. It is therefore to theology, what compara- 
tive anatomy is to physical science, or comparative 
philology is to linguistic. When languages began 
to be compared with languages, many obscurities 
were cleared up which overhung the old method of 
investigating them, and the whole subject of defini- 
tions underwent a great improvement. The mean- 
ing of language became much more precise and full, 
than it had been, under this light thrown back- 
wards and forwards, and in every direction, from a 
great number of languages investigated together. 
The same effect is produced by the comparative 
study of confessions of faith. Probably nothing in 
the way of means would do more to bring about 
that universal unity in doctrinal statement which 
has been floating as an ideal before the minds of 
men amidst the denominational distractions of Pro- 
testantism, than a more thorough and general ac- 


PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS. 427 


quaintance with the symbols of the various denomi- 
nations, and the history of their origin and forma- 
tion. There would be less misapprehension and 
misrepresentation of the views of other parties, 
which is one of the chief obstacles to uniformity in 
confessions of faith. The honest objections that 
trouble the minds of those who refuse to adopt a 
particular form of statement would be seen, and, — 
thus, would be more likely to be answered, instead 
of overlooked or perhaps ridiculed. On all sides, 
and for all minds, more light would be poured upon 
the profound mysteries of a common Evangelical 
Christianity, if theologians were in the habit of 
looking over the whole field of symbolic literature, 
instead of merely confining themselves to the exam- 
ination of a single system. Such study would by 
no means result in destroying cortidence in any one 
system, and induce that eclecticism which results in 
a mere aggregation that possesses no fundamental 
unity, and no self-subsistent force of its own. On )° 
the contrary, the theological mind would become | 
immoveably settled in its conviction, that this or 
that confession of faith is the closest to Scripture 
data, and when asked for its symbol would exhibit 
it, and defend it. But, at the same time, this very 
confidence would beget calmness and moderation in 
dealing with a mind of different doctrinal views; 
and calmness and moderation do much toward 
bringing controversialists to that point of view 
where they see eye to eye. 


& 


( 


428 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


§ 2. Apostles’ Creed. 


The Apostle Peter, in his answer to the inquiry 
of Christ: “But whom say ye that I am?’, made 
the first formal confession of faith under the Chris- 
tian dispensation. The answer: “Thou art Christ, 
the Son of the living God” (Matt. xvi. 16), was re- 
garded by the Redeemer as the doctrinal basis of 


' his kingdom upon earth; for “upon this rock,”’— 


oe 


\ 


this cordial acknowledgment of his character and 
redeeming work,—he informed his disciples he 
would found his church. * 

A short and simple confession similar to this 
was made by the early converts to Christianity. 
The candidate for admission to the church, at his 
baptism, professed his faith in Christ as the Re- 


a eS Pe 
“Ns of the world. The eunugh baptized by 


Philip said solemnly, in connection/with the admin- 
istration of the rite: “I believe that Jesus Christ is 
the Son of God.” (Acts, vii. 37.) Along with 
this recognition of the deity of Christ and his me- 
diatorial work, admission into the church was also 
connected with a confession of haljet in the doctrine 
of the trinity. The baptismal formula, which was 


invariably used, in accordance with the solemn and 
explicit command of Christ, naturally led to the 


The Protestant understands that by it is meant the person of 
the “rock” to be the confession Peter. 
of Peter; the Papist contends 


APOSTLES’ CREED. 429 


adoption of this doctrine into the confession made A 
by the new convert from Paganism or Judaism. 

And it would have been the deepest hypocrisy and 
dishonesty in the candidate for baptism, to reject a 

doctrine that was taught and commended to him by 

the officiating minister, at the very moment of his 
reception into the church, and in the very phrase- 

ology of his initiation. In this way, the confession 

of faith made in the Apostolic age, by the neophyte, 
combined the doctrine of the trinity with that of 

the deity of Christ, and his mediatorial Person and 

work. This confession, at first, was exceedingly 

brief and simple, and not adopted by any formal 

action of the church in its public capacity,—for, as 

yet, general councils, or even local ones, were un- 3 = 
known: ‘There is every reason, nevertheless, for be-| 
lieving that the practice of confessing one’s faith, 
was general and uniform among the churches. Paul © 
reminds Timothy of the “good profession” which 
he had made before many witnesses (1 Tim. vi. 
12); and in 1 Tim. ii. 16, there seems to be a 
summary that indicates a current creed-form. The 
concurrent testimony of the primitive Fathers goes 
to show that from the first, admission into the |. 
church was connected with the public acknowledg- | 
ment of certain truths. 

Out of these confessions, which each church 
adopted and used in the reception of its members, 
there was formed, at a very early date, what is call- 
ed the Symbolum Apostolicum. The term ovGodor, 


- 


430 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


: fr 


om ouyGaddey (conferre), denotes that the for. 


mula was a collocation and combination. Rufinus, 
at the end of the 4th century, would find in this 
etymology the proof of the apostolic authorship of 
this creed. It was constructed, he maintained, ort 
of matter which each one of the Apostles brought 


éxaoros GuveGade. 


Ww 
M4 in, and threw into a common stock; cuuPodov Ore 


m 


The objections to this view of Rufinus, which 
aintained itself down to the Reformation; that 


the Apostles formally and verbally drew up the 


creed which goes under their name, are the follow- . 


in 


, : ° “4 
g. 1. No mention is made in the Acts of the | 
—— 


Apostles, of any synod of the Apostles in which 
they composed a creed for the Christian Church,—a 
synod far too important to be unnoticed. 2. at 
. —™ Fathers of the first three centuries, in disputing with 
the heretits, while endeavoring to prove that the 
doctrine of this_creed is apostolic in the sense of 


sc 


riptural and tru@,never assert that the Apostles 





personally composed it. Eusebius, for example, 
would certainly have cited it as the Apostles’ work, 


if 


he had known or believed it to be theirs. 3. 


3 This creed is cited by the Primitive Fathers with 


m 


inor variations. Some of them omit the clause 


relating to the “descent into hell;” others, those 
concerning the “ communion of saints,” and the “life 
everlasting.” This they would not have ventured 


au 


*Laurentivs Vata (t 1546) was the first to dispute the apostolic 


2 Wren5 f : Capa oe 


APOSTLES’ CREED. 431 


to do, had they known the creed to be an inspired 
document. 
But that this symbol is of the very earliest an- 
tiquity cannot be doubted; and that it is apostolic 
in the sense of harmonizing with the Apostles’ doc 
trine in Scripture, is equally clear. The words of 
Luther respecting it are lively. ‘This confession 
of faith we did not make or invent, nor did the 
Fathers before us; but as a bee collects honey from 
the beautiful and fragrant flowers of all sorts, so is 
this symbol briefly and accurately put together out 
of the books of the prophets and apostles, 7. e. out 
of the whole sacred Scripture, for children and sim- 
ple hearted Christians. It is called the Apostles’ 
symbol or confession, because Christian truth could 
- not possibly be put into a shorter and clearer state-| - $2 
ment than this. And it has been in the church ww oe 
from the beginning ; since it was either composed 

by the Apostles themselves, or else brought togeth- 

er from their writings or preaching, by some of 

their best pupils.” ! . 

The Apostles’ Creed runs as follows: “TI believe 
in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and 
earth; and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord; 
who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the 
Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, was cru- 
cified, dead, and buried ; He descended into hell; the 
third day He rose again from the dead ; He ascend- 





432 


HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


ed into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God 
the Father Almighty; from thence He shall come 
to judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the 
Holy Ghost; the Holy Catholic Church; the com- 
munion of saints; the forgiveness of sins; the res- 
‘urrection of the body; and the life everlasting.” 


1 We append here the summa- 
ries of the Christian faith given 
by Irenarzus and TeERTULLIAN. 
Their coincidence with the Apos- 
tles’ Creed is apparent; while 
yet their variations from it show 
that they are not mere copies of 
it. ‘The Church, though scat- 
tered through the whole habita- 
ble globe to its utmost bounds, 
has received from the apostles 
and their pupils the belief, in one 
God, Father almighty, the maker 
of heaven and earth and the sea, 
and all that is in them; and in 
one Christ Jesus, the Son of God, 
who was made flesh for our sal- 
vation ; and in the Holy Ghost, 
who through the prophets an- 
nounced the dispensations, and 
the advents, and the birth from a 
virgin, and the passion, and the 
resurrection from the dead, and 
the incarnate ascension into hea- 
ven of the beloved Christ Jesus 
our Lord, and his re-appearance 
(rapovciav) from the heavens 
with the glory of the Father, in 
order to gather together into one 
(dvaxeadatooacSat. Eph. 1. 10) 
all things, and raise every man 
from the grave, that to Christ Je- 
sus our Lord and God and Saviour 


and King, according to the good 
pleasure of the invisible Father, 
every knee should bow, of things 
in heaven, of things in earth, and 
of things under the earth, and 
that every tongue should confess 
him, and that he should adminis- 
ter a just judgment upon all, that 
he should send into eternal fire 
evil spirits (ra mvevpatixa THs To- 
vnpias, Eph. vi. 12), and the an- 
gels who transgressed and apos- 
tatized, and the ungodly, unjust, 
and lawless, and blasphemous 
among men, but should give im- 
mortality, and minister abundant- 
ly of eternal glory, to the just and 
holy and those who have kept his 
commandments, and have contin- 
ued in his love, graciously giving 
life to those who have been such 
from the beginning, and to those 
who have been such after re- 
pentance.” Irenarus: Advyersus 
Haereses, I. x.—‘‘The rule of 
faith is one only, unchangeable, 
and not to be amended, namely, 
the belief in one sole omnipotent 
God, the maker of the world ; 
and in his Son Jesus Christ, born 
of the Virgin Mary, crucified un- 
der Pontius Pilate, raised from 
the dead on the third day, re- 


€ 


APOSTLES CREED. 433 

Several facts of great importance, in connection 
with the Apostles’ Creed, are worthy of notice. 1. 
In the churches founded by the Apostles and 
their pupils, a confession of faith, and therefore the 
formal adoption of a creed, wasrequired of the can- 
didate for admission to the church. 2. Although. 
the department of scientific theology can hardly 
be said to have been formed, yet this oldest creed 
is very distinct concerning the essential doctrines 
of Christianity. The Apostles’ Creed teaches the 
doctrine of the existence of God as Father, Son, 
and Holy Ghost ; of the incarnation of the Son; of 
his atoning \death ; of his mediatorial power and 
kingdom; of the resurrection; and of the final 
judgment. 3. The Apostles’ Creed is the earliest 
attempt of the Christian mind to systematize the 
teachings of Scripture, and is, consequently, the un- 
inspired foundation upon which the whole after- 
structure of symbolic literature rests. All creed- 
development proceeds from this germ. Being little 
more than a collection of Scripture phraseology, it 
contains fewer speculative elements than the later 
creeds which the church was compelled to form by 
the counter-speculation of the human mind; and 


ceived into heaven, seated now 
on the right hand of the Father, 
and to come hereafter to judge 
the living and dead, through the 
resurrection of the flesh.” Trr- 
TuLLIANts : De virginibus velan- 
dis, c. 1. The same creed, for 


VOL. 1.—28 


substance, is to be found in De 
praescriptionibus adversus haere- 
ticos, c. 18, and Adversus Praxe- 
am,c.2. See Pearson: On the 
Creed (Appendix), for these and 
other patristic symbols. 


} 
= 4 


ee 
othe 


434 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


yet, because it is composed wholly of Scripture data, 

it is capable of an indefinite expansion by the 
scientific mind in all ages. 4. This symbol con- 
tributed indirectly to the collection and fixing of 

the Canon. In the Ist and 2d centuries, but very 

w* ‘ew copies of the gospels and epistles were in exist- 
ye” ence. The Ancient Church had no opportunity to pe- 
ruse them as the Modern has, and, consequently, the 
entire Biblical knowledge of the common Christian 
of that period was obtained from the public reading 
and explanation of the religious assembly. It is 
easy to see that in such a condition of things, a 
brief compendium, or summary statement of the es- 
sential truths of Christianity, that could be commit- 
ted to memory and repeated by all, would be the 
. best substitute for the lack of manuscripts. Hence, 
the confession of faith that might pass from mouth to 
mouth, like the sacramentum of the ancient soldier. 
But in course of time, the heretical or schismati- 
cal parties who advanced doctrines contrary to those 
embodied in these brief creeds, and who appealed 

to the Scriptures for justification, compelled the 
catholic defenders of the simple original creed, to 
collect and fix the Canon, and to multiply copies of 

it. For, in order to make out his case, the heretical 

or schismatical opponent of the creed cited mutila- 
ted or garbled portions of the Scripture, or writings 
which like the apocryphal gospels and epistles 
could lay no claim to inspiration. In this way, the 
defence of the Apostolic Creed contributed to the 


NICAENO-CONSTANTINOPOLITAN SYMBOL. 435 


spread and authority of the inspired writings them- 
selves. 5. This earliest creed has been honoured 
and adopted more generally than any other single 
confession of faith, by all Christian denominations. 
It makes part of the liturgies of the various 
churches, and its doctrinal matter enters as a 
component into all the scientific creeds of Christen- 


dom. 

For the proof that the clause, “‘He descended into Hell,” in 
this Creed, is a late interpolation, see Shedd: Dogmatic Theol- 
ogy, II. 603-608. 


§ 3. WMicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol. 


The history already given of the formation of the 
doctrine of the Trinity renders a detailed account 
of this creed superfluous. This confession is closely 
confined to theology, or the doctrine of the Trinity 
and the Person of Christ ; while the Apostles’ Creed, 
though devoting more attention to this subject than 
to any other, yet makes statements respecting topics 
in Soteriology and Eschatology. There is no funda- 
mental variance between the trinitarian statements 
of these two creeds. The Nicene symbol contains fd} : 
a fuller expansion of the doctrine of the Apostles’} \ 
Creed, that God exists as Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost. This was necessitated, as was evinced in the 
history of Trinitarianism, by the defective or con- 
tradictory explanations given of the doctrine of the 
trinity. For it should be remembered, that men 
like Praxeas, Noetus, Beryl, and Sabellius, and even 
men like Arius, did not reject the doctrine of the 





or 


436 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


trinity altogether and in flat terms, like the ancient 
Theodotian and the modern Socinian. They held te 


a trinity, and contended that their mode of appre- 


hending the subject was both scriptural and ecclesi- 
astical. They claimed that they themselves, and 


yi not their opponents, were putting the right con- 


struction upon the teachings of Scripture, and also 
upon those of the Apostles’ Creed. They could do 
this last the more readily, because the Apostles’ 
Creed does not employ explanatory and technical 
terms. The biblical terms, Father, Son, and Holy 
Ghost, were freely used by the Sabellian and Arian 
of early times, because they put a Monarchian or 
Arian construction upon them. Sabellius and Arius 
maintained that the Apostles’ Creed was intended 
to be understood in their sense, and hence did not 
object to it as a confession of faith; just as the 
modern Socinian interprets the doxologies of the 
New Testament and the baptismal formula, in ac- 
cordance with his anti-trinitarian views, and does 
not altogether reject them as spurious portions of 
revelation. It became necessary, consequently, to 
define the doctrine with scientific precision, and to 
employ terms that could not by any possibility be 
taken in two senses. (Here was the great power of — 
the term duoovocoy,) Arians and Semi-Arians, alike, 
confessed their belief in “ God the Father Almighty, 
and in Jesus Christ his Son, and in the Holy Ghost ;” 
holding, however, that only to the first was the 
word deity properly applicable. But no honest 


NICAENO-CONSTANTINOPOLITAN SYMBOL. 437 


Arian or Semi-Arian could confess his belief in God 
the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, accompanied with 
the explanatory definition of the Nicene symbol, 
that these three terms denote three distinct persons 
in one essence, each consubstantial with the others. 
An Arian could assent to the Scripture phraseology 
of the Apostolic Symbol as he understood it, but 
not as it was interpreted by the Nicene Council, as 
teaching that the Son is “very God of very God, 
begotten, not made, being of one substance with the 
Father.” 

Hence the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol 
introduces scientific conceptions, and technical 
terms, in order to preclude that possibility of two 
interpretations of language which was connected 
with the earlier symbol. And this is the principal 
difference between the earlier and the later creed. 
The Primitive Church, not yet troubled with heresy 
upon this subject, found in the simple untechnical 
creed all that its religious necessities required. The 
Later Church required, both for its scientific wants ; 
and its defensive and polemic purposes, a more 
elaborate and explanatory statement, in which the 
terms “essence,” and “substance,” and “ hypostasis,” 
and “personal subsistence,” and the like, were used 
to define beyond possibility of misapprehension, or 
equivocation, or evasion, the terms Father, Son, and 
Spirit. 

The Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Symbol was the 
work of two oecumenical councils in 325 and 381, 


438 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


and had oecumenical authority in both the Greek 
and Latin Churches, and in modern times is the re- 
ceived creed-statement among all trinitarian church- 
es. For although doubts have been expressed by 
individual writers, respecting the tenet of “eternal 
generation,” contained in the Nicene Symbol, this 
tenet has never been formally rejected by any trin- 
itarian denomination. 


§ 4. The Chalcedon Symbol. 


It will be remembered, that the doctrine of the 
Person of Christ began to engage the speculative 
inquiry of the church, so soon as the doctrine of the 
Trinity had been established. Two councils, one 
at Ephesus in 431, and one at Chalcedon in 451, 
formed dogmatic statements upon this subject which 
have been regarded as biblical and authoritative by 
the church since that time, both Ancient, Mediae- 
val, and Modern. The Ephesian creed condemned 
the Nestorian theory of two distinct persons in 
Christ, and re-affirmed in the place of it the old 
heory of one Person consisting of two natures. 
The Chalcedon creed condemned the EutychTan or 
Monophysite theory of but one nature in Christ, 
and re-affirmed the old theory of two natures in the 
unity of one Person. The results to which these 
two councils came are to this day regarded as cor- 
rect, and the catholic mind has not ventured be- 


ATHANASIAN CREED. 439 


yond the positions established at this time, respect- 
ing the structure and composition of Christ’s most 
mysterious Person,—a subject in some respects more 
baffling to speculation than that of the Trinity 
proper. 


§ 5. Athanasian Creed (Symbolum Quicumque). 


The authorship of this creed is uncertain. 
Though Athanasian in its trinitarianism, it is gener- 
ally conceded that Athanasius is not its author. It ie 
does not contain the word é6oovocory, though it 
teaches the truth intended by this term. It also 
teaches the doctrine of the procession of the Spirit 
from both the Father and Son. These two pecu- 
liarities are evidence of a later origin than the time 
of Athanasius. For it is improbable that this the- 
ologian, in drawing up a creed, would have omitted 
the term upon which the whole controversy in his 
day turned, or that he would have expressed him- 
self so positively as does this symbol, in regard to 
the question of the procession of the Spirit, still 
mooted at that time even among the orthodox» The 
structure>of the creed would indicate that it was 
drawn up at a later date,-in order to furnish a sym- | 


bol that would be received by both the Eastern and } 
Western Churches. Hence it omits the term éwo- 
ovocov, while it retains the thing, in order to propi- 


tiate the Eastern_bishops who feared Sabellianism, 





440 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


and teaches the procession of the Spirit from both 
Father and Son, to meet_the vi rn 
Church. This creed also contains the results of the 
Ephesian and Chalcedonian councils respecting the 
Person of Christ,—a fact which goes to prove an 
origin later than the time of Athanasius. Itis most 


probable that it originated in the Western Church, 
and in the school of Vinca and Hilary, whose 
trinitarianism it embodies. The Athanasian creed 


was current among the French churches in the 9th 
century, and in the 10th century was somewhat used 
in Italy, and in those churches which were under 
the influence of Rome, particularly the English. It 
never prevailed to much extent among the Greek 
and Oriental Churches. 


§ 6. Recapitulatory Survey. 


Casting a glance backward over the history of 
Symbols anterior to the Reformation, we find that 
the confessions of faith constructed by the Church 
are few in number, considering the length of the 
period included, and are inferior as to comprehen- 
siveness. Only four symbols, (perhaps we might 
say three, for the Athanasian creed is substantially 
the same with the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan,) were 
the product of fifteen hundred years. Of these, only 
the first one covers the whole field of systematic 
divinity,—the others being confined to the depart- 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. 441 


ments of trinitarianism and christology. And even 
the Apostles’ Creed makes the doctrine of the trin- 
ity by far the most prominent of Christian doe- 
trines ; presenting less distinct, and to some degree, 
only implied statements respecting the topics of sin 
and redemption. The history of Symbols, then, 
previous to the Reformation, shows that while the 
Church was diligent and careful in constructing the 
doctrine of the trinity, and its cognate truths, it 
was comparatively negligent in regard to the doc-\ 
trines of ee and_soteriology. The re- 
sults to which the catholic mind came in investiga- 
ting the doctrines of theology and christology were 
carefully and fully expressed in a creed form, and 
as a consequence we find that the trinitarian here- 
sies of Sabellianism on the one hand, and of Arian- 
ism on the other, did not trouble the Church, even 
though it grew more and more corrupt in faith and 
practice. The Papal Church is orthodox to this day, ) 
upon the doctrine of the trinity and the Person of 
Christ. But the results to which the catholic mind 
came, during the first four centuries, in investigating 
the doctrines of anthropology and soteriology, 
were not thus carefully enunciated and fixed in a 
ereed-form. The controversy between Augustine 
and Pelagius, though it resulted in a body of clear 
-and profound discussion of the very first impor- 
tance to theological science in all time, did not re- 
sult in the announcement of any distinct and defi- 
nite symbol. Hence, there was no barrier, of a the- 


442 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


oretical kind, to the entrance of the Pelagian theory 
of sin, and the legalistic theory of justification, 
which are characteristic of the Papal as distinguish- 
ed from the Primitive and Patristic Churches. It 
is indeed true, that a creed enunciating the Augus- 
tinian anthropology as distinctly and unequivocally 
as the Nicene Symbol does the Athanasian theology 
would not necessarily have prevented the Church 
from lapsing into that. defective view of human na 
ture which appears in the Tridentine system. The 
doctrine of sin is more immediately practical than 
that of the trinity, though not more so ultimately. 
Deterioration in doctrine is more likely to com- 
mence in anthropology than in theology, and is 
more difficult of prevention, because of certain well- 
known tendencies of human nature. Still, it is plain 
that a theoretical barrier to error is better than 
none at all, and is certainly better than a theoret- 
ical barrier to truth. If those few advocates of the 
true Scripture doctrine, who appear here and there 
in those darkening centuries which intervene be- 
tween John of Damascus and the forerunners of the 
Reformation, could have fortified themselves by an 
appeal to a symbol of authority and antiquity, in 
which the moral state and condition of man were 
distinctly represented in opposition to the Pelagian 
views that were becoming dominant in the Latin 
Church, their protest against error would have been 
much more effective than it was. And the same is 
true in reference to the doctrine of justification by 


RECAPITULATORY SURVEY. 443 


faith. It would have been more difficult to have 
constructed a satisfactory symbol concerning this 
doctrine than that of sin, owing to that confusion 
of justification and sanctification which, we have 
seen, vitiates to some extent the soteriology of Au- 
gustine himself. But if a clear evangelical state- 
ment of this great truth, such as meets us in the 


symbolic literature of the Reformation, could have@, 


been made and authorized in the 4th century, it is 
certain that it would have exerted a great influence 
upon minds so disposed as were those of the Middle 
Ages to respect authority. It is not to be asserted, 
that of itself it would have prevented the corrup- 
tion and heresy of the Papal Church upon this sub- 
ject. A higher Power, alone, working in the heart, 
could have prevented this, and preserved the prim- 
itive faith. But the symbol would have been a nu- 
cleus and support for those few who stood firm, and 
at any rate a standing witness of decline and cor- 
ruption in doctrine, and a loud protest against it. 
It is to this day, an advantage to the Romish polem- 
ic, and a disadvantage to the Protestant, that the 
latter cannot point his adversary to a symbol of the 
first four centuries which is as distinct and Scriptur- 
al upon the subjects of sin and justification, as the 
Nicene Symbol is upon that of the trinity. 


oy 


CHAPTER II. 


MODERN SYMBOLS. 


§ 1. Lutheran Confessions. 


THE period of the Reformation is richer in its 
symbolic literature, than any other one in the histo- 
ry of the Church. After the first conflict and fer- 
mentation of the religious elements was over, the 
ecclesiastical mind, being now purified from the 
false and anti-Christian doctrines of the Papacy, felt 
the need of a clear and scientific statement of the 
results to which it had arrived. And inasmuch as 
the Protestants became divided among themselves 
upon minor and unessential points, though agreeing 
perfectly in their estimate of the Roman Church 
and system, a great number of creeds and symbols 
was called into existence, by the endeavor of each 
party to explain its own sentiments, and to justify its 
own position. Itis for this reason, that the inquirer 
will find in this age by far the most massive and solid 
part of Christian Symbolies. The denominations 
of Modern Protestantism derive their creed-forms, 
either directly or indirectly, from this fertile period. 


LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS. 445 


The Lutheran Church adopted with decision, the 
results to which the Patristic Church had come in 
the departments of theology and christology. The 
Apostles’ Creed, together with the Nicene and Atha- 
nasian, were laid down as the foundation of the sym- 
bol which was to consolidate the new evangelical 
church into one external unity, in opposition to that 
of Rome. But the doctrines of sin and redemption 
had been left, to some extent, undeveloped by the 
Patristic mind, and entirely without definite symbolic 
statement, and were afterwards misstated by the 
Papal mind at Trent; and hence the principal part 
of the new and original work of the Lutheran 
divine was connected with these. 

Of all the confessional writings of the Lutheran 
Church, the most important, as well as the first in 
time, is the Augsburg Confession, sometimes denomi- 
nated the Confessio Augusta, from the term augusta, 
or augustissima applied to it because it was drawn 
up under the sanction and authority of the imperial 
diet. 

Nearly fifteen years had elapsed since Luther 
had made his first public appearance as a reformer, 
by nailing up his ninety-five theses upon the door 
of the church at Wittenberg (a. p. 1517), and yet 
the Protestant Church had no public and received 
confession of its common faith. This was first 
made at the diet at Augsburg in 1530. There 
had, however, been some preparation made for the 
construction and adoption of this important symbol. 


446 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


The steps that were previously taken are interest 
ing, and evince the wise and prudent manner in 
which the leading minds of that stormy and excita- 
ble period of reform proceeded, when laying the 
dogmatic foundations of the future church. 

The process began with a commission from 
John, Elector of Saxony, given in March, 1530, to 
his favorite theologians, Luther, Justus Jonas, 
Bugenhagen, and Melanchthon, to prepare a series 
of succinct and comprehensive articles to be discuss- 
ed and defended as the Protestant form of doctrine. 
These theologians joined on upon work that had al- 
ready been perfomed by one of their number. In 
the preceding year (1529), Luther, at a convention 
of Protestants at Schwabach, had proposed 17 arti- 
cles to be adopted as the doctrinal bond of union. 
These articles, this body of commissioners appointed 
by the Elector adopted, and having added to 
their number some new ones that had respect to 
certain ecclesiastical abuses, presented the whole 
to the Elector in Torgau, in March, 1530. Hence 
they are commonly denominated the Articles of 
Torgau. This draft of a confession was then 
brought before the Protestant divines at Augsburg, 
for examination and adoption. Here, it received 
revision, and some modifications, under the leader 
ship of Melanchthon, who guidedin the dis- 
cussions before the body, and who was aided during 
the progress of the debate by the advice and con- 
currence of Luther, then in Coburg, in a free and 


LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS. 447 


full correspondence. The symbol having been 
formed in this manner was subscribed by the 
princes and authorities of tne Protestant interest, 
and in their name publicly read in German before 
the imperial assembly, and a copy in both German 
and Latin presented to the emperor. The Augs- 
burg Confession thus became the authorized doc- 
trinal basis of Protestantism in Germany. 

The general tone and spirit of this first creed of 
the Reformation is a union of firmness and mildness. 
The characteristics of Luther and Melanchthon, the 
two minds most concerned in its formation, are har- 
mniously blended in it. It is divided into two 
parts ; the one, positive and didactic in its contents, 
the other negative and polemic. The first division 
ig composed of 21 articles, in which the positive 
d »etrines of Scripture are enunciated as the Luther- 
a is understood and confessed them, in connection, 
n oreover, with an express condemnation of those 
uw levangelical and heretical views and tendencies 
which were already beginning to appear within 
P otestantism itself. The second division is com- 
pised of 7 articles, directed against those errors of 
th: Romish ritual and worship which the Luther- 
a3 rejected,—viz., the refusal of the cup to the 
la:ty; the prohibition of the marriage of priests; 
the superstitious use of the mass; auricular confes- 
sicn; meritorious fasts; monastic vows; and the 
union of ecclesiastical with secular power in the of- 
fice of bishop. 


448 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


An analysis of the doctrine of the Augsburg 
Confession yields the following particulars. In the- 
ology, this symbol enunciates the Nicaeno-Con- 
stantinopolitan trinitarianism, and the Chalcedon 
christology. In anthropology, it adopts the Au- 
gustinian theory, as the following extracts show. 
“The churches teach that after the fall of Adam all 
men propagated according to ordinary generation 
are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, 
without trust in God, and with concupiscence, and 
that this disease (morbus) or original vitiosity is 
truly sin, damning, and bringing eternal death upon 
those who are not regenerated by baptism and the 
Holy Spirit. The churches also condemn the Pela- 
gians and others who deny this original vitiosity 
(vitium originis) to be sin.” ? 

Respecting the degree and intensity of sin, and 
its effect upon the human will, the Augsburg Con- 
fession teaches the following. “The churches teach 
that the human will has some liberty, sufficient for 
attaining morality and choosing things that appear 
reasonable (ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deli 
gendas res rationi subjectas). But it has not the 
power, without the Spirit of God, of attaining holi- 
ness or spiritual excellence (efficiandae justitiae dei, 
seu justitiae spiritualis), because the carnal man 
does not perceive those things that are spiritual (1 
Cor. ii. 14). This Augustine says in the same 


1Hase: Libri Symbolici, 9, 10. 


LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS. 449 


words, ‘We acknowledge that free will is in all 
men; that it has, indeed, a rational judgment, by 
means of which it is able to begin and to finish 
without God’s grace not those things which pertain 
to God, but only those works which pertain to this 
present life, the good as well as the bad,—the good 
I say, meaning those which are in their place right 
and proper; e.g. to will to work in the field, to 
will to eat and drink, to will to have a friend, to 
will to have clothes, to will to build a house, to will 
to marry a wife, to will to raise cattle, to learn an 
art, or whatever good it may be that pertains to 
this present life.’ The churches also condemn the 
Pelagians and others who teach, that without the 
Holy Spirit, by natural powers alone, we are able 
to love Godsupremely.”* This Confession, then, ex- 
hibits the Latin in distinction from the Greek an- 
thropology, and favours the monergistic theory of 
regeneration. 

In its soteriology, the Augsburg Confession, 
as would be expected, is eminently evangelical. 
“The churches teach that men cannot be justified 
before God by their own power, merit, or works, 
but are justified on account of Christ, through faith, 
when they believe that they are received into fa- 
vour and their sins are remitted for Christ’s sake, 
who made satisfaction for our sins by his death. 
This faith God imputes for righteousness before 


' Hase: Libri Symbolici, 14. 


VOL. 11.—29 


450 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


Him (Rom. iii. and iv.).”’ After alluding to the 
alteration made by the Papists in their statement 
of the doctrine of good works,—viz., that man is 
justified not by works alone, nor by faith alone, but 
by faith and works together, which is the Tridentine 
theory,—the Confession proceeds to speak thus con- 
cerning good works: “Our good works cannot 
reconcile God, or merit remission of sins, grace, and 
justification, but we obtain all these by faith alone ; 
by believing that we are received into favour for 
the sake of Christ, who alone is the mediator and 
propitiation by which the Father is reconciled. 
This doctrine respecting faith is everywhere taught 
by Paul ‘By grace are ye saved through faith, 
and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God. 
Not of works, &c.’ ... Our churches also teach 
that it is necessary to perform good works, not 
however in order to merit pardon and remis- 
sion of sins, but because God wills and commands 
them.” ? 

In its eschatology, the Augsburg Confession 
enunciates the catholic doctrine concerning future 
retribution and the second advent of Christ. “The 
churches condemn the Anabaptists, who are of opin- 
ion that there will be an end to the punishment of 
lost men and devils. They likewise condemn those 
who are disseminating Jewish opinions, that prior 
to the resurrection of the dead the saints are to pos- 


1Hase: Libri Symbolici, 10. ? Hasse ; Libri Symbolici, 17, 18. 


LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS. A51 


sess the kingdoms of the world, the wicked being 
everywhere overcome” (oppressis).* 

Though decidedly Protestant upon the cardinal 
doctrines, the Augsburg Confession contains some 
_ remnants of that unscriptural system against which 
it was such a powerful and earnest protest. These 
Popish elements are found in those portions partic- 
ularly which treat of the sacraments; and more 
particularly in that article which defines the sa- 
crament of the Supper. In Article XIII, the 
Augsburg Confession is careful to condemn the 
popish theory, that the sacraments are efficacious 
“ ex opere operato,’—that is, by their intrinsic effica- 
cy, without regard to faith in the recipient, or to 
the operation of the Holy Spirit,—but when in Ar- 
ticle X.it treats of the Lord’s Supper, it teaches 
that “the body and blood of Christ are truly pres- 
ent, and are distributed to those who partake of 
the Supper.”’ This doctrine of Consubstantiation, 
according to which there are two factors,—viz., the 
material bread and wine, and the immaterial or 
spiritual body of Christ,—united or consubstantia- 
ted in the consecrated sacramental symbols, does not 
differ in kind from the Papist doctrine of Tran- 
substantiation, according to which there is indeed 
but one factor in the consecrated symbol, but that 
is the very body and blood of Christ into which the 
bread and wine have been transmuted. The Lu: 


1 Hase: Libri Symbolici, 14. ? Hasse: Libri Symbolici, 12. 


452 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


theran theory, like the Popish, promotes a supersti- 
tious feeling in reference to the Eucharist, and does 
much towards nullifying the meaning and effect of 
Article XIII.,in which a magical effect ex opere ope- 
rato is denied to the sacraments. 

Another feature in this symbol evincing that 
the riddance of Papal errors was not complete, is 
the point of Absolution. Article XII. thus defines 
it. ‘“‘ Repentance properly consists of these two parts; 
the first is contrition, or the terrors of an awaken- 
ed conscience, together with the acknowledgment 
of sin; the second is faith, which is conceived by 
an apprehension of the gospel promise, or by abso- 
lution, and which believes that the individual’s sin 
is remitted on account of Christ, consoles the con- 
science, and delivers from fear.” By “absolution ” 
is meant the official declaration of the clergyman 
to the penitent that his sins are forgiven him, 
upon finding or believing that he is exercising a 
godly sorrow, and is trusting in the blood of 
Christ. The creed cdopts this practice from the 
custom of the Roman Catholic Church, and like 
this finds its warrant for it in the words of 
Christ: “ Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are re- 
mitted unto them, and whosesoever sins ye retain, 
they are retained” (John xx. 23). In their explana- 
tion and defense of the Augsburg Confession, enti- 
tled Apologia Confessionis, the Lutheran divines, 
speaking of this power of the keys, say: “And 
since God really renews the soul by his word, the 


LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS. 453 


keys really remit sin, according to Luke x. 16: ‘He 
that heareth you heareth me.’ Wherefore the voice 
of him who gives absolution is to be believed not 
otherwise than as a voice sounding from heaven.” ? 
Now, although this act of absolution is merely de- 
clarative, and the most thoroughly evangelical 
view is taken of the ground and cause of the re- 
mission of sins, it is evident that this act and 
practice puts the penitent into wrong relations to 
the church and the clergy, and paves the way for 
the distinctively Papal theory upon these points. It 
is true, indeed, that if there be godly sorrow for sin 
and a hearty faith in the work of Christ, the soul is 
forgiven ; but no human authority can pronounce a 
person to be actually pardoned, and absolve him as 
such, without pronouncing at the same time, by im- 
plication, that the said person is truly penitent and 
believing,—a fact that cannot be unqualifiedly as- 
serted by any but the Searcher of hearts. In re- 
taining this power of absolution, and in exercising 
it, the Lutheran Church unintentionally tempted its 
members to an undue reliance upon a human deci- 
sion, and drew them away from a simple trust upon 
the work of Christ, contrary to its own theory and 
faith. 

In the year 1540, ten years after the adoption 
of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon put forth 
an edition of the symbol, in Latin, which goes un- 


* HaseE: Libri Symbolici, p. 167. 


454 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


der the name of the variata,—the original edition 
being denominated the znvariata. The changes in- 
troduced into it by Melanchthon relate to the sub- 
jects of regeneration and the sacraments. Me- 
lanchthon, as the controversy went on between the 
Lutherans and the Calvinists, became more and 
more inclined to synergism. The original Confes- 
sion, as we have seen in the history of anthropolo- 
gy, was decidedly monergistic, but the altered edi- 
tion leans to the theory of co-operation in regenera- 
tion. With respect to the sacraments, it inclines 
to the Calvinistic theory, showing the reaction 
against the Semi-Popish theory of consubstantiation. 
The original unaltered Confession, alone, has sym- 
bolical authority in the Lutheran Church ; but par- 
ties and individuals within it have received the Con- 
fessio variata with favour. The influence of Me- 
lanchthon’s synergism is very apparent in some of 
the Lutheran theologians of Germany of the present 
generation, in the assertion of the existence of a re 
cipiency, or preparation for the grace of the Holy 
Spirit, which is referred to the instinctive strivings 
of the human soul by virtue of its divine origin. 
The adoption of this view shows itself in decided 
opposition to the Augustino-Calvinistic doctrines of ~ 
election and predestination, and a strongly polemic 
attitude towards the Calvinistic system. 

The next document possessing symbolical au- 
thority in the Lutheran Church is the Apologia 
Confesstonis. 


LUTHERAN CONTESSIONS. 455 


The Protestants having thus put forth the Augs- 
burg Confession as the summary of their belief, 
the Papal theologians who were present at the diet 
were summoned by the emperor Charles V. to pre- 
pare a critical examination and refutation of it. 
This they did in a document entitled Confutatio 
Confessionis Augustanae, which was read in the 
imperial assembly on the 3d of August, 1530. The 
emperor approved it, and demanded that the Pro- 
testants should return to the doctrinal basis of the 
Catholic Church. They asked for a copy of the 
Confutation, for examination, which was refused. 
Melanchthon then entered upon a detailed refuta- 
tion of the Confutatio, so far as he could reconstruct 
the document from his own recollection on hearing 
it read, and from notes that had been taken by oth- 
ers who were present at the reading,—afterwards 
revising and perfecting his work, by the aid of an 
authentic copy of the Papal treatise that finally 
came into his possession. This defence of the Augs- 
burg Confession contains an expansion of the dog- 
matic positions of this document, together with 
some attacks upon the Papal system; although the 
work, as a whole, breathes the mildness and mode- 
ration of the peace-loving theologian who composed 
it. In doctrinal respects, it is even more decided 
than the original Confession, particularly upon the 
two points most at issue between Protestants and 
Papists, viz.: sin and justification. 

The Protestants proposed to present this Apolo: 


456 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


gy at the diet held on Sept. 22d, 1530; but the em. 
peror declared that he would neither hear, nor re- 
ceive, any more documents from the Protestants. 
Thus, the Apology received no public adoption at 
that time. It was from the first, however, regarded 
by the Protestant theologians as a symbolical docu- 
ment, and in 1537 was subscribed as such by them 
at Smalcald. In connection with the Augsburg 
Confession, it constitutes the sum and substance of 
the Lutheran theology, and both together constitute 
the doctrinal basis of the Lutheran Church. 

The resuits to which the Protestants had come 
in these two productions were wrought over, and 
presented at other times, before other bodies, and in 
other forms, according as the interests of the Pro- 
testants required. In this way, a series of symbol- 
ical writings resulted which constitute a part of Lu. 
theran Symbolics. The following are the most 
important of these. 1. The Confessio Saxonica, or 
Repetitio Confessionis Augustanae, was drawn up 
by Melanchthon for the use of the Council of Trent, 
in 1551, and is a repetition of the Augsburg Con- 
fession, as the title indicates. 2. The Confessio 
Wurtemburgica was composed by Brenz for the use 
of the same council, in 1552. 3. The Articles of 
Smaleald were drawn up by Luther in 1536, and 
subscribed by the evangelical theologians, in Febru- 
ary, 1537. They contain, in substance, the doc- 
trines of the Augsburg Confession and the Apolo- 
gy, presented in a decidedly polemic form. For 


LUTHERAN CONFESSIONS. 457 


their purpose was both defensive and aggressive. 
By this time, the Protestant cause had become 
strong politically as well as morally, and when the 
pope, at the suggestion of the emperor, sought to 
call a general council at Mantua, in 15387, these Ar- 
ticles served to consolidate the Protestant opposition, 
and to prevent the Protestant churches from taking 
any part in an ecclesiastical assembly in which their 
own opinions were already condemned beforehand. 
In the second part of these Articles, Luther, with 
his characteristic energy, attacks the claims of the 
pope to be a universal bishop, as contrary to the 
nature and spirit of the true evangelical church. 
Melanchthon signed the articles with the conciliato- 
ry remark, that he for himself should be willing to 
concede to the pope the bishopric of bishops jure 
humano, and on the ground of past usage and for 
the sake of peace, if the pope would concede evan- 
gelical doctrine to the Protestants. This disturbed 
the mind of the earnest reformer, who saw that re- 
conciliation with Rome was now impossible and un- 
desirable, and on parting with Melanchthon, after 
the convention at Smalcald, Luther left him the 
blessing: “ May God fill you with hatred of the 
pope.” 4. Luther’s two Catechisms, Major and Mi- 
nor, were published in 1529,—the first for the use 
of preachers and teachers, the last a guide in the 
instruction of youth. These, it will be noticed, 
were published before the Augsburg Confession. 5. 
The Formula Concordiae was drawn up by Andrea 


458 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


and Chemnitz in 1577, and presented to the Elee 
tor Augustus, who sought to secure its adoption 
by the entire Lutheran Church. In this he was 
unsuccessful. It is a polemic document, con- 
structed by that portion of the Lutheran Church 
that was hostile to the Calvinistic theory of the 
sacraments. It carries out the doctrine of con- 
substantiation into a technical statement,—teach- 
ing the ubiquity of Christ’s body, and explaining 
the communicatio idiomatum as the communica- 
tion of the divine attributes to the human nature 
of Christ. The Lutberan Church is still divided 
upon this symbol. The so-called High Lutherans 
insist that the Formula Concordiae is the scientific 
completion of the preceding Lutheran symbolics; 
while the moderate party are content to stand by 
the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and the 
Smalcald Articles. 


§ 2. Reformed (Calvinistic) Confessions. 


The Reformed, or Calvinistic, Churches were less 
successful than the Lutheran in maintaining an out- 
ward and visible unity, and one consequence is a 
much more varied symbolical literature. 

The oldest Confession of that branch of Protest- 
antism which was not satisfied with the Lutheran 
tendency and symbol is the Confessio Tetrapolitana, 
—so called, because the theologians of four cities of 
upper Germany, Strasburg, Costnitz, Memmingen, 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 459 


and Lindau, drew it up, and presented it to the em- 
peror at the same diet of Augsburg, in 1530, at 
which the first Lutheran symbol was presented. The 
principal theologian concerned in its construction 
was Martin Bucer, of Strasburgh. It consists of 22 
articles, and agrees generally with the Augsburg 
Confession. The points of difference pertain to the 
doctrine of the sacraments. Upon this subject it is 
Zuinglian. These four cities, however, in 15382 
adopted the Augsburg Confession, so that the 
Confessio Tetrapolitana ceased to be the formally 
adopted symbol of any branch of the church, al- 
though it was always held ia high repute among the 
Swiss churches, particularly on account of its Zuin- 
glian attitude upon the sacramental controversy. 
_ And this brings us to the views of Zuingle himself, 
who exerted a great influence upon the Reformed 
Churches, in the opening period of Protestantism. 

Zuingle sent a confession of faith, entitled dec 
Ratio, embodying his own individual opinions, to 
that notable diet at Augsburg in 1530, where so 
many religious parties and interests were repre- 
sented. Previously to this, Zuingle had exhibited 
his views in sixty-seven articles drawn up in 1528, 
but almost wholly upon points pertaining to the ex- 
ternals of Christianity, and particularly the sacra- 
ments. But in this document he discussed the car- 
dinal subjects of religion, and laid the foundation of 
that peculiar aspect of Protestantism which goes 
under his name. 


460 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


On examination, this creed is found to differ 
from the Augsburg Symbol. 1. Upon the sub- 
ject of original sin, the language of Zuingle is as 
follows. “I think this in regard to original sin. 
That is properly sin which is a transgression of the 
law ; for where there is no law, there is no trans- 
gression; and where there is no transgression, there 
is no sin properly so called,—that is to say, so far 
as by sin is meant wickedness, crime, villainy, or 
guilt. I acknowledge, therefore, that our father 
sinned a sin that is truly sin, i. e., wickedness, crime, 
and turpitude. But those who are generated from 
that person did not sin in this manner; for what 
one of us bit with his teeth the forbidden apple in 
Paradise? Hence, whether we will or not, we are 
compelled to admit that original sin, as it is in the 
sons of Adam, is not truly sin, in the sense already 
spoken of, for it is not a crime committed against 
law. Consequently, it is, properly speaking, a dis- 
ease and a condition. A disease, because, as he 
lapsed from love of himself, so also do we lapse; a 
condition, because, as he became a slave and obnox- 
ious to death, so also we are born slaves and child- 
ren of wrath, and obnoxious to death. 

Adam died on account of sin, and being thus dead, 
that is sentenced to death, in this condition he gen- 
erated us. Therefore we also die,—so far as he is 
concerned, by his fault and criminality; but so far 
as we are concerned, by our condition and disease, 
or, if you prefer, siz, but sin improperly so called. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 46] 


Let us illustrate by an example. A man is taken 
captive in war. On the ground of his own hostility to 
his captors, and treachery towards them, he deserves 
to be made a slave, and is so held. Now, they who 
are born of him in this condition are slaves, not by 
virtue of their own fault, guilt, or crime, but by 
virtue of their condition, which condition is the conse- 
quence of the guilt of their father, who had deserved 
to come into it by his fault. The children in this in- 
stance are not laden with crime, but with the punish- 
ment, fine, loss, or danger of crime,—i. e., with a 
wretched condition, a servitude.”* The difference 
between Zuingle’s theory of original sin, and that of 
Luther and his associates as exhibited in the extracts 
given from the Augsburg Confession, is apparent. 
It is the reappearance of the old difference between 
the Greek and Latin anthropologies, upon this sub- 
ject. 2. The second principal point of difference 
between Zuingle’s (dei Ratio, and the Augsburg 
Confession, relates to the sacrament of the Supper. 
Zuingle’s mind was a remarkably clear one, and 
made distinctions with great luminousness. Respect- 
ing the Romish theory, that there is an intrinsic 
efficacy in the sensible sign and material symbol, he 
makes the same general statement with the Lutheran 
confession, only in a more vivid and keen style. “I 
believe,” he says, “ nay I know, that all sacraments, 
so far from conferring grace, do not even bring or 


‘Niemeyer: Collectio, 20, sq. 


462 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


dispense it. In this, O Cesar, I may perhaps seem 
to you to be too bold and confident. But this is my 
opinion. For inasmuch as grace comes, or is given, 
by the Divine Spirit, the entire gift of grace in the 
end is resolved into the influence of the Holy Ghost 
alone. For a vehicle or guide is not necessary to 
the Spirit; for that is the real virtue and power in 
any instance which conveys or moves other things, 
and not that which needs to be conveyed or moved. 
We never read in the Scriptures that sensible and 
material things, such as the sacraments are, certainly 
and in every instance convey the Holy Spirit; but 
if sensible things, are themselves ever conveyed and 
made operative by the Spirit, then it is this Spirit, 
and not the sensible thing, that is the ultimate effi- 
cient energy. If, when the mighty wind rushed 
onward, the tongues of flame were borne cnward 
by the wind, then the wind was not lifted and 
conveyed by the tongues of flame. So, likewise, 
it was the wind that brought the quails and blew 
away the locusts; but no quails or locusts ever pos- 
sessed such wings as to bear onward the winds.” * 
To the sacrament of the Supper, Zuingle applies 
the principle thus stated and illustrated, with great 
energy and decision, in such a manner as to ex- 
clude both the theory of consubstantiation and 
transubstantiation. His reasoning is full and de- 
tailed. He argues from scripture, from reason, and 


1 NieMEvYER: Collectio, 24, sq. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 463 


from history; and maintains that view of the 
eucharist which is now widely prevalent in the 
Protestant churches. “TI believe,” he says, “that in 
the eucharist the body of Christ is truly present to 
the eye of faith,—that is, that those who thank God 
for the benefits conferred in Christ do acknowledge 
that he assumed real human flesh, really suffered in 
it, really washed away our sins by his blood, and 
thus all that was done by Christ becomes, as it were, 
a present reality to those who behold these sym- 
bols with the eye of faith. But that the body 
of Christ is present in essence and real substance,— 
in other words, that the natural body of Christ is 
present in the Supper, and is masticated by our 
teeth, as the Papists and certain persons who look 
back to the flesh pots of Egypt assert,—we not 
only deny, but affirm to be contrary to the word 
of God.”* Zuingle concludes with specifying the 
particulars in respect to which the bread and wine 
are symbolical, and his whole theory may be sum- 
med up in the statement, that the sacrament is com- 
memorative by means of emblems. 

The (dei Ratio of Zuingle was the work of an 
individual mind, and as such bears a private and not 
a public character. Though not adopted by any 
secular or ecclesiastical body, it nevertheless exerted 
great influence among the Swiss churches, and upon 
one branch of the Reformed doctrine. In this 


1 NIEMEYER: Collectio, 26. 


464 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


same year, 1530, Zuingle also drew up, for the use 
of the Swiss, a briefer statement of doctrine, sub- 
stantially the same with the Fidei Ratio, under the 
title of Lidet brevis et clara Expositio. 

The Zuinglian system prevailed in the Swiss 
cantons, and especially in the city of Basle and its 
neighbouring ally Mihlhausen. Oswald Myconius 
drew up, as early as 1532, a Confession in twelve 
articles, after a sketch which Oecolampadius had 
made, which goes under the name of the First 
Basle Confession (Basiliensis prior Confessio Fides). 
The cities of Basle and Mihlhausen adopted it, but 
it never obtained general currency. It is a brief 
and simple creed in its structure, presenting with 
distinctness the evangelical view of justification 
and the sacraments, and is considerably reserved re- 
specting the more speculative aspects of Christian 
doctrine. Concerning the character of man, it 
speaks as follows: “We confess that man in the 
beginning was made upright, after the image of 
God’s righteousness and holiness, but that he has 
fallen wilfully into sin, by which the whole human 
race has become corrupt and subject to condemna- 
tion, our nature has been weakened, and has ac- 
quired such an inclination to sin, that whenever it 
is not restored by the Spirit of God, the man of 
himself never will do anything good.” ? 

The most important of all the Reformed Con- 


1 NieMEYER : Collectio, 79. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 465 


fessions that were constructed previous to the pub- 
lic appearance of Calvin, is the Pirst Helvetic Con- 
Jession (Confessio Helvetica Prior), sometimes de- 
nominated the Second Basle Confession. It origin- 
ated as follows. In the year 1535, the most distin- 
guished Reformed theologians of Switzerland assem- 
bled at Aarau, to counsel with reference to a union 
with the Lutherans of Germany. The first step to be 
taken in order to this was, of course, to draw up a 
creed expressive of their own views, and indicating 
how far they could go towards meeting the Luther- 
ans upon controverted points. In 1536, deputies 
were sent for this purpose, from Basle, Zurich, Berne, 
Schafhaiisen, St. Gall, Mihlhausen, and Biel. They 
met in Basle, and appointed three theologians of 
their number to draft a confession of faith. These 
three were Bullinger of Zurich, Oswald Myconius 
and Simon Grynaeus of Basle, with whom were after- 
wards associated Juda of Zurich, and Groszman of 
Berne. This confession was subscribed March 26, 
1536, by the authorities secular and ecclesiastical of 
the seven above-named cantons, and was adopted by 
all the Reformed cantons of Switzerland as their 
symbol. In 1537, it was sent to the Lutheran theo- 
logians at Wurtemberg, and at Smalcald, without 
effect, however, so far as the union of the two par- 
ties was concerned. 

The First Heletic Confession is pacific in its 
tone. When compared with the views of Zuingle, 
it is easy to see that the Swiss theologians advanced 


VOL, 11.—30 


466 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


toward the Augsburg Confession in no inconsidera- 
ble degree, without, however, taking exactly the 
same position respecting the controverted points. 
Its language upon the subject of original sin is as 
follows. “Man, the most perfect image of God on 
the earth, and having the primacy of all visible 
creatures, consisting of soul and body, of which the 
last is mortal and the first immortal, having been 
created holy by God, lapsing into sin (vitium) by his 
own fault, drew the whole human race into the same 
with himself, and rendered it obnoxious to the same 
calamity. And this disease (lues) which is termed 
‘original,’ so pervaded the whole human race, that 
the child of wrath and enemy. of God can be cured 
by no power except the divine granted through 
Christ. We attribute free will to man in this sense, 
viz. : that when in the use of our faculties of knowing 
and willing we attempt to perform good and evil 
actions, we are able to perform the evil of our own 
accord and by our own power, but to embrace and 
follow out the good we are not able, unless illumin- 
ated by the grace of Christ, and impelled by his 
Spirit, for it is God who works in us to will and to 
do according to his good pleasure ; and from God is 
salvation, from ourselves perdition.”* 

In its anthropology, then, the First Helvetic 
Confession agrees with the Augsburg in recognizing 
the Adamic connection. It differs from the Augs 


1 NIEMEYER: Collectio, 116, sq. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 467 


burg Symbol, in asserting by implication instead of 
directly, that original sin is guilt, and agrees with it 
in denying a recuperative power in the fallen will— 
a point upon which Zuingle’s F%dez Ratio is silent, 
neither affirming nor denying. The approximation 
of this principal Swiss Confession to the Lutheran is 
not so near upon the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, 
though it is easy to see some slight modification of 
the Zuinglian theory. The phraseology is as follows. 
“Tn the mystic supper, the Lord offers his body and 
blood, that is, himself, to those that are truly his, 
that they may live more and more in him and he in 
them. Not that the bread and wine are, in their own 
substance, united with the substance of the body and 
blood of the Lord; but the bread and wine, by the 
institution of our Lord, are symbols through which 
is exhibited a true communication by the Lord 
himself, through the ministers of the church, of his 
own body and blood, not as the perishing food of 
the flesh, but as the nourishment of eternal life.” ? 
The Reformed Confessions thus far examined 
were constructed previously to the public appear- 
ance of Calvin, and without any direct influence 
from him. We come now to those which were 
drawn up, more or less, under his influence. The 
Consensus Tigurinus was composed by Calvin 
himself, in 1549, and was adopted by the Zurich 
theologians. It comprises twenty-six articles, which 


' NiemeyeER: Collectio, 120, sq. 


468 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS, 


treat only of the sacrament of the Supper. It grew 
out of a desire upon the part of Calvin, to effect a 
union among the Reformed upon the doctrine of the 
Eucharist. The attitude of Calvin respecting the 
Sacramentarian question was regarded by the Luther 
ans, as favourable rather than otherwise to their pecu- 
liar views. His close and cordial agreement with 
Luther upon the fundamental points in theology, 
together with the strength of his phraseology when 
speaking of the nature of the Eucharist, led the 
Swiss Zuinglians to deem him as on the whole fur- 
ther from them than from their opponents. In this 
Consensus Tigurinus, he defines his statements more 
distinctly, and left no doubt in the minds of the 
Zurichers that he adopted heartily the spiritual and 
symbolical theory of the Lord’s Supper. The course 
of events afterwards showed that Calvin’s theory 
really harmonized with Zuingle’s; for as the Luther- 
an scheme of consubstantiation expanded, the two 
parties became less and less cordial, so that the 
High Lutheran of the present day exhibits a tem- 
per towards the Calvinistic theory of the sacraments 
hardly less inimical than that which the early Lu- 
theran manifested towards the Papacy. 

Calvin, in 1551, drew up a confessiim entitled 
the Consensus Genevensis, which contains a very 
full exhibition of his theory of Predestination, to 
which topic it is confined. Its purpose was, to unite 
the Swiss churches in the reception of his own views, 
upon a topic far more difficult of comprehension 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 469 - 


than the sacraments, and respecting which there 
was some difference of opinion among the €wiss the- 
ologians. Zuingle had taught the doctrine of abso- 
lute predestination, and so far as his views had pre- 
vailed in Switzerland there was a readiness to re- 
ceive those of Calvin. In this Consensus, which the 
Genevan theologians adopted, and which acquired 
almost universal authority among the Reformed 
churches of Switzerland, the Calvinistic theory of 
Predestination is presented with great clearness and 
comprehensiveness. 

The Second Helvetic Confession (Confessio Hel- 
vetica Posterior) is one of the principal symbols 
of the Reformed Church. It was constructed by 
Bullinger, in 1564, who was intrusted with this la- 
bour by a body of Swiss theologians, mostly from 
the cantons of Zurich, Berne, and Geneva. It was 
adopted by all the Reformed churches in Switzer- 
land, with the exception of Basle (which was con- 
tent with its old symbol, the /irst Helvetic), and 
by the Reformed churches in Poland, Hungary, 
Scotland, and France. It enunciates the strictly 
Calvinistic view of the sacraments in opposition to 
the Lutheran view, and maintains the Calvinistic 
theory of predestination. As this creed represents 
the theology of that great division of Protestantism 
which received its first formation under the guid- 
ance of Zuingle and the Swiss theologians, and was 
completed under that of Calvin and his coadjutors, 
it merits some detailed examination. 


470 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


1. Upon the doctrine of the Trinity, its teaching 
is as follows. “ We believe that God, one and indi- 
visible in essence, is, without division or confusion, 
distinct in three persons: Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, so that the Father generates the Son from 
eternity, the Son is begotten by an ineffable genera- 
tion, but the Holy Spirit proceeds from each, and 
that from eternity, and is to be adored together 
with each, so that there are not three Gods, but 
three persons, consubstantial, co-eternal, and co- 
equal, distinct as hypostases, and one having prece- 
dence of another as to order, but with no inequality 
as to essence.”’ 2. Respecting the doctrines of Pre- 
destination and Election, the Helvetie statement is 
as follows. “God, from eternity, predestinated or 
elected, freely and of his own mere grace, with no 
respect of men’s character, the saints whom he would 
save in Christ, according to that saying of the apos- 
tle : ‘God chose us in himself before the foundation 
of the world” Not without a medium, though not 
on account of any merit of ours. In Christ, and on 
account of Christ, God elected us, so that they who 
are engrafted in Christ by faith are the elect, but 
those out of Christ are the reprobate.”* 3. Upon 
the topics of Sin, Free Will, and Justification, the 
Helvetic Confession makes the following statements. 
“Sin we understand to be that native corruption of 
man, derived or propagated to us all from our first 


1 NIEMEYER: Collectio, 470, 471. ? Niemeyer: Collectio, 481. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 471 


parents, by which, immersed in evil concupiscence 
and averse from good, but prone to all evil, full of 
all wickedness, unbelief, contempt and hatred of 
God, we are unable to do or even to think anything 
good of ourselves. In the unrenewed man there is 
no free will to do good, no power for performing 
good. The Lord in the gospel says, ‘ Whosoever 
committeth sin is the servant of sin’ The apostle 
Paul says, ‘The carnal mind is enmity against God, 
for it is not subject to the law of God, neither in: 
deed can be.’”? 


the apostle, signifies remission of sins, absolution 


“ Justification, in the meaning of 
y] fo) 


from guilt and punishment, reception into favour, 
and pronouncing just,”—all upon the ground of the 
fact, that “Christ took the sins of the world upon 
himself, endured their punishment, and satisfied di- 
2 Concerning the Eucharist, this sym- 
bol is Zuinglian. It teaches that the elements are 


vine justice. 


signs,—not vulgar or common, but “sacred” “ con- 
secrated” emblems. ‘ He who instituted the Sup- 
per, and commanded us to eat bread and drink 
wine, willed that believers should not perceive the 
bread and wine only, without any sense of the mys- 
tery (sine mysterio), as they eat bread at home, but 
they should partake spiritually of the things signi- 
fied, i. e. be washed from their sins through faith in 
Christ’s blood and sacrifice.” * 

The Second Helvetic Confession, besides having 


* NreMEYER : Collectio, 477, 480. ? NIEMEYER: Collectio, 494. 
* Niemeyer: Collectio, 514, 515. 


472 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


great currency among the Reformed churches with- 
in and without Switzerland, was recast and condens- 
ed into two other symbols: 1. The Confessio Pala 
tina; 2. The Lepetitio Anhaltina. These were lo- 
cal confessions, drawn up for the use of provincial 
churches only. 

The Formula Consensus Helvetici, one of the 
most scientific of Calvinistic symbols, was composed 
at Zurich, in 1675, by Heidegger, assisted by Fran- 
cis Turretin of Geneva, and Gereler of Basle. It 
was adopted as their symbol by nearly all the Swiss 
churches, though with hesitation on the part of some 
of them. Controversies, however, continued with- 
out abatement among them, so that this symbol did 
not prove to be the bond of union which it was de- 
signed to be, and since 1722 it has ceased to have 
authority as an authorized symbol, though much es- 
teemed by the High Calvinistic party. 

This Confession was called out by that modified 
form of Calvinism which, in the 17th century, emanat- 
ed from the school at Swuwmur, represented by Amy- 
rault, Placaeus, and Daillé. Concerning the Atone- 
nent, its language is as follows. “We do not agree 
with the opinion of those who teach that God pur- 
poses the salvation of all men individually, provided 
only they believe, by reason of his philanthropic be- 
nevolence, or because he is moved by a certain love 
of the fallen race of mankind that is prior to his 
purpose of election; by a certain ‘conditional will,’ 
or ‘primal compassion,’ as they term it,—that is, by 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 473 


a wish or desire on his part that is inefficacious.”? 
Upon this, follows a statement of the doctrine of 
atonement that limits its application to the individ- 
ual by the electing purpose of God, which purpose 
infallibly secures the saving acceptance of the atone- 
ment by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Nespect- 
ing the doctrine of Original Sin, the Formula Con- 
sensus teaches, that the ground of the imputation of 
Adam’s sin to his posterity as guilt, is a real and not 
a nominal one; in other words, that the charge of 
original sin upon the individual, as true and proper 
sin, is founded upon its commission by the race in 
the person of the progenitor, and not upon its ficti- 
tious imputation to the individual by an arbitrary 
act of God. The phraseology is as follows. “ We 
are of opinion, that the sin of Adam is imputed to 
all his posterity by the secret and just judgment of 
God. For the apostle testifies that all sinned in 
Adam; that by the disobedience of one man many 
were made sinners; and that in- the same man all 
die. But it does not appear how hereditary corrup- 
tion, as spiritual death, could fall upon the entire 
human race, by the just judgment of God, unless 
some fault (delictum) of this same human race, 
bringing in (inducens) the penalty of that death, 
had preceded. For the most just God, the judge 
of all the earth, punishes none but the guilty.”? 
The Heidelberg Catechism (Catechismus Palati- 


? Niemeyer: Collectio, 732. °* Niemeyer: Collectio, 733. 


474 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS, 


nus)* possesses the double character of a symbol, 
and a book for systematic instruction. In connection 
with the Second Helvetic Confession, it is the most 
generally adopted of the Reformed Confessions, and 
has great authority outside of the particular com- 
munions that adopt it. 

As early as the middle of the 16th century, the 
Palatinate of the Rhine, a large and important 
division of Germany lying upon both banks of the 
river, had adopted the Augsburg Confession, chief- 
ly under the influence of its Electors. In the 
year 1560, the Elector Frederick ILI. introduced 
the Swiss doctrine and worship. His successor, 
Lewis VI., in 1577 carried the Palatinate back 
again to a Lutheran symbol, the Formula Concor- 
diae. John Casimir,’ the successor of Lewis, restored 
the Reformed doctrine, which after that time became 
the prevalent one in the Palatinate. In order to 
give the Reformed party a definite and established 
organization, Frederick III. commissioned two Hei- 
delberg theologians to compose a catechism. These 
were Ursinus, a student of Melanchthon’s, and Ole- 
vianus,—the first of whom performed the principal 
labour. The catechism was laid before the superin- 
tendents or bishops, and preachers, in 1562, for their 
acceptance ; and in the following year it was pub- 


‘See the excellent Monograph man Reformed Church in Amer- 
commemorative of the tercente- ica, by Scribner, New York, 
nary of this symbol, published 1863. *Tn 1583. GrIESELER: 
under the auspices of the Ger- IV. 484.494. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 4Q5 


lished, in the name of the Elector, as the doctrine of 
the Palatinate, and was introduced into the churches 
and schools of the land. 

The Heidelberg Catechism is one of the best of 
the many systems of Christian doctrine that were 
constructed in the prolific period of the Reforma- 
tion. Though not composed directly for such a 
purpose, as were the Lutheran Formula Concordiae 
and the Calvinistic Formula Consensus, it is better 
fitted than either of them to unite both branches 
and tendencies of Protestantism. It consists of three 
parts. The first treats of the misery of man; the 
second of his redemption; the third of his happy 
condition under the gospel. It contains 129 ques- 
tions and answers, arranged for the 52 Sabbaths of 
the year. In doctrine, it teaches justification with 
the Lutheran glow and vitality, predestination and 
election with Calvinistic firmness and self-consisten- 
cy, and the Zuinglian theory of the sacraments with 
decision. It was originally composed in German; 
has been translated into Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, 
as well as into nearly all the languages of modern 
Europe; was approved by the highly Calvinistic 
synod of Dort, and is regarded with great favour by 
the High Lutheran party of the present day. 

The Confessio Belgica was first drawn up as a 
private confession by Von Bres, in 1561. It con- 
tains 37 articles, and is thoroughly Calvinistic. It 
was composed in French, and was first printed in 
Walloon French and Dutch in 1562. In 1571, it 


476 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


was revised, and adopted by the entire Holland 
Church in the 16th century. After another revis- 
ion of the text, it was publicly approved by the 
synod of Dort in 1618. 

The Confessio Gallicana, a Calvinistie symbol, 
was composed by a synod of the Reformed party 
convened at Paris in 1559. Theodore Beza sent a 
copy of it to Charles IX. It was subscribed by a 
synod at Rochelle in 1571, and is the adopted con- 
fession of the French Protestant Church. The 
French Reformed churches in Holland also receive 
this as their symbol. 

The Confessio Scoticana was constructed in 
1560, by the Scottish preachers,—principally by 
John Knox. It is Calvinistic in substance and spir- 
it, and was introduced throughout Scotland by state 
enactment. 

The Canons of the Synod of Dort constitute a 
highly important portion of the Calvinistic symbol- 
ics. In the beginning of the 17th century, Armin- 
ianism had arisen in Holland, and to oppose it this 
synod was convened. Besides the Holland theolo- 
gians, there were representatives from many of the 
foreign Reformed or Calvinistic churches,—though 
the former had the preponderating influence’ The 

1 The synod was composed of 61 East Friesland, and Bremen. The 
Hollanders,—viz.: 5 professors, States General levied one hun- 
36 preachers, and 20 elders,— dred thousand guilders upon the 
and 28 foreign theologians, from provinces, to defray the expenses 


England, Scotland, the Palati- of the deputies to the synod. 
nate, Hesse, Switzerland, Nassau, 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 477. 
lol 
synod met Nov. 13, 1618, and continued in session 
until May 9, 1619; held discussions with the Re- 
monstrants, or Arminians, who appeared in synod 
by 18 deputies headed by Episcopius; and drew 
up, during the 154 sessions, 93 Canones which com- 
bat the principal tenets of the Arminians, and de- ¢ 
velope the Calvinistic system. The Reformed 
churches in the Netherlands, France, the Palatinate, 
the greater part of Switzerland, and the Puritans in 
Great Britain received these canons as the scientific 
and precise statement of Christianity. The English 
Episcopal Church, in which at that time the Armin- 
ian party was dominant, rejected the decisions of 
this synod, and a royal mandate of James I., in 1620, 
forbade the preaching of the doctrine of predestina- 
tion. 
The Dort Canons are composed in a positive, and 
a negative form. After the statement of the i 
doctrine according to Calvinism, there follows a re- 
jection of the opposing Arminian errors. ‘The fol- 
lowing extracts from the Regectio errorum indicate 
the views of the Synod upon the doctrines of Origi- 
nal Sin, Free Will, and Atonement. “The synod 
rejects the error of those who teach that it is not 
true that original sin of itself is sufficient to con- 
demn the whole human race, and merits temporal 
and eternal punishment. ... . The synod rejects 
the error of those who teach that spiritual gifts, 
that is good dispositions and virtues, such as holi- 
ness and justice, could have had no place in the will 


HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


“5 a man when first created, and consequently could 
og not be separated from it in the fall... .. The sy- 
nod rejects the error of those who teach that 

spiritual gifts are not lost from the wii of man in 


spiritual death, because the will was not corrupted, 

oe . but is only impeded by the darkness of the mind, 
and the inordinate appetites of the flesh,—which 
wy” impediments being removed, the will is fe to ex: 
ert its innate freedom, i. e. of itself either to will or . 

to choose, or not to will or not to choose, whatever 

good is set before it... .. The synod condemns 

a, the error of those who teach that grace and free 
o” v will are each partial and concurrent causes at the 
commencement of conversion; that grace does not 
ce the efficiency of the will, in the order of 
causality,—i. e., that God does not efficiently aid the 

will of man to conversion, before the will itself 

moves and determines itself... .. The synod re- 

jects the error of those that teach that Christ by 

Ais satisfaction has not strictly merited faith and sal- 

vation for those to whom this satisfaction is effectu- 

rg ally applied, but that he has only acquired for the 
Father the authority or plenary power of treating 

de novo with mankind, and of prescribing whatever 

new conditions he pleases, the performance of which 
depends upon the free will of man, so that it may 


be that no man will fulfil them, or that all men 
will.” ? 


'NreMEYER: Collectio, in locis. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 479 


The Thirty-Nine Articles of the English Church, 
like the constitution of the English State, were a 
gradual formation. Under King Edward VI, arch- 
bishop Cranmer and bishop Ridley drew up a sym- 
bol, in 1551, for the Reformed Church in England, 
which was entirely Calvinistic in substance and 
spirit. This was adopted by a synod at London, in 
1552, and thereby received public sanction. It 
goes under the name of “The Forty-Two Articles 
of Edward Sixth.” This symbol was revised by the 
bishops of the English Church under Queen Eliza- 
beth, in 1562. The revision comprised a creed of 
thirty-nine articles, which was sanctioned by asynod 
in London in 1562, and by act of Parliament in 
1571. It is a Calvinistic creed upon all points of 
doctrine with the exception of the sacraments. 
With respect to this subject, it was intended to be 
a mean between the Lutheran and Calvinistic theo- 
ries. Its polity is prelatical episcopacy, the reigning 
sovereign being the earthly head of the church. 

The Westminster Confession is the result of the 
deliberations of the Westminster Assembly, a synod 
of divines called by Parliament, in opposition, how- 
ever, to the will of Charles I, for the purpose of 
settling the government, liturgy, and doctrine of the 
Church of England. It met July 1, 1643, and sat 
till February 22, 1648, four years six months and 
twenty-two days, in which time it held 1163 ses. 
sions. The members were chosen from the several 
counties of England, and thus the council contained 


480 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS, 


representatives of the Presbyterian, the Episcopa- 
lian, and the Independent parties. The great pre- 
ponderance, however, was on the part of the Pres- 
byterians, since many of the Episcopal divines, 
though elected, refused to attend, upon the ground 
that as the king had declared against the convoca- 
tion it was not a legal assembly ; and the Indepen- 
dents were a far smaller body than either of the 
other two. The system of doctrine constructed by 
this Assembly is thoroughly Calvinistic, and bears a 
close resemblance to the canons of the synod of 
Dort. The Westminster Confession was adopted as 
their doctrinal basis by the Presbyterians of England, 
and took the place of the Confessio Scoticana in 
Scotland. It is also the symbol of the Presbyterian 
Church in America.' 

The Savoy Confession is a symbol adopted by 
the Puritan Independents in England, who were 
not satisfied with the Westminster Confession so far 
as the polity and discipline of the churches was con- 
cerned. As yet they had formally adopted no com- 
mon creed. The Presbyterian assembly had urged 
them to this, reminding them that their brethren in 
New England had already done it. Under the au- 
thority of Cromwell, an assembly was convened at 
the Savoy, in London, October 12, 1658, composed 
of above one hundred ministers and delegates from 


1 See Neat: History of the Pu- bly, for an account of the West- 
ritans, and HetHertneton: His- minster Confession. 
tory of the Westminster Assem- 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 481 


the Independent churches, among whom were John 
Howe, then Cromwell’s chaplain, John Owen, Joseph 
Caryl, and Thomas Goodwin, who is styled by 
Anthony Wood “the very Atlas and patriarch of 
Independency.” A committee was chosen, of whom 
Goodwin and Owen were at the head, to draw up a 
new confession, with the instruction to keep as close 
to the Westminster upon doctrinal points as possible. 
This they did, saying in their preface that they fully 
consent to the Westminster Confession, for the sub- 
stance of it.’ 

The Savoy Confession differs from the West- 
minster upon the subject of polity. It teaches 
“that every particular society of visible professors 
agreeing to walk together in the faith and order of 
the gospel is a complete church, and has full power 
within itself to elect and ordain all church officers, 
to exclude all offenders, and to do all other acts re- 
lating to the edification and well-being of the 
church. . . . The way of ordaining officers, that is, 
pastors, teachers or elders, is, after their election by 
the suffrage of the church, to set them apart with 
fasting and prayer, and imposition of the hands of 
the eldership of the church, though if there be no 
imposition of hands, they are nevertheless rightly 


1“The difference between these agreed with the Presbyterians in 
two confessions is so very small, the use of the Assembly’s cate- 
that the modern Independents chism.” Neat: Puritans, IJ. 178 
have in a manner laid aside the (Harper’s Ed.). 
use of it in their families, and 


VOL. 1.—81 


482 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


constituted ministers of Christ ; for it is not allowed 
that ordination to the work of the ministry, though 
it be by persons rightly ordained, does convey any 
office-power, without a previous election of the 
church. No ministers may administer the sacra- 
ments but such as are ordained and appointed there- 
unto. The power of all stated synods, presbyteries, 
convocations, and assemblies of divines, over partic- 
ular churches is denied ; but in cases of difficulty, 
or difference relating to doctrine or order, churches 
may meet together by their messengers, in synods or 
councils, to consider and give advice, but without 
exercising any jurisdiction.” * 

The connection between the Calvinism of the 
Continent and the Puritanism of England, we have 
seen, is very close and intimate; that between the 
Puritanism of Old England and of New England 
is equally close, so that this is a proper place in this 
history of Symbols to introduce the creeds of the 
New England churches. The oldest of them, and 
one of the most important, is the Cambridge Plat- 
form. In 1646, a bill was presented to the Gen- 
eral Court of Massachusetts, for calling a synod of 
the churches to draw up some platform of disci- 
pline and church government.’ The bill was passed, 
but owing to scruples of some of the deputies the 
law did not take effect. The matter was then pro- 


‘Neat: Puritans, II. 178, 179 was the only directory in use up 
(Harper’s Ed.). to this time. 
? Cotron’s “ Book of the Keys” 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 483 


pounded to the churches, and by them a synod was 
convened. It met, sat fourteen days, and then ad- 
journed to June 8, 1647. Owing to epidemical sick: 
ness it soon adjourned, and met again August 15, 
1648. At this session, the Platform was constructed 
and adopted. The synod consisted of the clergy of 
Massachusetts, with as many others as could be col- 
lected from the other New England colonies. Hub- 
bard and Higginson, who personally remembered 
them, describe them as “men of great renown in 
the nation from whence the Laudian persecution 
exiled them. Their learning, their holiness, their 
gravity, struck all men that knew them, with adm1- 
ration. They were Timothies in their houses, Chry- 
sostoms in their pulpits, and Augustines in their 
disputations.” 

The Platform prepared by this synod, which sat 
fourteen days, was presented in October, 1648, to 
the churches and the general government, for their 
consideration and acceptance. It was adopted by 
the churches, and after some discussion by the gen- 
eral court,—the latter declaring “their approbation 
of the said form of discipline, as being, for the sub- 
stance thereof, what they had hitherto practised in 
their churches, and did believe to be according to 
the word of God.” Thus, the document received in 
Massachusetts the sanction of law, and was adopted 
and in force in all the New England colonies, until 
superseded in Connecticut by the Saybrook Plat- 
form, in 1708. 


484 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


The Cambridge Platform is wholly confined to 
polity. It makes no statements of doctrine whatever. 
Like the Savoy Confession, it refers to the Westmin- 
ster Symbol for a dogmatic statement. In their 
preface, the authors of the Cambridge Platform say: 
“Having perused the public confession of faith 
agreed upon by the reverend assembly of divines at 
Westminster, and finding the sum and substance 
thereof, in matters of doctrine, to express not their 
own judgement only, but ours also; and being like- 
wise called upon by our godly magistrates, to draw 
up a public confession of that faith which is con- 
stantly taught and generally professed amongst us; 
we thought good to present unto them, and with 
them to our churches, and with them to all the 
churches of Christ abroad, our professed and hearty 
assent and attestation to the whole confession of 
faith, for substance of doctrine, which the reverend 
assembly presented to the religious and honourable 
parliament of England, excepting only some sections 
in the 25th, 30th, and 31st chapters of their confes- 
sion, which concern points of controversy in church 
discipline, touching which we refer ourselves to the 
draft of church discipline in the ensuing treatise.” 
Respecting the subject of church government and 
discipline, this Platform agrees with the polity of the 
Savoy Confession,—teaching as that does, that the in- 
dividual church possesses all political power within 
itself, even to the ordination of its minister,and that 
councils or synods have nothing but advisory powers. 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 485 


The second New England symbol, both in time 
and importance, is the Boston Confession. A synod 
of the churches in the province of Massachusetts, 
ealled by the General Court, assembled in Boston 
September 10, 1679, in which the Cambridge Plat- 
form was re-adopted as the form of church polity. 
This synod then held a second session, May 12, 
1680, for the purpose of forming a confession of 
faith. On the 19th of May, 1680, the result of the 
deliberations of this synod was presented to the 
General Court for acceptance, whereupon the fol- 
lowing order was passed: “ This court having 
taken into serious consideration the request that 
hath been presented by several of the reverend 
elders, in the name of the late synod, do approve 
thereof, and accordingly order the confession of 
faith agreed upon at their second session, and the 
platform of discipline consented unto by the synod 
at Cambridge anno 1648. to be printed for the 
benefit of the churches in present and after times.” 
This is the only dogmatic confession that has been 
drawn up in the New England churches and by the 
New England divines, and for this reason it deserves 
some particular notice and examination. 

The Cambridge Synod of 1648 adopted the 
Westminster Symbol, in place of forming a new one 
for themselves. This Boston Synod of 1680 both 
adopt an antecedent symbol, and construct another 
of their own. In their preface to their Confession, 


the Boston Synod employ the following language 


486 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


“Tt hath pleased the only wise God so to dispose in 
his providence, as that the elders and messengers 
of the churches in the colony of Massachusetts in 
New England, did, by the call and encouragement 
of the honoured general court, meet together Sep- 
tember 10, 1679. This synod at their second ses- 
sion, which was May 12, 1680, consulted and con- 
sidered of a confession of faith. That which was 
consented unto by the elders and messengers of the 
Congregational churches in England who met at the 
Savoy (being for the most part, some small varia- 
tions excepted, the same with that which was agreed 
upon first by the assembly at Westminster, and was 
approved of by the synod at Cambridge in New 
England, anno 1648, as also by a general assembly 
in Scotland), was twice publicly read, examined, 
and approved of,—that little variation which we 
have made from the one, in compliance with the 
other, may be seen by those who please to compare 
them. But we have, for the main, chosen to express 
ourselves in the words of those reverend assemblies, 
that so we might not only with one heart, but with 
one mouth, glorify God and our Lord Jesus Christ. 
As to what concerns church government, we refer to 
the platform of discipline agreed upon by the mes- 
sengers of these churches anno 1648.” 

Having thus re-affirmed the Calvinism of the 
Westminster and Savoy Confessions, this synod 
proceed to the formation of a confession of faith in 
their own language and terms; from which the fol- 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 487 


lowing citations exhibit the views of the New 
England churches and divines of that period. “In 
the unity of the God-head, there be three persons, 
of one substance, power, and eternity, God the 
Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost; the 
Father is of none, neither begotten, nor proceeding ; 
the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the 
Holy Ghost eternally proceeding from the Father 
and the Son.” This confession, it is obvious, like 
the Calvinistic confessions generally, adopts the 
Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Trinitarianism. The 
Anthropology of the Boston Confession is indicated 
in the following extracts. “God having made a cov- 
enant of works and life thereupon, with our first 
parents, and all their posterity in them, they being 
seduced by the subtilty and temptation of Satan 
did wilfully transgress the law of their creation, 
and break the covenant in eating the forbidden 
fruit. By this sin, they and we in them fell from 
original righteousness and communion with God, 
and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in 
all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They 
being the root, and by God’s appointment standing 
in the room and stead, of all mankind, the guilt of 
this sin was imputed, and corrupted nature conveyed 
to all their posterity descending from them by or- 
dinary generation. From this original corruption, 
whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and 
made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to 
all evil, do proceed ali actual transgressions. Every 


488 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


sin, both original and actual, being a transgression 
of the righteous law of God, and contrary there- 
unto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the 
sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of 
God and curse of the law, and so made subject to 
death, with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and 
eternal, 2... : God hath endued the will of man 
with that natural liberty and power of acting upon 
choice, that is neither forced, nor by any absolute 
necessity of nature determined, to do good or evil. 
Man in his state of innocency had freedom and 
power to will and do that which is good and well 
pleasing to God ; but yet mutably, so that he might 
fall from it. Man by his fall into a state of sin 
hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual 
good accompanying salvation, so as a natural man 
being altogether averse from that good, and dead in 
sin, is not able by his own strength to convert himself, 
or to prepare himself thereunto. The will of man 
is made perfectly and immutably free to good alone, 
in the state of glory only.” The Boston Confession 
agrees, then, with the Latin in distinction from the 
Greek anthropology, in maintaining the two posi- 
tions that original sin, equally with actual, is guilty 
transgression of law, and deserves the punishment 
of eternal death; and that the will of man after the 
fall does not possess that power to good which it had 
by creation and anterior to its apostasy.” 


1This doctrine of the impo- endorsed by the most important 
tence of the apostate will, thus of the New England synods, was 


CALVINISTIC CONFESSIONS. 489 

The Soteriology of this confession is seen in the 
following extract. “Christ by his obedience and 
death did fully discharge the debt of all those that 
are justified, and did by the sacrifice of himself, in 
the blood of his cross, undergoing in their stead the 
penalty due unto them, make a proper real and full 
satisfaction to God’s justice in their behalf; yet in- 
asmuch as he was given by the Father for them, 
and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their 
stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, 
their justification is only of free grace, that both 


re-affirmed by the two most dis- 
tinguished of New England the- 
ologians. The elder Epwarps 
(On the Will, Pt. III. § iv.) com- 
bats the power of contrary 
choice, without which self-con- 
version is impossible, in the fol- 
lowing terms: “The will, in the 
time of a leading act or inclina- 
tion that is diverse from or op- 
posite to the command of God, 
and when actually under the in- 
fluence of it, 7s not able to exert 
itself to the contrary, to make an 
alteration in order to a compli- 
ance. The inclination is unable 
to change itself; and that for this 
plain reason, that it is unable to 
incline to change itself.” Hor- 
x1ns (Works, I. 233-235) remarks, 
that “every degree of inclination 
contrary to duty, which is and 
must be sinful, necessarily implies 
and involves an equal degree of 
difficulty and inability to obey. 
For, indeed, such inclination of 


the heart to disobey, and the dif- 
ficulty or inability to obey, are 
precisely one and the same. This 
kind of difficulty, or inability, 
therefore, always 18 great accord- 
ing to the strength and jixedness 
of the inclination to disobey ; and 
at becomes total and absolute when 
the heart is totally corrupt, and 
wholly opposed to obedience... . 
St. Paul says: ‘The carnal mind 
is enmity against God, for it is not 
subject to the law of God, nei- 
ther indeed can be.’ None can 
think the apostle means to ex- 
cuse man’s enmity against Ged, 
because it renders him unable to 
obey the law of God, and cannot 
be subject to it. The contrary is 
strongly expressed, viz, that this 
enmity against God is exceeding 
criminal, in that it is directly op- 
posed to God and his law, and in- 
volves in its nature an utter ina- 
bility to obey the law of God,—yea, 
an absolute impossibility.” 


490 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


the exact justice and rich grace of God might be 
glorified in the justification of sinners.” 

Upon the topics, then, of trinitarianism, anthro- 
pology, and soteriology, the Boston Confession of 
1680 is in harmony with the Protestant confessions 
of the Old World. And what is especially worthy 
of notice, with regard to those shades and differen- 
ces of doctrinal statement which prevailed within 
the wide and active. mind of Protestantism, the 
New England churches, as represented by this syn- 
od, adopted the more strict and not the more latitudi- 
narian statements of doctrine. Respecting the more 
difficult and disputed points in dogmatic theology, 
the Boston Confession gives the same definitions, 
and takes the same positions, with the Augsburg 
Confession of the German Lutherans, the Second 
Helvetic of the Swiss Calvinists, the Dort Canons 
of the Dutch Calvinists, and the Westminster Con- 
fession of the English Puritans. 

A synod of the churches in the Connecticut 
colony met in 1703, which adopted the Westminster 
and Savoy Confessions, and drew up certain rules of 
ecclesiastical discipline. This synod was only pre- 
paratory, however, to another more general one 
which they had in contemplation. In 1708, a synod 
was convened by the legislature, and met at Say- 
brook. This body adopted for a doctrinal confes- 
sion the Boston Confession of 1680, and drew up 
the Saybrook Platform of government and disci- 
pline which approximates to the Presbyterian, in 


PAPAL CONFESSIONS. 49] 


delegating judicial powers to churches organized 
into a “Consociation.” The confession of faith and 
platform were approved and adopted by the legis- 
lature of Connecticut, in October, 1708. 


$ 3. Papal Confessions. 


The fountain-head of the modern Papal theology 
is the Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini. The 
need of a general synod to counteract the progress 
of the Protestant churches had long been felt by 
the Papal body, and after considerable delay pope 
Paul III. convened one at Trent, on the 18th of 
December, 1545, which with intermissions continued 
to hold its sessions until the year 1563. <A papal 
bull of Pius IV., issued on the 26th of January, 
1564, confirmed the decisions of the synod; for- 
bade, under the severest penalties, all clergymen 
and laymen from making explanations or commen- 
taries upon them; and reserved to the pope the 
further explication, as need might be, of the more 
obseure points of doctrine contained in them. The 
Tridentine Symbol did not immediately acquire 
equal authority in all Roman Catholic countries. In 
the greater part of Italy, in Portugal, in Poland, and 
by the German emperor, the council of Trent was 
formally declared to be oecumenical. But in Catho- 
lic Germany its decisions were only tacitly accepted ; 
in Spain, Naples, and Belgium, they were adopted 


492 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


with a special reservation of royal rights; and in 
France, where the council met with strong opposi- 
tion, they were received only by degrees, and with 
respect to strictly dogmatic points. The decisions 
of the Tridentine Council, which were passed not 
unanimously but by a majority vote, fell into two 
classes. The first, entitled Decreta, contain detailed 
statements, in positive propositions, of the Papal doc- 
trine; the second, entitled Canones, explain in a 
brief manner the meaning of the Decreta, and con- 
demn the opposite tenets of the Protestant church,— 
ending, always, with the words “anathema sit.” 
Their teachings in theology, anthropology, soterio- 
logy, and eschatology, have been indicated in the 
several divisions of this history. 

A second document possessing symbolical author- 
ity in the Papal Church is the Professio fidei Tri- 
dentina, which pope Pius IV., in a bull issued in 
1564, required all public teachers in the Romish 
Church, all candidates for clerical or academical 
honours, and all converts from other churches, to 
subscribe. It is composed of the Nicaeno-Constan- 
tinopolitan symbol, together with extracts from the 
Tridentine Canons. It obligates the subscriber to 
belief in the Nicene doctrine; in the entire body 
of ecclesiastical tradition ; in the interpretation 
which the Church has given to the Scriptures; in 
the seven sacraments and their Catholic adminis- 
tration ; inthe statements of the Council of Trent 
concerning original sin and justification; in the 


PAPAL CONFESSIONS. 493 


mass, transubstantiation, purgatory, invocation of 
saints, and worship of images; in the authority of 
the church to give absolution; in the Roman Church 
as the mother and teacher of all other churches ; 
and in the pope as the vicegerent of Christ to 
whom obedience is due. 

A third document of a symbolical character in 
the Papal Church is the Catechismus Romanus, 
drawn up at the command of the pope by three 
distinguished Papal theologians, under the supervi- 
sion of three cardinals. It was published in Latin, 
under the authority of Pius IV., in 1556, and intro- 
duced into Italy, France, Germany, and Poland, by 
the votes of provincial synods. It adheres closely 
to the Tridentine Canons; though it enters into 
details upon some points respecting which the Tri- 
dentine Canons are silent, such as the sovereignty of 
the pope and the limbus patrum. Although this 
catechism was published by papal authority, several 
other catechisms have attempted to supplant it. 
The Jesuits, toward the close of the 16th century, 
during the controversies that arose respecting pre 
destination, endeavored to weaken the influence of 
the Roman Catechism, by the two Catechisms of Ca- 
nisius, a member of their body. One of these was 
intended to be a dogmatic manual for clergymen, 
and the other a book of instruction for children 
and youth. They were translated into many lan- 
guages, and exerted a great influence in connection 
with the educational system of the Jesuits. The 


494 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


pope, however, refused to give them papal authority, 
though strongly urged to do so by the Jesuit party. 
The Catechism of Bellarmin, published in 1608, also 
the work of a Jesuit, was authorized by pope Clement 
VIII. as a true exposition of the Roman Catechism, 
and obtained a wide circulation. Besides these 
documents, the Confutatio Confessionis Augustanae 
or answer to the Augsburg Confession, the bull 
Unigenitus of Clement XI. issued in 1711, and the 
liturgical books of the Roman Church, particularly 
the Missale Romanum and the Breviarium Roma- 
num, are important auxiliary sources of the Papal 
doctrine. 


§ 4. Confessions of the Greek Church. 


The Greek Church lays at the foundation of its 
dogmatic system the Apostles’ Creed, and the de- 
cisions of the seven oecumenical councils which were 
held previous to the schism between the East and 
the West,—viz., the first and second Nicene, in 325 
and 787; the first, second, and third Constantino- 
politan, in 381, 533, and 680; the Ephesian in 431, 
and the Chalcedon in 451. It differs from the 
Roman Church, in rejecting the decisions of all 
councils held at the West since the division of the 
two churches. 

Besides these, there are several symbolical docu- 
ments which the Greek Church adopts as the ex- 
pression of its faith. The most important of them 


ARMINIAN CONFESSIONS. 495 


is the Confessio Orthodoxa, drawn up in 1642, by 
Peter Mogilas, the metropolitan bishop of Kiew, to 
counteract a tendency towards Protestantism that 
was showing itself in the Russian Church. It 
was. published first in Russian, then in Modern 
Greek, and afterwards in Latin and German. An- 
other creed is the Confessio. Dosithei, composed by 
a Greek patriarch of Jerusalem, in opposition to the 
Calvinistic system. Still another is the Confessio 
Gennadit, which the patriarch Gennadius of Con- 
stantinople composed and presented to the sultan 
Mohammed ITI., on his conquest of Constantinople in 
1453, as the statement of the Christian faith. It 
does not enter into the differences between the 
Greek and Latin systems, but is an expression of 
the general truths of the Christian religion. 


$ 5. Arminian Confessions. 


The Arminians take their name from Arminius 
(+1609), first a pastor at Amsterdam, afterwards 
professor of divinity at Leyden. He had been ed- 
ucated by Beza in the opinions of Calvin, but as 
early as 1591 began to express his dissent from 
Calvinism, upon the points of free-will, predestina- 
tion, and grace, as being too rigid andsevere. ‘The 
Arminians were also called Remonstrants, because 
in 1611 they presented a remonstrance to the States- 
General of Holland, praying for relief from the 
harsh treatment of their opponents. 


496 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS, 


The Arminians formally adopted no symbol. 
One of their characteristics was a lower estimate 
than the Reformed churches cherished, of the value 
of confessions generally. Hence, their opinions 
must be sought in the writings of their leading 
minds. The principal sources are the following: 1. 
The writings of Arminius; particularly his contro- 
versy with Francis Gomar, his colleague. 2. The 
Confessio Pastorum qui Remonstrantes vocantur, 
drawn up by Episcopius (+ 1643). 3. The Remon- 
strantia of Peter Bertius,—a specification of the five 
articles (Quinqgue articulares) held by the Arminians, 
in opposition to the Calvinistic five points. 4. The 
writings of Grotius (apologetical and exegetical) ; 
of Limborch (dogmatical) ; of Curcellaeus, Wetstein, 
and Le Clere (exegetical), 

The controversy between the Arminians and Cal- 
vinists turned chiefly upon three Calvinistic points, 
viz.: the absolute decree of election; the irresisti- 
bleness of special grace; and the limitation, in the 
divine intention, of the merit of Christ’s death to 
the elect. 1. The Arminians held that the decree 
of election is conditional, or dependent upon the 
divine foreknowledge that grace will be rightly used 
in the instance of the elect. The Dort Canons main- 
tain that the electing decree secures the right use of 
grace itself, as well as bestows grace. 2. The Ar- 
minians held that the atonement of Christ is in- 
tended for all men alike and indiscriminately. As 
matter of fact, however, it saves only a part of 


ARMINIAN CONFESSIONS. 497 


mankind. The reason why the atonement does not 
save all men alike and indiscriminately lies in the 
fact, that the will of the finally lost sinner defeats 
the divine intention. There is no such degree of 
grace as is irresistible to the sinful will. The effect- 
ual application of the atonement, therefore, depends 
ultimately upon the decision of the sinner’s will, and 
this decision in the case of the lost defeats the divine 
purpose. In opposition to this view, the Dort Sy- 
nod held that the atonement, though sufficient in 
value for the salvation of all men, was intended only 
for those to whom it is etfectually applied, viz.: the 
elect. The Holy Spirit possesses a power that is ir- 
resistible, in the sense that it can subdue the obsti- 
nacy of any human wil however opposed to God. 
Hence, the application of the atonement depends, ul- 
timately, not upon the sinner’s decision but the divine 
determination to exert special grace. There is, there- 
fore, no defeat of the divine intention, and the atone- 
ment saves all for whom it was intended. 3. The 
Arminians held that grace is necessary in order to 
salvation, but that regenerating grace may be both 
resisted and lost. The Dort Synod, on the contrary, 
held that regenerating as distinct from common 
grace is able to subdue all opposition of the sinful 
will, and therefore cannot be resisted in the sense 
of being defeated or overcome, and therefore can- 
not be lost. 


VOL. 11.—32 


498 HISTORY OF SYMBOLS. 


§ 6. Socinian Confessions. 


The Socinians laid still less stress upon symbols 
than the Arminians. The principal writings having 
a confessional character among them are the fol- 
lowing: 1. The Cracovian Catechism,—composed 
mostly of passages of Scripture. It was drawn up 
by Schomann, and published in 1574, for the use of 
the Polish churches. 2. The Catechism of Faustus 
Socinus,—published at Racovia, 1618, in an un- 
finished form, owing to the death of Socinus. 3. 
The Racovian Catechisms,—the larger composed by 
Schmalz and Moscorovius, and published in 1605; 
the smaller by Schmalz, in 1605. These are the 
principal symbolical product of Socinianism, and are 
drawn very much from the writings of the Socini. 


ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


BELARD, i. 46, 163; his view of 

faith and reason, i. 186; bis trini- 
tarianism, i. 337 ; his soteriology, ii. 
287. 

Absolution (Lutheran), ii. 452. 

Acceptilation, ii. 347, sq. 

Advent (second) of Christ, ii. 398, 450. 

Adventists, ii. 397. 

AGassiz, i. 1. 

AWRIMAN, 1. 245. 

ALBERTUS Magnus, i. 82, ii. 298. 

Alogi, i. 259. 

Atcuin, i. 177, ii. 111; his statement 
of the relation of the person to the 
essence, i. 847 ; soteriology of, ii. 270. 

Axexanper, bishop of Alexandria, his 
opposition to Arius, i. 307. 

Alexandrine School, i. 67, 159; anthro- 
pology of, ii. 31; soteriology of, ii. 
226. 

AMBROSE, i. 12, 348, ii. 34, 49; anthro- 
pology of, ii. 48, sq.; eschatology of, 
ii. 401. 

Ammon, i. 218. 

Amatricu, of Bena, i. 179, 227. 

Anti-Judaizing Gnostics, i. 116. 

Anti-Trinitarians, i. 253. 

ANGELO, i. 5. 

ANSELM, i. 11, 46, 164, 177, 179, ii. 218; 
his view of reason and faith, i. 179; 
argument for Divine existence, i. 231, 
8q.; his use of substantia and essen- 
tia, i. 870; his trinitarianism, i. 376; 
anthropology of, ii. 114-139; defini- 
tion of original sin, ii. 115, sq. ; rela- 
tion of the individual to the species, 


ii. 120, sq.; realism of, ii. 117; idea 
of the will and freedom, ii. 127, sq. ; 
inability of the creature to originate 
holiness, ii. 1382; impossibility of 
God’s originating sin, ii. 186; soteri- 
ology of, ii. 278, sq.; maintains the 
absolute necessity of atonement, ii. 
274; definition of sin as debt, ii. 277; 
strict satisfaction required, ii. 279; 
his evangelical “direction” for the 
visitation of the sick, ii. 282; influ- 
ence of his system, ii. 286, 318; his 
soteriology compared with the Pro- 
testant, ii. 386, sq., 855; his idea of 
law, li. 855. 

Antiochian School, anthropology of, ii. 
39; attitude of towards Pelagianism, 
ii. 101. 

Anhalt, confession of, ii. 471. 

Anabaptists, ii. 450. 

A priori argument for the divine exist- 
ence, i. 238. 

A posteriori argument for the divine 
existence, i. 230. 

Apollinarism, i. 394. 

Apologia confessionis Augustanae, ii. 
455. 

Apologies, i. 30, 103; defect in mediae- 
val, i. 188. 

Aquinas, i. 12, 46, 82, 179, ii. 293; his 
view of faith and reason, i. 181; his 
trinitarianism, i. 376; relation of the 
individual to the species, ii. 121; 
soteriology of, ii. 304, sq.; relative 
necessity of atonement, ii. 306; doc- 
trine of unio mystica, ii. 308, 337; 


500 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


distinction between satisfactio and 
meritum, ii. 309; doctrine of supera- 
bundance of merit, ii. 310; confu- 
sion of justification with sanctifica- 
tion, ii. 312; his notion of * configu- 
ration,’ ii. 313; distinction of merit 
of condignity and congruity, ii. 329; 
his eschatology, ii. 405, 409, 413, 
417. 

ARISTOTLE, on the enslaved will, i. 54, 
55; on immortality, i. 55; his defini- 
tion of faith, i. 54. 

Aristotelianism, influence of, i. 52; er- 
rors of, i. 53, sq.; agreement with 
Platonism, i. 57 ; prevalence of, i. 66, 
76, 81. 

ARrivs, i. 307, ii. 485. 

Arianism, relation of to Origenism, i. 
307; christology of, i. 393. 

Arminians, confessions of, ii. 495, sq. 

Arminianism, anthropology of, ii. 178- 
196; definition of original sin, ii. 
179; original sin not guilt, ii. 182, 
477, sq. ; impotence of the sinful will, 
ii. 186; God cannot require faith ir- 
respective of grace, ii. 189; doctrine 
of the Adamic unity, ii. 190; doctrine 
of conditional election, ii. 1938, 496; 
soteriology of, ii. 870, sq.; Christ's 
death not a substituted penalty, but 
a substitute for a penalty, ii. 873; 
not a complete satisfaction, ii. 374. 

ARNOBIUS, i. 229. 

Arnosits, the younger, ii. 103. 

Artemonites, i. 68, 259. 

ATHANASIUS, i. 46, 70, 229, 280; his de- 
finition of Sabellianism, i. 260; his 
opinion of Origen, i. 291; of the 
Semi-Arians, i. 313; of Eusebius, i. 
313; his doctrine of eternal genera- 
tion, i. 821, sq., 327, 332, sq.; his 
doctrine of the Holy Ghost, i. 356, 
861; his definition of hypostasis, i. 
369; his anthropology, ii. 87 ; his so- 
teriology, ii. 289, sq. 

ATHENAGORAS, i. 119, 127. 

Atonement, defined, ii. 204; relative 
and absolute necessity of, ii. 223, 258, 
300, 302, 316. 

AUBERLW, ii. 397. 


Augsburg Confession, trinitarianism 
of, i. 879; anthropology of, ii. 152, 
sq., 166, sq. ; soteriology of, ii. 342; 
condemns chiliasm, ii. 596; account 
of, ii. 445, sq. 

AuGusTINE, i, 46, 230; Platonic studies 
of, i. 69; acquaintance with Aristo- 
tle’s writings, i. 74, 152; his idea of 
revelation, i. 143; of the church, i. 
144; his De civitate Dei, i. 154; his 
definition of faith, i. 155, 158; view of 
relation of faith to reason, i. 161; of 
miracles, i. 167; of eternal genera- 
tion, i. 344; specimens of his trinita- 
rian exegesis, i. 351; combats pre- 
existence, ii. 9; attitude towards tra- 
duciauism, ii. 15, sq., 77 ; his anthro- 
pology, ii. 50-91; his earlier syner- 
gism, ii. 51; his conception of the 
power of contrary choice, ii. 55, 65; 
his distinction between relative and 
absolute perfection, ii. 55; his con- 
ception of voluntariness, ii. 58; his 
idea of will and freedom, ii. 60, sq. ; 
view of freedom and necessity, li. 64; 
of the bondage of the will, ii. 66; 
his theory of regeneration, ii. 66 ; de- 
grees of grace, ii. 68 ; his doctrine of 
predestination, ii. 70; of irresistible 
grace, ii. 73; concerning the salva- 
tion of pagans, ii. 74; doctrine of the 
Adamic unity, ii. 76-79, 90; of the 
voluntariness of sin, ii. 79-91; im- 
possibility of God’s sinning, ii. 84; 
his soteriology, ii. 253, sq. ; occasion- 
al confusion of justification with sane- 
tification, ii. 255 ; maintains a relative 
necessity of atonement, ii. 258; his 
eschatology, ii. 401, 405, 408, 410, 
412, 414. 

Avirtus, of Vienne, ii. 105. 


ACON, i. 3, 65. 
BarNaBas, i. 267; soteriology of, 
ii. 209; chiliasm of, ii. 390. 

Bast, the Great, his doctrine of the 
Holy Ghost, i. 357; his eschatology, 
li. 404. 

Basle, confession of, ii. 464, 

BasILipEs, ii. 205, 227, 


ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


BavumGaRrTen-Crusius, method of, i. 36; 
extracts from, i. 130, 153. 

Baur, i. 231, 261; his statement of 
Origen’s trinitarianism, i. 297, 300; 
of Irenaeus’s soteriology, ii. 213, sq. ; 
his objection to Anselm’s doctrine 
of satisfaction, ii. 284; his statement 
of the difference between the Protes- 
tant and Papal soteriologies, ii. 331; 
his criticism on the Grotian theory 
of satisfaction, ii. 366. 

Baxter, i. 92, 204. 

Bens, ii. 111. 

Begotten, eternally. See Generation. 

Belgic Confession, ii, 475; its definition 
of justification, ii. 340; notice of chi- 
liasm, ii. 397. 

BELLARMIN, ii. 144, 151; his soteriology, 
ii. 328; twofold justification defined, 
li. 329. 

BEntLEY, i. 207, 216. 

BERNARD, i. 46, 179; his view of faith 
and reason, i. 183; his trinitarianism, 
i. 376; his soteriology, ii. 289. 

Bertivs, ii. 496. 

Beryt, 1. 255, ii. 435. 

Biet, i. 82; his soteriology, ii. 314. 

Boccaccio, i. 87. 

Boeratvs, i. 73. 

Bo.incBrokE, system of, i. 200; its in- 
fluence in France, i. 216. 

Bonar, ii, 397. 

Bonaventura, his creationism, ii. 28 ; 
soteriology of, ii. 293, sq. 

Boston Confession, ii. 484, sq. 

Boye, i. 207. 

Breviarium Romanum, ii. 494. 

Bucer, i. 444. 

BuGeNHAGEN, il. 446. 

Bott, i. 290, 312, 338; his view of Ori- 
gen’s trinitarianism, i. 301; opinion 
concerning the Nicene use of dvaia 
and bmdoraots, i. 369; concerning 
the Nicene idea of subordination, i. 
339. 

BuLuincer, ii. 465. 

BUNSEN, i. 255, 2638. 

Burnet, i. 404. 

Bourton, i. 270. 

Buthos, i. 240. 


501 


Burier (Bishop), his Analogy, i. 212. 
Burier (Archer), i. 249. 


ABSARIUS of Arles, ii. 105. 

Cavin, i. 46, 91, 144, 158, 811, il. 
80; his trinitarianism, i. 320, 321, 
880, sq.; his creationism, ii. 24 ; con- 
ception of human bondage, ii. 66; his 
anthropology, ii. 155; his criticism 
upon Augustine’s soteriology, ii. 
257. 

Cambridge platform, ii. 482, sq. 

Cassioporvs, i. 73. 

Catechism, of Luther, ii. 457 ; Romanus, 
li. 493; of Canisius, ii. 493; of Bel- 
larmin, ii. 493; Socinian, ii. 498. 

Cuxsus, i. 63, 118, 133; ii. 403. 

CerinTHes, ii. 390. 

Chalcedon, council of, i. 398; christo- 
logy of, i. 399, sq. 

CHaucer, i. 88. 

Curist, person of, i. 392, sq., 899. See 
Person. 

Curysostom, anthropology of, ii. 39; 
eschatology of, ii. 405, 415. 

Cusp, 1. 200. 

Church (universal), defined, i. 32. 

Circumincession, i. 347. 

CLARKE (SamUvEL), i. 207, 215 ; his trini- 
tarianism, i. 386, sq. 

Cuiement of Alexandria, i. 117, 119, 
124, 129, 130, 147, 229; trinitarian- 
ism of, i. 274, sq. ; anthropology of, 
li. 31; soteriology of, li. 230, sq. ; 
his idea of future punishment, ii. 
235 ; attacks chiliasm, ii. 895 ; escha- 
tology of, ii. 404, 415. 

CLEMENT of Rome, i. 265, 267; sote- 
riology of, 1i. 209; eschatology of, 
li. 414 

CoLeRinGs, i. 1, 66, 159. 

Cou.ins, 1. 199, 215. 

ConDILLAC, i. 216, 217. 

Congregational churches, trinitarian- 
ism of, i. 498, ii. 484. 

Consensus Tigurinus, ii. 467; Gene- 
vensis, ii. 468. 

Consubstantiation, ii. 451. 

ConyBeareE (John), his reply to Tindal, 
1. 2038. 


502 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


CowPeR, i. 8, 168, 226. 

Creation de nihilo, i. 11, sq. 
Creationism, defined, ii. 10 ; prevalence 
of, ii. 11; critical estimate of, ii. 11. 

CreUvzER, i. 207. 

Cupworrts, i. 11, 59, 63, 129, 204, 205, 
243, 326, 347, 349. 

CurcELLAEDS, il. 349, 370. 

Cuvier, i. 4. 

Crrit of Jerusalem, anthropology of, 
ii. 88; soteriology of, ii. 247. 

Cyr of Alexandria, i. 338, 398, ii. 8; 
soteriology of, ii. 250. 

Cyprian, anthropology of, ii. 47; chi- 
liasm of, ii. 394; eschatology of, il. 
401, 404, 414. 


hes. i. 217. 

Damian of Alexandria, i. 877. 

Dante, i. 87. 

Des Cartes, i. 1, 95. 

Deisn, i. 97, 98. 

Deirzscu, ii. 397. 

Developement, defined, i. 8; discrimi- 
nated from creation, i. 11; discrimi- 
nated from improvement, i. 15. 

Divyuvs, of Alexandria, ii. 417. 

Diperor, i. 217. 

Dinanto, David of, i. 179, 190, 227. 

Dionysius of Rome, his statement of 
trinitarian theories, i. 304. 

Dominicans, ii. 317. 

Dorner, i. 281; ii. 210; his opinion 
regarding Origen’s trinitarianism, i. 
300; regarding Irenaeus’s soteriol- 
ogy, li. 224. 

Dort, synod of, ii. 194, 195 ; canons of, 
li. 476, sq., 496. 

Dosiruevus, confession of, ii. 495. 

Dualism, 1. 225, 228. 


BIONITISM, i. 106, 259; its denial 
of atonement, ii. 206. 

Ecxart, i. 227. 

Epwarps, Jonathan, trinitarianism of, 
i. 383; traducianism of, ii. 25; his 
theory of imputation, ii. 163; his 
anthropology, ii. 488. 

E..i0o7T, ii. 397. 

Hnclyclopaedism, i. 216, 217. 


ENGELHARDT, method of, i. 57, 

Epicureanism,1. 60, 63. 

Eprpaanivs, i. 106, 152, 361. 

Episcoptus, ii. 181, 349. 

Ephesus, council of, i. 398. 

Erasmus, i. 83. 

Essence, distinguished from Person, i. 
363, 364. 

Evsesius, of Caesarea, i. 106, 263; trini- 
tarianism of, i. 310; anthropology of, 
ii. 247; his opposition to chiliasm, 
ii. 395. 

Evsesius, of Nicomedia, i. 310. 

Eutychianism, i. 397, ii. 250. 


ATHERS (Primitive), attitude of 

towards philosophy, i. 121-123, 126, 
153 ; anthropology of, ii. 29; soteriol- 
ogy of, ii. 265. 

Faith, pagan idea of, i. 154; patristic 
definition of, i. 155, sq. ; relations of 
to reason, i. 184; not the procuring 
cause of justification, ii. 338, 340. 

Faustvs, of Rhegium, ii. 103. 

Ficints, i. 86. 

Fievry, i. 343. 

Formula Concordiae, anthropology of, 
li. 154, sq., 168; its definition of jus- 
tification, ii. 338; its distinction of 
active and passive righteousness, ii. 
342; its origin, ii. 458. 

Formula Consensus Helvetici, anthro- 
pology of, ii. 157, sq.; origin of, ii. 
472. 

Franciscans, ii. 317. 

French philosophers, their interpreta- 
tion of Locke, i. 94. 

Fuse xt, i. 12. 


AIUS, ii. 394. 
Gate, i. 129; his Court of the Gen- 
tiles, i. 205. 
Gallican confession, ii. 476. 
GanGatrR, ii. 5, 54. 
GauNnILo, i. 235. 
Generation (Eternal), distinguished 


from creation, i. 317, sq.; from ema- - 


nation, i. 318; necessity of, i. 323, sq. ; 
distinguished from human genera- 
tion, i. 334, 343; confined to the hy- 


ALPHABETICAL 


postatical character, i. 339, sq., 343; 
metaphysical definition of, i. 347 sq. 

GENNADIUS, ii. 103. 

GERELER, ii. 159. 

GIBBON, i. 120. 

GyESELER, i. 149. 

GitBekrt of Poictiers, i. 377. 

Git, on eternal generation, i. 344, 

GLavsTONE, i. 57. 

Gnosticism, i. 114, 252 ; its theory of 
creation, ii. 28; of evil, ii. 28; of 
atonement, ii. 205; its idea of just- 
ice, li. 229. 

God, in history, i. 25; name of, i. 223; 
proofs of his existence, i. 229, sq.; 
impossible that he should sin, ii. 55. 

Gomar, ii. 496. 

GortscHaLK, anthropology of, ii. 113, 
114. 

Greek anthropology, ii. 27, 41 ; its idea 
of will, ii. 60, sq.; its prevalence, ii. 
198. 

Greek Church, i. 40, 361; confessions 
of, ii. 294. 

Grecory Naztanzen, i. 71, 358; his 
anthropology, ii. 39 ; his eschatology, 
ii. 404, 411, 412. 

Grecory Nyssa, i. 71, 152, 358, 361; 
anthropology of, ii. 39; eschatology 
of, ii. 404, 412, 417. 

Grecory THE Great, ii. 74; soteriology 
of, ii. 262 ; eschatology of, 11. 495, 411. 

Grortus, i. 57, ii. 496 ; soteriology of, 
li. 347, sq.; law a positive enact- 
ment, ii. 350 ; strict punishment de- 
pendent upon the divine will, i1. 353 > 
law capable of relaxation, ii. 354 ; 
his theory of relaxation, ii. 356 ; the 
death of Christ required to prevent 
the evil consequences of relaxation 
of law, ii. 358 ; his theory of substi- 
tution, ii. 360; the sufferings of 
Christ not a strict, but an accepted 
satisfaction, ii. 362; bis disclaimer 
of acceptilation, ii. 364; alliance of 
his theory with the Anselmic, ii. 
366 ; with the Socinian, ii. 367. 

Grrwnaezts, ii. 465. 

GuUERICKE, i. 255, 262, 268, 294, 310, 
392, ii. 26, 51, 114. 


INDEX. 003 


AGENBAOCH, method ef, i. 35; ex- 
tracts from, i, 146, 161, 354, ii. 44, 
400, sq. 

Hates, i. 82, ii. 293. 

Ha ua, i. 202, ii. 27. 

Hatysurton, reply to Herbert of Cher- 
bury, i. 204. 

Harvey, i. 57. 

HEPELE, i. 267. 

HEGEL, 1. 96, 227, 240. 

HEIDEGGER, ii. 158. 

Heidelberg catechism, soteriology of, 
ii. 344; origin and account of, ii. 
473, sq. 

HELFFErIcH, i. 81, ii. 39. 

Hetvetivs, i. 216. 

Helvetic (First) Confession, anthropol- 
ogy of, ti. 169, 465. 

Helvetic (Second) Confession, trinitari- 
anism of, i. 379 ; anthropology of, ii. 
169 ; soteriology of, ii. 348; origin 
and account of, ii. 469. 

Hersert of Cherbury, i. 97; system 
of, i. 192. 

Hermas, chiliasm of, ii. 390. 

Hreroctes, i. 118. 

Hinary, i. 225, ii. 103, 440; trinitari- 
anism of, i. 377; creationism of, ii. 
11 ; anthropology of, ii. 49, 50. 

Hipesert, i. 182. 

Hindoo trinity, i. 244. 

Hrpepotytus, i. 225; trinitarianism of, 
i. 285; anthropology of, ii. 43. 

History, definition of, i. 7; sacred and 
secular, i. 18, 24; profane, i. 19; re- 
lation of dogmatic to external, i. 25; 
general dogmatic, i. 33 ; special dog- 
matic, i. 34, 39; biographic, i. 48. 

Hoss, system of, i. 197. 

Hooker, i. 83, 253, 264, 318, 392, 396, 
ii. 30 ; soteriology of, ii. 323, 331; defi- 
nition of a trinitarian person, i 341, 
346; of Christ’s person, i. 397, 404, 
407. 

Hopsrss (Samuel), trinitarianism of, i. 
383; christology of, i. 408; tradu- 
cianism of, ii. 25; original and actual 
sin, ii. $1; anthropology of, ii. 489. 

Horsey, i. 57, 386. 

HoweE, i. 232, 317, 348, 365, ii. 74. 


504 


Humanitarians, L 259. 
Home, i. 138, 202. 
Hypostasis, i. 363, 364, 


GNATIUS, i. 265; soteriology of, 
ii. 208; epistles of, i. 266, 267. 
Imputation, mediate, li. 158, sq., 472; 
immediate, ii. 159, sq., 472. 
Infinite, positive conception of, i 185. 
Infralapsarianism, ii. 192. 
Intermediate state, ii. 400 sq. 
TRENAEtS, i. 11, 106, 117,147,174; trin- 
itarianism of, i. 282; soteriology of, 
li. 213, sq.; chiliasm of, ii. 392; doc- 
trine of resurrection, ii. 403; symbol 
of, ii. 432. 


 becsics i. 159. 

Jansenists, i. 191. 

JEHOVAH, translation of the word in the 
Septuagint, i. 224. 

JEROME, i. 332; eschatology of, ii. 404. 

JouN Damascene, i. 177; soteriology 
li. 251. 

Jounson (Samuel), i. 168. 

Judaism, i. 105. 

Judaizing Gnostics, i. 115. 

Justice, as related to omnipotence, ii. 
222. 

Justin Martyr, i. 119, 121, 127, 128, 
136, 174; trinitarianism of, 268, sq. ; 
anthropology of, ii. 28, 33; soteriol- 
ogy of, ii. 218 ; eschatology of, ii. 400, 
403, 412, 413, 414. 


cc T, theism of, i. 95; deism of, i. 
4 97, 218; moral argument for di- 
vine existence, i. 239 ; his idea of the 
will as a power of causation and not 
of alternative choice, ii. 62. 
K.ueroru, method of, i. 38. 


ACTANTIUS, i. 55, 127; chiliasm 
of, ii. 395. 

Latin anthropology, ii. 27, 45, 91; its 
idea of will, ii. 60, sq.; its preva- 
lence, ii. 198. 

Larpner, i. 215. 

LEcHLER, i. 203. 

LersniT7z, i. 71, 95, ii. 1. 


ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


LELAND, i. 178, 198, 201. 

Leo, the Great, ii. 111. 

LizBNER, i. 81. 

Limporcg, ii. 188, 349, 870, 496; sote- 
riology of, ii. 371, sq. 

Locke, philosophy of, i. 93. 

Logic, function of, i. 2. 

Logos-idea, i. 230; derived from the 
Old Testament and not from Plato, i. 
130. 

Lomzarp, soteriology of, ii. 288. 

Lucian, i. 63. 

Luter, i. 46, 90, 145, 166; traducian- 
ism of, ii. 24; anthropology of, ii. 
152, sq.; criticism of upon Augus- 
tine’s soteriology, ii. 258; on the 
Apostles’ creed, ii, 431; catechisms 
of, ii. 457. 

Lutheran church, symbols of, ii. 444, 
sq. 


\ ACAULAY, i. 198. 
MAckKINTOSH, ii. 27. 

Macedonians, i. 358. 

Mace, criticism of upon Socinus, ii. 
879. 

MANDEVILLE, i. 203. 

Manichzans, i. 146. 

Marce tts of Ancyra, i. 361. 

Meer, i. 300, 303, 304. 

MELANCHTHON, i. 47, 91; synergism of, 
li. 178, 454. 

Method, importance of in history, i. 1. 

Methodology, aim of, i. 4. 

Millenarianism, relation of to the Later- 
Jewish doctrine of the Messianic king- 
dom, ii. 389; never the Catholic doc- 
trine, ii. 391, 394. 

MitMan, i. 79, 82, 154, 173, 245, 896. 

Minvcivs FErx,i. 129; eschatology of, 
li. 414, 

Miracles, i. 165; not magical, i. 166; 
not unnatural, i. 167. 

MrranDota, i. 86. 

Missal (Roman), ii. 493. 

Mohammedanism, i. 178. 

MOaLeR, ii. 151. 

Monarchians, i. 254, 260, 809; christol- 
ogy of, i. 394. 

Monergism, ii. 44. 


le | 


ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


Monographs (Biographic), i. 45. 

Monotheism, in the pagan world, i. 55, 
56, 126. 

Monopbysitism, i. 397, 

More (Henry), reply of to Hobbs, i. 
205. 

Morgan, attack of upon the Old Testa- 
ment, i. 200. 

Morean, on the trinity of Plato, i. 57. 

Mosuerm, his opinion respecting Ori- 
gen’s theological system, ii. 237. 

Mother of God, i. 399. 

Munscuer-Von COxty, i. 292; ii. 98. 

Mycontus, ii. 464, 465. 

Mysticism, two species of, i. 79. 

Mystics, Platonism of, i. 77; scholasti- 
cism of, i. 77, 182; latitudinarian, 1. 
81, 85; heretical, i. 80. 


AGELSBACH, i. 57. 
Nature. See Essence and Person. 

Natural religion, contrasted with re- 
vealed, i. 137. 

NEANDER, i. 27, 68, 230, 258, 298, 299, 
ii. 114; opinion of concerning the 
Logos-idea, i. 130; concerning Sa- 
bellianism, i. 259; concerning Ori- 
gen’s trinitarianism, i. 299, 302; con- 
cerning Irenaeus’s soteriology, ii. 
225; concerning Anselm’s soteriolo- 
gy, li. 282. 

Nestorianism, i. 395, 399, ii. 250. 

New Nicenes, i. 371. 

New Platonism, i. 60, 61, 64. 

Nicene Council, problem before, i. 308 ; 
its idea of sonship, i. 329, sq.; criti- 
cal estimate of its results, i. 372, sq. 

NIEBURR, i. 65, ii. 31. 

NIEDNER, i. 27. 

Noetus, i. 255, ii. 435. 

Nominalists, ii. 317. 

Nominal Trinitarians, i. 256; christolo- 
gy of, i. 393. 

Nonconforming divines, philosophy of, 
192s 


CCAM, i. 82, 90, 227. 
OrcoLampapivs, ii. 464. 
Old Nicenes, i. 371. 
Omnipotence, scholastic doctrine of an 
abstract, ii. 301. 


505 


‘Opotovctos, i. 310, 311, 374. 

‘Ouoovoros, 1. 309-312, 314, 374, il. 436. 

Orange, council of, its decision against 
Semi-Pelagianism, ii. 105. 

OriGeEn, i. 46, 106, 117, 130, 183, 157, 
172; his idea of faith and science, i, 
159, 164; trinitarianism of, i. 288, sq. ; 
distinction between debs and 6 deds, 
i. 293; theological aim of, i. 289; 
view respecting the Holy Spirit, i. 
303 ; his idea of eternal generation, i. 
807, 826; his theory of pre-existence, 
ii. 5, sq.; anthropology of, ii. 33; 
soteriology of, ii. 230 sq.; opposition 
to chiliasm, ii. 395; eschatology of, 
ii. 404, 412, 415. 

Original sin, discriminated from actual, 
ii. 81; is guilt, ii. 17, 48, 76, 79-91, 
117-127, 153, 155-168, 448, 466, 471, 
478, 477, 478, 488; is not guilt, ii. 35, 
37, sq., 94, 100, 146, 147-149, 175, 
181-185, 460. 

Ormusp, 1. 245. 

Ovcta, 1. 363, 364. 

Owen, i. 92, li. 480; on confounding 
justification with sanctification, ii. 
259; on a relative necessity of atone- 
ment, li. 260; on divine justice, il. 
303. 


AGANISM, i. 105. 
Palatine confession, ii. 471. 

Pantheism, i. 13, 97, 225. 

Papal system, i. 378; confessions, ii. 
491, sq. 

Paptas, chiliasm of, ii. 390. 

Pascat, i. 159. 

Patripassians, i. 254, 261; Christology 
of, i. 394. 

Pautus, i. 218. 

Paut, of Samosata, i. 257. 

Pearson, his definition of eternal gen- 
eration and procession, i. 319. 

Person, meaning of the term in trinita- 
rianism, i. 348, 845, 363, 364, 371; 
meaning of the term in anthropology, 
i. 343; ii. 117, 118, 120, 123-126. 

Person of Christ, four factors in the 
conception of, i. 392; two natures 
in, not confused, i. 400; not divi- 


506 


ded, i. 401; illustrated by reference to 
man’s personality, i. 402; properties 
of both natures attributable to the 
person, i. 403; suffering of the per- 
son truly infinite, i. 404; the divin- 
ity, and not the humanity, the basis 
of Christ’s personality, i. 406; the 
Logos united himself with human 
nature, and not with a human indi- 
vidual, i. 407. 

Pevacius, fundamental positions of, ii. 
93, sq. ; his view of the difference be- 
tween Adam and his posterity, il. 94; 
his idea of grace, li. 96 ; of regenera- 
tion, ii. 96; explanation of ég’ @ in 
Rom. v. 12, ii. 95; his ecclesiastical 
trials, ii. 98, sq.; prevalence of his 
views, li. 199. 

Peravius, ii. 203; opinion of respect- 
ing the Nicene use of oveta and 
imooracis, i. 369; Semi-Pelagian- 
ism of, ii. 113. 

PeErTRARCH, i. 87. 

Philosophy, influence of upon dogma- 
ties, i. 28. 

Philosophia prima, Bacon’s estimate of, 
i. 3; Plato’s and Aristotle’s estimate 
of, i. 2 

Paro, i. 61. 

Pietists, i. 191. 

Puacagvs, his theory of mediate impu- 
tation, ii. 158, sq., 472. 

Prato, views of, respecting the popular 
religion, i. 56; respecting God, i. 
138; respecting immortality, i. 139; 
trinity of, i. 243 ; his doctrine of pre- 
existence, il. 5. 

Platonism, errors of, i. 53, sq.; influ- 
ence of, i. 52, 62, 70, 76, 86, 229; 
agreement with Aristotelianism, i. 
59. 

Platform, Cambridge, ii. 482; Say- 
brook, ii. 490. 

Puiny, i. 61, 262. 

Piorarcg, i. 61, 194. 

Polonorum Fratres, i. 384. 

Potycarp, i. 157; soteriology of, ii. 
208. 

Pope (Alexander), i. 201. 

Porpayrry, i. 63, 118. 


ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


PRAXEAS, i. 255, ii. 435. 

Pre-existence, definition of, ii.4; Ori- 
gen its chief advocate, ii. 5., sq.; 
prevalence of, ii. 8; critical estimate 
of, ii. 9. 

Presbyterian Church, trinitarianism of, 
i. 383. 

PRIESTLEY, i. 886, ii. 879. 

Procession (Eternal), i. 340, 344. 

Professio Fidei Tridentina, ii. 492. 

Prosper, ii. 103. 

Protestantism, soteriology of, ii. 321, 
835; anthropology of, ii. 448. 

Pyrruo, i. 202. 


UINQUE articulares, ii. 496. 
Quicumque Symbolum, i. 71, 351, 
li. 439. 


ACOVIAN creed, i. 384. 
Rationalism, i. 218. 

REDEPENNING, i. 294, 300, 801, ii. 33, 
234, sq. 

Reformers, philosophy of, i. 89. 

Remonstrants. See Arminians. 

Resurrection, ii. 403, sq. 

Revelation, relation of to dogmas, i. 
23 ; relation of to reason, i. 129, 130, 
135, sq., 151; an infallible authority, 
i. 142; vague idea of, i. 171. 

Righteousness, active and passive, ii. 
341. 

Ritter, i. 231; statement of coinci- 
dences between Plato and Aristotle, i. 
58 ; opinion respecting Origen’s trin- 
itarianism, i. 300. 

Rivetus, ii. 332. 

Ronur, i. 218. 

RoScELLIN, i. 877. 

RosENKRANZ, method of, i. 87. 

Rousseau, i. 217. 


ABELLIUS, i. 257, sq., ii. 435. 
Sabellians. See Monarchians, 
Sacraments, ii. 451. 
Satan, claims of, as related to redemp- 
tion, ii. 213, sq. 
Saumur, school of, ii. 158, 472. 
Savoy confession, ii. 480. 
Saybrook platform, ii. 490. 


ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


Scuarr, i. 268. 

ScHELLING, i. 96, 240, 362; opinion a 
respecting the Hebrew archives, i. 
206; system of, i. 227. 

ScHILLER, i. 219. 

ScHLEIERMACHER, i. 226, 390; system 
of, i. 99. 

Scholasticism, i. 73, 84. 

Scotus (Duns), i. 82, 90, 227 ; soteriol- 
ogy of, ii. 315, 347. 

Scotus (Erigena), i. 46, 177, 226; trin- 
itarianism of, i. 377; soteriology of, 
li. 271; eschatology of, ii. 406, 418. 

Scotch philosophers, their interpreta- 
tion of Locke, i. 94. 

Scoticana confessio, ii. 476. 

Scriptures, mutilations of by heretics, 
1. 146. 

Self-existence distinguished from ne- 
cessary existence in the trinitarian 
controversy, i. 388. 

Semi-Arians, i. 313, 356, 358, ii. 437. 

Semi-Pelagianism, ii. 102, sq. ; relation 
of to the Greek anthropolog;, ii. 108 ; 
its principal positions, ii. 109; pre- 
valence of, ii. 199. 

Servetus, i. 384. 

SHAFTsBURY, opinions of, i. 198. 

SHERLOCK, i. 214, 347. 

SILestvs, i. 227. 

Sin, originated de nihilo, i. 16, 86, ii. 
54, 57, 63; original, ii. 37,42. See 
Original Sin. 

Scepticism, Judaistic, i. 105; Pagan, i. 
105, 117; Gnostic, i. 113; in the 
Church, i. 179; modern, i. 192. 

Smalcald, articles of, ii. 456. 

Socinus, i: 383, 384; his idea of justice, 
ii. 376; justice the product of option- 
al will, ii. 377; his objections to the 
doctrine of satisfaction, ii. 379, sq. 

Socinian confessions, ii. 498. 

Sonship (Eternal). See Generation. 

Soteriology, of the Gnostics, ii. 205; of 
the Ebionite, ii. 206 ; of the Apostolic 
Fathers, ii. 207-212 ; of the Primitive 
Fathers, ii. 212-226; of the Alexan- 
drine school, ii. 226-237; of the 
Greek Fathers, ii. 237-253; of Au- 
gustine, ii. 253-260; of the school- 


507 


men, li. 273-818; of Trent, ii. 319- 
332; of the Reformers, ii. 333-346 ; 
of Grotius, ii. 347-370; of the Armin- 
lans, li. 370-375; of Socinus, ii. 376- 
386. 

Sozomen, i. 358. 

Sprnoza, i. 95, 138, 227. 

Spirit (Holy), Nicene doctrine of, i. 


Sraprer, his theory of imputation, ii. 
163, sq. 

STILLINGFLEET, i. 57, 145, 

Stoicism, i. 61. 

Subordination, of the Son to the Father, 
i. 320. 

Substance, ambiguity of the term in the 
Latin trinitarianism, i. 8370. See Es- 
sence and Person. 

Supernatural, as related to the natural, 
i. 165. 

Supralapsarianism, ii. 192. 

Suso, i. 85; eschatology of, ii. 413, 417. 

SWEDENzEORG, ii. 403. 

Swirr (Jonathan), i. 201. 

Symbol, Athanasian, (Quicumque), i. 
71, 351, sq., ii. 439; Nicene, i. 314, 
li. 435; its relations to the Apostles’ 
Creed, ii. 485; Constantinopolitan, 
1, 359, li. 435; Apostles’, ii. 428 , not 
composed by the Apostles, ii. 450 ; 
importance of, ii. 483; relation of to 
the Nicene, ii. 436; Chalcedon, ii. 
438. 

Symbols, history of, i. 41; importance 
of the study of, ii. 423, 426. 

Synergism, ii. 40. 

Syvesius, i. 225; eschatology of, ii. 
404. 


ATIAN, i. 119, 127, 225. 
TAULER, i. 85. 

Tay or (Jeremy), his idea of freedom, 
li. 64, 

Terms (technical), use of, i. 362; trin- 
itarian, i. 363, sq. 

TERTULLIAN, i. 46, 67, 117, 122, 123, sq., 
148, 146, 174, 229, 282; trinitarianism 
of, i. 277, sq.; traducianism of, ii. 14, 
sq., 48, sq.; alleged materialism of, 
ii. 19; his synergism, ii. 46 ; defective 


K 


508 


soteriology of, ii. 267 ; chiliasm of, ii. 
892; eschatology of, ii. 401, 404, 408, 
413; his symbol, ii. 432. 

Tetratheism, i. 377. 

Theism (Greek), i. 55, 61, 64, 100. 

THEOpDORET, i. 358. 

Theodotians, i. 259, ii. 436. 

Tueopuitus of Antioch, i. 12. 

Thirty-Nine Articles, trinitariapism of, 
i. 882 ; origin of, ii. 478. 

Tuomasius, i. 294, 298, 302. 

Thomists and Scotists, controversy 
between, ii. 315, 349. 

Tigurinus, consensus, ii. 467. 

TrnpDAL, i. 199, 203, 215. 

ToLanD, i. 199. 

Toledo, synod of, i. 361. 

Torgau, articles of, ii. 446. 
Traducianism, definition of, ii, 13 ; pre- 
valence of, ii. 14 sq., 28, sq., 44, sq. 

Transubstantiation, ii. 451. 

Trent, council of, ii. 491 ; its ambiguous 
statements, ii. 140 ; detinition of orig- 
inal sin, ii. 141 ; of original righteous- 
ness, ii. 142; idea of creation, ii. 144; 
of apostasy, ii. 146; guiltlessness of 
original sin, ii. 147; relation of the 
flesh to the spirit, ii. 148; theory of 
regeneration, ii. 149 ; its soteriology, 
li. 321, sq. ; justification resolve dinto 
sanctification, ii. 322; denial of justi- 
fication by faith alone, 1i. 325 ; justi- 
fication is progressive and not in- 
stantaneous, li. 327; its mixture of 
human with the divine satisfaction, 
ii. 329, 345. 

Trinity, pagan, i. 248; Platonic, i. 243; 
Hindoo, i. 244; inadequate illustra- 
tions of, i. 276; finite analogue of, i- 
366, sq. 

Trrpuo, Justin Martyr’s dialogue with, 
ewes 

Turreting, his doctrine of imputation, 
ii. 159, sq. 

TWESTEN, i. 187, 166; his statement of 
the relation of the Person to the Es- 
sence, i. 345. 


LLMANN, i. 81, 497. 
Unigenitus (Bull). ii. 494. 
Unitariamism, i. 383; relation of to 


ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 


the ancient Anti-Trinitarianism, i, 
385. 

Unity of God, taught by pagan sages, 
i. 55, 56, 126; distinguished from 
singleness, i. 848, 

Usae|Er, ii. 106. 


ALENCE, council of, ii. 105. 
VALENTINUS, his (Gnostic) idea of 

justice, ii. 228. : 

Variata, edition of the Augsburg Con- 
fession, ii. 454, 

Vauenyn, i. 81. 

Victor (Hugo St.), soteriology of, ii. 
291. 

Vincent of Lerins, ii. 108. 

VoLrTaireE, i. 217. 

Von City, i. 85. 


\ ATERLAND, i. 246, 275, 276, 287, 
290, 303, 821, 338, 386 ; his view 
of Origen’s trinitarianism, i. 302; 
definition of Sonship, i. 321; of gen- 
eration by will, i. 325, of hypostatical 
character, i. 340 ; his distinction be- 
tween self-existence and necessary 
existence, i. 388. 

WEGSCHEIDER, i. 218. 

Wesss., soteriology of, ii. 324. 

Westminster Confession, origin of, ii. 
479: its distinction between justifi- 
cation and sanctification, ii, 322; 
trivitarianism of, 1. 382. 

WHEWELL, i. 1, 362. 

Wuitsy, ii. 26, 30. 

Wicuirr, 1. 87; 
333. 

WIGGERS, ii. 26, 51. 

Worrr, i. 95. 

Worpsworts (Christopher), i. 255, 
287 

Worpvswortu (William), i. 6. 

Wartemburg Confession, ii. 456. 


soteriology of, ii. 


UINGLE, ii. 153 ; anthropology of, 

ii. 174, sq. 460, sq.; sacramental 
theory of, ii. 461, sq.; his fidei ratio, 
ii. 459, sq., 467 ; his doctrine of pre- 
destination, ii. 468. 










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